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“Don’t just do something; stand there!” 
     -The White Rabbit 
 
 
 
 
“But if I never start, then I can always stop, for my eternal starting is my eternal 
stopping… It is always difficult for philosophy and philosophers to stop… The point 
is that I do not stop now but stopped where I began.” 
     -S. Kierkegaard 
 
 
 
 
 
“Philosophy hasn’t made any progress?—If someone scratches where it itches, do we 
have to see progress?”  
     -L. Wittgenstein 
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0 Introduction:  
0.0 Philosophy Does Not Begin nor Can It End:  
 
 
In many ways, Wittgenstein's reflections on the nature of philosophy, 
philosophical methodology, and the ends of philosophical investigation are among the 
most difficult and widely contested features of his thought. Indeed, the TLP, and its 
self-condemnation of nonsense, and the PI, and its insistence that philosophy cannot 
advance theses while seeming to advance many theses, are prima facie 
metaphilosophical absurdities. Thus, to take a representative and apt remark from an 
otherwise sympathetic philosopher, "Wittgenstein's work is full of very general 
remarks about what philosophy is, such as philosophy should propound no theses, or 
at least none that could be questioned. This is… the weakest part of his 
work….indeed, it seems to me that his actual practice belies them" (Dummett (1978), 
434).  
This dissertation aims to offer an apt, coherent, and consistent interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of philosophy (hereby, for ease of reference, 
"metaphilosophy"). By doing so, it seeks to show that Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophical reflections are not the weakest part of his work, one that his own 
practice belies, and so on. Instead, my overall objective is to show that Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophical thoughts are, if anything, one of the most impressive, innovative, 
and profound features of his thought. Specifically, I argue that for Wittgenstein, both 
earlier and later, philosophy is best understood as a practice or activity. Further, 
pursuant to this, I also argue that the inherent result of this practice (when it is 
successful) is clarity. As it were, “to philosophize” is akin to an accomplishment verb 
and the end-state that it results in is clear thinking or understanding.2 In turn, this 
implies that the philosophy is internally connected to clear thoughts or perspicuous 
understanding in the same way that construction of a house (when it is successful) is 
internally connected to a house. As it were, philosophy simply is the process whereby 
one comes to have clear thoughts or a perspicuous understanding.  
Indeed, if this rather simple shift in emphasis from philosophy as a discipline 
to philosophy as a process (that may go on in a certain department in a university), is 
                                                 
2 cf. Vendler (1957) for the original discussion of “accomplishment verbs” 
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correct, then the way that much metaphilosophical inquiry is conducted may be 
deeply problematic. Specifically, much as Duhem (1991)'s brilliant work, The Aim 
and Structure of Scientific Theory, on scientific inquiry begins with an assessment of 
the aims of scientific theory, the structures that best accord with these aims, and the 
methods that most fruitfully realize these aims, so too does metaphilosophical inquiry 
into the nature of philosophy  (e.g. Williamson (2008), ix-x, 1; Overgaard, Gilbert and 
Burwood (2013), 1-16, for accounts that rely, implicitly or explicitly, on such a 
conception). One begins by examining the metaphilosophical goals philosophy has- 
e.g. obtaining objective theoretical knowledge- one then works out a structure that 
keeps the game running smoothly- e.g., a particular style of writing, a set list of 
canonical problems, schools, -isms, etc.- and a method- e.g., modal logic- to best 
realize this objective. Notice that such a view tends to judge philosophy not in terms 
of the inherent results the process but in terms of its ability to secure an external 
element like theoretical knowledge of, e.g., the truth predicate. In other words, 
philosophy is best understood in terms of something that is independent of, and 
external to, the philosophical process itself.   
In contradistinction, if my thesis can be defended and elaborated properly, 
then the philosophical activity or investigations and clarity or understanding are 
internally related. Again, learning to do philosophy well is learning how to think 
clearly or understand perspicuously. If this is so, for Wittgenstein, philosophy does 
not begin when we stumble on an interesting puzzle or decide on some external goal, 
and then develop methods that accord with disciplinary standards, to solve it. Nor yet 
did philosophy begin when a mad bricklayer began accosting his social betters in the 
marketplace and demanding that they explain themselves in a way that shoemakers 
and mathematicians do. Rather, it “began” when speech and discourse began, when 
we became recognizably human beings, a political animal that needs to figure out 
how to live with others by making sense of each other and ourselves in a clear or 
understandable way.3 In other words, philosophy does not "begin" at all at a point in 
                                                 
3 The reader must forgive my euro-centrism here but, at least in the west, it seems to me that one 
cannot read either Book 24 of Homer's Iliad or the Book of Job, the earliest texts of Greek and Jewish 
culture, respectively, without recognizing deeply philosophical themes and moments. Socrates does it 
better in that he, like Wittgenstein, offers a method. However, the idea that we can "grow out" of our 
"endless adolescence" and learn to stop asking certain questions- i.e., Why is life so short? Why do 
good people suffer so much? Why do we die? Why do we live? Why Being at all?- is truly post-human 
in a horrifying sense. Suffice it to say, as chapter eight discusses further, these are not the "canonical 
questions" handed down to us by our noble tradition. However, I argue, Wittgenstein follows the mad 
bricklayer in his sarcastic rejection of pre-Socratic philosophy, which is to say, philosophy as a 
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time separate from language, understanding, thought, and so on. Instead, philosophy 
is ‘internally' related to thought and understanding in such a way that clarifying one is 
doing the other well. 
Furthermore, pursuant to this, a metaphilosophy that sees the philosophical 
activity or investigation and clarity as being internally related begins making sense of 
the odd way Wittgenstein uses both “philosophy” and “clarity.” Specifically, and as 
discussed at length latter, Wittgenstein’s conception of “clarity” is odd in that it is 
decidedly unclear what he has in mind. Indeed, if clarity is his metaphilosophical aim, 
something external to the philosophical activity, then he has left us rather in the dark 
what he is after. By contrast, if “clarity” simply is an internal feature of philosophy 
i.e., a conceptual correlate of the philosophical activity or philosophical 
investigations, this worry is obviated. Philosophizing does not so ‘aim’ at some 
external ‘thing’ called ‘clarity.’ Rather, philosophizing (when it succeeds) just 
produces clear thoughts or perspicuous understanding as an inherent result and end-
state of the verb. Further, pursuant to this, “philosophy” itself comes to have two 
possible uses that nicely explicate Wittgenstein’s rather Janus-faced use of 
“philosophy” as both a deleterious cause of confusion and as the only way to avoid 
confusion (cf. TLP 3.324 & TLP 4.112; PI § 111 & PI § 133). On the one hand, the 
sort of “philosophy” Wittgenstein praises, is precisely the process whose inherent 
results are clear thoughts or perspicuous understandings. Indeed, this explains why 
Wittgenstein is so insistent that philosophy produces no knowledge (cf. TLP 4.111) 
and should not put forward theses (cf. PI § 128). Philosophy is an activity, or method, 
and is, ‘in itself,’ barren in exactly Socrates’s sense. As it were, it is a midwife that 
helps to birth other people’, discipline’s, etc., thoughts. On the other hand, the sort of 
“philosophy” Wittgenstein denigrates, call it ‘robust philosophy,’ is both confused 
and causes confusion. It is confused in that it believes that the activity of philosophy 
is best understood in terms of some goal that has “nothing to do with philosophy” 
(TLP 6.53), e.g., knowledge, theories, and so on. It confuses because, in this quixotic 
quest, to reach these goals, robust philosophy ends up making claims that simply do 
not function properly, and leads itself into ever-murkier water.    
In sum, I argue in this dissertation that Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy proffers 
an account of philosophy that emphasizes the process, and the inherent end-result of 
                                                                                                                                           
research program (cf. Popper (1958) for this view of the pre-Socratic philosophy. cf. Lakatos (1980), 
for what I mean by “research program”). 
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the process, clarity. In other words, what Wittgenstein tries to teach us are not 
particular facts, theses, dogmas, etc., but a method (or set of them) that can engender 
clear thinking. Further, if this is so, then in a deeply important sense, Wittgenstein 
attempts to salvage Socrates’s insight that philosophy is dialogical and that it does not 
‘aim’ at anything but coming to think clearly or understand perspicuously what we are 
saying or doing. In sum, and to tease the reader with a quote we return to in the end, 
"I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when I said: really one 
should write philosophy only as one writes a poem" (CV p. 28). The “as” here is best 
read not in terms of style but in terms of practice. One does not write poetry for any 
sort of external goal and, similarly, one does not do philosophy for to reach an 
external goal. 
To support this thesis, this dissertation divides into two parts. Part I examines 
four fairly popular attempts to read Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical remarks in an 
‘robust’ manner- i.e., to read Wittgenstein as though he adduces a set and external 
metaphilosophical goal and produces a method to achieve it. I begin with alternative 
interpretations for two related reasons. First, Wittgenstein’s remarks are often so 
gnomic or truncated that properly making sense of them, and their argumentative 
structure and point, demands interpretation. Indeed, as a famed quip has it, there are 
as many interpretations of what Wittgenstein is up to as there are readers of 
Wittgenstein. By beginning with some salient subset these interpretations4, I can make 
sense of both how people have tried to read Wittgenstein as well as the insights and 
errors these readings cause. Indeed, such a method, surely allows me to read 
Wittgenstein’s work in a far more nuanced way than I otherwise would. Second, as 
Aristotle says (e.g., Topics 100b21), one should begin with the opinions of the wise 
before one proceeds on to one’s own account. I take this Aristotelian attitude to be 
laudatory and seek to emulate it. 
 My goal in Part I is two-fold. One, I aim to show that such an ‘robust’ 
interpretations are not viable. Specifically, I argue that the four interpretations I 
consider of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy in terns of an external metaphilosophical 
goal and a set method to reach it, face insuperable problems- ranging from exegetical 
tensions to metaphilosophical incoherencies. Two, I attempt, for each position, to 
salvage the valuable insights these interpretations have. Indeed, if my account of 
                                                 
4 Even here, I am well aware of excluding many readings that are interesting, viable, and so on. One 
does what one can.  
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Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy proves to be viable, such recognition and an attempt to 
redeploy features of other interpretations, other ways of understanding, is of 
paramount importance to doing philosophy well (cf. Z § 460). 
Part II elaborates an interpretation of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy that 
views philosophy as a process. Specifically, I begin from the nearly undeniable 
premise that, for Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation is always sui generis and 
cannot be made into, e.g., a of scientific research. However, I further argue that this 
difference, far from leading Wittgenstein to disparage philosophical investigations as 
worthless, empty of value, nonsense, and so on, causes Wittgenstein to put forward a 
compelling defense of philosophy against the onslaught of positivism and a culture of 
scientism. In effect, I argue that Wittgenstein aims to defend the idea that not all 
abstract reflection can or should cash out as pragmatic theory construction, true 
propositions, set goals and apt means, and so on. As it were, thinking clearly and 
understanding perspicuously, though perhaps not as high minded as building theories 
and obtaining knowledge, as still critical and the philosophical activity is critical for 
engendering them.  
 
0.1 Chapter-by-Chapter Guide: 
 
Chapter one examines the therapeutic account of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. By "therapeutic account" I have in mind any account that ascribes to 
Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of alleviating or excising philosophy by 
addressing underlying disquiets, nonsense, and so on, that engenders it. I examine six 
prevalent positions grouped along two parameters. These are: the texts that the 
interpreters focus on- specifically TLP-focused, mixed, PI-focused; the target of the 
philosophical therapy the interpretation imputes to Wittgenstein- pure, which sees all 
philosophy as stemming from a form of personal psychic abnormality, and moderate, 
which sees philosophy as being generated by a myriad of complex factors that may 
not reduce to the individual. I argue that each position is unworkable for various 
reasons. I then argue that the therapeutic account, on the whole, is unworkable as it is 
unable to align Wittgenstein's supposedly philosophical-as-therapeutic method with 
his assumed metaphilosophical goal. In other words, there just is no way for a rational 
and argumentative philosophical methodology to address the irrational disquiets or 
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nonsense that engender philosophy. Succinctly, if philosophy is nonsense, then so are 
Wittgenstein's replies to it. 
Chapter two examines an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. This account also ascribes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical 
goal of removing philosophy. However, antiphilosophy denies that Wittgenstein's 
method is appropriately thought of as "philosophical," i.e., learnable, principled, 
rational, etc., at all. Instead, it casts Wittgenstein as a rhetorician (or sophist) who uses 
clever wordplay to convince us that "philosophy" should be abandoned. Pursuant to 
this, Wittgenstein's "method" need not be coherent, philosophical, logical, and so on- 
it merely needs to do the job, by hook or by crook. To buttress such an odd account, I 
also examine how one might attempt to make sense of the difference between 
philosophy and rhetoric/sophistry. I then argue that this antiphilosophical account 
cannot be sustained as an interpretation of Wittgenstein for many reasons.  
Chapter three examines an anti-theoretical interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. Again, this account ascribes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical 
goal of removing philosophy. However, the anti-theoretical account denies that this is 
because philosophy is engendered by nonsensical ‘claims,' psychic disquiets, 
dangerous rhetoric, and so on. Instead, the anti-theoretical account imputes to 
Wittgenstein the view that philosophy cannot ‘deliver the goods’ it has promised us. 
More specifically, philosophy is incapable, for various reasons examined further, of 
obtaining objective theoretical knowledge of the topics it investigates. In turn, and 
granting that the goal of philosophy is such knowledge, to continue plugging along 
after one realizes that it cannot return the desired results is irrational. Pursuant to this, 
the anti-theoretical account ascribes to Wittgenstein a philosophical methodology that 
has two related components. One, Wittgenstein makes the trivial and common sense 
assumption that natural science has the best claim to have gained objective theoretical 
knowledge about the phenomena it studies. Two, Wittgenstein adduces several trivial 
differences between philosophical investigation and scientific research that should 
make us deeply skeptical that the former can gain objective theoretical knowledge. I 
close by arguing that the anti-theoretical account tries to ascribe to Wittgenstein two 
distinct endgames that grow out of this realization and that both endgames fail.  
Chapter four discusses the grammatical account of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. Unlike the other three accounts, this account ascribes to Wittgenstein 
a positive metaphilosophical goal in addition to his negative goal of removing, 
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alleviating, and so on, the sort of nonsense that academic philosophy may engender. 
To wit, it imputes to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of discerning and 
displaying the normative interdependencies that obtain within our conceptual-
linguistic schemes and are underwritten by constitutive rules and, ultimately, 
normative practices. Pursuant to this, it imputes to Wittgenstein a descriptive 
methodology that is, at base, an incredibly sophisticated form of connective analysis- 
i.e., a way of systematically exploring the connections that the nodes within our 
conceptual schema have with one another (cf. Strawson (1993), 17-29). Further, as 
we, shall see, such an account, unlike the former three, is sensitive to the distinction 
between this sort of proper philosophy-as-connective-analysis and the problematic 
academic sort. I then argue that the grammatical account is unable to articulate how, 
exactly, one describes normative features of grammar in such a way that the 
descriptions are still normative. 
Chapter five begins to develop an alternative account of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. It focuses on the earlier Wittgenstein and the metaphilosophical 
points of the TLP- specifically, TLP 4.11-4.116. I argue that, for earlier Wittgenstein, 
the philosophical activity is clarifying thoughts and, further, that without philosophy, 
cloudy and indistinct (cf. TLP 4.112). I examine how this clarification works at some 
length. I close by arguing that such a metaphilosophy does emphasize the 
philosophical process and reflect on how this affects other aspects of earlier 
Wittgenstein’s thought.  
Chapter six discusses later Wittgenstein's attack, on a central set of 
preconceptions at work in the TLP in, i.e., PI § 89- §108. Specifically, I argue that 
later Wittgenstein both attacks the TLP's philosophy of logic, and the way it 
underwrites the clarificatory activity of philosophy that the TLP puts forward. 
Pursuant to this, I also discuss later Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic. Specifically, I 
argue that later Wittgenstein reconceives of the nature of representation along far 
more pragmatic lines.5 I further argue that this reconception has substantial 
implications for the relationship between logic and language.  
Chapter seven turns to later Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology. This 
emerges from and continues to investigate Wittgenstein's pragmatic account of 
representation. Specifically, I focus on the descriptive methodology Wittgenstein 
                                                 
5 I have in mind an account of representation similar to, e.g., Giere (1999).  
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utilizes in the PI. I argue that, later for Wittgenstein, the key features he aims to 
describe are the frameworks for descriptions we rely on (roughly, the terms or 
parameters by which we describe some phenomenon or other). I also argue that his 
descriptive methodology is indirect in that it does not so much describe frameworks 
for description as exhibit them in “models” or “objects of comparison” (PI § 130). 
Finally, I argue that this insistence on description is, far from being a crippling 
metaphilosophical stricture, a simple acknowledgment that first things come first. 
Specifically, I argue that both explanation and interpretation assume the adequacy of a 
prior description and that Wittgenstein's focus is elaborating what "adequacy" means.  
Finally, chapter eight examines what I take to be later Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophical remarks proper, i.e., PI § 109-133. I briefly remind the reader of 
some themes discussed in chapter five- precisely how the TLP conceives of meaning. 
Next, I discuss later Wittgenstein's assault on the TLP’s view of meaning as well as 
later Wittgenstein's reimagining of meaning as use. From there, I examine in some 
detail the links between use and understanding. Next, I discuss how understanding 
and philosophy, for later Wittgenstein, relate. Specifically, I argue that, for later 
Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation is the process by which we restore 
understanding after a breakdown has occurred. I further argue that the sorts of 
breakdowns in understanding that Wittgenstein has in mind are not primarily 
generated by robust philosophy. Instead, they are simply consequences of how human 
beings are and the sorts of things they do. Finally, I close by briefly reflecting on what 
sort of “peace” Wittgenstein sought for philosophy as well as how philosophical the 
philosophical activity, and the resultant clarity, can dissolve philosophical problems. 
  If my argument for a metaphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein that stresses 
the philosophical process proves to be apt, then my thesis is well supported. To 
remind the reader, my thesis is that the philosophical activity or philosophical 
investigation has the inherent result of clear thoughts or perspicuous understanding. 
As it were, philosophy is Socratic- a way of learning to think or understand more 
clearly.  
 
0.2 Dialectics of the Dissertation- Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic and Clarifying 
Accounts: 
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With my thesis in view- i.e., that the philosophy processes (when they 
succeed) has the inherent result of clarity- and the layout of the chapters in view, I 
now want to outline the overall dialectical interrelationships between the eight 
chapters that compose the two parts of this work.  
To begin, let us examine how the first four chapters that make up part one 
interrelate. Chapter one aims to demonstrate that the attempt to ascribe to 
Wittgenstein an argumentative and philosophical method to address the irrational and 
non-philosophical causes of philosophy cannot align properly. Succulently, if 
philosophy is nonsense, then so too are Wittgenstein’s replies to it. Chapter two 
considers one way of removing this tension. Specifically, it proffers a reading of 
Wittgenstein that rejects the thought that he has a principled and philosophy method. 
As it were, he does reply to nonsense with nonsense or, better put, to one kind of 
rhetoric with a different kind of rhetoric. Chapter three considers the other way of 
removing the tension. Specifically, it proffers a reading of Wittgenstein that accepts 
that philosophy’s semantics are in good working order. It then imputes to him a view 
that Wittgenstein aims to demonstrate not that philosophy is nonsense, but that it 
cannot fulfill its promise. Finally, chapter four closes by considering an interpretation 
that is distinct from the above dialectic in that it ascribes to Wittgenstein a positive 
metaphilosophical goal. To wit, it imputes to Wittgenstein the goal of conceptual 
cartography.  
 For each chapter in Part I, I argue that there are insuperable difficulties, 
ranging from willful exegetical distortions to metaphilosophical incoherencies. The 
upshot of this progression is that such failures, across several fairly independent 
interpretations of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy, should make us wary of viewing 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as proffering an extrinsic view of philosophy- i.e., as 
best viewed in terms of set goals and specific methods. 
  Part II begins elaborating a metaphilosophical view of Wittgenstein that 
stresses the philosophical process. In other words, it argues that, for Wittgenstein, 
philosophy is not akin to scientific research in that whereas the later has set goals and 
specific methods, the former does not. Instead, philosophy is a conceptual correlate of 
clear thinking or understanding in such a way that thinking clearly or understanding 
perspicuously just is learning to carry out the philosophical activity or investigation. 
Chapter five begins with the TLP. I begin here because, as later Wittgenstein 
notes, the PI can only be seen "in the right light only by contrast with and against the 
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background of my older way of thinking" (PI preface p. 4). I focus on TLP 4.11-4.116 
and argue that, for the TLP, philosophy and clarity are internally related in such a way 
that doing proper philosophy simply results in clear thinking. I also flag various 
assumptions and preconceptions that the TLP relies on to establish this connection 
between thought and language. Chapter six begins to examine why later Wittgenstein 
repudiated many of the TLP’s assumptions and preconceptions. Specifically, it 
focuses on his reject of the TLP’s constitutive conception of logic in PI § 83- §108. It 
argues both that Wittgenstein’ rejects this constitutive conception and that this 
problematizes the way the TLP’s philosophical process. It further argues that, in the 
PI, Wittgenstein has a far more pragmatic conception of how representation or 
description works. Chapter seven develops the pragmatic account of description 
further. It focuses, specifically, on the role of description as a methodological feature 
of philosophical investigation as well as why this role is of such paramount 
importance for later Wittgenstein. Finally, chapter eight relies on insights from 
chapter six and seven to proffer an interpretation of the most explicit 
metaphilosophical remarks in the PI- i.e., PI § 109- §133. I argue that, though the 
philosophical activity of the TLP is recast and modified as philosophical 
investigations for the PI, the idea that the philosophical activity (when it succeeds) 
results in clarity is unchanged. Specifically, I discuss how, for later Wittgenstein, 
philosophical investigations are internally related to understanding in the same way 
that the TLP related thought in clarity. I briefly explore some implications. 
Thus, the aim of Part II is showing that Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is best 
viewed in terms of process. For Wittgenstein, to reiterate, “to philosophize” is 
conceptually akin to an accomplishment verb and the inherent end-state of the verb is 
clarity. I the close with a conclusion that briefly considers the implications of such a 
view for Wittgenstein scholarship, broader philosophy, and the role that philosophy 
can and should play in the intellectual world.  
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Part I  
 
 
 
 
“How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world? 
Through the life of knowledge” NB p. 81e 
 
 
 
“The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in” 
    Z § 16 
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1 Therapeutic Metaphilosophy: 
 
 This chapter discusses several interrelated interpretations of Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophy in terms of therapy. The characteristic feature that these 
interpretations share is that they all ascribe to Wittgenstein the same 
metaphilosophical goal. To wit, each account assumes that Wittgenstein aims to cure, 
or at least alleviate, the intellectual “disquiet” (e.g., PI § 111), “torment” (e.g. PI § 
133), “cramps” (e.g. BlBK p. 1), etc., that are betoken philosophical problems. 
However, each interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a different methodology to 
achieve this goal. Indeed, this heterogeneity is to be expected as there “is not a single 
philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it 
were” (PI § 133). Further, it is critical that each interpretation, despite their overall 
agreement on the metaphilosophical goal, be considered on its own terms as each is 
unique exegetically, philosophically and metaphilosophically. 
 In this chapter, I argue that each interpretation of therapy I consider, as well as 
the overall philosophical-therapeutic program, suffers from a grave problem. To wit, 
it is opaque, for each and all, how a therapeutic interpretation can adequately align 
Wittgenstein philosophical methodology with his therapeutic goal. To begin, I offer a 
rough taxonomy of several popular therapeutic interpretations in section 1.1. In 
section 1.2 a, c, e, g, i, I develop each interpretation individually and on its own terms. 
In sections 2 b, d, f, h, j, I offer criticisms of each of these individual interpretations. 
In section 3, I pull back and note three common features all of the interpretations 
share as well as problems with each feature. Finally, I close by arguing that the aim of 
alleviating mental cramps and the ascription to Wittgenstein of an undeniably 
philosophical methodology engenders a profound tension that the therapeutic 
interpretation cannot resolve. In turn, this sets the stage for chapter two as 
antiphilosophy rejects the ascription of anything “philosophical” to Wittgenstein.  
 
1.0 A Partial Taxonomy: 
 
This section proffers a partial taxonomy of several popular therapeutic 
interpretations of Wittgenstein. To reiterate, however, each therapeutic interpretation 
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of Wittgenstein agrees that Wittgenstein’s overall metaphilosophical goal is 
alleviating cramps or disquiets that betoken philosophical problems. First, I lay out 
why such a taxonomic approach is necessary. Second, I offer some criteria to organize 
the various interpretations into a coherent structure. Finally, I offer a taxonomy 
guided by these criteria that places the interpretations into this structure. I note here 
that this taxonomy is not exhaustive.6 However, I focus on interpretations that are 
both most clearly therapeutic and influential in Wittgenstein scholarship.   
To begin, there is considerable variation within therapeutic interpretations of 
Wittgenstein. This is for several reasons. First, the various therapeutic interpretations 
often present themselves in rather negative and oppositional terms rather than positive 
and programmatic ones. Indeed, a therapeutic reading "is a kind of constraint on a 
reading, rather than a reading" (Conanat and Diamond (2004), 78). However, such 
constraints leave open a wide field of possible readings. Second, there is considerable 
disagreement between therapeutic interpretations about how to understand 
Wittgenstein’s diachronic development. Indeed, both ‘how many Wittgenstein(s)?’ 
and ‘which Wittgenstein(s) are therapist(s)?’ are answered differently by different 
interpretations. Pursuant to this, third, there is considerable disagreement about what 
elements of the Nachlass accurately reflect Wittgenstein’s philosophy. For example, 
Baker (2006) continues the Baker & Hacker tradition of drawing extensively from the 
Nachlass whereas Cavell (1979), 3, explicitly rejects such an approach. Finally, and 
most critically, fourth, there is the question of what a proper therapeutic methodology 
actually entails. For example, Mulhall (2007) views the link with Freud and 
psychoanalysis to be key whereas Kuusela (2008) does not.  
In turn, granting these divergences between interpretations, a clear taxonomy 
is needed for three reasons. First, the force and nature of an objection will change 
from interpretation to interpretation. For example, a passage from the Nachlass may 
problematize a point Baker makes but will leave Cavell untouched. Second, if the 
therapeutic-philosophical methodology varies between interpretations, clearly keeping 
them apart is critical. For example, emphasizing or ignoring psychoanalysis 
drastically alters what sort of method Wittgenstein is thought to utilize to address 
disquiet. Third, without a clear taxonomy of various interpretations, one runs the risk 
                                                 
6 For example, I do not discuss Stern (2004), e.g., 40-55, and a “Pyrrhonian" interpretation not because 
I do not find such an interpretation interesting but because it tends to read the role of philosophy in a 
somewhat different way than the interpretations I examine. 
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of equivocating between them. In turn, this means that a rational reconstruction of an 
interpretation or a criticism of it may miss the mark.  
 To avoid these worries, I offer a taxonomy of readings that relies on two 
criteria to organize the various therapeutics interpretations. The first criterion focuses 
on what parts of Wittgenstein’s writings should count as philosophical works. This 
criterion offers three categories for Wittgenstein’s writings. These are TLP focused, 
mixed, and PI focused. I note that the mixed position tends to view Wittgenstein’s 
Nachlass as a “hypertext” in Stern (1994)’s sense. The other criterion focuses on the 
origin and status of philosophical problems. This criterion offers two categories. 
These are pure therapy and moderate therapy. Pure therapists see philosophical 
problems and confusions as always betokening some preventable and deleterious 
mistake. In effect, philosophy is always the product of some wrong turn that we could 
have avoided. Also, pure therapy sees the cause of this error in overtly psychological 
terms and caused by the individual herself. By contrast, the moderate view of therapy 
sees philosophy as inexorably linked to some feature that cannot either be reduced to 
the individual or her will-to-confusion. Various sub-types of moderate therapy 
emphasize different features that are responsible for philosophy, as we will see. 
However, what is critical is that the confusions that engender philosophy cannot 
simply be cashed out as mistakes due to psychological abnormality.  
Thus, there are six possible positions. For each, there are specific philosophers 
whose interpretations fall into it as well as specific philosophical-cum-therapeutic 
methodologies it ascribes to Wittgenstein. See figure 1. 
 
Type of Therapy: Textual Basis: Philosopher(s): Method: 
Pure TLP Conant & Diamond Elucidatory 
Moderate TLP Zemach et. al. Functional 
Pure Mixed Baker Psychoanalytic 
Moderate Mixed Kuusela Comparative 
Pure PI Mulhall Transference 
Moderate PI Cavell Genetic 
       Figure 1.  
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1.1 Filling in the Taxonomy and Criticisms: 
 
 In the last section, I offered a clear taxonomy of various therapeutic 
interpretations of Wittgenstein as well as the specific thinkers I engage with who fall 
into each category. This section proffers a rational reconstruction of each of the six 
therapeutic interpretations in sections 1.2a, c, e, g, i, k. For each, first, I lay out the 
preconditions and assumptions the methodology rests on. Second, I then examine the 
nuts-and-bolts of the methodology. Third, I discuss how it links to Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophical goal of alleviating philosophical craps. After each reconstruction, I 
offer specific criticism of the interpretation in section 1.2b, d, f, h, j, l. I note here that 
these criticisms range from specific exegetical points to metaphilosophical ones. 
 
1.1.a Pure Therapy- TLP: 
  
To begin, the Pure Therapy-TLP interpretation of Wittgenstein is perhaps the 
most developed, systematic, and programmatic of the therapeutic interpretations. 
Though many philosophers have contributed to refining and developing this 
interpretation, I focus on two in particular.7 These are Conant and Diamond. I focus 
on these philosophers for two reasons. First they offered the first interpretation along 
these lines and so are touchstones for all subsequent elaborations. Second, they are 
deeply interested in nailing down the basic requirements of such an interpretation. 
Granting this focus, pure therapy-TLP ascribes to Wittgenstein an elucidatory 
methodology. In effect, this elucidatory methodology assumes that the TLP is made 
up of two distinct kinds of points. These are frame-propositions, e.g., methodological 
notes about how to elucidate metaphysical-ly sounding8 nonsense “claims," and faux-
propositions, e.g. metaphysical-ly sounding nonsense “claims” that we are meant to 
elucidate and expose as nonsense (e.g., Conant (2000), 100 fn 102; Diamond (1995), 
19). In turn, by learning how to expose the faux status of faux-propositions, 
Wittgenstein achieves his metaphilosophical goal by teaching us how to “see through” 
metaphysical-ly sounding nonsense that we are tempted by for psychological reasons 
and so alleviate the intellectual cramps such nonsense engenders. First, I examine the 
                                                 
7 E.g., Goldfarb (2012), Ricketts (1996), Read & Hutchison (2000), and so on.  
8 It is a very interesting question what exactly distinguishes “x-ly sounding” nonsense from “y-ly sounding” 
nonsense as, prima facie, Dadaist poetry and Hegel are rather different. This question will occur at several points 
in the chapter.  
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conception of “nonsense” that underwrites this elucidatory methodology. Second, I 
examine how the elucidatory methodology works. Finally, third, I proffer an account 
of how this elucidatory methodology does, in fact, achieve Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophical goal.  
To begin, a critical feature of pure therapy-TLP is its conception of 
“nonsense”- both metaphilosophically and exegetically. Metaphilosophically, pure 
therapy-TLP maintains that philosophical “problems” are always a consequence of 
being taken in by nonsense. Indeed, “[w]hen we attempt to formulate these 
[philosophical] problems [they] are to be recognized as Unsinn” (Conant (2000), 
197). Thus, the real source of philosophical “problems” is our psychological tendency 
to confuse nonsense with senseful points. Exegetically, pure therapy-TLP insists that 
any viable reading of the TLP must meet two conditions. First, “that it [the 
interpretation of the TLP] does not take those propositions of the Tractatus about 
which Wittgenstein said, at 6.54, that they are to be recognized as ‘nonsensical’ to 
convey ineffable insight. The second feature is a rejection of the idea that what such a 
recognition requires on the part of a reading of the Tractatus is the application of a 
theory of meaning that has been advanced in the body of the work” (Conant and 
Diamond (2004), 47). Thus, pure therapy-TLP must not "chicken out" and should 
realize that most of the points of the TLP as nonsensical (e.g., Diamond (1995), 194). 
In short, nonsense both causes philosophical “problems” and nonsense is key to 
reading the TLP correctly. However, we have yet to discuss either what nonsense is or 
how it comes about. Let us turn to this.  
As to what nonsense is, pure therapy-TLP insists that all “nonsense” is “real 
nonsense, plain nonsense, which we are not in the end to think of as corresponding to 
an ineffable truth” (Diamond (1995), 181). This is because pure therapy-TLP insists 
that a string is nonsensical iff  “some determination of meaning has not been made” 
(ibid 106). Pursuant to this, such a nonsense string does not express semantic content, 
cannot enter into deductive and inferential relations, is not propositionally structured, 
and, most critically, is, from a logical point of view, identical to any other nonsense 
string (e.g., Conant (1991), 342-54). Indeed, a string like “The world is all that is the 
case” (TLP 1) and a string like “piggly wiggle tiggle” (Diamond (2000), 151) are both 
nonsense in the same way in that both lack a meaning determination. Granting this, 
we turn to how nonsense comes about. Unsurprisingly, all nonsense comes about in 
the same way and is due to a string that “contains a word to which, in its use…, no 
 19  
meaning has been given” (Daimond (1995), 197). Indeed, “[h]is [Wittgenstein’s] 
point is that we don’t know how to render the sentence ‘Socrates is identical’ into the 
symbolism because, as it stands, we don’t know what sentence (if any) it is… [but] 
we can simply stipulate something adjectival for the word ‘identical’ to mean here” 
(Conant (1989), 259). Thus, the sole factor responsible for all nonsense is the failure 
to assign meanings to our terms and all nonsense arises from this failure. Let us call 
this conception of nonsense “monistic” in that there is only one factor responsible for 
nonsense and, relatedly, only one kind of nonsense, from a logical point of view.  
However, this may strike us as counter-intuitive. Consider “Caesar is a prime 
number” and “piggly wiggle tiggle.” These strings seem very different from each 
other. Indeed, a reader may insist that the former betokens a category mistake in that 
“Caesar” refers to a general and  “____ is a prime number” is satisfied by natural 
numbers. Pursuant to this, the Caesar string is nonsense not due to meaning privation 
but due to the “clash” of trying to force the open sentence to accept an object of a 
different logical type. On this reading, “Caesar” has certain internal logico-syntactic 
features that allow it to concatenate with some open sentences (e.g. “___ is merciful”) 
and not others (e.g. “____is a color”). In turn, this undermines monistic nonsense.  
The pure therapy-TLP reading answers this objection by insisting on a 
radicalized version of the context principle. Specifically, the above paragraph 
assumed that “Caesar” or “___ is a prime number” can each be correctly assigned a 
meaning independently of the context of the total proposition and “such a mistake is 
one’s tendency to think one already knows what ‘Vienna’ [or ‘Caesar’] means taken 
all by itself and outside the context of a propositions” (Conant (2002), 399). However, 
“when we ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, we unwittingly end up looking 
for the meaning in what Frege wants to teach us to recognize as the realm of the 
psychological” (ibid). For example, assume that “Caesar” has the logico-syntactic 
properties of a proper name independently of a proposition. Granting this, is 
"Napoleon is no Caesar" still fair employment? If it is, then it seems as though the 
logico-syntactic internal properties of Caesar are not those of a proper name. If it is 
not, then we must maintain that "Napoleon is no Caesar" is nonsense, despite 
appearances. In either case, something has gone awry. 
With this conception of monistic nonsense in view, we can examine how it 
links to the elucidatory methodology that pure therapy-TLP ascribes to Wittgenstein. 
The central, and most critical, quote that for the interpretation is TLP 6.54: 
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“My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he as used 
them… to climb up beyond them” 
 
To begin, pure therapy-TLP insists that the “nonsense” Wittgenstein indicates is 
monistic. In other words, the points in the TLP that Wittgenstein refers to here are 
not, from a logical point of view, distinct from “la lu le.” Clearly, this interpretation 
has radical implications. Chief among them is that it dissolves many of the supposed 
“riddles” and exegetical “puzzles” that the TLP supposedly “sets up.” For example, 
the picture theory of meaning, the saying/showing distinction, logical atomism, etc., 
are all monistic nonsense and so, quite literally, cannot be interpreted in any way (e.g. 
Diamond (1995), 179-204; Conant (1989)). Indeed, these “thoughts” are more akin to 
Finnegans Wake than philosophy. However, this seems to leave the pure therapists in 
a bind. If all the points of the TLP are monistic nonsense, how can they claim that 
there is any sort of philosophical methodology at work in the TLP at all? Indeed, how 
can they even claim to read with understanding the TLP it in the first place? 
To resolve this, we must "notice that what Wittgenstein says in 6.54 is not: ‘all 
of my sentences are nonsensical’ (thus giving rise to the self-defeating problematic 
Geach has nicely dubbed Ludwig’s self-mate). Section 6.54 characterizes the way in 
which those propositions which serve as elucidations elucidates… which sentences 
are (to be recognized as) nonsensical? Answer: those that elucidate” (Conant (2002), 
457 fn 135). Notice that this quote, somewhat implicitly, brings into play a distinction 
between the kinds of points in the TLP. On the one hand, there are faux-propositions 
that we are meant to elucidate. In other words, we are meant to expose that a faux-
proposition like “[a] sign is what can be perceived of a symbol" (TLP 3.32) is, in fact, 
faux. The point fails to have a proper meaning assignment and so does not express 
semantic content, is not a proposition, and so on. However, critically, on the other 
hand there are frame-propositions. These are “instructions concerning the nature of 
the elucidatory aim and method of the work” (Conant (2002), 457 fn 135). In other 
words, a frame-proposition, like TLP 6.54, the preface, etc., are meant as instructions 
or methodological notes that help the reader understand Wittgenstein’s elucidatory 
methodology as he applies it. Indeed, “it [the TLP] is not a textbook” (TLP preface 
1), exactly because it is a work or exercise book, and “[p]hilosophy is not a body of 
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doctrine but an activity” (TLP 4.112), namely, the activity of exposing the faux status 
of faux-propositions.  
In turn, the elucidation of faux-propositions by relying on the instructions 
Wittgenstein offers in the frame-propositions is Wittgenstein’s methodology, 
according to pure therapy-TLP. In other words, we use the method the frame-
propositions put forward to expose the faux status of faux-propositions in the TLP. 
Indeed, “Wittgenstein’s aim in the Tractatus is to lead philosophers from original 
‘disguised’ piece of nonsense [i.e., faux-propositions] … through this network of 
(apparent) logical relations to some more patently nonsensical (pseudo-) 
consequences” (Conant (1991),  346). Thus, in a rather interesting sense 
 
“[t]he only correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to 
say nothing… and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something 
metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to 
certain signs in his propositions” (TLP 6.53) 
  
is carried out. In effect, Wittgenstein writes the faux-propositions that he assumes a 
metaphysician wants to say and then he elucidates them in such a way that its faux 
status is exposed and we see them as univocal nonsense. Notice, critically, that this 
method rests on an “attempt to enter into the philosopher’s illusion of understanding 
and explode it from within” (Conant (1991), 346). To enter into the illusion, we must 
have an “imaginative identification with the utterer of nonsense… [and then] we are 
able to go on successfully on our own and correctly anticipate the (apparent) logical 
relations that he will imagine obtain between the nonsensical string in question and 
other (pseudo-)propositions” (ibid). To explode it from within, Wittgenstein forces us 
to realize that “no assignment of meaning to it [a faux-proposition] will satisfy you. 
There is not some meaning you cannot give it; but no meaning… will do; and so you 
see that there is no coherent understanding to be reached of what you wanted to say” 
(Diamond (1995), 198). In sum, the elucidatory method begins by identifying with the 
speaker who, enthralled in her philosophical illusions, offers faux-propositions or else 
takes faux-propositions as significant metaphysical points. It then proceeds to "play 
along" with the speaker and, by employing apparent logical deductions, ersatz-
inferences, etc., explodes the faux-propositions from within. 
 In turn, pure therapy-TLP claims that this method reaches Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophical goal of “dispel[ing] philosophical illusions, [which] will 
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themselves also turn out to be nonsensical” (Conant & Diamond (2004), 79). In 
effect, this result of this method is that it undoes “our attraction to various 
grammatical well-formed strings of words that resonate with the aura of sense. The 
silence the book wishes to leave us in at the end is one in which nothing has been said 
and there is nothing to say… It is silence the silence represented by the book as a 
whole” (Conant (1991), 344). In short, Wittgenstein uses his method to help us realize 
that the points put forward in TLP, and philosophical “problems” more generally, are 
monistic nonsense. This realization dissolves the “problems” as they are not problems 
at all. So all we are left with is “our own sense of deprivation” (Conant (1991), 337). 
 
1.1.b Pure Therapy-TLP: Criticism: 
 
The pure therapy-TLP interpretation has at least four deeply problematic 
features. First, it directly conflicts with Wittgenstein’s discussions of the TLP. 
Second, it does not offer a principled way to distinguish between frame-proposition 
and faux-proposition. Third, it is unclear how various aspects of pure therapy-TLP 
interrelate. Finally, fourth, the methodology it imputes to Wittgenstein is suspect. 
 First, it is rather striking that Wittgenstein’s discussions of the TLP do not 
conform to the pure therapy-TLP’s account. Indeed, Wittgenstein seems to take his 
own supposedly faux-propositions as real attempts make assertions, arguments, etc. 
Indeed, Hacker (2001), 126-140, offers example after example where Wittgenstein 
seems to be “taken in” by his own faux-propositions and discusses them without the 
sort of irony one might expect. For example, it is rather difficult to deny that 
Wittgenstein took the “color exclusion problem” very seriously (PO 29-35; see 
Hacker (1986), 108-113, for a reconstruction). However, if this is not really a problem 
as it is just monistic nonsense, it is unclear why Wittgenstein would respond to the 
‘problem’ in the manner he does. Further, pursuant to this, we can add a simple point. 
If pure therapy-TLP is correct, it becomes rather unclear why Wittgenstein would 
return to philosophy or modify any of his previous thought. Indeed, it is unclear what 
“modifying nonsense” entails.  
The second problem with pure therapy-TLP has been forcefully pointed out by 
Schonbaumsfeld (2007), 93-96. To wit, it offers no principled way to distinguish 
between frame-propositions and faux-propositions. Indeed, “[t]here can be no fixed 
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answer to the question what kind of work a given remark [in the TLP] within the text 
accomplishes [e.g. if it is frame or faux]. It will depend on the kind of sense a reader 
of the text will (be tempted to) make of it” (Conant (2002), 458, fn 135). Further, 
Conant & Diamond (2004), 67-8, argue explicitly that there can be no general criteria 
to distinguish what points are faux and which are frame. This leaves much to chance 
and individual psychology. Worse, it may engender a reading that is deeply ad hoc. 
Consider “[a] proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition I 
know the situation it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had 
its sense explained to me” (TLP 4.021). Schonbumsfeld argues that, on the pure 
therapy-TLP view, this point seems to be half-faux and half-frame, a rather odd result. 
The third is that it is unclear how faux-propositions, the elucidatory 
methodology, and the aim of excising the urge to do philosophy, relate. Specifically, 
we focus on two critical problems. One, it is unclear how the act of “imaginative 
identification with the utterer of nonsense” (Conant (1991), 346) can be understood. 
This identification is critical in that it is what allows us to work with a faux-
proposition in such a way that its faux status is exposed to the utterer. Indeed, since 
faux-propositions are monistic nonsense, and so are neither about anything nor 
propositionally structured, the only guidance we have to make pseudo-deductions, 
draw on ersatz-inferential relations, and so on, is this identification. However, what is, 
and how do we preform, this “imaginative identification”?  
Prima facie, either the “imaginative identification” depends solely on the 
reader and how she appreciates the author of the TLP or it does not. If identification 
depends solely on the reader, then there does not seem to be any way to restrict the 
possible identifications one can have with the author of the TLP. For example, there is 
no reason that I cannot identify with the author of the TLP as I do with authors of 
great modernist poetry like Eliot.9 However, this identification problematizes the pure 
therapy-TLP interpretation entirely. Succinctly, one does not read poetry to learn a 
philosophical methodology; poetry is not at all concerned with pretending to make 
pseudo-deductions; poetry does not rely on ersatz-inferential relations. Further, 
pursuant to this, the response we have to the nonsense of TLP shifts drastically. For 
example, the nonsense of the last line to The Wasteland, “Shantih, Shantih, Shantih” 
                                                 
9 Gellner (2005), 8-9, originally noted, flippantly, a similarity between Eliot’s Wasteland and the TLP. 
However, today some serious and interesting research has emerged that seeks to relate the TLP to 
modernism in literature (see Anat (2015),13-27; Skorupski (2017))  
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should not lead us to try to expose the faux status of the string but reflect on a certain 
haunting echo. Similarly, a claim like “[i]t is not how things are in the world that is 
mystical but that it exists” (TLP 6.44), if read poetically, may not be a mere fodder 
for elucidation but may aim to have a certain poetic affect on us. Further, such a 
poetic identification, if it needs to support itself at all, can note that the opening motto 
from Kürnberger as well as the rhyme in TLP 7 should be read as critical frame-
propositions that instruct us to understand the work as poetry. Alternatively, if there is 
some non-reader-dependent criterion that tells us how to identify with Wittgenstein 
imaginatively, we need to be told what the criterion is and how it functions. Pure 
therapy-TLP offers neither. Further, it is reasonable to assume that such non-reader-
dependent criterion for imaginative identification with Wittgenstein will allow us to 
distinguish between faux- and frame-propositions. However, this flatly contradicts 
pure therapy-TLP. 
Two, it is simply unclear how the elucidatory methodology can dissolve a 
philosophical problem at all- as Glock (1991) & (2004 b) argues with great force. 
Specifically, it seems is though the sole criterion for success of the elucidatory 
methodology is that we loose interest in a philosophy “problem.” However, drugs, 
lobotomies, etc., achieve this as well. Are they, then elucidatory?  
 Finally, the fourth problem concerns the methodology it ascribes to 
Wittgenstein. One important note that Conant (1989) and Diamond (1995), 179-203, 
make is that the pure therapy-TLP enables us to read Wittgenstein as adhering to the 
only correct method in philosophy (cf. TLP 6.53). In effect, his faux-propositions 
function as stand-ins for the metaphysical-ly sounding stuff he assumes philosophers 
say and his frame-propositions help us work through it and expose it as monistic 
nonsense. However, this has three problems. One, Wittgenstein runs the risk of 
“infecting” healthy people with metaphysical-ly nonsense. Indeed, by speaking for 
someone, Wittgenstein may involve that someone in philosophy, exactly the illness he 
seeks to eradicate. Two, Wittgenstein was opposed to exactly this sort of an authorial 
procedure. Thus “Kierkegaard’s writings are teasing and this is of course their 
intention, although I am not sure whether the exact effect they produce on me is 
intentional…[T]here is something in me that rejects this teasing… The idea that 
someone uses a trick in order to make me do something is unpleasant” (LWPPO p. 
62). Though I think this misunderstands Kierkegaard, the key point here is that 
Wittgenstein was critical of such “teasing.” Three, Wittgenstein fails to respect and 
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acknowledge his possible conversation partners. To some extent, this is a corollary of 
one and two. In effect, by writing a book of trick faux-propositions that Wittgenstein 
places in the reader’s mouth, he presupposes some privileged position since he 
himself, supposedly, already sees through the nonsense. And this undermines the 
therapist’s insistence that their reading respects the conversation partner. 
  
1.1.c Moderate Therapy-TLP: 
 
The moderate therapy-TLP position is more inchoate than the pure therapy-
TLP. Furthermore, as we shall see, if the position is correct, expressing what it is after 
in language is fundamentally impossible. Ergo, a certain amount of vagueness, 
metaphorical or poetic speech, etc., is simply a necessary correlate. First, I paint, in 
broad strokes, what moderate therapy-TLP is and the methodology it ascribes to 
Wittgenstein. Second, I examine its functional account of nonsense. Finally, third, I 
adumbrate how this functional nonsense achieves Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical 
goal of removing cramps. 
To begin, moderate therapy-TLP assumes that the mystical, the nonsense one 
deploys in the face of it, and the silence that one is forced to when encountering it, are 
the keys to the book  (e.g., TLP 6.44; Zemach (1964); Fronda (2010)). Further, it 
assumes, as all great mystics tell us, that this experience of the mystical is something 
so powerful and profound that all problems- be they philosophical, personal, 
professional, etc.- are annihilated by this moment. Indeed St. Thomas notes, after his 
mystical experience, that he “can write no more. All that I have written appears to be 
as so much straw after the things that have been revealed to me” (reported in Butler 
(1991), 29-30). Finally, moderate therapy-TLP assumes that this mystical experience 
is the single most important thing a person can endure and that trying share it is 
critical. Granting this, the methodological role of Wittgenstein’s points, especially the 
points that touch on this mystical experience, in the TLP is to “get us to adopt a 
mystical point of view” (Morris & Dodd (2007), 16). In turn, if we adopt the mystical 
point of view, the supposed ‘problems’ of philosophy, along with all other problems 
(cf. TLP 6.5), are nullified in light of this mystical experience. However, how can 
Wittgenstein- or anyone else- assist us in taking up such a view? The answer, again in 
deep harmony with mystics, is to use nonsense in a very particular sort of way. Thus, 
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“nonsense” is critical to making sense of Wittgenstein’s methodology and his attempt 
to lead us to the mystical. Let us examine this.  
To begin, moderate therapy-TLP assumes a monistic account of nonsense that 
does not “suggest there is something that lies outside of language” (Ackinstein 
(2009), 92). In other words, a nonsensical point lacks semantic content and so cannot 
be said to be about anything, convey any insight, generate category mistakes, etc. All 
nonsense is simply nonsense. However, moderate therapy-TLP insists that “[t]o say 
that nonsense sentences may be ‘illuminating’ is to say that they may play a role in 
prompting enlightenment; and their doing this does not commit us to thinking of 
nonsense as making a kind of sense” (Morris & Dodd (2007), 6- emphasis mine). In 
other words, moderate therapy-TLP insists that the null semantic content of a 
nonsensical string and the function of the string are two completely different matters. 
The what-is-said nullity of content for a nonsensical utterance gives me, as yet, no 
handle on what the utterance does. In other words, the function of mystical nonsense 
is not to transmit information, to assert the ineffable, etc., but to, e.g., provoke 
someone, to call their attention somewhere, etc. For example, assume that “Ahhh! 
Ohh!” is nonsense in that it has no semantic content. However, it can function as, e.g., 
an expression of pain, a sign of epiphany, a cry for attention, and so forth. In each 
case, the function of the nonsense shifts even as the content remains invariant and 
null. Thus, “[f]or the very reason, that a bit of language is nonsensical, it is still 
possible to go on using it” (NB p. 50-emphasis mine)).  
However, there are two possible objections to this view of functional 
nonsense. One, from pure therapy-TLP, is to insist that, from a strictly logical point of 
view, function drops out of consideration and nonsense is still monistic. This is, 
perhaps, strictly speaking true. However, moderate therapy-TLP maintains that, for 
Wittgenstein, the mystical is intrinsically connected to a deeply subjective experience, 
and so the point falls rather flat. Indeed, the mystical and experience are held together 
in such a way that the representational-cum-logical-cum-linguistic form cannot 
convey or capture them. As it were, the experience is beyond thought itself.10 Two, it 
                                                 
10 There is a vital connection with Schopenhauer (1969), 429-30. However, there is also a lurking 
mistake. For example, Glock (1999), 42-37, is quite right to chastise Schopenhauer and his odd idea 
that we can do some sort of ‘metaphysics’ on this experience. But correcting this error does not prevent 
one from seeing experience itself as fundamentally non-propositional and so outside representation full 
stop. In other words, we cannot talk about, think about, let alone do metaphysics of any kind, with this 
experience. Strange as it sounds, we have an experience we cannot really understand- again, a point 
common for mystics- see, e.g., The Cloud of Unknowing for a beautiful articulation.  
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may be objected that this functional view imputes too much of later Wittgenstein’s 
concern with use into the TLP. However, earlier Wittgenstein also notes the 
importance of use. Thus “[i]n order to recognize the sign in the sign we have to attend 
to the use” (NB p. 18), “[i]n order to recognize a symbol by is sign we must observe 
how it is used with sense” (TLP 3.326), “the essence of religion cannot have anything 
to do with the fact that there is talking, or rather: when people talk, then this itself is 
part of a religious act and not a theory. Thus it also does not matter if the words used 
are true or false or nonsense” (LWVC p. 117- emphasis mine), etc. Thus, it is not 
prima facie unimaginable that the nonsense one utters in the face of the mystical has a 
function that is different in kind than Diamond’s function for “piggly wiggle tiggle”- 
e.g. giving an example of nonsense to a philosophical audience. Pursuant to this, a 
mystic might well utter "piggly wiggle tiggle” to, e.g., engender a mystical 
experience. In sum, Wittgenstein’s nonsense, though void of semantic content as all 
nonsense is, is “doing something other than, communicating truth. Wittgenstein is not 
using the text to communicate a final conclusion to his readership… Rather… he 
knowingly produced an incoherent text… for a decidedly non-alethic purpose” 
(Morris & Dodd (2007), 14).  
Granting that there is a distinction between content and function, and allowing 
that the function of a nonsensical string is a different matter than the null content of 
the string, we now turn to how Wittgenstein’s nonsense functions to call our attention 
to the mystical. The most plausible account of this function is in terms of a negative 
and positive role. Negatively, moderate therapy-TLP insists that "philosophy can 
contribute [something]… distinctive and valuable- namely, not discursive expression 
[i.e., propositional or senseful] of mystical insight but a way of making a clearing in 
which insight becomes possible. Perhaps, even, only philosophy can do that” 
(Skorupski (2017), 17). Indeed, “the business of the Tractatus is that of getting us to 
see something that escapes philosophy, because philosophy is always concerned to 
say something… The crucial difference is that whole philosophy aims to produce 
thoughts and propositions… mysticism involves a certain kind of experience: a 
feeling… mysticism provides us with knowledge of an object, acquaintance-
knowledge” (Morris and Dodd (2007), 17). In effect, ideally, philosophy helps clear 
the ground. It does this in two interrelated ways. First, it attempts to make a point that 
is very old yet worth making again. To wit, mixing facts with the transcendental, 
reality with substance, truth with acquaintance, thought with experience, etc., is 
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deleterious. Wittgenstein seeks to undermine this in a manner akin to the dialectic of 
apophatic theology (e.g., Fronda (2010), and Atkinson (2009), 123-36, both explore 
this point11)- by “asserting” nonsense, “negating” that nonsense, and, by doing so, 
trying to break language itself. Second, pursuant to this, the role of the nonsense is to 
undermine language and thought in the face of the mystical. In effect, the worst thing 
one can do to try to experience the mystical is thinking about experiencing the 
mystical. In turn, this casts Wittgenstein's functional nonsense as a sort of Zen riddle12 
that is meant to exhaust the intellect and so clear the way for the mystical.  
The positive aspect of the nonsense Wittgenstein deploys in the face of the 
mystical is much more difficult to flesh out. To begin, it is critical to note that 
“feeling the world as a limited whole is something different from feeling that it is a 
limited whole…. Ordinarily speaking, we may allow that feeling something as F 
involves a (possibly indefinite) number of feelings that, but we are likely to insist that 
feeling something as F is at least prior to all those (possibly indefinite) propositional 
elaborations” (Morris & Dodd (2007), 16). Notice, first, that this accounts, to some 
extent, for why Wittgenstein links the mystical to experience and feeling rather than 
thought and propositional articulation (e.g., TLP 5.552, 6.45). And, indeed, such an 
account of even normal experience being prior to, and richer than, propositional 
elaboration is fairly in line with folk intuitions, can be given rigorous philosophical 
form in certain branches of phenomenology13, and is something Wittgenstein notes 
explicitly. Thus: 
 
“If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you 
know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the 
matter as if I have studied the stove as one among many things in the world. 
But if I was contemplating the stove it was my world, and everything else 
colourless by contrast with it” (NB 83) 
 
Thus, even a stove, when contemplated properly, is richer than language. Pursuant to 
this, second, it is critical to note that the TLP, Wittgenstein, and nothing else, can 
“give” one a mystical experience- again a common theme in apophatic theology. 
                                                 
11 The locus classicus for apophatic theology is Pseudo-Dioynesus (see, e.g, Pseudo-Dionysus (1988), 
133-43). For example he “asserts” that G-d is a shimmering darkness, using two contradictory 
predicates in an attempt to “deconstruct” language itself.  
12 Perhaps the best collection of Zen poems and sayings is McCandless and Oryu (2000) 
13 see, e.g., Husserl (1970), 379-84, Heidegger (2002), Merleau-Ponty (2012), 1-66,  Marion (2002), 7-
70. 
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Indeed, “[m]y [Wittgenstien’s] work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus 
all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important 
one” (letter to von Ficker). Thus, the “insight that can only be shown are very 
specific… His [Wittgenstein’s] focus is on the meaning of life, what makes life worth 
living, our relation to existence. This cannot be put in the words… The point is that 
what is in each case said to be the object of the respective experience conflicts with 
the normal requirements for something to be its object” (Skorupski (2017), 19-20). 
Thus, the best that can be done is to “say nothing… and then, whenever someone else 
wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he has failed to 
give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions” (TLP 6.53). 
In any case, moderate therapy-TLP insists that Wittgenstein uses nonsense to 
aide us in accessing the mystical. If he is successful, and if we encounter the mystical 
for ourselves, Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical goal is achieved because we see that 
the cramps and discomforts we face are straws. So all we can say is "[w]hereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (TLP 7).  
 
1.1.d Moderate Therapy-TLP: Criticism: 
 
 Moderate therapy-TLP suffers from three problems. First, it is unclear at 
several critical points in the argument. Second, it is not completely clear how 
functional nonsense works. Third, it engenders several exegetical issues. 
 First, moderate therapy-TLP is underdetermined at several critical points. 
Indeed, as Ramsey's famous quip has it, if you cannot say it, you cannot whistle it 
either. For example, it is not clear how the negative function of nonsense is supposed 
to work. Precisely, how does reflection on the TLP's nonsense breakdown the intellect 
and so clear the ground for this sort of mystical experience? Matters are, if anything, 
worse for the positive role of nonsense. If the mystical experience is so sui generis, it 
is unclear how we can even talk around it.  
 Second, pursuant to this, it is unclear how functional nonsense works with the 
mystical. Specifically, if moderate therapy-TLP assumes a monistic account of 
nonsense, then undoubtedly any nonsensical utterance by a mystic that assists 
someone in having a mystical experience is fair. However, it is unclear both by what 
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criteria a mystic can determine if a nonsensical utterance will do this and how the 
receiver of this nonsense can react to it in such a way that she encounters the mystical.  
 Third, exegetically, it is unclear how to engage with the TLP properly. For 
example, Morris & Dodd (2007), 13-18, christen their view a ‘no truths at all view' 
However, it then becomes unclear how one "reads" and "understands" the points that 
make up the TLP. By assumption, these nonsensical points are not propositional in 
that they have no semantic content. However, if they lack semantic content, can we 
still be said to read them with understanding? Further, Morris & Dodd, Skorupski 
(2017), Fronda (2010), and so on, all seem to believe that part of the negative function 
of Wittgenstein's nonsense as a sort of reductio argument against philosophy. 
However, how can nonsense provide grounds for any sort of argument? 
   
1.1.e Pure Therapy- Mixed 
 
 Pure therapy-mixed is an interpretation of Wittgenstein that stresses the 
interconnectedness and diachronic consistency of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical 
goal and method to alleviate philosophical cramps. Pursuant to this, it draws freely 
from all of Wittgenstein's Nachlass to properly frame, elaborate, reconstruct, and so 
on, various elements in Wittgenstein's canonical works. For this position, I focus on 
the work of the later Baker as he is a very sophisticated proponent of the view.  
With this focus in view, pure therapy-mixed maintains that the key to 
understanding Wittgenstein's methodology is not a proper interpretation of nonsense 
per se. Indeed, "the interpretation of the term ‘nonsense'… is no less distracting than 
the old one [i.e., the rise of Kripkenstein] was for anyone seeking philosophical 
benefit" (Baker (Unpublished Review), 1). Rather, making sense of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical methodology depends on what Baker takes to be the critical analogy 
between Wittgenstein and psychoanalysis. In effect, much as Freud's "talk-cure" (e.g., 
Baker (2006), 205), helps an analysand come to terms with her neurotic compulsions 
and odd behaviors, so too does Wittgenstein offer us a philosophical "talk-cure" 
whose aim is to expunge our neurotic compulsion to do philosophy. Indeed, as we 
shall see, Wittgenstein's methodology is best read as a re-application of the 
psychoanalytic methodology to philosophical problems (e.g., Baker (2006), 205-222). 
In turn, pure therapy-mixed assumes that such a psychoanalytic method will achieve 
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Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim of removing cramps in the same way that 
Freud's "talk-cure" alleviates the symptoms of the analysand. First, I examine how 
pure therapy-mixed links together psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's philosophical 
methodology. With this linkage in view I, second, elaborate how Wittgenstein's 
philosophical-as-psychoanalytic method is thought to work on the conversation 
partner. Third, I discuss how this achieves Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal. 
To begin, a critical facet of pure therapy-mixed is that it stresses a profound 
analogy between Wittgenstein's methods and Freud's methods. Indeed, 
"[p]sychoanalysis is… a model for developing a distinctive for of intellectual therapy 
(‘our method')" (ibid 179). Pursuant to this, "this therapeutic method is radically 
different from established procedures of conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy" 
(ibid). Indeed, it is a "revolutionary programme" (ibid).  
To support this critical analogy, pure therapy-mixed proffers four reasons to 
accept a relevance and influence of psychoanalysis on Wittgenstein's methodology. 
First, it claims that Wittgenstein has "[a] distinctive conception of philosophical 
problems is conspicuous in these texts [in VoW roughly 1931-36]. They are described 
in strong psychological connotations" (Baker (VoW preface), xxxviii). Indeed, 
philosophical problems are "not regarded as abstract puzzles that stand in need of 
solutions… Rather, they are individuals' troubled states of mind" (Baker (2006), 212). 
Granting this, and assuming that a goal of psychoanalysis is relieving troubled states 
of mind, the linkage between the two is fairly clear as both methods aim to quiet 
similar psychic disturbances. Second, it notes that "there was a definite phase [i.e., 
1931-1938 AD or so] of Wittgenstein's thinking in which close comparison with 
Freud's methods informed his own conception of philosophical investigations" (Baker 
(2006), 155) and, further, that "[a]rguably, it [psychoanalytic methods] continued to 
dominate his later work" (ibid 201 fn 3). Though the footnote is hedged, it is critical 
to notice that almost a third of Baker (2006) is devoted to elaborating this analogy. 
Further, several parts of the work explicitly rely on this analogy to interpret parts and 
sections of, e.g., the PI (e.g., ibid, 49 fn 19, 132, 13, etc.).14 In an external key, the oft-
quoted "[t]here is not a single philosophical method, though there are methods, 
different therapies, as it were" (PI § 133-box)15 and "[t]he philosopher treats a 
                                                 
14 Hacker (2007) makes this same point in far greater detail.  
15 A reader may demur here and note that “different therapies” seems to imply that the entire analogy is 
misguided, as there are clearly non-psychoanalytic kinds of therapy. Baker (2006), 201 fn 9, notes that 
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question; like an illness" (PI § 255) can be cited to support this sort of linkage. Third, 
Wittgenstein seemed to stress his indebtedness to Freud. For example, "Freud was one 
of the few authors he [Wittgenstein] thought worth reading. He would eagerly speak 
of himself- at the period of these discussions [ca. 1919-1938]- as a ‘disciple of Freud' 
or a follower of Freud" (reported by Rhees in L&C, p. 41), "[a]ll of this [i.e., the 
abuses of psychoanalysis] doesn't detract from Freud's extraordinary scientific 
achievement" (Letter to Malcolm 1945), and so on. Finally, fourth, pure therapy-
mixed broadens what should count as part of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. For example, 
Wiasmann's essay How I See Philosophy "is very closely based on material that 
Wittgenstein dictated to Waismann during the period 1931-35" (Baker (2006), 179) 
and so can be used to help interpret and clarify Wittgenstein's thought. Indeed, Baker 
often moves seamlessly between Wittgenstein's Nachlass and Wiasmann's works (ibid 
passim). Granting this broader scope for the Nachlass, and assuming that Baker is 
right to see Waismann as an acolyte of Freud and a slavish disciple of Wittgenstein, 
an analogy is fair. Thus, pure therapy-mixed offers four reasons to accept to the 
analogy between psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's methodology. 
Granting this link between psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's methodology, I 
now examine how we can use the former to make sense of the latter. First, 
Wittgenstein's philosophical method does not aim to expose univocal nonsense or 
foster a mystical experience. Instead, it seeks to "allay worry or disquiet" (Baker 
(2006), 165). Indeed, "[w]hat we need to clarify… [is] what motivates a particular 
individual to say obviously puzzling things… We try to get him to direct attention to 
his own motivation. He needs to work out why he feels driven to say what he does. 
What is pathological in his thinking is not the deviance of his philosophical utterances 
from everyday speech-patterns, but the unconscious motives which give rise to his 
behavior" (ibid 208). Further, these "intellectual disquiet (Unruhe), sometimes even 
terror or anxiety (Angst)… arise from intellectual obsessions, compulsions, or 
‘neuroses'" (ibid, 146). Indeed, philosophical therapy should be "addressed more to 
the will than to the intellect (CV 17)" (ibid 136). Clearly, the parallel with 
psychoanalysis is on full display. In each case, the goal is uncovering the unconscious 
motives that drive someone to say or do odd things. Pursuant to this, in both cases, 
                                                                                                                                           
there are indeed “many different conceptions of therapy….But this is not the conception of therapy 
which informs HISP [Wiasmann’s How I See Philosophy]!” Thus, the devil is how much weight should 
be given to Wittgenstein circa 1931-938 when reading Wittgenstein post 1938. Again, it seems to me 
that Hacker (2007) is quite right that Baker puts a great deal of weight it.  
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this uncovering is focused more on latent drives and the will than on consciousness 
per se. However, this leaves us with two open questions. To wit, how do we target the 
will or unconscious? Pursuant to this, how does our therapeutic intervention alter it? 
Unsurprisingly, the answers come from psychoanalysis. First, much as 
ordinary psychoanalytic practices analyzes only one person at a time, so too 
Wittgenstein's "[t]herapy must be individualized" (Baker (2006), 181). In other words, 
"Wittgenstein's enterprise is essentially person-relative, and it centres on the dynamics 
of somebody's thinking, not on the geometry of thoughts" (ibid 68). Indeed, such 
disquiet is always "somebody's mental disturbance" (ibid 210). Further, "dissolving 
the patient's problem must respect his freedom; it makes no sense to foist the 
diagnosis on him against his will" (ibid, 165). Indeed "[t]he criteria of success in 
giving perspicuous representation are strictly relative… Adequacy must be judged 
with reference to the elimination of a particular person's not knowing his way about a 
particular situation" (ibid, 43). In other words, Wittgenstein's philosophical 
methodology is entirely person-relative. There are no general criteria we can rely on 
to determine if some particular philosophical problem has been aptly addressed and 
dissolved. The conversation partner alone determines if some contribution of the 
philosopher is apt. In sum, therapy is completely person-relative and a contribution 
has hit the mark only if the analysand accepts it.  
Second, pursuant to this, much as psychoanalysis insists that a therapeutic 
contribution to a conversation is helpful only if it is recognized by this particular 
analysand to be helpful (e.g., Freud (1989), 28-41), so too does Wittgenstein. For 
example, "'grammar' is invented and voluntary; it is freely negotiated with one's 
interlocutor or audience, and it owes its authority to free acknowledgement. ‘The 
grammar of our language' is subject to each individual's decisions about how to use 
his own words… only recognition, acknowledgment, or decision determines what 
something means for me" (Baker (2006), 196)." Thus, not only is the aptness of a 
contribution on the part of a philosopher person-relative, so too is her Wittgensteinian 
therapeutic method. Again, the sole criterion for the success of an appeal to grammar 
is the consent of the conversation partner. As Wittgenstein notes "[f]or only if he 
acknowledges it [i.e., a helpful contribution] as such, is it the correct expression 
(psychoanalysis)" (BT § 87 p. 303-italics mine). In other words, the aptness of our 
therapeutic attempt to bring to light her will and unconscious depends solely on her 
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recognizing that it does so. Thus, we work only on a particular person and require her 
consent at each stage of therapy. 
Third, both psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's method aims to bring about a 
particular form of self-knowledge.16 Indeed, Freud's famous motto is "where id is, 
there shall ego be" (Freud (1990 a), 100). Echoing this, Wittgenstein's method brings 
about "self-knowledge:… [by giving] him [a conversation partner] a better 
understanding of his own ways of thinking and speaking" (ibid 148). Further, this 
self-knowledge is "tak[ing] notice of prejudices, dogmas analogies, and pictures that 
have unconsciously shaped his own thinking. Full self-understanding is attained to the 
extent that these are traced to their deeper roots in certain very primitive and 
pervasive pictures... The patient's becoming conscious of his own prejudices, 
analogies, etc., will deprive them of their power to work mischief; he will be freed 
from the spell they cast on his thinking" (Ibid, 154). In other words, it is when a 
person "acknowledges the analogy I'm presenting as the source of his thought" (BT § 
87 p. 303) that she comes to see the latent picture, anxiety, etc., driving her into 
philosophy. In turn, this recognition of the source of her will-to-philosophy allows her 
to obviate it.  Thus, we work on a person, with her consent, to uncover the sources of 
her unconscious drives to do philosophy. 
Thus, for both psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology, 
a person-relative version of therapy is utilized whose aim is to uncover the latent and 
unconscious sources of disquiet. In other words, both insist that we focus not so much 
on the semantic content of utterances as on the person uttering them and her mental 
state. Notice that this conception of therapy transforms the role of a philosophical 
therapist. A philosophical therapist's job is not to discuss, debate, etc. philosophical 
claims, questions, abstract theories, etc. Instead, her role is helping alleviate "deep 
disquiets, feelings of discomfort, torments, irritations, conflicts" (Baker (2006), 213). 
Moreover, the means she can deploy to facilitate this can vary from pointing out 
analogies, highlighting biases, uncovering assumptions, and so on. However, in all 
cases, the sole criterion of the aptness of the philosophical therapist's intervention is if 
it assuages the disquiet is the conversation partner herself. There is nothing external to 
                                                 
16 Arguably, such self-knowledge is a positive goal. Without going too far afield, or too deep into 
Freud, I would argue that this self-knowledge is more a restoration of sanity than a gain per se. 
Regardless, I bracket this.  
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the conversational exchange such as grammar, nonsense, etc., which a philosopher 
can appeal to. Instead, only the agreement of the conversation partner will do.  
In turn, if Wittgenstein's philosophical-as-therapeutic methodology works, the 
philosophical problem is dissolved in the same way that Anna O's inability to drink 
water dissolved after she realized that her aversion to water stemmed from her seeing 
a dog drink out of a glass (e.g., Freud (1989), 1-23). In both cases, recognition of the 
source of the neurosis obviates the symptoms it produces. Indeed, what occurs is "not 
merely a change of opinion, but a kind of conversion" (Baker (2006), 35). Moreover, 
"[w]hat is required is a kind of conversion… or re-education" (ibid 287). We become 
aware of the unconscious drives that cause our problematic habits. This awareness 
gives us control over them. So since we have control, we can stop doing philosophy 
when we want to (cf. PI § 133).  
 
1.1.f Pure Therapy-Mixed: Criticism: 
 
 Pure therapy-mixed has at least three problems. First, there is how the 
disquiet, the philosophical problem, and the proposed therapy relate. Second, there is 
how this method casts the conversation partner herself. Third, there is the exegetical 
gerrymandering pure therapy-mixed brings into play. 
 First, it is unclear how pure therapy-mixed relates together philosophical 
problems, philosophical therapy, and disquiet. Let us examine each combination. 
To begin, let us examine how a philosophical problem and disquiet relate. The 
critical issue with this relation is that it is unclear what mechanism accounts for the 
mental disturbance manifesting itself as a philosophical problem. This is in marked 
contrast to psychoanalysis, which, for better or worse, does claim to provide a 
framework that explains how a symptom relates to a latent mental cause. For 
example, Anna O's symptom, i.e., her inability to drink water, was caused by her 
seeing a dog drink from a glass, feeling guilt at not informing her friend, and disgust 
at the dog's behavior. By helping Anna O recover this memory of the dog, Freud 
dissolved the symptom as Anna O’s awareness of the memory gives her control of her 
neurosis. Regardless of what one thinks about this explanation, there is a reasonably 
intuitive relationship between the symptom of water avoidance and the repressed 
memory of the dog drinking from a friend’s glass. Indeed, for Freud, a critical task of 
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psychoanalysis is explaining how a symptom and a disquiet relate. In contrast, Baker 
does not give, and cannot claim to follow Wittgenstein and give (cf. PI  §109), an 
account of the mechanism that causes a mental disquiet to manifest itself as a 
symptomatic philosophical problem. In turn, it becomes unclear both what is unique 
to philosophical problems as one can feel torment about a problem in physics, anxiety 
over a romantic rendezvous, etc., and how to properly isolate a philosophical problem 
that requires treatment from other problems. Further, it becomes unclear if a latent 
mental disturbance has any relationship with the philosophical problem at all. 
For the therapy and philosophical problem relation, the philosopher's role is 
problematic. Prima facie, the role of the philosopher is as follows. The conversation 
partner puts forward a philosophical claim or question, and then the philosopher 
offers some sort of reconstruction that brings to light the latent mental disquiet 
causing it. However, it is unclear what guides the philosopher's reconstruction of the 
problem. By what criteria can she know that some reconstruction will be apt, 
especially if the sole criterion in play is the acceptance of the conversation partner? 
Worse, if the conversation partner's acceptance is the sole criterion of a successful 
reconstruction, then, in principle, she may always reject any and all reconstructions. 
Worst, however, is the fact that the conversation partner may accept a 
"reconstruction" that has no comprehensible relationship to the problem at all. In 
other words, a conversation partner may accept that an unrelated utterance like "I 
have to go" is, somehow, the correct reconstruction of her problem concerning, e.g., 
the nature of the truth-predicate. Indeed, it seems like the philosophical therapist must 
accept the utterance is a correct reconstruction, even if she does not know why it is. 
For the therapy and disquiet relation, matters are completely opaque. Baker 
claims that "bringing to consciousness things of which he [the conversation partner] 
was partly or wholly unconscious and tracing things to their origins or roots [is a 
critical feature of the method]. Disorders are held to disappear once full self-
knowledge is attained" (Baker (2006), 153). However, it is unclear how this process 
of bringing about self-knowledge and the underlying cause relate. As noted above, for 
Freud, a symptom and a disquiet are tightly connected. In turn, uncovering the 
disquiet that causes the symptom via the talk-cure, dissolves the disquiet as the 
disquiet can find a healthier expression. In contrast, it is unclear what sort of self-
knowledge Baker has in mind and how engendering it relates to the disquiet. This is 
partly because we have no idea of the mechanism that manifests a disquiet as a 
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philosophical problem symptom. However, prima facie, it is also partly due to a 
divergence between philosophical problems and self-knowledge. Indeed, how does 
even a tormenting question about truth relate to a childhood experience or repressed 
drive? Pursuant to this, how does self-knowledge affect the disquiet?  
The second problematic aspect of pure therapy-mixed is that it casts the 
conversation partner in a rather odd light. Baker writes that "[t]reament is targeted on 
a person, someone who is, by his own lights, sick and unhappy" (ibid 152). In 
therapy, this is a crucial point. Ideally, therapy begins with the acknowledgment by 
the analysand that she cannot keep living the way she is. However, this sort of view of 
philosophy misfires in three very distinct ways. One, for the majority of philosophers, 
both historical and contemporary, the analogy with deep unhappiness is rather odd. 
Rarely does philosophy cause the sort of existential dread Baker has in mind. In turn, 
this means that philosophical therapy passes by much traditional philosophy. Two, for 
the few that do have existential dread in relation to philosophy, the assumption that 
they want to be cured is simply not attested to in their writings. Indeed, they would 
likely view Baker's therapy as a way to re-normalize them into a society they see as 
nothing but illusory. Indeed, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, etc., all prided themselves on 
the discomfort their engagement with philosophy caused them. Three, it is not the 
case that philosophy as Wittgenstein practiced it in his lectures (e.g., LFM, LWVC, 
etc.), is akin to psychoanalysis in this sense. Philosophy does not begin with a 
confession on the part of the conversation partner that her life has become impossible. 
Instead, it emerges from attending to what a person says and showing why such an 
assertion is problematic. Far from admitting an illness, Turing, say, is quite confident 
in his conception of mathematics (see LFM passim). It is precisely this confidence 
that Wittgenstein addresses rather than a self-confessed confusion. 
 The third aspect concerns pure therapy-mixed exegetical account. 
Specifically, it may be plausible that from 1930-36, Waismann was a faithful disciple 
of Wittgenstein and that, ergo, Waismann's turn to Freud was merely him following 
his master. However, extending this already tentative assumption beyond 1936, and 
into the PI, is problematic for two reasons. One, it is well known that Wittgenstein 
repudiated Waismann, both intellectually and personally (e.g. Shanker (1996), 13). 
And it is critical that this break came at almost the same time as the Brown Book and 
the language game method were coming to prominence in Wittgenstein's thought. To 
assume a tentative harmony between Wittgenstein and Freud, mediated by Waismann, 
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without argument, after a profound methodological shift on Wittgenstein's part, 
strains credulity. Two, Wittgenstein's own relationship with psychoanalysis was not 
nearly as straightforward as Baker makes it seem. As Bouveresse (1995) convincingly 
argues, Wittgenstein was deeply skeptical of Freud's theoretical discussions of his 
own methodology for reasons strikingly similar to our above to objections. 
Specifically, without more than a just-so story about how a latent cause, a symptom, 
the talking cure, and healing relate, too many wheels idle (ibid 22-42).  
 
1.1.g Moderate Therapy- Mixed: 
  
 The representative we consider for this position is Kuusela (2008). This is 
because Kuusela is the most articulate version of such a view. The philosophical 
methodology Kuusela ascribes to Wittgenstein is perhaps best called "comparative 
therapy" in contrast to either psychoanalytic therapy or the insistence on nonsense. 
Comparative therapy ascribes to Wittgenstein a methodology that engenders "seeing 
the connections" (e.g., PI § 122). Specifically, Wittgenstein adduces several different, 
and often orthogonal, modes of presenting the rules for the use of language. In turn, 
these different modes of presentation ameliorate philosophical problems and 
confusions by showing the problems to be dependent on one way, among others, of 
looking at things. To take an example Wittgenstein often returns to (e.g. TLP 3.323, 
PI § 558), one might become so fixated on the rules that determine the use of "is" in 
identity statements- e.g. "2 and 2 is 4"- that one falls into complete confusion when it 
appears in its predicative role- e.g. "John is nice." By reminding us that "is" has two 
distinct roles, and is governed by two different sets of rules, Wittgenstein helps us 
realize that is no real problem with “is” at all. Thus, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical 
aim of excising philosophy is met by showing that the problems that constitute 
philosophy do not arise from nature, reason, grammar, etc., but from a particular, and 
optional (from a logical point of view), way of thinking about things. First, I briefly 
discuss both Kuusela's exegetical strategy and his assumptions. Second, I give an 
account of how Kuusela frames the evolution of Wittgenstein's methodology focused 
specifically on what Kuusela calls Wittgenstein's "turn" (Kuusela (2008), 120-132 & 
(2005)). Third, I elaborate this turn in terms of comparative therapy and how Kuusela 
frames the interrelations between an object of comparison, a philosophical problem, 
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clarification, and culture. Finally, I discuss how comparative therapy achieves 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal. 
 To begin, let us examine Kuusela's exegetical approach and assumptions. 
First, Kuusela writes that "I make wide use of Wittgenstein's Nachlass… his 
notebooks, manuscripts, [etc.]" (Kuusela (2008), 13). Hence, he is mixed. Second, 
Kuusela ascribes to Wittgenstein the key, and diachronically consistent, insight that 
there must be a "difference between true and false factual statements and expressions 
of exceptionless necessity" (ibid 3). Indeed, Wittgenstein "preserves the…distinction 
between philosophy and science. Whereas metaphysics is conceived as an… 
‘superfactual' investigation, philosophy for Wittgenstein is a conceptual investigation" 
(ibid 103). Thus, the empirical/conceptual distinction is diachronically consistent in 
Wittgenstein. Indeed, this distinction is critical for making sense of how Wittgenstein 
can offer alternative modes of presentation without thereby flying in the face of, e.g., 
a physics that insists that cheese does not randomly change its weight (cf. PI § 142). 
Third, Kuusela focuses mainly on "Wittgenstein's later work, from the early 1930s 
onward" (ibid 8). However, fourth, Kuusela thinks that making sense of later 
Wittgenstein's methodology should not depend on an analogy between him and Freud 
or Waismann. Rather, we should see "Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a novel 
attempt to achieve the aims of the Tractatus" (ibid 8-9) and "whatever was correct in 
the Tractatus seems incorporated in Wittgenstein's later philosophy" (ibid 10). In 
other words, for Kuusela, properly articulating Wittgenstein's methodology should 
rely, as much as possible, on the internal evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. 
 Thus, understanding how Wittgenstein's thought changed from the TLP to the 
PI is critical to properly frame his later methodology. Let us examine how 
Wittgenstein's thought evolved and how his methodological turn works. For Kuusela, 
earlier Wittgenstein insists that all language is "analyzable into truth functional 
combinations of elementary propositions and ultimately into pictures of states of 
affairs, where such pictures consist of [simple] names that stand for simple objects" 
(ibid 60). However, Kuusela argues that this should not be taken as Wittgenstein 
adducing a theory of language that falls prey to a self-application paradox. Rather, 
Wittgenstein attempts to "draw the reader's attention to certain logical distinctions she 
already recognizes in her use of language but that are not clearly reflected in the 
ordinary symbolism [of natural language]" (ibid 63. See also Kuusela (2011)). Thus, 
the TLP is a "method of philosophy as a critique of language… [which relies] on its 
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readers' pre- or non theoretical capacity to distinguish sense from nonsense" (Kuusela 
(2008), 24). Indeed, the TLP is "not a matter of making true/false statements about 
anything…. Rather, philosophy is not engaged in theoretical assertions at all. Its task 
consists solely in clarification or clear expression of what can be said" (ibid 99). 
Philosophy is, thus, the activity of translation of ordinary sentences into a concept-
script governed by logical syntax (e.g., ibid, 55-64; Kussela (2015)). In turn, the 
exceptionless necessity Wittgenstein seeks to distinguish from scientific 
generalizations manifests itself in the concept-script itself. And this removes 
philosophical problems by displaying what a philosopher tries to say clearly in the 
concept-script. Thus, for earlier Wittgenstein, the translation method dissolves 
philosophical problems by showing them to be parts of the script. 
However, according to Kuusela, later Wittgenstein realized that there are still 
metaphysical assumptions embedded in this script-based approach. To wit, the 
method of translation assumes: "(1) there is only one complete analysis of a 
proposition that terminates in simple names, that (2) all propositions can be analyzed 
in this way and that (3) all logical confusions can be clarified through such an 
analysis" (ibid 99). In turn, these assumptions have "a metaphysics of language built 
into its conception of the method of logical analysis" (Kuusela (2008), 100). 
Moreover, the mistake is that "a particular conception of propositions was turned into 
a metaphysical thesis about what propositions must be" (ibid 105). Indeed, the author 
of the TLP inadvertently projected his "mode of presentation onto the object of 
investigation" (ibid 109).  
Granting this, Wittgenstein's turn, and his novel methodology of comparative 
therapy, arises as he corrects the latent projection. Indeed, the "turn constitutes a 
strategy for avoiding metaphysical projection of the forms of presentation on the 
objects of investigation in the guise of statements about necessary truth" (ibid 111). 
To see this more clearly, it is imperative to keep in mind that Wittgenstein insists that 
"'musts' and ‘cans' of metaphysical statements indicate rules for the use of an 
expression" (ibid 103). Notice that this re-imagining of the role of necessary 
statements leaves the distinction between the conceptual and the empirical intact. 
Indeed, "a statement of rules [for the use of expressions] does not describe anything in 
making a true/false claim" (ibid 115).  Notice also that the linkage between necessary 
statements, rules, and the use of expressions, begins to explain how philosophical 
problems may arise. Thus, "propositions that express such inclinations or temptations 
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[e.g., putting forward a necessary statement as a metaphysical truth] indicate the root 
of philosophical problems" (ibid 44). This is because we often take these seemingly 
metaphysical propositions as, somehow, describing the deep structure of the world 
rather than seeing them as rules. Notice, finally, that the TLP's key mistake is this. It 
takes a definition of "proposition," say, as an essential feature of propositions rather 
than as a statement of rules concerning the use of "proposition" (e.g., Kuusela (2008), 
96-132).   
However, it is critical to note that a statements of rules "do not tell us anything 
about actual language use, and as soon as a rule is claimed to be descriptive of actual 
language use, the problem about the status of the philosopher's statements arises. The 
question is, what allows one to say that… language must be used in such and such a 
way [e.g., in conformity to a statement of rules Wittgenstein offers]…is not a 
philosophical or metaphysical thesis about language?" (ibid 119-120). In other words, 
Wittgenstein's statements of rules are not empirical claims about how language works, 
metaphysical statements, or descriptions of inherently normative rules that constitute 
language. Indeed, a statement of rules "does not constitute a claim about a necessity 
pertaining to language use" (ibid 145). Furthermore, it does not assert that "this is 
how language must be used unless one wants to deviate from its actual and normal 
use" (ibid 117). In sum, a statement of rules "abandons all such claims about language 
use" (ibid 136). Rather, a statement of rules offers a "prototype… on which other 
cases may be modeled and which, in this capacity, forms to basis for a way of 
conceiving those cases and a mode of presenting them" (ibid 123).  
In turn, this prototype takes us to the heart of Wittgenstein's new methodology 
as a prototypical "example should be comprehended as an object of comparison" (ibid 
124). Let us scrutinize this. First, an "object of comparison is not used to make 
empirical statements about any particular objects" (Kuusela (2008), 125). Second, an 
object of comparison is a way "of conceiving objects of investigation" (ibid 132). 
Third, an object of comparison highlights "both the similarities and the dissimilarities 
between the model [i.e., the object of comparison] and the actual use" (ibid 155). 
Fourth, the point "of Wittgenstein's introduction of… objects of comparison… is to 
eliminate a source of philosophical problems" (ibid 145). Finally, fifth, an object of 
comparison achieves this by "the articulation of an alternative mode of presenting 
language use or facts that allows us to get rid of the problems and confusions one fell 
into" (ibid 257). Thus, Wittgenstein's comparative therapy relies on putting forward 
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different objects of comparison, or ways of conceiving the objects one investigates, to 
show that philosophical problems are an outgrowth of one particular, and not 
exclusive, exhaustive, etc., way of thinking. In other words, by offering a viable 
alternative way of conceptualizing some object, Wittgenstein dissolves philosophical 
problems by showing that they arise in only one conceptualization.  
 However, such a comparative therapy faces a serious objection. To wit, if 
Wittgenstein's objects of comparison are not empirically factual, metaphysical, or 
normatively constitutive of actual language use, how do they relate to language and 
philosophical problems at all? What enables an object of comparison to function as a 
viable alternative way of thinking to our current one if it is but a whimsical product of 
the philosopher's imagination? Indeed, "does this not mean that philosophy becomes 
an idle game of coining possible… ways of looking at things?" (Kuusela (2008), 238). 
 To address this objection, Kuusela puts forward two additional features of 
comparative therapy and how it uses the objects of comparison. First, they must be 
problem-relative. Second, they must be culture-relative. Let us examine each.  
First, Kuusela notes that Wittgenstein "characterizes philosophical problems 
as arising from, or as the expressions of, misunderstandings concerning language" 
(ibid 17). Pursuant to this, "[p]hilosophical clarification addresses cases where it is 
not clear how to characterize and understand the use of expressions" (ibid 253). In 
other words, comparative therapy only begins once confusion has emerged and the 
goal of philosophy is to reach "complete clarity… understood as the complete 
disappearance of particular philosophical problems" (ibid 81. Cf. PI § 109). In turn, 
"[c]larification… is not a matter of imposing an alleged standard of correct language 
use on the interlocutor… but clarifying the interlocutor's language use to her on the 
basis of her own criteria" (ibid 79). And, critically, an object of comparison "qualifies 
as a clarification only insofar as it actually clarifies something. ‘To clarify', one might 
say, is a success verb" (ibid 247). In other words, Wittgenstein's objects of 
comparison are "instruments employed to dissolve actual philosophical problems that 
particular people have" (ibid 250). Thus, an object of comparison, or an alternative 
way of looking at the objects one is investigating, is not a mere idle fantasy but a tool 
designed explicitly to address a particular philosophical problem. Further, it is an apt 
tool only if it clarifies that problem. Thus, objects of comparison "gets its light- that is 
to say, its purpose- from the philosophical problems" (PI § 109) and this partly 
removes the worry that a philosopher offers mere fantasies.  
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However, the relativization of an object of comparison to a problem is not 
enough to make sense of comparative therapy. This is for two related reasons. One, it 
seems as though any contribution to a philosophical exchange- from "I have to go" to 
reading Tagore at people- can function as an object of comparison. Indeed, if the sole 
criterion that determines if an object of comparison relates to a problem is that the 
former clarifies the later, anything that clarifies is apt. Two, the emphasis on clarity 
and particular problems quickly collapses into a Baker-style person-relative therapy. 
In effect, if the only person who can determine if some object of comparison clarifies 
is the interlocutor, then clearly she, and only she can determine if a contribution to the 
exchange is apt. In turn, if clarification is person-relative, it is unclear why we should 
restrict ourselves to objects of comparison at all. If jumping up and down, somehow, 
clarifies for a person, then this too should count as an apt method. 
This leads us to the second feature of Kuusela's account of how comparative 
therapy uses objects of comparison, a form of culture-relativity. To begin, he insists 
that philosophical problems should not be "taken as merely psychological 
peculiarities of individuals" (Kuusela (2008), 44). Rather, they depend on the 
"intellectual backgrounds, i.e., the convictions that provide a background for the 
problem and constitute a context in which it is to be resolved" (ibid 249). Indeed, 
"[t]he proper object of philosophical therapy in Wittgenstein are tendencies of 
thinking that lead to the adoption of philosophically problematic. They are… 
expressions of broader cultural dispositions embedded in human life" (ibid 44- 
emphasis mine).  Further, "[p]hilosophical questions are posed in the language or 
languages spoken by those involved in the philosophical discussions and these 
languages have a historically contingent existence." (ibid 77) Indeed, this "conception 
of philosophical problems as historical [and cultural] phenomena has an important 
bearing on how one should understand the significance of philosophical work" (ibid 
273). Thus, a philosophical problem and the way of thinking that gives rise to it are 
not so idiosyncratic products of a particular individual's neurotic mind. Rather, they 
arise from a particular cultural milieu. In turn, this means that the relationship 
between a philosophical problem, understood as an expression of a cultural tendency, 
and an object of comparison can be related in a far less capricious way. In effect, an 
object of comparison relies on a shared cultural background to play a clarificatory role 
in a philosophical exchange. Thus, though the relationship between a philosophical 
problem and an object of comparison is not internal- i.e., there is no necessary 
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conceptual relationship between them- it is not arbitrary in the sense that a shared and 
tacit cultural background is assumed that guides the philosopher, and her conversation 
in partner, in accepting certain objects of comparison as clarificatory. For example, 
offering a particular interpretation of scripture in the 11th century AD may have 
effectively dissolved a philosophical problem then and today probably won't. In turn, 
Wittgenstein's "conception of philosophy arises as response to problems in a 
philosophical tradition in which he operates and gets its significance from its contrast 
with this tradition. Thus, were the tradition different, things that needed saying might 
be different too" (ibid 273).  
In turn, this cultural-relativity gives Kuusela the resources to answer the above 
to objections. The danger of person-relativity is avoided by simply insisting that a 
philosophical problem is not psychological but cultural. In turn, this means a focus on 
the will and re-education falls rather flat. The danger of any sort of contribution to the 
exchange doing potentially clarificatory work is not avoided but mitigated. In effect, 
what restricts the range is the shared cultural milieu. Thus, an object of comparison 
depends on the problem it is put forward to dissolve and a shared tacit cultural 
background that partly determines what the interlocutor accepts as clarificatory.  
In turn, this comparative methodology reaches Wittgenstein's goal by 
removing "a certain compulsion to continue doing philosophy" (ibid 50). In effect, by 
presenting someone with a viable object of comparison, or a different way to think 
about the objects of investigation, the philosophical problem dissolves because the 
alternative obviates the seeming intractability of the problem. In other words, an 
object of comparison helps us learn our way about (cf. PI § 123) by reminding us that 
the particular way we are looking at things is optional and that others exist.  
 
1.1.h Moderate Therapy-Mixed: Criticism 
 
  We focus on three objections to Kuusela's account. First, there is the assumed 
relationship between a philosophical problem, a cultural tendency, and comparative 
therapy. Second, there is the problem of how Kuusela relativizes objects of 
comparison to philosophical problems and culture. Third, there is the question of the 
philosophical discussion itself. 
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 First, recall that Kuusela insists that a philosophical problem arise in part 
from a cultural tendency. However, granting this assumption, I argue that comparative 
therapy is either unable to address the root cultural cause of the problem or else 
philosophical problems and culture cannot relate in the way Kuusela claims.  
The inability of comparative therapy to address the root cultural tendency is best seen 
by contrasting comparative therapy with proper historicism. Specifically, I have in 
mind Lukacs (1972), 83-222, and his attempt to clarify how philosophical concepts 
emerge from economic structures. To begin, proper historicism agrees with Kuusela 
that philosophical problems are, at base, generated by contingent historical-cultural-
economic settings.17 However, historicism further argues that the only way to dissolve 
a philosophical problem is to modify this cultural setting. Indeed, it is somewhat 
unclear how else to deal with a philosophical problem engendered by culture except 
by changing the culture. Thus, to remove a philosophical problem, it is not enough to 
merely present a different way of thinking about things. Instead, one must offer a 
different way of doing things- i.e. "[p]hilosophers have hitherto only interpreted the 
world in various ways; the point is to change it" (Marx (1998), 570). However, 
Kuusela cannot endorse proper historicism as it flatly contradicts Wittgenstein who 
claims philosophy "leaves everything as it is" (PI § 124) and that "a reform [of 
language or perhaps culture] for a particular practical purposes… may well be 
possible. However, these are not the cases we are dealing with" (PI § 132). 
Alternatively, Kuusela might insist that offering a new way of thinking can dissolve a 
philosophical problem while leaving the cultural substratum intact. However, it is 
quite opaque how this works. Indeed, the most plausible way to make sense of this is 
to argue that a philosophical problem is not generated by a cultural tendency in the 
first place. However, this quickly leads to the grammatical account, discussed in 
chapter four. Regardless, such a perspective simply abandons the supposed 
relationship between a philosophical problem and culture. 
  The second objection is focused on how Kuusela attempts to relativize objects 
of comparison to philosophical problems and culture. Recall that Kuusela insists that 
an object of comparison should be explicitly constructed with an aim at clarifying 
particular philosophical problems. He argued that this mitigates the worry that objects 
of comparison become idle ways of looking at things that do no real work. Also, 
                                                 
17 Kuusela (2008), 273, notes that some philosophical problems may be universal or transcultural. 
However, he gives no information about how to identify these, and so I bracket this. 
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recall Kusela also insisted that "to clarify" is a success-verb and a conversation 
partner decides if the clarification is apt. In turn, however, this threatens to collapse 
into person-relativity as the sole criterion for clarification is the conversation partner. 
Indeed, "grammatical investigation allows for demonstrations of inconsistencies only 
insofar as the interlocutor acknowledges each step of the demonstration" (Kuusela 
(2008), 245). To prevent this collapse into person-relativity, Kuuela also insists we 
should assume that the philosopher and the conversation partner share a cultural 
background that partly frames (not conceptually per se) what should do clarificatory 
work. In turn, this background is thought to give both a tacit sense of what sort of 
objects of comparison can do the clarificatory work. However, this raises a host of 
issues- e.g., how does one individuate a shared culture, what occurs when two people 
do not share this culture, etc. For example, an object of comparison that aims to 
clarify skepticism about other minds taken from Lacan will strike many analytic 
philosophers as unhelpful and many critical theorists as apt. Conversely, a discussion 
of the ‘grammar' of "pain" will strike many analytic philosophers as apt and many 
critical theorists as unhelpful. Does this mean the two groups are from different 
cultures? Further, if a Lacanian object of comparison does clarify for the critical 
theorists, it seems like it must be apt. In turn, this seems to imply that if I find reading 
the labels on food-products a suitable object of comparison that helps clarify the truth-
predicate, then it too is apt. Thus, the position does collapse into person-relativity and 
is faced with the objections given in section 1.2f. 
  The third problem is the way Kuusela's account frames a philosophical 
discussion. In effect, if a statement of rules is simply a fabricated object of 
comparison that an interlocutor is free to accept or reject and that can work only if the 
interlocutor feels it clarifies, then the relationship between comparative therapy and 
traditional philosophy becomes, at best, tentative and hard to understand. For 
example, Kuusela claims that a philosopher's contribution to an exchange "do not 
function… as premises in a deductive argument. Rather, the last inference is replaced 
by something of the form ‘you admit this and you admit that, so would you admit this 
too? If you do, would you not agree that there is an inconsistency?' In conceptual 
investigation there are demonstrations of inconsistencies only in this latter, 
clarificatory sense" (Kuusela (2008), 245). Such a conception of a philosophical 
discussion raises both an exegetical and a metaphilosophical worry. Exegetically, 
Wittgenstein insists that "philosophizing is: rejecting false arguments" (BT §87 p. 
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303). It is unclear what "rejecting false arguments" means on such a catholic view of 
discussion. Moreover, Wittgenstein also insists that pat of his method is based on “the 
calm ascertaining of linguistic facts” (BT § 92 p.316). Suffice it to say, it is rather 
unclear what “facts” means here if Wittgenstein is simply inventing his rules. 
Metaphilosophically, it seems to imply that a philosopher must accept any 
contribution that a conversation partner makes to a conversation, on pain of being 
dogmatic (e.g., Kuusela (2008), 215-64). Such a view is problematic for two reasons. 
One, as Glock (1991) notes, it renders comparative therapy and traditional philosophy 
incommensurate. If a philosopher cannot even point out internal inconsistencies in the 
view of her conversation partner, it is unclear why we should call her activity 
philosophy at all. Two, it infantilizes the conversation partner. To see this, assume 
that it is partly constitutive of an assertion that its direction of fit is word-to-world. In 
other words, the truth or falsity of the content of an assertion has to do with the way 
the world is rather than some subjective features of the asserter. Pursuant to this, part 
of pointing out inconsistencies in a conversation partner’s claims, noting that 
something she said is unsound, and so on, are simply taking her utterances as 
assertions whose content depends on the way the world is and not how she feels (or 
whatever). Also assume that, for Kuusela, a philosopher cannot point out 
inconsistencies, note that some utterance is unsound, and so on, as this is ‘unfair’ to 
the conversation partner. From this, it follows that a philosopher cannot treat the 
conversation partner as an asserter who is making assertion since the contributions of 
the conversation partner are not assessed in terms of their truth or consistency at all. 
Granting this, the philosopher deprives the conversation partner of her right to be 
wrong. Clearly this infantilizes her as we refuse to take her words seriously- i.e., as 
assertions whose content’s truth depends on the world.  
 
1.1.i Pure Therapy- PI 
 
 For pure therapy PI, we focus on Mulhall (2007) and, to some extent, (2001). 
However, note that Mulhall claims that "the primary preoccupation of this essay is 
that of critically evaluating the philosophical illumination that might be gained by 
attempting to transfer this originally Tractarian distinction between resolute [i.e., pure 
therapy-TLP] and substantial readings to the context of Wittgenstein's later 
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philosophy" (Mulhall (2007), 12). Thus, the text may simply be an experiment to see 
what such transference enables. Circumspect readers should keep this in mind. 
Regardless, as one would expect, pure therapy-TLP and pure therapy-PI have a fair 
amount in common. Specifically, both maintain that the sole cause of philosophical 
"problems" is that we are taken in by metaphysically sounding nonsense. Further, 
both also maintain that nonsense is monistic in that it is always caused by meaning 
privation and that there is only one kind of nonsense from a logical point of view. 
From here, the methodology Mulhall imputes to Wittgenstein is that of exposing 
monistic nonsense by demonstrating that philosophical "problems" fail to have 
assigned meaning to certain terms. In turn, exposing this nonsense reaches 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical goal of excising philosophy by showing that 
philosophical "problems" are, in reality, just monistic nonsense. First, I examine how 
pure therapy-PI argues that monistic nonsense is the only sort of nonsense in the PI. 
Second, granting this, I examine later Wittgenstein's methodology of uncovering 
meaning privation in philosophical "problems." Finally, I link this methodology to 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim. 
 To begin, pure therapy-PI argues that the sole cause of a philosophical 
"problem" is that it is, in reality, monistic nonsense. To understand this clearly, it is 
necessary to engage with and disable, an alternative reading of the PI that ascribes to 
the text additional kinds of nonsense. Indeed, much as pure therapy-TLP began by 
arguing that monistic nonsense is the only conception of nonsense operative in the 
TLP, so too must pure therapy-PI establish this for the PI. Such a not-just-monistic-
nonsense reading of the PI maintains that "nonsensicality is the result of the speaker 
attempting to conjoin intelligible words in unintelligible ways (conjunctions which 
violate their grammar, as opposed to violating their logical syntax)" (ibid 9). In other 
words, assume that the meaning of an expression is determined by constitutive rules 
for its use. Non-monistic nonsense arises when I attempt to use an expression in a 
way that does not accord with these constitutive rules. Let us call this form of non-
monistic nonsense, "grammatical nonsense."  
To establish that grammatical nonsense is not viable, Mulhall focuses on the 
private language discussion (roughly PI § 243- § 315). This focus is apt as, especially 
in these sections, Wittgenstein seems to "to lay down the law" (Mullhall (2007), 19) 
and his grammatical statements seem to tap "into a given, impersonal, source of 
authority" (ibid 66). Specifically, a grammatical nonsense reading of these sections 
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maintains that "Wittgenstein shows that, given the meaning of words in the 
interlocutor's penultimate sentence [i.e. ‘[t]he individual words of this language are to 
refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private 
sensations' (PI 243)], the idea of a private language that he attempts to construct out 
of them must be nonsensical or incoherent, a violation of grammar. § 244 unfolds the 
grammar of ‘referring' and ‘sensation'; §246 and § 253 remind us of the grammar of 
‘privacy' of ‘sensation… [And the goal is] showing that the private linguist cannot 
legitimately appropriate them [e.g. ‘referring' ‘sensation' ‘privacy']'" (ibid, 18) In 
short, "grammar is a limitation on our capacities for speech and thought—that it 
deprives us of something" (ibid 10). As it were, we cannot use expression e in a way 
that contravenes the rules that govern the use of expression e. 
 With this in view, pure therapy-PI offers three arguments that aim to show 
that grammatical nonsense is not viable. First, Mulhall claims that "Wittgenstein does 
not assert that his interlocutor's questions [claims, etc.] are nonsensical- unintelligible, 
a violation of the bounds of sense" (Mulhall (2001), 117). In other words, 
exegetically, if Wittgenstein accepts the existence of grammatical nonsense, we 
should expect to find points where later Wittgenstein cites a grammatical rule to his 
interlocutor and declares her pseudo-assertions out of bounds. However, Mulhall 
argues that Wittgenstein does not do this. Indeed, an overriding focus of Mulhall 
(2007) is showing exactly this. Regardless, it is prima facie defensible that 
Wittgenstein's way of engaging with the possibility of a supposedly private language 
does not readily reduce to simply citing rules. 
Second, pure therapy-PI argues that grammatical nonsense is problematic 
because it places a philosopher in a privileged position she has no right to assume. In 
turn, this "amounts to failing to take one's interlocutor seriously—failing to 
acknowledge her" (ibid 83). Indeed, grammatical nonsense is predicated, according to 
pure therapy-PI, on "philosophical illusions—in particular, the illusion that our 
everyday understanding of language… is in need of the support or authority of a 
philosophical theory" (ibid 7). Pace this, however, pure therapy-PI insists that 
grammar, and the charge of nonsense, "can have authority over the sceptic [or 
interlocutor] only if he freely acknowledges it does so" (ibid 83). This is for several 
reasons. One critical one is the following. Pure therapy-PI insists that many terms in 
natural language are multifaceted in such a way that a uniform account of the rules 
that govern their use is inherently problematic  (e.g., Mulhall (2007), 118). For 
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example, Mulhall (2007), 44-46, following Cavell (2002), 238-67, notes that the verb 
"to know" has several independent and non-epistemic uses (e.g., confessional, 
emphatic, etc.). Granting this, consider someone who says, during her daughter's 
funeral, "only I know my pain!" This use of "to know" does not betoken a 
grammatical nonsense so much as a non-epistemic use of "to know." However, trying 
to establish that this is so in a non-contextual way that relies solely on examining 
constitutive rules that govern the use of "to know" is rather hard to make out. Thus, 
the primary point is that an expression in natural language may have several closely 
related though irreducible and non-uniform uses. And assuming that there is one core 
use is something Wittgenstein takes pains to warn us away from (e.g., PI § 23).  
Third, pure therapy-PI maintains that grammatical nonsense rests on an 
inherently flawed conception of grammar itself. Specifically, Mulhall claims that 
grammatical nonsense rests on the assumption that there is a "predetermined structure 
of grammatical rules" (Mulhall (2001), 58). In turn, this assumption of a 
predetermined structure of rules casts grammatical nonsense as rather like trying to 
play football with a hockey stick. Pace this, pure therapy-PI offers two interrelated 
arguments against this predetermined view of grammar. One, it stresses that natural 
language has a flexibility and projectability that does not readily reduce to rigid and 
predetermined rules (Mulhall (2001), e.g., 52-118 & (2008), e.g., 96-111). For 
example, the constitutive rules that governed "mouse" in the 1950s were surely 
something like "the word ‘mouse' applies correctly to furry small rodents." However, 
a coterminous feature of its use was that the animals it correctly applies to typically 
have long tails. Later, an engineer, Bill English, began to apply "mouse," based on 
this conterminous feature, to a computer part (e.g., English (1965)). This casts doubt 
on our ability to properly isolate out a constitutive rule from a conterminous feature. 
Two, Mulhall insists that  "grammatical investigations [are]… simply deploying our 
everyday capacity… that can equally be claimed by any competent speaker" (ibid 10). 
This quote implies that knowing the grammar of a language is basically the same as 
knowing how to speak and understand the language. Granting this, however, the 
function of both grammatical nonsense and reminders becomes problematic. For 
grammatical nonsense, it is unclear what it means to claim that someone both already 
knows the rules and then unwittingly fails to follow them. Indeed, if she speaks and 
understands the language in question, how does she lose track of this ability? For the 
function of a reminder, Mulhall notes that a grammatical nonsense account sees a 
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reminder as reminding us of "the limits of sense, and thereby identify a region or 
domain that lies beyond those limits, from which we are excluded" (Mulhall (2007), 
9). However, if we already know the grammar, what are we reminding the person of 
(ibid 60)? How has she fallen into nonsense if she speaks the language just fine? 
Thus, pure therapy-PI argues that any conception of nonsense apart from 
monistic nonsense is untenable in that the most plausible form of non-monistic-
nonsense does not work. Granting this, let us turn to the philosophical methodology it 
imputes to later Wittgenstein. To begin, pure therapy-PI claims that "Wittgenstein 
tries to imagine, and then tries out, certain ways of giving meaning to the constituent 
terms of the interlocutor's formulations" (Mulhall (2001), 18). In other words, the 
methodology aims to "inhabit the sceptic's [or philosopher's] perspective" (Mulhall 
(2007), 83) and expose it as unimaginable. Notice that, like pure therapy-TLP, pure 
therapy-PI invokes imaginative identification with the speaker of nonsense.  
However, pure therapy-PI is far more precise and specific about what enables 
such imaginative identification as well as how such identification helps uncover 
monistic nonsense. For what enables the identification, pure therapy-PI understands 
the imaginative identification in psychoanalytic terms. Indeed, imaginative 
identification is "therapeutic in purpose; hence it is concerned with understanding the 
complex desires, intentions, fantasies and confusions that find expressions in the 
interlocutor's contributions… Hence, our involvement in such dialogues necessarily 
involves us in a mode of psychological undertaking" (Mulhall (2001), 56). Further, 
pursuant to this, such a psychoanalytic account of imaginative identification is 
person-relative. Thus, "an analytic treatment could be deemed to reach closure… only 
with the patient's acknowledgment of the correctness of the analyst's interpretation" 
(ibid 92).  Further, though Mulhall offers three glosses as to how to understand this 
sort of imaginative psychoanalytic identification (e.g., Mulhall (2007), 89-95), he 
focuses on one in particular. This "psychoanalytic model of philosophical questions 
[that]… suggest the mutual imbrication of philosophy and the everyday… and its 
model for therapeutic treatment would correspondingly put in question the authority 
otherwise invested in the analyst over the patient" (Mulhall (2007), 92). Pursuant to 
this, the account stresses "not only transference, but counter-transference: the drives 
and impulses at work in the patient, and so his understanding of his analyst, are just as 
much at work in the analyst's understanding of his patient and their relationship" (ibid 
92). In other words, the philosopher and the interlocutor are related by an imaginative 
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identification with each other that relies on transference and countertransference. In 
sum, I imaginatively identify with the utterer of monistic nonsense, she imaginatively 
identifies with me, and this mutuality is what enables me to help uncover nonsense. 
For how the imaginative identification uncovers monistic nonsense, pure 
therapy-PI claims that once we have imaginatively identified with each other, we can 
begin to show a speaker that "her utterances hover between two very different 
possibilities of sense or meaning without ever actualizing either. Once the necessity of 
separating out those two possibilities is made clear to her, she will see that there is 
nothing here to be said—no claim of the kind she took herself to be making" (Mulhall 
(2001), 42). In other words, we work together to try to imagine what her claim means 
by, e.g., embedding it in a language-game (cf. PI § 1 & § 2). If this embedding cannot 
be achieved, the seeming claim of the interlocutor does not have a unique sense 
(Mulhall (2007), 111-123 & (2001), 55-58). Thus, she has failed to assign to it a 
meaning and it is monistic nonsense. However, it is imperative to realize that this 
method of exposing nonsense requires the consent of the conversation partner to 
function. Indeed, "the ordinary language philosopher is at the mercy of his opponent, 
in that a test of the pertinence of his criticism must be whether those to who it is 
directed" (Mulhall (2007), 84).  
In turn, this methodology of imaginative identification does, in fact, fulfill 
Wittgenstein's goal of alleviating a philosophical problem. In effect, we help the 
person come to see that her philosophical "problem" is monistic nonsense by helping 
her try (and fail) to imagine what it might mean. In turn, she should realize that the 
problem is nonsense and so frees herself from its torment.  
  
1.1.j Pure Therapy-PI: Criticism: 
 
  Pure therapy-PI has at least three problems. First, there is the question of the 
supposed link between imaginative identification and psychoanalysis. Second, there is 
the question of respect for and acknowledgement of the conversation partner. Third, 
there are the problems with person-relativity.  
The first problem is the nature of psychoanalysis as Mulhall envisions it. To 
begin, Mulhall attempts to interpret "[t]he philosopher treats a question; like an 
illness" (PI 255) in a psychoanalytic way so as to avoid the unpleasant thought that 
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"philosophy itself is essentially diseased- a pathology of human culture, something 
that purely and simply damages the realm of the ordinary" (Mulhall (2007), 91). 
Indeed, such a "diseased" reading has the consequence that "the best of all possible 
worlds would be one in which the [philosophical] question never put down roots" 
(ibid). However, Mulhall is also wary of a purely psychoanalytic reading in that such 
a reading casts the philosopher in a problematic light. Specifically, within a 
psychoanalytic context, it is undeniable that an asymmetric relationship between 
analyst and analysand emerges. Indeed, though very muddy, I think Lacan (1991)'s 
basic point is that the analysand must believe that the analyst can help restore her to 
sanity. Without this assumption, the therapeutic exchange breaks down. To avoid this 
asymmetric dynamic, and the very carefully constructed contexts it brings with it (i.e., 
a silent office, a therapist who may never talk, etc.), Mulhall stresses counter-
transference. In effect, the reciprocity between the philosopher and the interlocutor 
emerge because of transference and counter-transference. The problem, though, is that 
this stress belies the psychoanalytic model under almost any gloss. Indeed, Freud 
writes that "the problem of counter-transference…  [t]heoretically… much easier to 
solve... One must… always recognize one's counter-transference and overcome it." 
(Freud's letter to Fitcher (2003), 112-emphasis mine). Thus, for Freud, counter-
transference is not a precondition of proper analysis but a hindrance to it, pace 
Mulhall. Matters are made even more difficult to understand as Mulhall also claims 
that a philosophical-psychoanalytic counter-transference based methodology assumes 
that "the idea of treatment are continuous with the disease under treatment" (Mulhall 
(2007), 93). Suffice it to say, Freud was not a ‘hysterical' woman and Lacan not a 
victim of the holocaust. Thus, the insistence on equality between philosopher and 
interlocutor undermines the very preconditions for psychoanalysis to function. 
Succinctly, a analysand must assume that her analyst can help her and Mulhall, at 
least implicitly, denies this by denying the asymmetry it carries with it. 
  The second problem emerges naturally from this- to wit, the role of the 
interlocutor for pure therapy-PI. Pure therapy-PI stresses that the philosopher and the 
interlocutor are on equal footing. Indeed, such emphasis on equality is part of why 
pure therapy-PI finds grammatical nonsense untenable. The philosopher has no access 
to the constitutive rules that determine the use of terms so that she can declare some 
claim on the interlocutor's part to be (grammatical) nonsense. This insistence on 
equality may be a laudable in most contexts. However, it is undermined by an 
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assumption that pure therapy-PI is committed to. To wit, pure therapy-PI necessarily 
assumes that all philosophical "claims" are vitiated by monistic nonsense. However, 
this, if anything, places the philosopher in a far more unequal position than either 
traditional philosophy or other accounts of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy (be they 
moderate therapeutic or otherwise). In effect, the philosopher necessarily assumes that 
the content of talk about possible words, or about God, or any other philosophical 
"claim," really just is monistic nonsense. As it were, the philosopher knows that the 
interlocutor's "claims" are not about what she thinks they are about as monistic 
nonsense is not “about” anything. Suffice it to say, such an assumption, and the 
related focus on the questioner, is the height of arrogant disrespect.  
  Following from this, third, it becomes opaque how this method and 
philosophy relate at all. This criticism was noted for both pure and moderate therapy- 
mixed. In effect, the philosophical question, the questioner and her psychology, and 
the contributions of a philosopher cannot be aligned in such a way that they have any 
bearing on philosophy. The lack of an internal relationship between problem and 
answer make the entire exchange opaque. Simply put, we do not know why a 
conversation partner tries to utter monistic nonsense, how our ‘imaginative 
identification’ can help, or what role philosophy is supposed to play in this sort of 
therapy. 
   
1.1.k Moderate Therapy-PI: 
 
  The thinker we engage with here is, in many ways, the most complex and 
challenging of all the therapists- Cavell. These difficulties arise for many reasons 
including Cavell's commitment to a unique version of metaphilosophy, his refusal to 
separate out style from thought, and his engagement with “heterodox” thinkers. As 
much as possible, I bracket these concerns. First, I discuss the interpretation of the 
nature of, and origin of, philosophical problems that Cavell imputes to Wittgenstein. 
Second, I examine how this ascription leads to Cavell's claim that Wittgenstein's 
philosophical methodology is genetic. In other words, it aims to trace philosophical 
problems back to their source and offer an alternative way of responding to them. 
Finally, third, I discuss how this genetic therapy aligns with the metaphilosophical 
aim of removing a philosophical problem and so returning us to the ordinary. 
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To begin, Cavell imputes to Wittgenstein a unique account of the nature of 
philosophical problems. There are several interconnected aspects of this account. 
First, Cavell insists that Wittgenstein is "not led to philosophical reflections from his 
own voice… but from, as it were being accosted. The accosting is by someone 
Wittgenstein cares about and has to take seriously" (Cavell (1996 a), 263). In other 
words, a philosophical problem is ‘external' in that it does not arise either as a normal 
practical problem or emerge from the complex dynamics of a scientific research 
program and its investigation of nature. Instead, something provokes philosophy. 
Second, this account of the ‘externality' of philosophical problems is partly a 
ramification of the metaphilosophy Cavell has and imputes to Wittgenstein. 
Specifically, Cavell assumes that "philosophy is best viewed not as a set of problems 
but as a set of texts. This means to me that the contribution of a philosopher… to the 
subject of philosophy is not to be understood as a contribution to… a set of given 
problems" (Cavell (1979), 3). This textual conception carries with it several critical 
aspects. One, part of the difference between a philosophical problem and other 
problems is that the former depends on texts. Two, texts, reading, a reading, and 
readers hang together in a complex and interdependent way. Though this nexus is 
critical to Cavell, he does not, as far as I am aware, develop it systematically in a 
single work. However, partly following Rudrun (2013), 1-24, a critical thought is that 
reading is a form of responsiveness on the part of the reader to the text. Indeed, 
"reading seems to tell me what kind of understanding or interpretation I might aspire 
to" (Cavell (1979) 363). Furthermore, the text simply does not exist independently of 
a reader responding to marks on a page in a particular way. In turn, three, this means 
that a philosophical problem depends on a specific sort of response that a philosopher 
has with a text. Four, texts are to be understood in the broadest sense to include oral 
discussions (Cavell (1979), 5), bodies (ibid, 363-4), etc. Indeed, "[s]ome philosophers 
are able to make about anything into a philosophical text" (ibid 4). Finally, five, one 
critical feature for something- a situation, a book with marks, etc.,- to become a text 
in Cavell's broad sense is that it calls for and depends on a reading. Though difficult 
to fully articulate, the idea is reminiscent of Heidegger (Rudrum (2013), 246, points 
this out).18 To use a well-worn example, when the hammer is fine, we happily 
hammer along. We do not think about the hammer, how to use it, its physical 
                                                 
18 Cavell (1979), 240-243, hints at this point. 
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properties, and so on. Indeed, here we see "a way of grasping [a hammer]… which is 
not an interpretation" (PI 201). Then, the hammer breaks, and we are suddenly struck 
by it as a brute physical object. When this happens, we begin "reading" the situation 
and trying to understand what has happened, what went wrong, etc. The situation of a 
breakdown provokes a reading precisely because it runs against our normal 
expectations, ways of doing things, etc. I note here that I follow Cavell in using both 
text and reading in these wide ways. In sum, a philosophical problem depends on a 
philosopher responding to a text, i.e., a situation that disrupts or breaks our 
expectations, in a particular manner. 
Third, responding to a text philosophically and thereby generating a 
philosophical problem, means responding to it in a testing manner conditioned by 
doubt. Indeed, a "philosopher appealing to everyday language turns to the reader not 
to convince him without proof but to get him to prove something, test something, 
against himself" (Cavell (2002), 95). Furthermore, this accounts for why a mark of a 
great philosopher is her ability to insert a question, to raise a doubt, etc., in a novel 
way. In turn, this means that a philosophical response is always of danger of 
collapsing into skepticism. Further, given that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim is 
removing these philosophical problems, it also means that his "teaching is everywhere 
controlled by a response to skepticism" (Cavell (1979), 7). In sum, a philosophical 
response is a form of testing against a background of doubt, and this is always in 
danger of collapsing into skepticism.   
Finally, fourth, and most critically, a "philosopher's originating question –e.g. 
‘(How) do (can) we know anything about the world?'…- is a response to… a real 
experience which takes hold of human beings" (ibid 140). Cavell's discussion is quite 
convincing here (ibid, 129-246 but especially 135-54). The process has four phases, it 
seems to me. To begin, one, imagine that one meets a friend and as carefully as 
possible-e.g., ensuring that the lighting is good, that one writes with deliberateness, 
etc.- one writes down her phone number. Later, one calls the number, and it turns out 
to be wrong. Two, this error demands a ‘reading’ in that one usually gets phone 
numbers right in such situations. So what went wrong here? How could I have gotten 
this wrong? Three, one possible reading is philosophical. Such a reading moves from 
the local failure, e.g., the miswritten phone number, to questions concerning my entire 
cognitive relation with the world, e.g., the veridical status of any of my perceptions. 
As it were, if I was wrong in such an ideal context, how can I be sure that I am ever 
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right? And this reading makes the situation into a philosophical text. Less 
metaphorically, one might respond to this rupture with the ordinary in a philosophical 
and questioning way, as discussed above. Four, this text quickly produces a host of 
intractable philosophical problems. Thus, one asks what epistemic standards and 
safeguards I relied on to justify my belief to have written the number correctly? If I 
had claimed to know my friend's number, does this imply that knowledge if inherently 
fallible? Did I really know my friend's number or did I just believe I did? If the later, 
what marks the difference between knowing and believing?  Moreover, given that I 
cannot ‘step outside my head' and record my friend's number ‘independently' of my 
auditory perception, am I really justified in believing these perceptions? And so on. 
Thus, for moderate therapy-PI, a philosophical problem is a particular 
response to a situation where something goes wrong. This response is defined by 
testing as against a background of doubt. Also, very quickly, this testing leads one to 
the profoundly uncomfortable problem that we have no justification for assuming that 
we have reliable access to an external world, to the thought that the supposed stability 
of the world may not really exist, etc. 
From here, moderate therapy-PI imputes to Wittgenstein a genetic 
methodology to ameliorate these skeptical philosophical problems. This genetic 
therapy begins by assuming that "'What we do is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use' (116)… Why does that help?... my suggestion, 
essentially, was: It shows us that we did not know what we were saying, what we 
were doing to ourselves" (Cavell (2002), 62). For example, a person who says "I 
doubt the existence of material objects" seems to have assumed she knows the 
concept ‘material objects' so that she can doubt the existence of the things that ‘fall 
under' the concept. However, this attempt to doubt material objects while maintaining 
that the concept of ‘material objects' is fine, quickly implodes on itself, according to 
moderate therapy-PI. Either the skepticism is forced into a higher gear wherein the 
doubter is no longer sure of the semantics of her doubt. Moreover, when this occurs, 
moderate therapy-PI says "that when the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air 
what vanishes was already air, revealing a non-scene of destruction" (Cavell (1991), 
69). Alternatively, the skeptic is reminded of something she already knows, 
something that she forgot that led her to her confusion. To wit, she is reminded that 
the concept ‘material object' and her expression "I doubt the existence of material 
objects" depend on her having learnt a language. In turn, in "learning language, you 
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do not merely learn the pronunciations of sounds, and their grammatical orders, but 
the ‘forms of life' which make those sounds the words they are, do what they do" 
(Cavelll (1979), 177). And this learnt language brings into play certain stable features, 
responses, etc., that need to ordinarily be in place for words to do what they do. In 
other words, error, a break with our normal expectations, etc., only make sense 
granted that, ordinarily, things move along smoothing (e.g., OC passim). In the case 
of skepticism, the concept ‘material object’ presupposes a host of practices and uses 
that engender the meanings of the term. Further, these uses presuppose that there are 
material objects we handle in certain ways. Granting this, Wittgenstein, according to 
Cavell, aims to remind us that our supposed doubt concerning material objects 
presupposes material objects to get going in the first place. 
Thus, the genetic methodology returns to the origin of the philosophical 
response and seeks to show that such a response must both "be the investigation of a 
concrete claim if its procedure is to be coherent [e.g. we start with miswritten 
telephone numbers, wax balls, etc.]; [and that] it cannot be the investigation of the 
concrete claim if its conclusion is to be general [e.g., the philosophical response that 
calls all knowledge claims into question]; Without the coherence it would not have 
the obviousness it has seemed to have; without the generality is conclusion would not 
be skeptical" (ibid 2002). In other words, and more abstractly, genetic therapy 
attempts to show that a philosophical response always distorts the context in which 
the situation occurs. We respond philosophically only when we repress the contextual 
features and things we already know. In turn, this repressed context enables a sort of 
generalization from particular cases to a grand philosophical claim. Indeed, "[i]t is 
difficult not to exaggerate in philosophy" (BT § 89 p.309). Further, by pointing this 
repressed context out, genetic therapy aims at the "breaking of such control [e.g., a 
philosophical response to a problematic situation] is the constant purpose of the later 
Wittgenstein… [it is] intent upon unmasking the defeat of our real need in the face of 
self-impositions which we have not assessed (PI § 108) or fantasies.. which we cannot 
escape (PI § 115)" (Cavell (2002), 72). Indeed, in this key, "Wittgensteinian 
methods… [are] an effort to free ourselves from philosophy's chronic wish to instill 
our words with, or require of them, magic… by reminding us of ordinary cases in 
which words have their genuine effect" (Cavell (2005 b), 295). In other words, what a 
philosophical response forgets is that words mean only given our ways with them and 
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the contexts these presuppose. And this means that the words cannot mean properly 
within a rarified philosophical "context.” 
In turn, genetic therapy reaches Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical aim of 
ameliorating a philosophical problem by returning with it to its root source. It then 
examines not so much the problem as the situation that provoked it. And it seeks to 
remind the philosopher that her reaction to the situation, her framing the situation as a 
text that generates the problem, distorts and represses the context she finds herself in. 
In turn, ideally, the reminders that moderate therapy-PI offers to the philosopher help 
her control and moderate her response. Indeed, though there is "there is no absolute 
escape from (the threat of) illusions and the desires constructed from them… no 
therapy for this in the sense of cure for it" (Cavell (2002), xx), reminders can help " to 
free the human being from the chains of delusions [e.g., a particular philosophical 
problem]" (Cavell (2005 a), 293). In sum, by showing that a particular response is, at 
least partly, optional, we gain control of it and alleviate philosophical disquiet.  
 
1.1.l Moderate Therapy-PI: Criticisms: 
 
The version of moderate therapy-PI described above, and ascribed to Cavell, 
has two problems we focus on. First, there is the problem of the relationship between 
the original situation that provokes philosophical text, a philosophical 
response/problem, and therapy. Second, there is the question of the ordinary and the 
end(s) of philosophy. 
The first problem is how a problematic situation, a philosophical response or 
reading the situation as a philosophical text, a philosophical problem that emerges 
from this response, and genetic therapy relate. Specifically, genetic therapy is unclear 
as to how Wittgenstein's methodology manages to address and dissolve a 
philosophical problem. This has two aspects. One, moderate therapy-PI is unclear 
about how the origin and structure of a philosophical problem relate. Two, moderate 
therapy is unclear about what is uniquely philosophical about its genetic therapy. Let 
us take each in turn. 
One, a critical lacuna in moderate therapy-PI is that it fails to account for the 
relationship between the origin of a philosophical problem and the structure that a 
philosophical problem has. Without an account of this relationship moderate therapy-
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PI runs the risk of committing a genetic fallacy. To see this clearly, let us grant to 
moderate therapy-PI that philosophy begins as a particular response to a problematic 
situation or break with the ordinary. One writes a phone number carefully and with all 
possible care, and it is still wrong. Then one is lead to respond with deep doubt 
concerning, e.g., the veridical nature of our senses. In turn, moderate therapy-PI 
assumes that this response, this reading of the situation as a philosophical text, 
engenders a philosophical problem- i.e., external world skepticism and a demand for 
apodictic knowledge. Notice, critically, a vital mark of this philosophical problem, 
and others like it, in Wittgenstein, is that they concern essence, necessity, or 
exceptionless generality. The philosophical problem that emerges from the incorrect 
phone number manifests itself as a demand for airtight, infallible, and apodictic x that 
cannot be wrong or doubted. However, moderate therapy-PI is utterly unclear as to 
why philosophical problems have this unique structure. Succinctly, why do we jump 
from doubt, a philosophical response, to a demand for apodictic certainty, the form of 
a philosophical problem? In turn, such a lacuna may doom genetic therapy as it does 
not really engage with a philosophical problem per se. In other words, the focus on 
how a philosophical problem emerges holds in abeyance what the problem actually 
asks after, what a solution would be, and, most importantly, the structure of a 
philosophical problem within Wittgenstein. Moreover, this is a genetic fallacy in that 
it assumes understanding the origin is the same as understanding the problem. Indeed, 
Cavell notes that "[a]ccepting the ‘thing-world' is just accepting the world, and what 
kind of choice do we have about that? (I don't say there isn't one)" (ibid, 242). This 
parenthetical comment shows that Cavell seems to admit that the genetic story he 
offers still does not quite deal with the philosophical problem properly.  
Two, it is somewhat unclear what is distinctively philosophical about a 
philosophical genetic therapy. Indeed, Cavell notes that "to know what constitutes its 
[the PI's of the TLP] criticism would be to know what constitutes philosophy" (Cavell 
(1979), 3), knowledge Cavell thinks we do not yet have. I find this metaphilosophical 
honesty deeply laudable. Indeed, I cannot help but agree with Cavell that today, 
nearly 2500 years later, we still are not quite sure what a mad bricklayer was doing 
when he accosted aristocrats and demanded that they explain themselves in a manner 
akin to shoemakers or mathematicians. In turn, this leads Cavell to ascribe 
philosophical reflection to, e.g., movies (cf. Cavell (2005 b), 61-82), Shakespeare (cf. 
Cavell (2002), 267-356), Freud (cf. Cavell (2005 a)), and so on. 
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 However, and very much in the spirit of Wittgenstein, our inability to give an 
airtight definition of what philosophy is, in some set of unified, reified, necessary and 
sufficient conditions, does not thereby mean anything should count as philosophical 
(e.g., P §I 67). In other words, noting that “philosophy” is a family resemblance term 
is not the same as claiming that “anything goes!” Further, Wittgenstein insists on that 
certain features are "not philosophy; but it is its raw materials" (PI § 254) and is quite 
keen to distinguish at least one field of research, i.e., science, from philosophy (PI § 
109). Thus, using Freud, films, Shakespeare, etc., as raw materials to help develop 
and grapple with a philosophical problem is not the same as treating them as a 
philosophical per se, any more than looking at the history of science gives, without 
ado, lessons for philosophy of science. Indeed, history and Freud can sharpen our 
swords and help remind us of salient facts as we do philosophy- e.g., pace a whole 
tradition in philosophy of mind, my mental states may be opaque to me; pace 
positivism, there is no magical method that all science always uses and that, 
somehow, the dastardly Catholic church managed to suppress for a period of around 
1000 years. However, these points are not philosophical in themselves exactly 
because they do not relate to philosophy correctly- they are raw materials for 
philosophy than philosophy itself. To ignore this distinction is deleterious for two 
reasons. One, it makes it unclear why there are, in fact, certain forms of response that 
count as philosophical and some that do not. Indeed, even in supposedly "extreme" 
cases, it is critical to note that Derrida deconstructs philosophers and not phonebooks 
and Foucault's archeology focuses on knowledge and not fashionable footwear 
whereas Katie Perry sings fun pop music and Iago manipulates people. The former 
two count as philosophy and the later two are, at best, raw materials for it. By not 
minding the gap between raw material and philosophy, moderate therapy-PI may just 
cease to be philosophical at all. Two, pursuant to one, moderate therapy-PI threatens 
to let in far too much. As with Baker, Kuusela, and Mulhall, the danger is that 
showing someone a Katie Perry music video may count as a genetic philosophical 
intervention (if it, e.g., helps someone get a handle on her bad habits by reminding her 
that she has a body) just as much as careful reflection on Frege’s writings. Thus, there 
is no principled way to designate some responses as philosophical, others as not, and 
pursuant to this, to maintain any difference between philosophy and raw materials.  
The second problem is Cavell's rather odd fetishization of the ordinary. To 
begin, for Cavell, a philosophical problem emerges as a response to a break in the 
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ordinary or a problematic situation that we do not typically come across. Indeed, "[a] 
philosophical problem has the form: I don't know19 my way about" (PI 123). In this 
sense, there is a deeply interesting alignment between Wittgenstein and many other 
thinkers in philosophy. For all, a moment of wonder, of being struck by something 
unordinary, is the moment that begins philosophy. However, whereas most other 
thinkers20 valorize the extraordinary, Cavell insists that Wittgenstein lionizes the 
ordinary. Frustratingly, however, Cavell is terribly vague on what he means by the 
ordinary. I follow his lead in trading on intuitions more than nailing what "ordinary" 
means. In all cases, what is critical for Cavell that there be a sharp distinction between 
the ordinary and philosophy since, without this, the entire point of philosophical 
therapy is lost. Indeed, Wittgenstein aims at "reminding us of the ordinary cases in 
which words have their genuine effect, a process that invites disappointment, since on 
its first approach it seems to deprive us of, rather than to give us, something precious" 
(Cavell (2005), 295). I take this, in part, to mean that Wittgenstein aims to deflate our 
sense of the extraordinary- to return us to the normal. 
However, imputing to Wittgenstein this valorization of the ordinary in Cavell's 
sense seems to misfire in at least two ways. One, the PI does not seem nearly as 
committed to the ordinary as Cavell makes it out to be. To begin, Wittgenstein tell us 
that "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if 
possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI preface 4). Simply put, it is 
unclear why Wittgenstein would want to do this by Cavell's lights. For Cavell, 
philosophy emerges as a flawed response to a break in the ordinary. Moreover, the 
point of philosophical therapy is dissolving this flawed response. In contrast, this 
quote seems to mean that Wittgenstein, far from wanting to dissolve philosophy, 
wants to provoke it. Further, consider Wittgenstein’s extraordinary examples- e.g., 
robotic shopping trips (PI §1), tribes who speak only in tongues (PI § 528), reading-
machines (PI § 156), meaning-blindness (e.g. PI II xi § 261),lions speaking (PI II xi § 
327), having a soul (e.g. PI II iv § 22). None of these are ordinary, yet Wittgenstein 
seems to utilize them exactly to remind us how extraordinary our life with language 
is. A reader may object that these extraordinary examples are meant as ‘objects of 
comparison’ that help bring the ordinary into view. This may be true but it does not 
                                                 
19 The German verb, kennen, is much closer to the English “know by acquaintance” or “be familiar 
with" than to propositional "know that" 
20 See, e.g., Plato Theaetetus, 155c-d, Aristotle Metaphysics, 982b. 
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seem to help Cavell as even such objects of comparison threaten to disrupt the 
ordinary and provoke philosophy. Finally, consider Wittgenstein’s insistence that 
“[m]an has to awaken to wonder- and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of 
sending him to sleep again” (CV p. 53); “[t]his running against the walls of our cage 
[i.e., trying to speak about absolute matters like ethics] is perfectly absolutely 
hopeless…. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally 
cannot help respecting deeply and would not for my life ridicule it” (PO p. 44), and so 
on. Suffice it to say, these are odd things for a champion of the “ordinary,” in Cavell’s 
sense, to say.  
Two, and more pressing for Cavell, is that Wittgenstein simply seems to reject 
the binary opposition between ordinary and not. For example, the joking builders (PI 
§ 42) can be read as beginning from a language game that has rigidly defined ordinary 
bounds. Yet Wittgenstein himself raises the possibility of a "violation" of this 
supposedly rigid bound and the sort of playful response it might engender. Indeed, 
"[a]nd is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? 
And even where we alter them—as we go along" (PI § 83). Part of what Wittgenstein 
seems to be stressing here is a feature that Cavell is at once deeply attuned to (cf 
(Cavell (1979), 168-190) and seems to disable in this context. To wit, we project our 
words and practices into new contexts in novel, dare I say, extraordinary ways. 
Indeed, if ordinary means stock or standard use or usage in some intuitive sense, 
Cavell's own account seems to run counter to it. However, if ordinary does not mean 
stock, then it is entirely unclear how to understand the dichotomy in the first place. 
Further, Wittgenstein himself seems to anticipate exactly this when he notes that 
"[d]oes everything that we do not find conspicuous make an impression of 
inconspicuousness? Does what is ordinary always make the impression of 
ordinariness?" (PI § 600). Answering this question negatively obliterates the 
distinction between ordinary and philosophical, as Cavell draws it, and so 
problematizes the very idea of therapy. Indeed, "[d]on't for heaven's sake, be afraid of 
talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense" (CV p. 56). I take this 
quote, partly, to mean that the fanatical insistence that we stop doing philosophy, that 
we accept the ordinary and stop talking nonsense, does not interest Wittgenstein.  
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1.2 Therapy- Common Motifs and Common Criticisms: 
 
 In closing, I pull back from the fairly fine-grained analysis of possible 
therapeutic interpretations and address therapy itself. First, I discuss three common 
threads that run through all of these various sub-types. Second, I present a criticism of 
each thread. 
 Though heterogeneous, there are obvious common threads all the therapeutic 
interpretations of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. First, a philosophical problem or 
question is not as essential as the questioner. Indeed, the emphasis on the person 
rather than the philosophical points is a critical facet of therapy. Second, therapy 
argues that its method gives the conversation partner the respect and acknowledgment 
she deserves. Indeed, the standard hostility to "standard" or "substantial" accounts of 
Wittgenstein, and “tradition philosophy” more generally, is predicated on precisely 
this. Whereas the standard readings place the philosopher in a privileged position as 
someone who can distinguish between sense and nonsense, the therapeutic reading 
abdicates this ability and, by doing so, respects the conversation partner. Third, there 
is an irreducible analogy between illness and therapy, on the one hand, and 
philosophy and therapy, on the other. In turn, the most likely way to cash out this 
analogy is to argue that since philosophy is some sort of departure from the ordinary 
course of life, it is akin to a sickness. So the goal of philosophical therapy is returning 
the conversation partner to the normal course of life. 
 The first feature, the focus on the questioner, leads to several problems we 
outlined in various ways above. However, the core feature is that it becomes opaque 
how a philosophical problem, a person, and a philosophical therapy relate. The target 
of a philosophical therapy is supposed to be the latent elements- be they psychic, 
cultural, etc.- that generate the problems. However, this implies that the therapy need 
not have anything to do with the problem, specifically the (seeming?) semantic 
content the problem expresses. In turn, there are three critical difficulties with such a 
view. One, if the therapy and the problem do not relate, is there any meaningful way 
to restrict the former? Is drugging someone, lobotomizing her, reading Joyce at her, 
etc., all apt ways to address her problem? Two, it is unclear both why and how the 
disquiet or disturbance relates to the philosophical problem and its structure. For 
example, it is unclear how "psychic torment" engenders specifically philosophical 
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problems21 or vice versa. Three, such therapeutic responses may merely pass 
philosophy by in the night. Indeed, if a therapist is not at all concerned with the 
content of a philosophical utterance, there is no apparent relation between the therapy 
a therapist offers and the philosophical problem that, somehow, it is directed towards. 
   The second feature, the respect for the conversation partner, undermines itself 
in a rather striking way. The philosopher is instructed to never argue with, contradict, 
point out an inconsistency of, etc., the conversation partner. However, it seems that 
this simply means we do not take the various talkings of the conversation partner to 
be assertions or "problems" at all. Indeed, the therapeutic metaphor works against 
respect for freedom at this juncture. A psychoanalytic therapist is not concerned with 
the content of an analysand's talkings as she is viewing the talkings as symptoms that 
manifest something else. In turn, and granting that assertion and truth are deeply 
interconnected, it is right to say that the analysand does not make "assertions" in 
therapy at all. Further, a psychoanalytic therapist does not aim to refute, argue with, 
ferret out, etc., the truth of her analysand's takings. Instead, she seeks to notice, and 
call the analysand's attention to, recurring patterns, things her talking elides, etc. This 
may be fine in a therapeutic setting. However, behaving as though someone's words 
literally do not mean what she claims them to mean, treating her assertions, not as 
assertions but symptoms of mental disquiet, etc., clearly does not valorize the freedom 
of the conversation partner. In point of fact, it infantilizes her. Further, far from 
placing the philosopher in a more reciprocal relationship or even placing the 
philosopher below the conversation partner, therapy inscribes an even more 
asymmetric relationship that privileges the philosopher. The interlocutor is denied the 
ability to make assertions in the first place- the height of disrespect. Indeed, since she 
cannot be wrong with her talkings, she also cannot be right with them (cf. PI § 202). 
Succinctly, she is denied the right to be wrong. Moreover, this, far from betokening a 
liberal stance, is a form of intellectual imperialism where the philosopher knows the 
conversation partner's “problems” are really disquiets.  
 The third feature, the link between philosophy and illness, is the most 
problematic. A constant temptation in psychology is to correlate "sanity" with 
                                                 
21 Indeed, the therapeutic conception may suffer from an even deeper problem here. It strains credulity 
to claim that, since my mother was mean to me as a child, I started doing social epistemology or that 
because I suffer from anxiety attacks and I do modal metaphysics. Even in extreme cases like 
Kierkegaard, I do not think it is apt to claim, nor do I think he would claim, that his probably clinical 
depression caused him to do philosophy. As best, his depression caused him to break off his 
engagement and philosophy was, to some extent, an attempt to make sense of this.  
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"normal" and "normal" with "how people usually act" (the deleterious effects of this 
have been pointed out by, e.g., Weisstein (1969), Foucault (1989), and Hacking 
(2002)). In modern psychology, this link is explicitly rejected, and the DSM V refuses 
to use terms like "sane" at all. Instead, a critical criterion for "ill" in contemporary 
psychology is the failure of a person, by her own lights, to live her life in the manner 
she wants. In contrast, it is unclear what makes philosophy an illness other than that 
fact that it is not ordinary or normal. Indeed, no principled reason to consider 
philosophy as akin to illness has been offered, as most philosophers do not admit that 
they cannot go on living and the few who are so tormented would rather die than give 
up their relentless questioning. In turn, this indicates that the only reason philosophy 
is an "illness" is that it is not something the woman-on-the-street or the man-about-
town concerns themselves with.22 Not only is the problematic for the same reasoning 
correlating "sanity" and "normal" in psychology is problematic, but it also refuses to 
engage with philosophy at all on its own terms. Indeed, if philosophy is a sickness, 
why should anyone concern themselves with it but the tragic few who are infected?  
 
1.3 The Key Uptake: 
 
 To summarize, the problem with a therapeutic metaphilosophical 
interpretation is that it cannot adequately align Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical goal 
and his supposedly therapeutic methodology. It ascribes to Wittgenstein the 
metaphilosophical goal of excising or mitigating philosophical problems. It then 
attempts to ascribe to him a method that therapizes these questions away. Moreover, 
as we have argued at length, the problem is that this method and the philosophical 
problems cannot align properly. Therapy quickly becomes sui generis and distinct 
from philosophy. In turn, this makes it opaque how a therapeutic method and a 
philosophical problem can have anything to do with one each. In sum, the 
metaphilosophical aim therapy imputes to Wittgenstein- i.e., excising philosophical 
problems- and the metaphilosophical methods of various forms of therapy (e.g., 
working through nonsense, psychoanalysis, genetic, etc.) do not align properly. The 
method misses the goal, and so the account is not viable by its own lights.  
 
                                                 
22 Especially later Wittgenstein is quite careful here- he stresses an analogy between philosophical 
problems and illness rather than conflating the two (e.g. PI § 133- box, PI § 255) 
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1.4 Summary:  
 
 This chapter has sought to give a principled taxonomy that does not elide the 
very real differences between various conceptions of what "therapy" could mean as a 
metaphilosophy for Wittgenstein. Then, for each sub-type, it offered specific 
criticisms. Finally, it used this data to prescind certain assumptions that are common 
to each sub-type and criticize these. However, the critical problem is that, as the game 
stands, there just is no right way to relate a philosophical problem to the therapeutic 
intervention that supposedly addresses it.  
  However, critically, notice that this objection is predicated on the assumption 
that there are such things as distinctly philosophical "problems." Further, it also 
assumes that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology for addressing them is 
philosophical- i.e., it is a reasoned intervention that is coherent, principled, and, one 
assumes, above all, argumentative. Succinctly, it assumes that Wittgenstein can reply 
to nonsensical philosophy with a senseful methodology based on reasoned arguments. 
We have argued that this cannot be so- there is no way to relate a senseful 
methodology to nonsense. The next chapter examines a view that explicitly rejects 
this. To wit, it argues that Wittgenstein's responses to philosophy are just as 
‘nonsensical’ as the nonsense they address themselves to. Indeed, it ascribes to 
Wittgenstein the fundamental realization that there is, in point of fact, no difference 
between rationality and rhetoric, sense and nonsense, logic and wordplay, truth and 
power, philosophy and sophistry, etc. In other words, it casts Wittgenstein as an 
antiphilosopher. 
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2 Antiphilosophical Metaphilosophy: 
 
  This chapter discusses a metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein as an 
antiphilosopher. Such a discussion emerges quite naturally from the failure of a 
therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein. Specifically, both interpretations agree on 
ascribing to Wittgenstein the metaphilosophical goal of alleviating or completely 
excising philosophy. However, there is a critical methodological difference. To see 
this clearly, recall that, e.g., pure therapy-TLP is confronted with a problem. To wit, if 
the TLP is nonsense, how can we learn a method (or anything else) from it. Indeed, 
Conant notes that “Geach has dubbed this problem… Ludwig’s self mate: how are we 
to understand an author who attempts to illuminate through a philosophical treaties 
those very matter which he says cannot be illuminated?” (Conant (1996), 270). The 
solution that the pure therapists offer to this conundrum is that “Wittgenstein says in 
§6.54 is not: ‘all of my sentences are nonsensical’ (thus giving rise to a self-defeating 
problematic)… Section 6.54 characterizes the way in which those propositions which 
serve as elucidations elucidate…. Question: Which sentences are (to be recognized as) 
nonsensical? Answer: those that elucidate… Not every sentence of the work is (to be 
recognized as) nonsense. For not every sentences serves as an elucidation. Some 
sentences subserve the elucidatory aim of the work by providing the framework 
within which the activity of elucidation takes place” (Conant (2002), 457 fn 135). In 
other words, pure therapeutic readings of the TLP maintain that there are frame-
propositions, i.e., methodological instructions for how to expose the faux-status of 
faux-propositions. Further, the methodology that these frame-propositions aim to 
teach us is properly philosophical. This is because, among other things, the method 
depends on a philosophical thesis concerning the nature of nonsense (i.e., that it is 
monistic and caused by a failure of meaning assignment) and presents a rational, 
coherent, consistent, etc., way of showing that the meaning assignment has not 
occurred. Moreover, this sort of bifurcation between nonsense, psychic disquiet, and 
so on, that betoken philosophical problems and Wittgenstein’s attempt to address and 
redress it with some learnable, philosophical method, is pronounced in pure therapy.  
 Pace this, antiphilosophy, with due irony, accuses especially pure therapy of 
“chickening out.” Simply put, antiphilosophy maintains that in Wittgenstein there are 
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no frames, no learnable methods, and so on, that can be called “philosophical” in 
Wittgenstein’s work at all. Instead, Wittgenstein offers us a novel form of rhetoric 
that pragmatically persuades us to abandon philosophy. As we shall see, such 
persuasions do not depend on Wittgenstein’s beliefs about philosophy, a learnable and 
rational method, particular theses about nonsense, and so on. They only depend on 
Wittgenstein’s desire to convince us to abandon philosophy. In turn, this shifts 
antiphilosophy’s focus. Indeed, antiphilosophy is far more interested in "not what is 
said but the effect of what is said" (Badiou (2011), 152). Pursuant to this, the 
“method” Wittgenstein relies on aims at “[d]efacing the image of philosophy as 
primarily propositional, discursive and theoretical… the antiphilosopher shows that 
the ‘truths’ of philosophy to be externally motivating and not self grounding” (Givenc 
(2015), 85). Finally, though counter-intuitive, this focus on the pragmatic affects of 
even monistic nonsense strings may be defensible. For example, consider the US 
army’s utterance “hooah!” This utterance is clearly monistic nonsense- i.e., no 
meaning assignment has been made. However, the utterance can have the pragmatic 
affect of, e.g., motiving US army soldiers to die or kill in a coming battle. Thus, the 
affects of an utterance can plausibly be distinguished from the semantic content (or 
lack thereof) that it has.  
 In turn, the self-mate is not avoided but celebrated. The point of 
Wittgenstein’s works, under an antiphilosophical reading, is not to teach us anything 
at all. Instead, Wittgenstein’s works are meant to persuade us to abandon philosophy- 
by hook or by crook. However, such a position is somewhat hard to make sense of, 
prima facie. In section one, I sketch in a schematic and general way what an 
antiphilosophical metaphilosophy is and how it works. With this in view, section 2.1a, 
c, d, examine three attempts to ascribe an antiphilosophical stance to Wittgenstein. 
Specifically, it considers such an ascription for a TLP focused view, a mixed view, 
and a PI focused view, respectively. This nicely parallels the taxonomy I developed 
for therapeutic interpretations. In section 2.1b, d, e, I criticise each. In section three, I 
pull back and note several characteristic features of these antiphilosophical 
interpretations of Wittgenstein as well as the problems with each. Finally, I close by 
arguing that such a reading cannot be sustained. In turn, this sets the stage for an anti-
theoretical reading interpretation of Wittgenstein. 
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2.0 What is Antiphilosophy? 
 
 In this section, I discuss what antiphilosophy is. To begin, I set the stage. I 
define what “antiphilosophy” is as well as discussing why certain positions should not 
be counted as antiphilosophical. Second, I consider a master metaphilosophical 
argument that is designed to show that antiphilosophy is not a viable 
metaphilosophical position and note that any antiphilosophical position must reply to 
this objection. Third, I consider what features we should expect an antiphilosophical 
interpretation of Wittgenstein specifically to have.  
To begin, prima facie an “antiphilosophical” position is a position that argues 
against philosophy. However, this is clearly not sufficient to distinguish 
antiphilosophy as either a unique metaphilosophical position or as a specific 
metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. It is not a unique metaphilosophical 
position in that such a characterization includes, e.g., a radical scientism that claims, 
“philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in 
science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of 
discovery in our quest for knowledge” (Hawking (2010), 3), a sort of common sense 
‘don’t care’ indifference, and so on, as antiphilosophical. It is not a unique reading of 
Wittgenstein in that the versions of therapy discussed in chapter 1, anti-theoretical 
metaphilosophy discussed in chapter 3 and aspects of the grammatical account in 
chapter 4 would all count as “antiphilosophy” as they each take Wittgenstein to argue 
against philosophy in some sense or other. To rectify this, I add two more 
interdependent criteria to determine if a position counts as “antiphilosophical.” These 
are that: antiphilosophy must be, above all, rhetorical; antiphilosophy addresses itself 
to a philosophical audience. Let us take each in turn. 
First, an antiphilosophical position is purely rhetorical. To begin, “[c]lassical 
rhetoric, the art of speaking well- that is, the art of speaking (or writing) persuasively- 
was concerned to study the discursive ways of acting upon an audience, with a view 
to winning or increasing its adherence to the theses that were presented to it for its 
endorsement” (Perelman (1979), 43). Notice, one, that this definition of rhetoric has 
nothing to do with truth, justification, belief on the part of the speaker, and so on. 
Indeed, a rhetorician may put forward a claim, e.g., “Mexico will pay for the wall,” 
that he knows to be false. Two, the sole goal of a rhetorician is convincing an 
audience to adopt some p. This p may motivate the audience to do something or else 
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cause them to adopt a (possibly false) belief. Three, pursuant to one and two, it is not 
the belief of the rhetorician that matter but her desire to convince some audience to 
adopt p. Four, for a rhetorician, anything goes in principle. Bursting into tears, yelling 
incoherently, gesturing wildly, and so are, are all fine “methods” provided that they 
move an audience to adopt p. In sum, antiphilosophy is against philosophy 
rhetorically and should be understood in terms of the desire of a rhetorician to 
convince her audience that philosophy should be abandoned rather than her beliefs 
about philosophy, her “method,” and so on.  
Second, though in rhetoric anything goes in principle, rhetoric is pragmatically 
constrained by the audience that it addresses. For some audiences, bursting into tears 
may be a powerful tool to convince them to adopt p whereas for others, a (possible 
fallacious) argument is required. Pursuant to this, antiphilosophy takes itself to have a 
very specific audience and so its rhetoric is constrained in very important ways. To 
wit, an antiphilosophical position is one that seeks to convince a philosophical 
audience to abandon philosophy. In turn, this means that antiphilosophical rhetoric 
often appears to be standard philosophy- complete with (possibly fallacious) 
arguments, (possibly pseudo-) deductions, and so on. Indeed, the best 
antiphilosophical rhetoric is nearly indistinguishable from philosophical discourse.  
To bring this further into view let us examine our three conditions in relation 
to Gorgias and his amusing text On Nature or Concerning What is Not23 (Gorgias 
(2012), 23-39). In this text, Gorgias produces a set of utterance designed to convince 
us that nothing exists (i.e., that no objects, properties, relations, and so on, obtain in 
the actual world)24, that if something exists, we cannot know it, and that if we could 
know it, we would not be able to communicate this knowledge of it. First, the text is 
clearly against philosophy in that, assuming that philosophy has something to do with 
conveying truth or knowledge to people, Gorgias seeks to cut the legs out from under 
it. Second, it may be that Gorgias is incapable of believing that nothing exists as it is 
rather probably that Gorgias ran into existing things all the time- i.e., people, the 
marketplace, tables, and so on. Such an inability to believe that nothing exists, 
                                                 
23 This gloss makes “antiphilosophy” and “sophistry” nearly synonymous. In this, I part ways slightly 
with, e.g., Badiou (2011), 138-39, Bosteels (2008), 156, who argue that a critical distinction between 
the two is the “act.” I find their conception of “act” to be a gross misreading of Kierkegaard’s “truth as 
subjectivity” and so do not follow them.  
24 The reader might demur and worry that “Nothing exists” is a strange pre-Fregean abuse of a 
quantifier. Horwich (1975) provides an interesting possible formalism of “Nothing” as a nominal 
expression and interested readers should see this work.   
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however, does not prevent him from putting forward his utterances. Moreover, it is 
clear that Gorgias is involved in a “preformative contradiction” in that if language 
cannot communicate truth, and Gorgias believes that “nothing exits” is true, then he 
cannot communicate it. Far from bemoaning this, Gorgias plays with it in a rather 
delightful rhetorical manner. In both cases, it is clear that what is relevant here are not 
Gorgias’s beliefs but his desire to convince his audience. Third, consider that “[s]ome 
scholars make Gorgias a profound thinker… others treat What is Not as a serious and 
witty reductio… others again take it for a rhetorical tour de force… I do not know 
what Gorgias intended me to think” (Barnes (1982), 173). Barnes’s note implies that 
he, a great classicist, has no principled way to distinguish Gorgias’s text from a 
properly philosophical one. As it were, Gorgias’s antiphilosophical rhetoric is so well 
crafted that it is indistinguishable from, e.g., the Eleatics and their claim that “being is 
one.” Indeed, if we adopt “the way of opinion” (Parmenides (1987), 85), then 
Parmenides’s radical monism is about as counter-intuitive as Gorgias claim that 
nothing exists.  
In turn, these three criteria do distinguish antiphilosophy as a unique 
metaphilosophical position as well as a possibly interesting particular reading of 
Wittgenstein. It is a unique metaphilosophical position in that it is not concerned with 
truth, propositional attitudes, justification, argument, etc., but, rather, with persuasive 
techniques and pragmatic affects. In turn, this distinguishes antiphilosophy from both 
radical scientism and common sense ‘don’t care’ views. For radical scientism, it is 
reasonable to assume that Hawking’s position stems from his belief that science has 
superseded philosophy. Further, Hawking surely took such a claim to be justified by, 
e.g., the stunning success of science, and took himself to be conveying an important 
truth, e.g., the death of philosophy, to his audience. Similarly, my mother’s common 
sense being against philosophy arises from her belief that philosophy is impractical 
and her knowledge of the job market. Further, she voices her position (rather often) 
because she takes herself to be conveying the truth that philosophy does not pay bills. 
In contrast, antiphilosophy’s emphasis on pure rhetoric and pro-attitudes rather than 
reasons and propositional attitudes distinguish it from these positions. Indeed, for 
antiphilosophy, what matters is not what is said but how it is said (i.e., its pragmatic 
affects) and not what a speaker believes but what she desires to convince us of.  
An antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein is also distinct from other 
accounts discussed in this thesis. Specifically, an antiphilosophical reading of 
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Wittgenstein is neither concerned with features that engender philosophy- e.g., 
monistic nonsense, irrational analogies, semantic confusion- nor with a “principled 
philosophical method” thought to govern Wittgenstein’s responses- e.g., a frame-
propositions, reminders that expose the flawed analogies, grammatical statements that 
reflect our normative linguist-conceptual schema. Instead, it is concerned with the 
pragmatic affects of Wittgenstein’s utterances on his philosophical audience. 
Consequently, it will focus on style rather than meaning, persuasive techniques rather 
than “method,” and so on. Furthermore, and more critically, an antiphilosophical 
interpretation steadfastly refuses to ascribe to Wittgenstein any sort of “insight” into 
the nature of philosophy or the desire to “communicate” such an insight to us. To 
reiterate, rhetoric does not require belief, justification, insight, truth, and so on, it only 
requires that the speaker desires to convince an audience and is clever enough to pull 
it off. Finally, antiphilosophy insists that the salient question when reconstructing 
Wittgenstein’s texts is not what did he believe but what did he desire to convince us 
of.  
Thus, a reading of Wittgenstein is antiphilosophical only if it meets the 
following three conditions. First, it must view Wittgenstein’s utterances as being 
against philosophy. This assumption is shared by (most) metaphilosophical 
interpretations of Wittgenstein in the literature. Second, it must view this “being 
against philosophy” in purely rhetorical terms. In other words, Wittgenstein desires to 
convince us with his rhetoric to abandon philosophy. His beliefs, the truth of his 
views, the supposed insights he has, and so on, are irrelevant for a proper 
interpretation. Third, an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein must see 
Wittgenstein’s rhetoric as pragmatically constrained by his explicitly philosophical 
audience. Further, antiphilosophy is often more specific here and takes Frege and 
Russell as key audience members. Granting this, antiphilosophy expects to find, and 
does find, odd sorts of logical formalisms that may or may not go anywhere, strange 
comments on key concepts like truth, reference, name, description, and so on.  
Granting this conception of antiphilosophy, it is important to notice that, far 
from being the eccentric creation of ‘postmodernists,’ antiphilosophy or sophistry 
have been with philosophy at least since Plato. Further, it is clear that finding some 
means of distinguishing Socrates’s talkings and Gorgias’s talkings was critical to 
Plato and his conception of “philosophy” as a noble and enlightening endeavor 
concerned with conveying the truth rather than a base and banal one concerned 
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merely clever use of words to convince audiences to do or believe whatever I would 
like them to (e.g., Protagoras (336b), Gorgias (502e), Phaedrus (257c-279c)). 
Moreover, it seems to me that neglecting antiphilosophy or sophistry today is not 
viable as more radical intellectual circles employ a sophistical rhetoric to cast 
aspersions of philosophy rather often- e.g., “philosophy is just what dead white, cis-
gender, straight, European, racist, imperialist, men thought about things and it 
systematically represses, suppresses, and silences, marginal Others in the name of 
some ghostly and ghastly ‘thing’ called ‘Reason’ that is either purely instrumental as 
in economics or else smuggles in cultural/historic/class-based/etc. norms into the 
picture.”25 Such claims are ignored at one’s peril as Bloom (1987), 313-335,’s 
admittedly biased history of the academy in the sixties shows. Regardless, it is 
unsurprising that ancient philosophy has a master metaphilosophical argument 
designed to show that antiphilosophy is untenable.  
The mater argument26 begins with the assumption that an antiphilosophical 
position is one that argues against philosophy rhetorically. However, the argument 
notes that “to argue against” is left critically under-defined in this characterization. 
The master argument than assumes that arguing against something can be done in a 
rational manner or a non-rational manner. On the one hand, if it is done in a rational 
manner, then the master argument notes that antiphilosophy should give reasons to 
object to philosophy, that these reasons are best though of as beliefs on the part of the 
antiphilosopher, that these reasons make up the arguments antiphilosophy proffers 
against philosophy, that these arguments are well within the purview of logic, and so 
on. Granting this, the master argument also notes that this conception of argument as 
giving reasons is simply dialectics as Aristotle characterizes it (e.g., Topics (I.2 
101a25-101b4)). This being so, two problems emerge for antiphilosophy. One, what 
does the yeoman’s work is not the rhetoric but the reasons. In turn, this means that the 
emphasis on rhetoric, the pro-attitude of desire on the part of the speaker, and so on, 
are not viable. Two, it renders antiphilosophy conceptually incoherent in that by 
                                                 
25 I should note that there is a kernel of truth to this that I find deeply interesting and worth keeping in 
view. This is perhaps most clearly seen in Chomsky’s famous debate with Foucault (Chomsky & 
Foucault (2005)) wherein each time Chomsky attempts to move from “hard-wired range of ethical 
positions” to a specifically western conception, Foucault offers historical examples that show that the 
western conception is predicated on violence and contingent biases. Regardless, today, the sort of glib 
“check your privilege” way such claims are used is simply sloppy and would have been abhorrent 
people like Foucault, Derrida, and so on.  
26 This argument has several similarities to Aristotle (F 51 R3) 
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giving reasons to be against philosophy, antiphilosophy is dialectical, and this makes 
it simply a part of the philosophical science as Aristotle conceives it. In turn, it is 
simply unclear what “against” means.  
On the other hand, the master argument goes on, if antiphilosophy does not 
argue against philosophy in a rational manner, then the emphasis on rhetoric makes 
good sense. Indeed, what is doing the work is the antiphilosopher’s use of her words 
to cast aspersions on philosophy. If this is so, then it is safe to assume that 
antiphilosophy is not dialectical, as it is not interested in giving reasons to be against 
philosophy, debating with philosophers, and so on. However, it then becomes unclear 
why a philosopher should engage with an antiphilosopher’s rants at all. Indeed, if a 
critical aspect of philosophy is dialectic, the giving and taking of reasons, and 
antiphilosophy steadfastly refuses to give and take reasons, it is unclear if 
antiphilosophy has anything to do with philosophy. Worse, however, it is unclear 
what, if anything, can “justify” an antiphilosophical “position” or set it apart from 
idiosyncratic preferences, bizarre personal bias, and so on. Indeed, if antiphilosophy 
refuses to give reasons, it is unclear how it can possibly be anything more than 
emoting. In turn, this justifies philosophy’s indifference to antiphilosophical 
invectives, as they do not really “argue against” philosophy, any more than, e.g., 
Katie Perry’s music “argues against” philosophy. Furthermore, ignoring an 
antiphilosophical “position” makes perfect sense as it is of no interest to philosophy 
though perhaps it is of interest to biographers or sociologists.  
Thus, succinctly, if one gives reasons to be against philosophy, one is still 
doing philosophy as dialectic and the “anti” part of antiphilosophy becomes rather 
hard to make out. Conversely, if one does not give reasons to be against philosophy, it 
is unclear why philosophy should engage with rants that do not concern it and the 
“philosophy” part of antiphilosophy becomes problematic. In either case, such a 
metaphilosophical position proves to be unworkable. Properly speaking, one cannot 
argue against a position based solely on rhetoric.  
There are several possible ways to meet such a challenge. My personal 
favorite comes from Pyrrhonism and its use of the Agrippa trillemma to cast doubt on 
how reasons and arguments relate. Regardless, it is quite clear that any 
antiphilosophical position must meet the challenge and convince us that it is both 
coherent in its own right and that it is something philosophy must address. As we 
shall see, the antiphilosophical interpretations of Wittgenstein we consider each 
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ascribe to Wittgenstein fairly similar strategies to meet this metaphilosophical master 
argument. Succinctly, Wittgenstein persuades us that philosophical discourse does not 
really have anything to do with truth, is not justified, and so on. Pursuant to this, 
Wittgenstein convinces us that there is no tenable divide between philosophy and 
antiphilosophy. As it were, a banal reading of Plato has it right- the only difference 
between Socrates and Gorgias is that the former was too stupid to get paid.27  
Granting this, let us close by discussing the features an antiphilosophical 
interpretation of Wittgenstein will bring in its wake. To remind the reader, an 
antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein is an interpretation of Wittgenstein 
that sees him as arguing against philosophy to a philosophical audience rhetorically. 
To reiterate, this rhetoric has nothing whatever to do with truth, insight, method, 
justification, and so on, but merely on Wittgenstein’s desire to convince. Granting 
this, there are four interdependent features that an antiphilosophical interpretation of 
Wittgenstein should bring into play. (a) Wittgenstein’s texts should persuade us that 
there is no sharp distinction between reason and rhetoric. This is necessary to avoid 
the master argument given above. (b) Wittgenstein’s texts should cast aspersions on 
philosophy and, ergo, be against philosophy. (c) Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein’s 
rhetoric should aim to convince us to abandon philosophy and replace it with 
something else (d) A critical feature of proffering an apt interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s texts is discussing how and why he desires to replace philosophy 
rather than his beliefs about philosophy.  
  
2.1 Antiphilosophical Accounts of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy: 
 
   With this in view, we can examine what an antiphilosophical interpretation of 
Wittgenstein is and how it functions. I focus on three such attempts to view 
Wittgenstein as an antiphilosopher. These are: Antiphilosophy-TLP in Badiou (2011); 
Antiphilosophy-Mixed in Gellner (2005); Antiphilosophy-PI in Marcuse (1991) & 
Russell (1959) & (2005). First, I present each author’s attempt to impute and sustain 
an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, and taking our cue 
                                                 
27 The dialectical complexities of Plato’s arguments, and the ‘esoteric games’ he is fond of, especially 
in his middle works, etc., are outside the scope of this dissertation. Regardless, it is important to keep 
in mind that, prima facie, Plato bangs on rather often about Socrates not getting paid and this, 
somehow, distinguishing him from sophists (e.g., Apology 19d, Euthydemus 304b-c, Hippias Major 
282b-3, etc).   
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from the end of section 2.0, an antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein imputes the 
following to Wittgenstein's texts: (a) the texts attack the idea of a principled 
distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, reasoned arguments and clever ploys; (b) 
the texts cast aspersions on philosophy; (c) the texts attempt to persuade us to 
abandon philosophy and replace it with something else; (d) a key focus for an 
interpreter of Wittgenstein should not be on Wittgenstein’s beliefs but his desires. I 
use (a)-(d) to structure sections 2.1a, c, e. Second, I argue against particular aspects of 
this ascription in 2.1 b, d, f.  
 
2.1.a Antiphilosophy-TLP: 
 
 An antiphilosophy engagement with the TLP has been developed by Badiou 
(2011) and it is on his account I focus. Under this antiphilosophical interpretation, the 
TLP is not a cogent set of propositions connected by admittedly gnomic arguments 
nor yet is it a workbook consisting of frame-propositions and faux-propositions. 
Rather, it is a rhetorical assault on philosophy as well as an attempt to convince us to 
abandon the supposed “problems of philosophy” and consider instead the "problems 
of life" such as the good will (cf. NB p. 79-80 TLP 6.423 & 6.43). Let us examine 
how this reading works in terms of the four antiphilosophical features listed above.   
  (a) To begin, Wittgenstein must defuse the metaphilosophical master 
argument by arguing that there is no sharp divide between reason and rhetoric. For 
Badiou, Wittgenstein defuses this challenge by claiming that the supposed links 
between dialectic, reason, and argument, belief, and so on, fail to obtain in 
philosophy. Thus, "for Wittgenstein philosophy, in the final instance, cannot be 
reduced to its discursive appearance, its propositions, its fallacious theoretical 
exterior" (Badiou (2011), 75). Indeed, "[p]hilosophy is divested of all theoretical 
pretentions, not because it would be an embroidery of approximations and errors- 
which would still be conceding too much to it- but because its very intention is 
vitiated: ‘Most of the propositions and questions found in philosophical works are not 
false but nonsense' ([TLP] 4.003)" (Badiou (2011), 77). Badiou takes TLP 4.003 as 
critical evidence for an antiphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein conception of 
philosophical discourse. To further buttress this, Badiou claims that "[p]hilosophy is 
not even a form of thinking… [as] ‘A thought is a proposition with sense' ([TLP] 4)" 
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(Badiou (2011), 77). Thus "philosophy, then, is a non-thought… [Furthermore] 
[p]hilosophy is a sick and regressive non-thought because it pretends to present 
nonsense that is proper to it within a propositional and theoretical register" (ibid). 
Thus, for Badiou, the TLP proffers a view of philosophy that decouples the supposed 
links between philosophy, truth, dialectic, and so on.  As it were, sick non-thoughts 
have nothing to do with giving and taking reason.  
 (b) Granting this, Badiou then ascribes to Wittgenstein a rhetorical attack on 
philosophy. To begin, for Wittgenstein, a philosophical claim is supposed to be both 
"true and necessary… which say a point of the real. The paradigm of such 
propositions can be found in mathematics" (Badiou (2011) 133). In other words, and 
given a standard reading of the TLP (cf. 2.1-2.223), a philosophical claim attempts to 
be true in that it is isomorphically related to an actually obtaining state-of-affairs (i.e. 
the propositional ‘picture' matches a fact cf. TLP 2.222). Moreover, such a claim also 
attempts to be necessary in that the pictured state-of-affairs cannot fail to obtain. 
However, Badiou goes on, Wittgenstein seeks to persuade that, in fact, such a link 
between truth and necessity is deeply problematic. Thus, "[w]e finally discover 
necessity [in the TLP]: that of the truth of certain complex propositions… called a 
tautology" (Badiou (2011), 128). From here, "[b]ut of what necessity is this [i.e., a 
philosophical claim/tautology] the necessity? Evidently, it is not a necessity of the 
world, or in the world. And this is for the good reason that tautologies say nothing of 
the world" (ibid 129). In other words, if a proposition is necessary, it is senseless, i.e., 
a limiting case that does not picture states-of-affairs at all (e.g., TLP 4.461). 
Conversely, if a proposition is true, then it can be false as the state-of-affairs it 
pictures need not be the case (e.g. TLP 1.21, 2.0271). If this is so, then the 
philosophical claims are not workable and Wittgenstein has gone some way in casting 
doubt on them.  
 Notice that both (a) and (b) are reasonably common interpretations of the 
TLP, albeit with odd flourishes. However, when we turn to the rhetoric Wittgenstein 
deploys to convince us to abandon philosophy and replace it with ‘the problems of 
life,’ matters are more interesting.  
 (c) Badiou argues that Wittgenstein uses his rhetoric to convince us to replace 
philosophy with “the problems of life.” To do this, Wittgenstein’s rhetoric relies on 
"[t]he metaphor of sickness [that] is never absent from this plan [to put forward 
alternative rhetoric], and it certainly comes through when Wittgenstein speaks of 
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‘nonsensical'" (Badiou (2011), 77). The use of "plan" here is very telling. In effect, an 
antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein insists that his (in)famous distinction 
between sense and nonsense is not a philosophical one but a rhetorical one aimed to 
convince us to replace philosophy with the problems of life. To bring this into view, 
consider that Wittgenstein seems to operate with two distinct notions of nonsense 
These are: (1) that nonsense is "[a]n immediately understandable property" (ibid 119); 
(2) that nonsense is "[a] substantial possibility for the combination of objects" (ibid). 
This claim seems borne out in the secondary literature- specifically the war between 
the classicists, who tend to view (2) as the key notion, and the new Wittgensteinians 
who deny that (2) is coherent (see chapter 1.2a). Indeed, an equivocation concerning 
“nonsense” seems positively encouraged by Wittgenstein who writes both that “all the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand are in perfect logical order” 
(TLP 5.5563). and that “[i]n everyday language it very frequently happens that the 
same word has different modes of signification ” (TLP 3.232) that this provokes “the 
most fundamental confusions… (the whole philosophy is full of them)” (TLP 3.324). 
However, if the sense/nonsense distinction is philosophical, this equivocation is 
unacceptable (e.g., Badiou (2011), 107-121). In turn, this should show us that the 
distinction is rhetorical and that the equivocation may, in fact, help Wittgenstein 
convince us of something. Indeed, in rhetoric, it is "not what is said but the effect of 
what is said" (ibid 152) that matters.  
Granting this, what does Wittgenstein deploy the sense/nonsense distinction to 
convince us of? Badiou argues that Wittgenstein uses it to forward his "strategic goal 
to subtract the real (what is higher, the mystical element) from thought" (ibid 107). In 
other words, Wittgenstein uses the rhetorical sense/nonsense distinction to convince 
us that "the ‘problems of life' is intrinsically different from any scientific or 
theoretical figure. It is subtracted from the authority of propositions and sense" (ibid, 
79). In turn, the pragmatic affects of Wittgenstein’s rhetorical use of the 
sense/nonsense distinction should be to force us to confront the problems of life in a 
non-philosophical manner. Indeed, "[t]here will be two types of such an act. One, 
which is infrascientific and nonsensical because it attempts to bend non-thought by 
force into philosophical propositions, is the philosophical sickness proper. The other, 
suprascientific, silently affirms non-thought as ‘touching' of the real" (ibid 79). Thus, 
Wittgenstein’s rhetoric persuades us both that ‘the problems of life’ are critical (e.g. 
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TLP 6.4-7) and persuade us that philosophical thoughts concern them are ‘nonsense.’ 
In turn, this should force us to abandon philosophy and adopt ‘the problems of life.’ 
  (d) This leads us to the most novel, and, from my perspective, least interesting 
feature of Badiou's antiphilosophical reading of the TLP. Given that one is 
interpreting Wittgenstein antiphilosophically, a reconstruction of his thought should 
focus not on what Wittgenstein believes, holds to be true, etc., but on his desire to 
denigrate philosophy. Indeed, this makes sense of Badiou’s use of “plan,” “strategy,” 
etc. But what is this motiving desire? To begin, Badiou claims that Wittgenstein 
"constantly exhibited [himself] as an existential singularity" (ibid 87). Indeed, 
Wittgenstein needed to "to announce and practice an active salvific break in one's 
own name only" (ibid 88). And the point of this antiphilosophical rhetoric in the TLP 
is so that Wittgenstein can "speaks in his own proper name, and he must show this 
‘proper' as a real proof of his saying" (ibid 87). Indeed, Wittgenstein's "aim of living 
up to the dignity of their antiphilosophical act, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are 
absolutely devoted to… show this solitude" (ibid 90). The supposed link between 
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is crucial for Badiou (ibid 73-92- over a third of the first 
part of the work). In effect, Badiou attempts to impute to Wittgenstein's biography the 
same megalomaniacal obsessions he imputes to Nietzsche. Badiou sees both as 
rhetorical masters who seek to exhibit their skills to prove their greatness (e.g., ibid 
79, 87). Granting this admittedly problematic link, and admittedly rather opaque 
account, Badiou then claims that the rhetoric of the TLP is put forward to "bear 
witness to his [Wittgenstein’s] act [and the TLP] is merely its negative preparation" 
(ibid 157). In sum, Wittgenstein puts forward the TLP's rhetoric out of his desire to 
show his act- e.g. that this is who he is and where he stands and he can do no other. 
 
2.1.b Antiphilosophy-TLP: Criticism: 
 
  As mentioned above, (a) and (b) are relatively common in several 
interpretations of the TLP. Specifically, aspects of point (a) are addressed in chapter 
1.2a and b and aspects of (b) are addressed in chapter 3.1. Ergo, I refer the reader to 
these. Instead, I focus on (d) and (c) as these critically interconnect for Badiou. Let us 
take each in turn. 
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  (d) There are several objections to the way Badiou attempts to read 
Wittgenstein's life and its relation to the TLP. First, exegetically, he relies on a slip-
shot methodology that claims to "clarify" the TLP with biographical notes that ignore 
dates, times, situations, etc. For example, Badiou makes much of Wittgenstein's 
confession in 1936 to his friends (see Badiou (2011), 155). At the very least, granting 
that Wittgenstein rejected much of the TLP at this time, it is opaque if this act can 
shed any light on his older work. Indeed, we are often given decontextualized 
anecdotes (e.g., ibid 73, 87, 95, 151-157) with no clear ordering or set of relationship 
either with each other or the TLP. Then we are told that this somehow explicates the 
TLP. Suffice it to say, I, at any rate, have no idea how true Badiou's tales of 
"Wittgenstein, the rhetorician" are to Wittgenstein. And, in all cases, it certainly does 
not help illuminate the TLP as far as I can tell.  
Second, analogically, the link between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is entirely 
speculative and predicated more on Badiou's need to fit Wittgenstein into the same 
antiphilosophical position as Nietzsche. Indeed, Badiou takes Nietzsche as the 
paragon of antiphilosophy and then attempts to force Wittgenstein to conform to the 
Nietzschean model (Badiou (2011), 73-92). In turn, this supposed analogy causes 
Badiou to misread or ignore large parts of the TLP willfully. For example, 
Wittgenstein's admission that he is "conscious of having fallen a long way short of 
what is possible [for clearly presenting the thoughts of the TLP]… May others come 
and do it better" (TLP preface 4) is unthinkable within the Nietzsche-ian framework 
that emphasizes "greatness" and the duty of genius. Further, this analogy causes 
Badiou to interpret TLP 6.54 in a manner that is far more problematic than either the 
classical or pure therapy-TLP reading. Badiou needs TLP 6.54 to emphasize 
Wittgenstein rhetorical grandeur. However, this is just not supported.  
Third, philosophically, Badiou does not explain the interdependence between 
biography and philosophy. Though I am willing to grant that there may be such a 
linkage and this linkage may somehow be critical (cf. Cavell (1994)), without 
explicitly articulating the conceptual interdependencies, one is left with oddly ad 
hominem attacks combined with commentary. Finally, metaphilosophically, Badiou 
says he "feels a certain (philosophical) embarrassment for having to adopt a 
biographical procedure" (Badiou (2011), 151). Would to God he had followed the 
angels of his better nature here and passed biography over in silence. 
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 (c) We now examine Badiou's more interesting claim. To wit, that 
Wittgenstein’s sense/nonsense distinction is rhetorical and designed to persuade us to 
abandon philosophy and replace it with the problems of life. Such a rhetorical reading 
may, in fact dissolve certain exegetical puzzles about the TLP that plagued other 
interpretations. Pace the pure therapeutic readers, there simply are no “frame-
propositions” and so we should be unsurprised that we cannot find any. Pace the 
classical readers, there is no principled philosophical theory in the book and so we 
should not be surprised to not find it. However, the rhetorical gloss of the 
sense/nonsense distinction faces some objections. 
First, exegetically, it is both antithetical to Wittgenstein's avowed intention as 
well as deeply problematic for any attempted interpretation of the book. For 
Wittgenstein's intention, he tells us that "the truth of the thoughts that are here 
communicated seems to me to be unassailable and definitive" (TLP preface 4). One 
can read the “thoughts” in question as indicating frame-propositions and 
Wittgenstein’s method or the “thoughts” as the sort of theory the TLP offers. 
However, for Badiou, neither reading will do as Wittgenstein’s points have nothing 
whatever to do with truth, belief, and so on. Consequently, Badiou might insist that 
this is just so much more rhetorical maneuvering. However, this fails to sit well with 
the very biographical data Badiou (mis)represents. To wit, and as Monk (1991), 28-
168, shows, such duplicity, and dishonesty would have horrified Wittgenstein. Thus, 
ascribing to Wittgenstein such a duplicitous procedure simply misfires. For 
interpretation, two key questions come to the fore that plague antiphilosophical 
interpretations generally. One, how Wittgenstein’s rhetoric has the pragmatic affects 
it does is woefully underdetermined. Indeed, it simply is not clear how the rhetorical 
utterances Wittgenstein puts forward can manage to convince anyone of anything, 
especially if they are pushed as far as Badiou wants them to be. Two, it is unclear how 
to engage with the points in the TLP at all. Indeed, the self-mate mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, raises its head here. How do we read with understanding, 
interpret, etc., the TLP at all if Badiou is right? 
Second, philosophically, it seems to grossly misunderstand why Wittgenstein 
places the strictures he does on language in the TLP. For Badiou's reading, it is 
imperative that Wittgenstein began with the aim of subtracting the problems of life 
from philosophical discourse and that the sense/nonsense distinction is merely a 
rhetorical means to this end. Pace this, however, I think Russell is quite right that 
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Wittgenstein's "attitude [towards the mystical or problems of life]… grows naturally 
out of his doctrine in pure logic, according to which the logical proposition is a 
picture… of the fact, and has in common with the fact a certain structure… but the 
structure cannot itself be put into words, since it is a structure of words" (TLP 
Introduction, xxiii). Further, the emergence of the mystical in the NB speaks to this as 
well. Though why this is so, how the mystical relates to the TLP points, etc., are areas 
that are deeply contested, the primary point is that Wittgenstein did not decide that the 
problems of life needed to be sectioned off from thought and then developed a 
rhetoric to achieve this.  
Third, metaphilosophically, Badiou's account fails to take seriously enough 
Wittgenstein's insistence on philosophy as an activity that aims at clarity (TLP 4.111-
116). More specifically, and as argued in chapter five, clarity and the philosophical 
activity that the TLP tries to teach us are importantly linked. However, a critical 
problem for a rhetorical reading of the TLP is that it is unclear how rhetoric can 
achieve this. Indeed, assuming that prima facie rhetoric and sophistry aim at un-
clarity and intellectual obfuscation, this linkage is deeply problematic. Thus, ascribing 
rhetorical means to foster clarificatory ends is strikingly odd.  
 
2.1.c Mix-Antiphilosophy: 
 
  The account of mixed antiphilosophy we consider is Gellner (2005). As with 
Badiou, Gellner takes Wittgenstein to be using rhetorical ploys to both disabuse us of 
philosophy and to adopt a different view (ibid 1-44). In Gellner’s case, the view 
Wittgenstein tries to convince us to adopt is a sort of quietist acceptance of common 
sense and the world (e.g., ibid 106). However, Gellner’s account is equivocal 
concerning both (a), the rhetoric Wittgenstein deploys to convince us that there is no 
sharp break between philosophy and rhetoric and (b), the sorts of attack Wittgenstein 
launches against philosophy. I flag these equivocations when they arise and present 
both possible readings.  
  (a) Again, Wittgenstein must defuse the metaphilosophical master argument 
by arguing that there is no sharp divide between philosophy and rhetoric. To remind 
the reader, such a maneuver is necessary because, if philosophy, dialectic, truth and so 
on, relate in a certain way, then antiphilosophy in general, and as an interpretation of 
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Wittgenstein in particular, is conceptually incoherent or not worthy of consideration. 
For Gellner, Wittgenstein’s rhetoric “demolishes reason in philosophy by depriving 
sustained reasoning not merely of any ontological, but also of all informative, critical 
and evaluative functions. Its job, it says, is to describe how language works… to pass 
judgments is something extra-philosophical” (Gellner (2005), 291). In other words, 
according to Gellner, Wittgenstein persuades us that reasons (and, relatedly, truth, 
justification, etc.) do not play any role in philosophy. However, Gellner’s account 
becomes equivocal in that he seems to ascribe to Wittgenstein two very kinds of 
rhetoric that aim to ‘demolish reason’ in philosophy. First, there is what I term the 
‘semantic gloss.’ Under this gloss, Wittgenstein’s rhetoric attempts to persuade us that 
philosophy is too ‘sick’ a (pseudo-) discourse to have anything to do with reasons, 
dialectic, support, and so on. Indeed, the semantic gloss echoes Badiou in claiming 
that Wittgenstein "exclude the kinds of expressions which are responsible for these 
difficulties [e.g. philosophical ‘problems'] as meaningless, as violating the limits of 
meaning" (ibid 6). Indeed, "(Old) philosophy is somehow the pathology of language: 
philosophical problems arise from a misunderstand of language; philosophical 
theories misuse language" (ibid 48). Granting this, it is clear that a philosophy, truth, 
etc., have little to do with one another, as meaningless utterances do not have 
anything to do with truth, justification, etc. Second, there is what I term the 
‘domesticate gloss.’ Under this gloss, Wittgenstein’s rhetoric persuades us that 
philosophy does not have access to verification-transcendent truth, absolute reason, 
and so on. Thus, Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations is both a completion 
and a denial of the Tractatus. It is a completion of it in this sense: it takes over the 
doctrine that nothing can be said outside a proper language game; nothing can, for 
instance, be said about its general conditions or its relation to reality" (ibid 106). In 
other words, Wittgenstein's ploys are not about "this world [e.g., trying to make 
claims independently of language]. Linguist philosophy tries to make us… take the 
world for granted and to think only about the oddity of philosophy emerging in it, 
rather than to think philosophically about it. It tries to make us do so by sheer 
dogmatic insistence" (ibid 128). Notice also that the domesticated gloss is only 
antiphilosophical provided that one grants Gellner’s prior metaphilosophical 
assumption that (real) philosophy should have access to verification-transcendent 
truth, absolute reasons, and so on (e.g., ibid 52), a point we return to in 3.1c.  
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 (b) Next, Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein a form of rhetoric that is designed to 
cast aspersions on philosophy. However, again, Gellner equivocates between the 
semantic and domesticated gloss. For the semantic gloss, Gellner ascribes to 
Wittgenstein a rhetoric that persuades us that “rival contentions [in philosophy]… can 
be devoid of meaning” (Gellner (2005), 5). This is because such contentions violate 
“the limits of meaning, even though they had not violated any of the initial rules of 
notation or ‘grammar.’…meaning is a notion which can be used to exclude rival 
doctrines, and… blesses that which it does cover” (ibid, 6). Thus Wittgenstein 
persuades us that philosophical contentions, positions, arguments, etc., are 
meaningless and so not to be taken seriously. For the domesticated gloss, Gellner 
claims that Wittgenstein's rhetoric convinces us that "the contents of those particular 
kinds of discourse, ‘forms of life', ‘language games' which you happen to favor… the 
validity of the content is thus ensured; as language-in-general (which includes this 
particular language game) is viewed naturalistically, as de facto custom and is 
validated by the claim that language is the measure of all things" (ibid 25). In other 
words, Wittgenstein convinces us that philosophy does not have access to 
verification-transcendent truth, absolute reason, and so on. Again, such a view is 
antiphilosophical only if one grants Gellner’s metaphilosophical assumption.  
 (c) Gellner's account of both how Wittgenstein convinces us to abandon 
philosophy and what he seeks to replace it with are far less equivocal. Specifically, 
Gellner interprets Wittgenstein as proffering an ideology designed to render 
philosophy obsolete and replace it with a sort of quietist acquiescence in common 
sense (e.g., ibid 1-44). First, I define what an ideology is for Gellner. Next, we 
examine Wittgenstein as an ideologist and how this ideology disabuses us of 
philosophy and leads us to passively accept the world as we find it.  
For Gellner an ideology is a "systems of ideas… [that] undergo[es] a 
Stendhalian crystallization…[Further, an] ideology is a system of ideas with a 
powerful sex appeal" (ibid 2). To begin, let us explicate "Stendhalian crystallization." 
One plausible reading of “crystallization” is that an ideology is a reified system of 
ideas that one simply applies to any and all problems (also see ibid 395-8). Pursuant 
to this, the internal structure of an ideology, e.g., how it links various concepts 
together, is not modified or updated based on new evidence, exposure to the world, 
etc. The "Stendhal" part is drawn from a quote from Stendhal’s essay On Love that 
opens Words and Things (Gellner (2005), 1). The quote discusses how a twig, a 
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commonplace thing, is transformed into an object of beauty and admiration. A 
plausible interpretation of this is that an ideology is a way of transforming truisms 
into something that seems profound. The "sex appeal" can be interpreted as claiming 
that an ideology is a prefabricated system that does not arise from the complex 
interdependencies of research, theory, evidence, etc. Rather, the system is 
prefabricated to address an already-given cultural worry and make it go away (e.g., 
ibid 24-25). For example, Gellner (1991) maintains that both Islam and Marxism are 
ideologies in that both are prefabricated systems that cannot be refuted, refined, 
developed, etc., that both transform truisms (e.g., "one should be kind to orphans!" 
"the rich have all the money!") into "deep truths", and both are explicitly designed to 
address social problems rather than arising from research. 
With this in view, let us examine Gellner's interpretation of Wittgenstein as an 
ideologist. First, the crystalline condition of a reified system is met in both the earlier 
and later Wittgenstein. For earlier Wittgenstein "found its [the TLP's] conclusions 
beyond doubt or challenge, and was not inhibited by any modesty from saying so" 
(Gellner (2005), 8). This seems apt. Indeed, Wittgenstein does seem to think that no 
modification to the system adumbrated in the TLP is possible (e.g., TLP preface, 4). 
For later Wittgenstein "rules [of language] were given by nothing more or less than 
actual linguistic custom. Validation [e.g., justification for some practice] was still 
achieved- but it was now much broader and more permissive…. The norms and 
practices it [language] observed in so doing legitimated themselves, and neither 
required nor allowed any other kind of validation" (ibid 13). The point here is that the 
reified system of thought that the later Wittgenstein adduces cannot be wrong.  
The Stendhal condition for earlier Wittgenstein is attested to by the fact that 
"[a]ny humanist intellectual can make observations such as that the world of the 
happy is different from that of the unhappy… [However] [w]hat is quite unique was 
the joint presenting presentation of both these elements [ethical truisms and technical-
logical points dressed up as ontology], as one unity" (ibid 11). In effect, ethical 
truisms and technical math are fused together in such a way that both appear to be 
very profound. For the later Wittgenstein, the Stendhal condition is met by moving 
from the truism that we do act and talk in certain ways to the claim that "all customs 
and norms, simply in virtue of being part of natural language… are built into our 
language, as well as validating our principles…. Ordinary speech, and the entire 
corpus of custom of which it is part, are a self-justifying system that neither permit 
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nor need external validation" (ibid 15). Again, Gellner sees a set of truisms like "this 
is what simply what I do" (PI § 217) transformed into a deep truth. For both the PI 
and the TLP, however, the most critical truism-into-deep-truth transformation Gellner 
ascribes to both earlier and later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is the claim that 
“nothing can be said outside a proper language… One cannot speak outside of 
speech” (Gellner (2005), 106). We return to this in a moment. 
Finally, the "sex appeal" is identical in both earlier and later Wittgenstein. To 
wit, Wittgenstein designed his ideology to address "certain pervasive problems. The 
serious ones … arise independently [of philosophical research]… [They are] (1) the 
problem of validation [roughly, how can we justify our cultural practices] (2) the 
problem of enhancement [roughly, how do we ‘save’ values from science] (3) the 
issue of its [philosophy's] own professionalization" (Gellner (2005), 3). Thus, a set of 
cultural difficulties, not pure research, motivates Wittgenstein to develop a 
prefabricated system. Thus, for Gellner, Wittgenstein self-consciously puts forward 
an ideology rather than makes assertions that can be true or false. This ideology 
cannot be wrong, it transforms truisms into deep truths, and it is designed to explicitly 
address cultural problems. 
In turn, this ideology, if it is accepted, replaces philosophy with a sort of 
passive tolerance of whatever happens to be the case. This is a direct ramification of 
the fact that we cannot ‘speak outside of speech.’ In effect, since there is no 
meaningful way to compare, examine, discuss, etc., the various ‘language-games’ we 
play, we should just accept them as they are. Indeed, "[t]he Wittgensteinian view of 
our conceptual schemes and languages is [that we are]… too involved in them to be 
able to change them without confusion, and they are too accidental and contingent to 
be worth changing" (ibid 165). Further, granting that we have neither the ground nor 
need to change anything, we had best accept that “the world is what it is” (ibid 144). 
Thus, Wittgenstein’s ideology convinces us to accept "this world… [It] tries to make 
us… take the world for granted and to think only about the oddity of philosophy 
emerging in it, rather than to think philosophically about it. It tries to make us do so 
by sheer dogmatic insistence" (ibid 128). 
(d) This still leaves us with the question of the relationship between 
Wittgenstein and his ideology. In other words, what desire caused Wittgenstein to put 
forward his ideology? First, Gellner engages in some very odd armchair sociology of 
philosophy to try to answer this properly (ibid 300-342). In effect, Gellner claims that, 
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sociologically, philosophy had been so outshone by the natural sciences that some 
new defense or apology is needed to maintain philosophy is worthwhile (ibid 15-19). 
Wittgenstein's prefabricated and reified system was partly designed, according to 
Gellner, to address this (ibid 26-29). However, Gellner also indulges in biographical 
speculation to account for why Wittgenstein puts forward such an ideology. Thus, we 
are told that "both [Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's antiphilosophy] sprang from a 
reaction to pan-logism.… in both cases the reaction was a doctrine stressing 
involvement… and the essential-ness of idiosyncrasy" (ibid 309-10). It is striking that 
Gellner adduces such a comparison and stresses the need to exhibit idiosyncrasy 
(demonstrating one's "existential singularity" as Badiou said).  We are also told that 
Wittgenstein's biography shows an "authoritarian, capricious, messianic and exclusive 
characteristics of Wittgenstein's practice" (ibid 318) and this is linked to 
"Wittgenstein's messianism" (ibid 339) and his "totally infallible Delphic procedure 
[of being so vague that no refutation was possible] (ibid 204). In sum, for Gellner as 
Badiou, Wittgenstein's aims to show his greatness through his rhetoric.  
 
2.1.d Mix-Antiphilosophy: Criticism: 
 
  Gellner’s antiphilosophical interpretation suffers from several problems. First, 
I discuss various problems (a) and (b) and the rather uncertain status of what, 
precisely, Gellner takes Wittgenstein to be up to. Then I examine the unequivocal 
antiphilosophical features that Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein in (c) and (d), 
respectively.  
(a) & (b) To begin, recall I argued that Gellner equivocates between a 
semantic and domesticated gloss on Wittgenstein’s (supposed) philosophy. However, 
this equivocation is deleterious as it leads Gellner to confuse two distinct lines of 
attack and offer criticisms that misfire. Let us begin with the domesticated gloss. 
Recall that, for the domesticated gloss to be antiphilosophical, Gellner needs to make 
the metaphilosophical assumption that real philosophy has access to verification-
transcendent truth, absolute reason, and so on. However, this assumption is 
historically wrong and philosophically problematic. It is historically wrong because, 
under most interpretations of Kant and German Idealism, the commitment to 
verification-transcendence is jettisoned and replaced by, e.g., the bounds of possible 
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experience (see, e.g., Braver (2007), 33-139). In turn, if Gellner’s assumption is 
correct, Kant and Hegel should count as antiphilosophical. Suffice it to say, this 
ascription strains credulity. Philosophically, the antiphilosophical ascription is deeply 
problematic as it is clear that Kant, Hegel, and, by charity, Wittgenstein, can and do 
offer principled and cogent reasons and arguments to reject verification-transcendence 
in philosophy. In turn, this renders the ‘antiphilosophical’ ascription opaque.  
The semantic gloss seems more promising and aligns Gellner and Badiou. 
This interpretation cast Wittgenstein’s rhetorical attacks on philosophy as trying to 
convince us that the utterances of philosophy are meaningless and so not worth 
engaging with. However, the key problem with this interpretation is that it exposes the 
shallowness of Gellner’s own understanding. In effect, the problem with philosophy is 
not that it attempts to ‘speak outside of speech’ or ‘stand back from our language 
games.’ Instead, the problems are that its utterances are meaningless. However, this 
means that many of the moves Gellner ascribes to Wittgenstein, and Gellner’s 
criticism of Wittgenstein, do not make much sense as the key concern is not how 
claims are true or false but if an utterance is meaningful in the first place.  
Thus, Gellner’s discussion misfires. If the domesticated gloss of Wittgenstein 
is correct, Wittgenstein is best thought of as an antirealist and not an antiphilosopher. 
In turn, this means that Wittgenstein can and does give reasons for his position, 
arguments, and so on. However, it then becomes unclear why we should ascribe to 
him a rhetorical ideology at all. Conversely, if the semantic gloss of Wittgenstein is 
correct, Gellner’s discussion misses the mark entirely. It is not that Wittgenstein 
convinces us that we cannot ‘speak outside of speech.’ Rather, he convinces us that 
philosophy literally is bereft of meaning and so says nothing whatever. In either case, 
Gellner’s account misfires.  
 (c) Let us now examine Gellner's ideological reading of Wittgenstein. Unlike 
(a) and (b), this claim suffers from far less equivocation. Recall that Gellner 
characterizes ideology as a reified system that transforms truisms into deep truth and 
is prefabricated to account for already existing problems. With respect to the earlier 
Wittgenstein, Gellner does have prima facie justification for this reading. Earlier 
Wittgenstein offers a reified system that seems to transforms ethical truisms into deep 
truths, and seems prefabricated in that it aims to ameliorate cultural anxieties like the 
fate of the mystical in a scientistic world. However, the devil is very much in the 
details, details Gellner very much ignores. Against prefabrication, it is important to 
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notice that Wittgenstein's thought in the NB and proto-TLP do not seem motivated in 
the way Gellner asserts they are. Wittgenstein did not set out to re-enchant the world. 
As with Badiou, the key problem with such a rhetorical ascription is that it does not 
take Wittgenstein's philosophical logic seriously enough. Certainly, the mystical is an 
odd place to end up but this is due to his philosophical logic, not his religious 
proclivities. The charge of truisms can be met by noting that context matters much 
more than Gellner implies. Certainly anyone can claim things like "what we cannot 
talk about, we must pass over in silence" (TLP 7). However, it is what underwrites 
this claim that makes it interesting. That being said, the charge of reification seems 
apt and attested to in Wittgenstein's self-critique of the TLP (see, e.g., PI § 113 & § 
114). 
In any case, Gellner’s ascription of ideology to the later Wittgenstein and the 
PI badly misfires. First, pace reification, a remarkable feature of the PI is its utter 
flexibility and responsiveness. Wittgenstein seldom silences a voice with a quip about 
the meaninglessness of her words, let alone a charge that she is not speaking 
"normally." Rather, he constantly and constructively engages with odd claims, 
objections, and so on, and tries to make sense of them- a point stressed in chapter 8.5. 
Pace truisms, again, Gellner ignores context and the critical role of ‘truisms’ in 
Wittgenstein. Suffice it to say, Wittgenstein does not simply assert banalities as a 
means of ending conversations. Rather, he arrives at seeming truisms after careful 
work. Finally, pace addressing some cultural problems, it simply does not seem to be 
the case. Indeed, though the PI does certainly have broad implications, Wittgenstein 
does not seem terribly concerned with “fixing culture.”  
 (d) The sociological and biographical motives that Gellner ascribes to 
Wittgenstein are the most problematic. The key problem for Gellner's sociology is 
that it is unmoored from anything like empirical data (see Gellner (1995), 301-95). 
Consider, for example, Gellner's claim that Wittgenstein "denies the legitimacy to 
certain questions, doubts… which in our hearts we know full well to be legitimate" 
(ibid 306). I am not sure what empirical methods allowed Gellner to peer into hearts 
as no survey data is given to justify this sweeping claim. His biographical notes on 
Wittgenstein are, if anything, even more unhinged and less empirical. For example, 
Geller justifies his claim that Wittgenstein has "authoritarian tendencies" (ibid 318) 
with reference to Malcolm (2002). This is deeply problematic as Malcolm writes that 
"Wittgenstein sat in a plain wooden chair… he said things like ‘I'm a fool!', ‘You 
 91  
have a dreadful teacher!', ‘I'm just too stupid today.'" (ibid 25). Suffice it to say, this is 
not normally how authoritarians talk. Wittgenstein's "hatred of opposition" (Gellner 
(1995), 37-8) is justified based on Robertson (1977), 23, who writes that "[w]e [he 
and Wittgenstein] had a rather simulating discussion." Again, a stimulating discussion 
is not normally the result of talking with a fanatical dogmatist. Gellner also cites 
Popper (1976), 124, to buttress his claims. However, what actually happened between 
the two great philosophers is a deeply contested matter (see Edmonds & Eidinow 
(2002), 1-5). Thus, Gellner's claims are either under-determined by evidence or flatly 
contradict it.  
 
2.1.e Antiphilosophy-PI:  
 
The antiphilosophy-PI interpretation is drawn from Marcuse (1964) and 
Russell (1959). As with the previous two interpretations of Wittgenstein, 
antiphilosophy-PI takes Wittgenstein to attack philosophy rhetorically. Further, 
Wittgenstein then seeks to replace philosophy with a sort of comfortable numbness 
and avoidance of thought. Indeed, antiphilosophy-PI claims that later Wittgenstein 
grew "tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make 
such an activity unnecessary" (Russell (1959), 161). 
  (a) An antiphilosophical reading of the PI needs to avoid the 
metaphilosophical master argument. It does so by claiming that philosophy should 
concern "itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with different ways 
in which silly people can say silly things" (Russell (1959) 170). Furthermore, "[t]he 
desire to understand the world is… an outdated folly" (ibid 162). This stems from the 
"a curious suggestion… that the world of language can be quite divorced from the 
world of fact… [and] that assertions are compared with assertions… and that we can 
never compare reality with propositions" (ibid 161). Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein 
"sets up a self-sufficient world of its own, closed and well protected against the 
ingression of disturbing external factors" (Marcuse (1964), 182). Granting this, 
Wittgenstein meets the metaphilosophical master argument by claiming that 
philosophy should not really aim at truth, dialectic, and so on. Rather, it should 
simply proffer fabricated toy models that do nothing so much as spin idly. 
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 (b) Antiphilosophy-PI then claims that Wittgenstein’s rhetoric casts aspersions 
on philosophy. To make sense of this rhetoric, antiphilosophy-PI claims that one key 
assumption Wittgenstein makes is that "common speech is good enough, not only for 
daily life, but also for philosophy" (Russell (1959), 178). Indeed, "there is an 
unalterable right way of using words and… no change is to be tolerated however 
convenient it may be" (ibid 179). In turn, this means that "[t]hinking is not only 
pressed into the straitjacket of common usage, but also enjoined not to ask and seek 
solutions beyond those that are already there" (Marcuse (1964), 178). Interestingly, 
both Russell and Marcuse do not discuss why Wittgenstein should be thought to hold 
such an odd premise. Regardless, from here, Wittgenstein's cast aspersions on 
philosophy by simply noting that it ‘talks weird.’ Though the "argument" is a bit of a 
travesty, the guiding thought seems to be: premise1- if a discourse is respectable then, 
by definition, it relies on normal, common speech; premise2- Philosophical discourse 
distorts normal, common speech. Ergo, philosophy is not respectable. Thus, 
Wittgenstein "provide[s] intellectual justification… [for] the defamation of alternative 
modes of thought which contradict the established universe of discourse" (ibid 173). 
Thus, Wittgenstein casts doubt on philosophy by "debunking of transcendent 
concepts; it [Wittgenstein's philosophy] proclaims as its frame of reference the 
common usage of words, the variety of prevailing behavior" (Marcuse (1964), 171) 
and, by so doing, "it militates against intelligent non-conformity" (ibid 174). In sum, 
and in a terse and simple way, since philosophers talk weird, all Wittgenstein has to 
do is point out this glaringly obvious fact and this casts their talk into doubt. 
 (c) The question of how Wittgenstein’s rhetoric aims to convince us to 
abandon philosophy and what he puts forward as a replacement are, perhaps, the most 
worked out of all the antiphilosophical positions discussed. To begin, if we accept the 
argument given in (b), that language that is different from common usage is 
inherently problematic, then philosophy is indeed problematic. Granting this, 
antiphilosophy-PI ascribes to Wittgenstein a two-stage process to convince us to 
replace philosophy with worthless games with words. One, Wittgenstein stresses 
"[t]he therapeutic character of philosophic analysis is strongly emphasized… 
Wittgenstein… proclaimed it as the renunciation of all theory" (Marcuse (1964), 183). 
Indeed, the entire point of Wittgenstein's thinking is to invent the "useless 
‘discovery'… that ‘gives philosophy peace so that it is no longer tormented by 
questions which bring itself in question'" (ibid 183-4). Further, "adherents of WII 
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[Russell's term for later Wittgenstein] do not bother with any kind of justification" 
(Russell (1959), 162). Thus, at stage-one, antiphilosophy-PI agrees with pure therapy 
(see chapter 1.2a, e, i), that Wittgenstein attempts to therapize away philosophy. 
However, somewhat implicitly, antiphilosophy-PI also offers a replacement for 
philosophy. Specifically, antiphilosophy claims that Wittgenstein wants to replace 
philosophy with a new ‘form of inquiry’ that is “at best, a slight help to 
lexicographers and, at worst, an idle tea-table amusement" (ibid). For example, 
Wittgenstein “offers us Wittgenstein's endless language game with building stones… 
[holds in abeyance] the speakers and their situation... They are x and y, no matter how 
chummily they talk. But in the real universe of discourse x and y are ‘ghosts.' They 
don't exist; they are the product of the analytic philosopher" (Marcus (1964), 198). I 
take these to mean that, for antiphilosophy-PI, Wittgenstein seeks to replace 
philosophy with idle games with words. 
(d) Finally, let us examine what motivated Wittgenstein to adopt such a view. 
To begin, the antiphilosophy-PI account is markedly different from the previous two 
antiphilosophical accounts. Specifically, antiphilosophy-PI views later Wittgenstein's 
desire not in terms of the need to demonstrate an “existential singularity” but 
stemming from intellectual exhaustion. Thus Wittgenstein "seems to have grown tired 
of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an 
activity unnecessary" (Russell (1959), 161). Indeed, Wittgenstein's rhetoric "exhibt[s] 
a sado-masochism, self-humiliation, and self-denunciation of the intellectual whose 
labor does not issue in scientific, technical, or like achievements" (Marcuse (1964), 
173). Thus, Wittgenstein's rhetoric is due to intellectual collapse. He wanted to stop 
doing philosophy and invented a way to stop. 
 
2.1.f Antiphilosophy-PI: Criticism:  
 
  Antiphilosophy-PI is somewhat more clear than antiphilosophy-mixed in that 
it consistently ascribes to Wittgenstein antiphilosophy. Let us consider each point. 
 (a) The key problem with how antiphilosophy-PI claims that Wittgenstein 
belies the metaphilosophical master argument is that it simply does not work. Recall 
that the master argument claim that if one gives reasons to be against philosophy, then 
one is still doing philosophy and the “anti” part of “antiphilosophy” is problematic 
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whereas if one does not give reasons to be against philosophy, then philosophy has no 
reason to take the emoting seriously and the “philosophy” part of “antiphilosophy” 
falls out. Antiphilosophy-PI attempts to meet this by claiming that philosophy has 
nothing to do with truth, justification, and so on. However, even if we grant the 
assumption that Wittgenstein views philosophy as something for which one can truly 
say that ‘there is no outside the text,’ this still does not make the relationship between 
a reason a position moot. As it were, certain texts can function as reasons for other 
texts and certain texts cannot, unlike in pure rhetoric.   
 (b) For antiphilosophy-PI, Wittgenstein casts aspersions on philosophy by 
simply pointing out that philosophy talks funny when compared to normal speech. 
This attack has several problems, however. Exegetically, it does not track the PI. To 
begin, Wittgenstein not dismiss voices because they put forward absurd objections- 
e.g., “’But in a fairy tale a pot too can see and hear!’” (PI § 292). Indeed, Wittgenstein 
also offers strikingly odd talkings in his own voice- e.g., “[g]iven the two concepts 
‘fat’ and ‘lean’, would you be inclined to say that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday 
was lean…? I want to use these words (with their familiar meanings) here” (PI II xi § 
274). Whatever else PI II xi § 274 does, it seems to undermine antiphilosophy-PI’s 
claim that Wittgenstein thinks that talking funny is something that should make us 
skeptical of philosophy.  
Philosophically, neither Marcuse nor Russell offer any good reason to either 
accept the premise that ‘talking funny’ and ‘not respectable’ are deeply related or to 
ascribe this premise to Wittgenstein. For the assumption that ‘talking funny’ and ‘not 
respectable’ are related, there is a rather old argument to belie this. To wit, scientists 
and poets talk funny and it strains credulity to assume that this means that a statement 
like “quarks have six flavors: up, down, strange charm, top, and bottom” or “he sang 
his didn’t and he danced his did” are, somehow, not respectable. For ascribing the 
premise to Wittgenstein, there are several key problems. One is that Wittgenstein 
notes that the “results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain 
nonsense” (PI § 119). It is rather unclear what Wittgenstein thinks we discover if 
simply pointing out that philosophy talks funny is enough.  
Finally, metaphilosophically, if casting aspersions on philosophy is really as 
simple as pointing out that it talks funny, we should expect to find in the PI a sort of 
lazy indifference to ‘funny sounding’ philosophical problems and a rather trite 
methodology of ‘reminding’ people that they do not normally talk that way. Pace the 
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lazy indifference, Wittgenstein notes that that "[t]he problems arising through a 
misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep 
disquietudes; are as deeply rooted in us as the forms of our language and their 
significance is as great as the importance of our language" (PI § 111-underlining 
mine). Thus, Wittgenstein himself notes that these problems are not trivial matters but 
are as important as our lives with and in language. Further, Wittgenstein’s method in 
the PI does not reflect such a lazy attitude. 
(c) Concerning both how Wittgenstein persuades us to abandon philosophy as 
well as what he tries to replace it with, matters are problematic for antiphilosophy-PI. 
Clearly, Wittgenstein’s persuasions only work if we accept the odd premise given in 
the last paragraph- i.e., that since philosophy talks funny, it is not respectable. I 
argued that we have no reason to do so. 
The claim that Wittgenstein aims to replace philosophy with a sort of idle 
amusement is problematic on two fronts. First, the charge only makes sense if we 
adopt Marcuse and Russell’s strong metaphilosophical assumptions concerning what 
makes philosophy different from tea-time games. Specifically, both assume that real 
philosophy and science share the same goal of gaining objective non-trivial 
theoretical truth. 28 Further, both impute to real philosophy a methodology akin to 
science- namely theory construction to access such truths. Finally, both view 
philosophy as worthwhile, i.e., as not a mere parlor game, only provided philosophy 
is constructing theories to access these truths. Granting these metaphilosophical, it is 
almost trivial that Wittgenstein’s insistence that philosophy cannot construct theories 
(cf. PI § 109) is tantamount to transforming philosophy into an idle game. However, 
both Marcuse and Russell studiously avoid Wittgenstein’s discussion of why 
philosophy and science are different in kind, how this problematizes ‘theory 
construction’ in philosophy, and why the goal of objective theoretical knowledge is a 
non-starter, points discussed at length in chapter 3. Suffice it to say, without engaging 
with Wittgenstein’s discussions, Russell and Marcuse beg the question against him by 
simply insisting that philosophy is theoretical. 
 (d) The last point, the desire Wittgenstein had that accounts for why 
Wittgenstein put forward his rhetoric, is at once the clearest and the least tenable of 
                                                 
28 There are, of course, deep differences between them (see, e.g., Russell (1959), 184, and Marcuse 
(1964), 144-169). However, both clearly think that using theory to obtain non-trivial objective 
knowledge about aspects of the world is critical in proper philosophy.  
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the three antiphilosophical positions. For antiphilosophy-PI, Wittgenstein is an 
exhausted thinker, and his antiphilosophical rhetoric amounts to intellectual 
euthanasia. That being said, the problem is that such an assumption does not track 
Wittgenstein. The accounts of his lectures during this time show not a tragically used 
up thinker, but someone passionately investigating (see, e.g., LFM, BlBK, BRBK, 
etc.). Wittgenstein is not the tragic wreck antiphilosophy-PI sees him as. 
 
2.2 Antiphilosophy and Wittgenstein: 
 
  This section pulls back and examines why an antiphilosophical ascription to 
Wittgenstein is problematic. To begin, I examine the reliance on biography and desire 
to make sense of Wittgenstein’s thought in (d). Next, I examine (c), the claim that 
Wittgenstein persuades us to abandon philosophy and replace it with something else. 
Then, I turn to the rhetorical aspersions antiphilosophy claims Wittgenstein uses to 
attack philosophy in (b). Finally, I briefly discuss the metaphilosophical master 
argument and how Wittgenstein avoids it in (a).  
   Against (d), recall that antiphilosophy assumes that desire on the part of a 
speaker is a critical feature of antiphilosophy. This is based on the note that the beliefs 
of a rhetorician, what she knows, her justifications, and so on, and what she utters 
rhetorically, do not correlate. Granting this, so the story goes, to reconstruct a 
rhetorical position, it is necessary to consider what the rhetorician is trying to 
convince us of with her rhetoric and not what she believes, knows, and so on. There 
are problems with this interpretive strategy in general and as it concerns Wittgenstein 
specifically. In general, it is unclear how desire and reconstruction of arguments 
relate. It is simply not enough to cite biographical information about Gorgais, Lacan, 
Wittgenstein, etc., and suppose that this, somehow, gives ‘insight’ into their rhetoric. 
However, it is unclear what else is required to make biography and desire relate to 
reconstruction. In a related key, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, for example, is a powerful 
discussion of rhetoric that does not invoke, and has no need to invoke, the desire of a 
rhetorician. Indeed, to tropes Aristotle studies, his considerations of how different 
ploys affect different audiences, etc., have nothing to do with desire. Thus, it is 
unclear what work desire is supposed to do and how it relates to reconstruction. The 
problem with using this strategy to reconstruct Wittgenstein emerges naturally from 
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this. None of the antiphilosophical interpretations of Wittgenstein we considered give 
us any principled way of connecting their often ad hominem notes on Wittgenstein’s 
life with his position and how they claim to interpret it. Indeed, this strategy is 
bedeviled by the simple fact that there is no describable way to link biography and 
philosophy together in the way antiphilosophy attempts to.   
  Against (c), the claim that Wittgenstein self-consciously uses rhetoric to 
convince us to abandon philosophy and replace it with something else, things simply 
do not pan out. For the TLP, Wittgenstein writes that "the truth of the thoughts that 
are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive" (TLP preface 4). 
Needless to say, this insistence on truth is out of place for a rhetorical reading. For the 
PI, Wittgenstein notes that part of his writing it was to correct "grave mistakes in what 
I set out in that first book [the TLP]" (PI preface 4). Again, if the TLP is mere 
rhetoric, it is hard to understand how philosophical criticisms could cause 
Wittgenstein to revise it at all. Furthermore, in all cases, Wittgenstein notes that 
"Kierkegaard's writings are teasing and this is of course their intention, although I am 
not sure whether the exact effect they produce on me is intentional…[T]here is 
something in me that rejects this teasing… The idea that someone uses a trick in order 
to make me do something is unpleasant" (LW Public & Private Occasions, 62). If we 
take ‘teasing' as antiphilosophical ploys, clearly Wittgenstein rejects this method. 
 For (b), Wittgenstein’s use of rhetoric to attack philosophy, an 
antiphilosophical reading quickly falters. To begin, it is imperative, for an 
antiphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein, that Wittgenstein casts aspersions on 
philosophy in purely rhetorical terms. In other words, Wittgenstein’s attacks on 
philosophy are little more than polemics. However, this simply discards the force of 
Wittgenstein’s claims as well as why we should read Wittgenstein at all. For 
Wittgenstein’s work, casting his remarks as rhetorical gestures against philosophy is 
incapable of appreciating their internal structure, power, and relationship with 
philosophy. For example, and as noted in section 3.1a, b, c, and d, a stunning thing 
about the mystical and the silence in the TLP is that Wittgenstein arrives at it via 
philosophical arguments; he does not simply begin by screaming that everyone should 
shut their mouths. For reading Wittgenstein, if his ‘discussions’ are, in reality, little 
more than invectives against philosophy, it is unclear why we should concern 
ourselves with him. Whatever he is up to, it has nothing to do with philosophy. 
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  Against (a), the entire debate between philosophy and antiphilosophy turns on 
Plato’s insistence that philosophy is a truth seeking and truth conveying enterprise 
whereas antiphilosophy is not. However, it is unclear if truth is the best way to 
distinguish between philosophy and antiphilosophy/sophistry. This is for two reasons. 
One, it is unclear what sorts of criteria can let us know that someone is really seeking 
truth or trying to convey it, a point that caused Plato much consternation. Two, such a 
distinction may assume an inflated concept of truth- i.e., that truth is a robust 
property, that there are truth-makers and truth-bearers, and so on. However, such an 
inflated concept of truth faces some problems- both in itself (cf. Horwich (1998 a)) 
and as a reading of Wittgenstein (cf. PI §136). Thus, it may be that relying on truth to 
differentiate philosophy and antiphilosophy is not the best way to go.  
 
2.3 The Key Uptake: 
 
 This chapter has both discussed what antiphilosophy is metaphilosophically 
as well as how one may ascribe such an antiphilosophical position to Wittgenstein. 
Metaphilosophically, a position is antiphilosophy only if it argues against philosophy 
to a philosophical audience using rhetoric. Relatedly, an antiphilosophical reading of 
Wittgenstein focuses on his rhetorical style, desires, and the pragmatic affects of his 
remarks rather than their meaning, a philosophical method, and so on. I argued that 
such a reading misfires in all sorts of ways. Thus, though perhaps there is something 
to antiphilosophy as a possible metaphilosophical position, it certainly does not 
function as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.  
 
2.4 Summary:  
 
 In this chapter, I have offered an account of what an antiphilosophical reading 
of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy entails. First, I discussed the nature of 
antiphilosophy and argued that a position is antiphilosophical only if it argues against 
philosophy to a philosophical audience on purely rhetorical grounds. Then I examined 
three attempts to read Wittgenstein under these lights. I argued that each faces some 
deep problems. Finally, I discussed an antiphilosophical Wittgenstein in a more 
coarse grained manner. I argued that such a reading is not workable.  
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3 Anti-Theoretical Metaphilosophy: 
 
This chapter examines a third metaphilosophical interpretation of 
Wittgenstein- an anti-theoretical one. In many respects, this position is the other way 
of resolving the instability inherent in the therapeutic conception of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. Recall that the therapeutic position ascribes to Wittgenstein the goal 
of excising or ameliorating philosophy. It further claims that philosophy is linked to 
nonsense, psychic disquiets, etc. Finally, therapy ascribes to Wittgenstein learnable 
and explicitly philosophical methodologies that addresses and redresses the nonsense, 
psychic disquiet, etc., and so remove philosophy. Much like antiphilosophy, anti-
theoretical metaphilosophy finds such a mixed position untenable.  
To begin, the anti-theoretical interpretation of Wittgenstein agrees with both 
the therapeutic and antiphilosophical interpretation that Wittgenstein’s key 
metaphilosophical goal is removing philosophy. However, it maintains such a project 
should not depend on nonsense, rhetorical ploys, semantic confusion (i.e., not 
understanding the meanings or combinations of certain terms) etc., at all. Indeed, an 
anti-theoretical metaphilosopher “need not, and should not, assume that the trouble 
with philosophical questions and theories is our unwittingly having lapsed into 
nonsense. For he [an anti-theoretical philosopher] can suppose, much less 
contentiously, that their true defect is irrationality” (Horwich (2013), 149). Rather, 
the real problem with philosophy is that it is pragmatically confused- i.e., it attempts 
to employ the method of scientific theory construction designed for natural 
phenomena to features that are decidedly non-naturalistic. Pursuant to this, an anti-
theoretical interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a thoroughly philosophical 
methodology designed to expose the flaws of such an attempt to use scientistic 
theories in philosophy and demonstrate that such an attempt can never lead to 
objective theoretical knowledge. In turn, if such a method works, and if one grants the 
assumption that the real business of philosophy is (trying to) theorize in a manner 
akin to science, one sees that philosophy is indefensible as philosophy’s theories do 
not work properly. Thus, philosophy as philosophical theorization is globally flawed 
and to keep doing it is irrational. Thus, philosophy should be abandoned.  
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This chapter unfolds the anti-theoretical interpretation more carefully. I focus, 
specifically, on the account given by Horwich, e.g. (2012), and Hutto, e.g., (2005 a). 
First, I examine how anti-theoretical metaphilosophy interprets the evolution of 
Wittgenstein's thought. I argue that it attributes to Wittgenstein the diachronically 
consistent metaphilosophical goal of revealing that theory construction is untenable in 
philosophy. However, I also note that anti-theoretical metaphilosophy imputes to 
Wittgenstein a drastic methodological shift. Second, I discuss how anti-theoretical 
metaphilosophy interprets Wittgenstein's mature philosophical methodology and how 
this methodology does, in fact, achieve his goal of demonstrating that theory 
construction is not viable within philosophy. Finally, third, I examine two possible 
metaphilosophical endgames that an anti-theoretical interpretation may ascribe to 
Wittgenstein. These are an end-of-philosophy response (e.g., Horwich (2016)) in 
section 3.2a, and a form-of-life response (e.g., Hutto (2005 a), 216-221) in section 
3.2c. However, I also argue, in 3b and 3d, respectively, that these endgames are not 
viable interpretations of Wittgenstein. Consequently, there is something amiss in the 
anti-theoretical account.  
 
3.0 Diachronic Consistency- A Tragic View: 
 
This section examines anti-theoretical metaphilosophy's claim that 
Wittgenstein's goal of proving that theory construction is not viable in philosophy is 
diachronically persistent and stable feature of his metaphilosophical thought. 
However, I also discuss how Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology to achieve 
this goal went through a reasonably drastic revision from the TLP to the PI. 
Specifically, as we shall see, the TLP is a "tragic" text precisely because it attempts to 
ban theory in philosophy on the basis of a philosophical theory. First, I set the stage. 
Next, I, very briefly, present the metaphysics and philosophy of language that both 
Hutto and Horwich ascribe to the TLP. As we shall see, the TLP's metaphysics and 
philosophy of language do render theory construction unworkable within philosophy. 
Third, granting that there are no theories in philosophy, I examine what the anti-
theoretical metaphilosophical account thinks that the TLP is trying to do. Finally, I 
consider why the anti-theoretical account claims that the TLP fails. In turn, this leads 
naturally to our account of Wittgenstein's mature methodology. 
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To set the stage, an anti-theoretical reading of Wittgenstein maintains that 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical aim is diachronically invariant. In other words, 
Wittgenstein, earlier and later, seeks to prove that theory construction is not viable 
within philosophy. Thus, "the Tactatus and the Philosophical Investigations represent 
improved expressions of one and the same hyper-deflationary insight" (Horwich 
(2005), 171). Pursuant to this, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy ascribe to the TLP a 
"tragic reading"- i.e., that earlier "Wittgenstein prohibits philosophical theorizing on 
the basis of a philosophical theory!" (Horwich (2012), 103). Under the tragic reading, 
we must keep in mind that the TLP "attempts at elucidation not as theory, without 
suggesting that they succeed in being such" (Hutto (2005 a), 101). In other words, 
though earlier Wittgenstein attempts to ban theory, this attempt fails precisely because 
his conception of elucidation relies on a theory. Pursuant to this, later Wittgenstein's 
critical move is to jettison the problematic anti-theoretical theory of the TLP and, by 
doing so, present the anti-theoretical insight consistently. Let us examine the inner 
workings of this account.  
To begin, both Horwich and Hutto accept large parts of the classical reading 
of the TLP. Specifically, for both, Wittgenstein's points in the TLP are neither faux-
propositions in the manner of pure therapy-TLP discussed in chapter 1.2a nor 
rhetorical ploys as presented in chapter 2.2a. Instead, at its core, the TLP proffers a 
"representational and referential view of language" (Hutto (2005 a), 97). The 
referential aspect is best understood in terms of the TLP's metaphysics combined with 
a particular conception of the denotation. For metaphysics, the TLP "makes a series of 
metaphysical claims, presented as obvious, including (a) that there is a stock of basic 
entities (‘objects'), the ultimate constituents both of our world and of all merely 
possible worlds; (b) that certain combinations of these entities actually exist, forming 
atomic fact; and (c) that all other facts that make up the real world are constructed… 
on the basis of these logical ones" (Horwich (2012), 76). Further, these ‘objects' are 
"indivisible, [and] necessarily-existent… [They] may be combined with a variety of 
other basic objects to make a variety of atomic facts- where the possibility of a given 
combination depends on the intrinsic nature of the objects…. [Thus,] [a]n atomic fact 
is then a purely logical combination of such entities" (ibid, 78-79). In other words, 
Wittgenstein's ‘objects,' in virtue of being the sorts of objects they are (their logical 
type) have certain internal properties that determine what sorts of concatenations that 
they can enter into. In this key, Hutto's metaphor of legos is quite helpful (Hutto 
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(2005 a), 67 & 222-25). Specific legos can concatenate with some legos and not 
others, in virtue of the type of lego they are. It is in this sense that simple "objects fit 
into one another like the links of a chain" (TLP 2.03).  
From here, and granting that these ‘objects' exist in this manner, a simple 
name- i.e. the terms one ends up with at the ground floor of logical analysis (e.g., NB 
50)- denotes one of these objects. Thus, "each [simple] name refers to a simple 
‘object'" (Horwich (2005), 160) and, thus, simple names are "correlated with objects" 
(Hutto (2005 a), 60). In turn, this correlation of simple names and ‘objects' ensures 
that the names have the same internal properties of the ‘objects' they refer to. In other 
words, the simple names denote the ‘objects' in such a way that the former mirrors the 
internal properties of the later. Thus, a simple "name means an object. The object is 
its meaning" (TLP 3.203). Notice, however, that these simple names do not as yet 
represent anything.  
To fill in this lacuna and account for the representational aspect of language, 
we should note that an "elementary proposition ‘depicts' a possible ‘atomic' fact" 
(Horwich (2005), 160). This is because the simple names that constitute an 
elementary proposition can "act as proxy for the elements they depict in the state of 
affairs in question… It is this feature that underwrites the possibility of representing 
the world accurately or inaccurately by means of a picture" (Hutto (2005 a), 58). 
Indeed, it is exactly because simple names in elementary propositions and ‘objects' in 
atomic facts "ultimately share the logic form of what is depicted" that the 
concatenation of one can represent the concatenation of the other (ibid 59). Notice 
that a few other features flow from this.  
First, an elementary proposition, thus construed, is inherently bipolar. In 
effect, since the "general for of a proposition is: this is how things stand" (TLP 4.5), 
any elementary proposition will represent a possible atomic fact that can be either true 
or false, depending on how the world is. Second, this in no way tells us if some 
elementary proposition is, in fact, true or false. To establish this, we must see if the 
actual atomic fact that obtains is matched or fails to match the picture the elementary 
proposition shows us (e.g., TLP 2.21). Third, "nonsense" is not monistic and includes, 
in addition to signs that have not been assigned a referent (e.g. "ksldj"), ill-formed 
formulas. In effect, since "[t]o represent a fact, a proposition cannot simply be a 
conglomerate of words… They [the words] must be put together in the right way" 
(Hutto (2005), 68). Fourth, complex propositions "will be logically determined by the 
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truth values of elementary propositions" (Horwich (2012), 84). In other words, a 
logical operator like ‘&' does not refer to some logical object but is a short hand for 
arrangements of truth-values between propositions- e.g. ‘&' is the configuration 
(TFFF) (TLP 4.211 & 5.134. Also see Horwich (2012), 87). In turn, fifth, "each 
legitimate [complex] proposition is the result of successive application of the usual 
logical operators to elementary propositions…. Thus he is able to do what… he said 
he was aiming to do: namely ‘to set a limit to thought, or rather, not to thought but to 
the expression of thoughts'" (Horwich (2012), 87). In other words, any legitimate 
complex proposition is simply an iterated application of logical operators to 
elementary propositions. Seventh, these logical operators allow for logically true 
(tautologies) or false (contradictions) complex propositions that are limiting cases of 
representation and so are senseless.29  
  In turn, these features account for how the TLP attempts to ban any sort of 
theory construction in philosophy. To see this, assume that "philosophy consists of 
logic and metaphysics: logic is its base" (NB p. 106). From this, a philosophical 
theory is best construed as a theory of logic. However, such a viewpoint assumes that 
"metaphysically speaking, the subject matter of logic had to be purely factual. Logical 
forms and principles… were just facts about the world, although quite general ones… 
[In turn, a] direct consequence of regarding logic to have a factual status is… to treat 
it as legitimate that quarry for metaphysical theorizing and speciation… like any other 
factual domain" (Hutto (2005 a), 30). Thus, much as physics utilizes theories to 
investigate the quantum realm, philosophy can utilize a theory to figure out, e.g., what 
sorts of logical forms there are. Indeed, Russell seems to think in this manner when he 
notes that in logic one can discover "a new sort of thing, a new beast for our zoo, not 
another member of our former species but a new species" (Russell (1956), 226). 
Pace this, according to the anti-theoretical interpretation, the TLP attempts to 
show that such an understanding of logic is grossly flawed and problematic for a host 
of interconnected reasons. For our purposes, the critical note is that the TLP maintains 
that "logic is inherent in the very fabric of thought and cannot exist independently" 
(Hutto (2005 a), 42). Further, "logic cannot inform us about the world…tautologies 
do not represent any possible state of affairs" (ibid 43). Indeed, "there can be no 
                                                 
29 Technically speaking, senseless propositions do not picture anything. Indeed, on orthodox construals 
of logic, this is quite right as "John is nice or it is not the case that John is nice" and "5 is prime, or it is 
not the case that five is prime" end up being, logically equivalent.  
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science of logic, for it lacks a subject matter of its own that can be properly 
articulated" (ibid, 45).  Thus, a key problem with such a factual construal of logic, and 
the related assumption that theory construction can play a role is that it takes logic to 
be about things and different from language, thought, and reality, in a way it is most 
decidedly not. As it were, there is no real room for a "theory of logic" as logic is 
constitutively connected to thought, language, and reality itself (i.e., "My work has 
extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world" NB p. 79).  
With this in view, we can attempt to make sense what the TLP is trying to do. 
In other words, if the TLP does not present us with a theory of logic, then what does it 
take itself to do? To begin, "legitimate philosophical activity must be confined to 
conceptual clarification and the disillusion of pseudo-problems" (Horwich (2012), 
77). It attempts to achieve both goals by presenting "us with an alternative notation, 
designed to discourage our tendency to treat Russellian notation as if its symbols for 
logical constants named objects" (Hutto (2005 a), 47). Indeed, anti-theoretical 
philosophy argues that the TLP is meant to "be merely clarificatory elucidations… 
those elucidations are merely pointers designed to remind us of that we ought already 
to know. In this respect, Wittgenstein specifically contrasts them with the kind of 
factual statements that are meant to typify the corpus of the natural sciences" (Hutto 
(2004), 134). In other words, the TLP is not put forward as a theory of logic, a set of 
faux-propositions, or rhetorical ploys. Rather, the hope is that philosophy becomes 
"nothing but clarification of our thoughts on particular occasions, achieved by means 
of elucidation" (Hutto (2005 a), 77). 
Tragically, however, this hope could not be realized. Specifically, this 
laudable attempt to merely elucidate what we already know is spoiled by a robust and 
substantial metaphysics combined with an insistence that language's only purpose is 
representing. Further, both are underwritten by a mythologized account of how 
denoting works. Indeed, both Hutto (2005), 100-27, and Horiwch (2012), 96-104, 
point out that it is precisely these aspects of the TLP that are attacked in the PI. To see 
this clearly, notice that "[t]he Tractatus meta-philosophy involves the following 
sequence of ideas: 
(1) Philosophical questions are provoked by confusion 
(2) Therefore they articulate pseudoproblems which can at best be eliminated 
and not solved 
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(3) Consequently, no philosophical explanations, theories or discovers are 
possible 
(4) Philosophical confusions originate in misunderstandings about language 
(5) To be more specific, such confusions arise because of the considerable 
distance between the superficial forms of certain propositions and their 
ultimate analyses in terms of fundamental primitives. For example, ‘The F is 
G' should be analyzed, following Russell, as '∃x (Fx & (y) (Fy→x=y) & Gx).' 
This distance can be so great that we can easily fail to appreciate a statement's 
real meaning. (Horwich (2005), 164). 
 
(1)-(4) seems like claims that may not depend on a "theory" in a problematic sense. 
However, (5) is deeply problematic. Notice, first, that (5) relies on the heavy-duty 
aspects of the TLP- it presupposes that a proposition can be analyzed into simple 
names, that these refer to ‘objects', that the surface grammar of the sentence may fail 
to present the true structure of a proposition properly, and that Russell's way of 
analyzing is fundamentally the correct method to uncover the real propositional form. 
Indeed, even more problematically, these assumptions make up a fairly robust and 
substantive theory of language and, pursuant to this, a theoretical account of what 
nonsense is. Thus, paradoxically, "Wittgenstein prohibits philosophical theorizing on 
the basis of a philosophy theory" (Horwich (2005), 163). In turn, such an odd account 
betokens "a further and deeper threat of incoherence within Wittgenstein's position- 
one that would not be relieved by a show/say distinction, even if such a thing could be 
made out" (ibid). 
 However, much as Dante's journey through hell would bring him, eventually, 
to heaven, so too does the failure of the TLP end in a viable, robust, and consistent 
metaphilosophical method in the PI, according to the anti-theoretical account. 
Explicitly, the critical move is rejecting (5) and the latent theory it carries with it. 
Further, to support this claim, the anti-theoretical account stresses that Wittgenstein's 
rejection of (5) accounts for why the PI attacks the points in the TLP it does. Thus, 
Wittgenstein takes pains to show that the denoting relation between simple names and 
‘objects' is mythical in his earlier work (e.g., PI § 1- § 15 &, esp, § 40- § 45. See also 
Horwich (2012), 97-8; Hutto (2005 a),104), that language cannot be reduced to its 
representational aspect (e.g., PI § 114 see also Horwich (2012), 96-7; Hutto (2005 a), 
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97), that the conception of ‘objects' as eternal and simple cannot be made sense of 
(e.g., PI § 40 see also Horwich (2012), 98-99, Hutto (2005 a), 105-106). In other 
words, though the TLP is tragic, the play is not yet over. It is to the second act we 
now turn. 
 
3.1 Later Wittgenstein's Consistent Method Against Theory: 
 
With this in place, we can examine how later Wittgenstein's philosophical 
methodology achieves his metaphilosophical aim without presupposing any theory of 
its own. However, this may seem slightly paradoxical.30 To wit, can Wittgenstein put 
forward a consistent philosophical methodology that does not rely on a theory in the 
first place? First, I examine the arguments that the anti-theoretical account puts 
forward to answer this question. With this done, second, I turn to the methodology 
that the anti-theoretical account ascribes to Wittgenstein. I argue it has three steps. 
Third, granting that this method is successful, I argue that Wittgenstein has 
problematized the role of "theory" in philosophical investigations because science and 
philosophy are simply different in kind. In effect, science is simply too different from 
philosophy and any analogical extension of “theory” from one to the other is 
inherently problematic. 
  To begin, the idea of an anti-theoretical methodology may strike the reader as 
something of a contradiction in terms. Indeed, it seems plausible to argue that 
methodology presupposes theory and, pursuant to this, Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophical goal of showing that theory is out of place in philosophy will 
always fall prey to a profound, internal incoherence. To meet this challenge, we need 
to define "theory" in a more specific manner. An apt definition is that "by a theory, 
Wittgenstein has in mind a hypothesis about some non-evident reality- an attempt to 
unearth facts that are not out in the open, that cannot be discerned merely from 
looking in the right direction" (Horwich (2012), 64). Notice, first, that such a 
definition of theory does not seem to count as a theoretical claim by its own lights. 
Indeed, when contrasted with, e.g., the logical positivist view of a “theory” as an 
uninterpreted syntactic system of propositions that gains content only by correlation 
with propositions given in an observational vocabulary (e.g., Feigl (1970)), the anti-
                                                 
30 Indeed, a case can be made that Wittgenstein succumbs to the ‘myth of mere method’ (e.g. Glock 
(2017)). 
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theoretical definition of “theory” looks positively intuitive. Further, Merriam-Webster 
American English Dictionary defines "theory" as "a plausible or scientifically 
acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to explain a phenomenon- 
the wave theory of light." Thus, this conception of "theory" is a rather standard 
everyday one rather than a technical term of art. Second, it is also important to note 
that a claim not being theoretical does not ipso facto mean that it is "indisputable. For 
even phenomena that are perfectly open to view, may, for a variety of reasons, not be 
noticed and therefore be disputed" (Horwich (2012), 64). Granting this fairly intuitive, 
and non-theoretical, conception of "theory," it is possible to offer a non-theoretical 
methodology to show that philosophical theorization is problematic. What is critical, 
however, is that this methodology must not utilize any sort of theoretical terms, 
assumptions, etc. Instead, it must draw solely on descriptions of things that lay open 
to view, utilize reminders, and so on. In sum, the methodology must conform to what 
Wittgenstein says in PI § 108- § 35.  
With this in view, we turn to the methodology that the anti-theoretical account 
ascribes to Wittgenstein. As we shall see, this anti-theoretical methodology relies on 
common sense to remind us both that philosophy is different in kind from science and 
that, pursuant to this, any attempt to redeploy "theory" from science into philosophy, 
misfires. This methodology consists of three interrelated moves. First, Wittgenstein 
reminds us of features that are obviously in play within scientific research where 
“theory” is utilized properly. These features, as we shall see, do not depend on 
specialized knowledge but on rather truistic claims like "science rests on observation" 
or "science explains phenomena." Second, Wittgenstein elaborates these claims in a 
common sense way. For example, "if science rests on observation, then the observed 
elements are the sorts of things we can see, slam, poke, etc." Third, Wittgenstein 
points out that philosophical investigation lacks these features, for common sense 
reasons that are obvious and open to view. In particular, there are four features of 
scientific research and theory construction that the anti-theoretical account of 
Wittgenstein focuses on. These are: (a) the nature of data and observation; (b) the role 
of explanation; (c) the idea of convergence on method, theories, knowledge, etc.; (d) 
the possibility of radical revision.  
I note here that I avoid many critical, and critically interesting, debates in 
philosophy of science concerning, e.g., the nature and role of explanation, the 
complex interdependencies between theory, observation, raw and treated data, and so 
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on, and assume a "common sense" view that most educated non-scientist would agree 
to. Though this does grossly simplify and misconstrue many critical aspects of 
science31, assuming a common sense view is grits to anti-theoretical metaphilosophy's 
mill. I should also note that this anti-theoretical criticism "targets a certain 
traditionally dominant form of philosophy that, although self-consciously not 
scientific, is shaped by the theoretical goals and methods of reasoning that closely 
resemble those the sciences. I'll be calling it ‘T-philosophy' to suggest ‘traditional' and 
‘theoretical'" (Horwich (2015), 130). Further, T-philosophy " t-philosophical theories 
are not scientific, they are scientistic" (Horwich (2012), 24). In other words, T-
philosophy attempts to put forward theories that are analogically akin to scientific 
theories. I follow Horwich in using T-philosophy for the specific target. We return to 
the scope of this in section 3.3a, b. Finally, note that the anti-theoretical account is 
"not straightforwardly exegetical. That is to say, I am less concerned to establish my 
interpretation is the correct one" (Hutto (2005 a), 2). Indeed, its aim is "not to offer an 
interpretation of his [Wittgenstein's] notoriously cryptic pronouncements but a 
sympathetic development of them" (Horwich (2016), 2).  
(a) One critical feature of scientific practice is the role of data and observation. 
From a common sense perspective, science "gets its hands dirty" and the scientific 
method begins with observation. We consider two interconnected components of this. 
First, observation and the data derived from it is not "from the armchair." Instead, it is 
a posteriori. Second, these data constrain theoretical speculation. This is particularly 
stressed from a common sense perspective. If a scientist puts forward a pet theory, 
and an observation conflicts with it, it is on the scientist to modify or drop her theory.  
Granting this construal of data and observation, anti-theoretical 
metaphilosophy reminds us that t-philosophy has no plausible candidate that meets 
these conditions and, ergo, does not make observations and has no data in any sense 
akin to science. First, from a common sense perspective, we do not observe possible 
worlds like we do penguins, we do not see conceptual connections like we do carbon 
reactions, etc. Pursuant to this, since observation is a non-starter, the most likely 
                                                 
31 I should stress that I find many of the views I outline here untenable from a philosophy of science 
perspective. For example, the idea that "data" floats in the world in a pre-theoretic state (e.g. Longino 
(1990), 38-61, for a significant criticism), the idea that if a theory conflicts with evidence, we drop the 
theory (e.g., Lakatos (1980), for how deleterious this assumption would be if implemented), the 
assumption that there is THE scientific method that is trans-historic and applicable to everything from 
quantum physics to macroeconomics (Feyerabend (2010), for a powerful criticism). 
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candidate to play the role of data in T-philosophy are "so-called intuitive judgments- 
for example, that planets must be located in space and time… Such facts play the role 
that in science is played by the observed data" (Horwich (2012) 3). However, such 
philosophical "data" is "not scientific. Instead of sensory perceptions [or other a 
posteriori evidence], one relies upon basic a priori convictions (so-called ‘a priori 
intuitions')" (ibid 25). Indeed, such a reliance on a priori intuition seems to simply 
assume that these intuitions are veridical, universal, trans-cultural, and so on. 
However, critically, there is "considerable disagreement in our intuitions" (Hutto 
(2005 b), 4). Further, "our linguo-conceptual practices, and the basic a priori 
commitments associated with them, are extremely messy" (Horwich (2012), 35). This 
is partly because "our concepts exhibit a highly theory-resistant complexity and 
variability. They evolved, not for the sake of science and its objectives, but rather in 
order to cater to the interacting contingencies of our nature, our culture, our 
environment, our communicative needs and other purposes" (Horwich (2015), 292-
93). Granting this, it is rather doubtful if an intuition can play the role of "data" at all. 
If there are considerable variations culturally, historically, interpersonally, and so on, 
no reason to assume a deep unity (and good reasons to assume a lack of unity- e.g. PI 
§ 23 & § 24), no public and intersubjective access and means to "calibrate" intuitions, 
etc., it is opaque why we should call them "data" in the first place. Worst of all, 
however, the assumption that intuition has a veridical relationship with the world is 
itself rather problematic.32  
A possible retort to this is that scientific data is very messy as well. This is 
true. However, it is imperative to keep in mind that in science, the messiness of data is 
dealt with in a particular set of ways. Ideally, a scientist "looks for, and often finds, 
simplicity at some deeper level… the superficial facts [e.g., the apparent messiness of 
the data] are then explained as the causal products of simply underlying laws in 
combination with messily varied spatio-temporal array of particular circumstances" 
(Horwich (2012), 36). Further, this finer-grained level often relies on "postulat[ing] an 
underlying unobservable realm in which simple regularity really does hold- And, by 
combining this segularity [sic] with an ineliminably messy array of extraneous factors 
he aims to explain all the observed phenomena" (ibid, 37).  This is not a viable 
methodology when one is dealing with features that are not spatio-temporal or causal. 
                                                 
32 Djordjevic (2018), though as ever long-winded, argues this point passably well. 
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Further, though science does exclude outliers, it does so in a principled and public 
manner (e.g., statistically analysis, keeping track of ceteris paribus assumptions, and 
so on). In contrast, T-philosophy has the habit of "allowing simplicity to trump data—
but with no attempt to explain how those data could be mistaken" (ibid, 46). In other 
words, in T-philosophy, a T-philosopher does not so much deal with the messiness of 
her data as gerrymander in such a way that she excludes it.  
Second data constrains theories in science. Bracketing many niceties and 
sticking to a common sense conception, if a scientist puts forward a theory, and the 
data conflicts with this theory, then the scientist needs to modify or abandon the 
theory in light of the data. By contrast, this feature is hard to make sense of with 
respect to T-philosophical intuitions and theories. Indeed, "[i]s this idea really 
plausible [for a priori intuitions and T-philosophy theories]? For example, consider a 
parallel worry about using proofs and arguments to settle issues of substantial 
philosophical concern objectively… the success of the proof and its putative 
refutation were built into the reception of the premises that supposedly enable us to 
draw our final conclusion… the success of proofs involves making practical 
decisions; it is never the result of a purely objective process" (Hutto (2005 a), 198). 
For example, consider "Parmenides' argument for a monistic account of Being…. 
Parmenides was aware of the common view that things change, even though he 
denied it (his first premise) whereas Aristotle based his counter-argument on 
accepting it [i.e., the common intuition] that things change" (ibid 197-8). It is critical 
to note here that Parmenides's arguments did not confute Aristotle's intuition in the 
way that data constrain a theory. Granting this, we should be "suspicious of the idea 
that there could be an identifiable independent standard against which to assess the 
correctness" (ibid 199). In other words, intuition does not properly constrain a T-
philosophical theory construction. We are as likely to dispute an argument, as we are 
to give up an intuition.  
(b) Another common sense feature of science is that it offers explanations. 
Again, sticking with common sense, there are two features of this. First, science often 
explains a complex phenomenon by reducing it to some more basic elements and their 
regular connections and interactions. Thus, a "common and fruitful scientific practice" 
explains "the characteristics of whole systems in terms of the properties of their parts 
and how those parts are arranged with respect to one another" (Horwich (2016), 135). 
Further, this reduction allows us to see those seemingly desperate phenomena are all 
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simply different configurations of the lower level elements and connections. Indeed, 
"[s]ubstantial gains in simplicity are often achieved… because a plethora of complex 
systems… turn out to be construed by different arrangements of relativity few 
common parts" (ibid). Thus a scientific explanation unifies desperate phenomena by 
showing that they all reduce to the same basic common parts and regularities. Second, 
from a common sense perspective, a scientific explanation has something to do with 
experiments and so, probably, with causes.  
  Granting this common-sense view of explanation, anti-theoretical 
metaphilosophy maintains that all both features are not mirrored in T-philosophy. To 
work in reverse order, second, a T-philosophical explanation does not depend on 
experiments and has very little to do with causes, from a common sense perspective. 
A reader may demur and insist that, e.g., the current push toward xphi and its use of a 
posteriori methods in philosophy undermine this common sense claim (e.g., Knobe & 
Nichols (2007), 3-14). Critically, though, anti-theoretical metaphilosophy notes “this 
complaint would be inappropriate since there has been no suggestion here that 
“philosophy” can’t be properly applied to empirical projects. The claim was merely 
that there is a traditional and still prevalent conception of the subject (T-philosophy) 
which requires a priority and this is the conception that was Wittgenstein’s target” 
(Horwich (2012), 23). In other words, though xphi, say, might be empirical, it is 
exactly because it is empirical that it should not count as “T-philosophy.”  
Furthermore, and to defend this common sense perspective in a less 
terminological manner, it is quite clear that one does not build a machine to test 
possible events in metaphysics, one does not construct ‘painting colliders’ to study the 
‘beauty-ions’ that paintings emit in aesthetics, and so on. Relatedly, common sense 
can also make a simple note about T-philosophical education itself. To wit, there are 
no T-philosophy labs in universities, T-philosophical methods rarely emphasize 
statistics at an undergraduate level, T-philosophers are normally not trained to 
conduct experiments, and so on. Thus, the claim that T-philosophical explanation 
does not have to do with experiments or causes seems prima facie defensible.  
For explanation as unification, however, matters are not as clear-cut. Indeed a 
T-philosopher may argue that, in point of fact, T-philosophical explanations do just 
this. For example, she may point out that T-philosophical research has shown that 
much of the desperate and complicated stuff we do with and in natural language can 
be explained/reduces to a unified truth-theoretical semantics. Further, she may point 
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out that we have made progress here- showing, e.g., that the subjunctive mood can be 
assimilated into such a theory. Alternatively, a T-philosopher may note that 
conceptual analysis aims to do precisely this- explain a complex notion like 
"knowledge" in terms of more basic parts like "truth" "justification" and "belief." Let 
us, again, work in reverse order. For conceptual analysis, such a reductive account has 
been supplemented and revised, powerfully, by Strawson’s (1992), 17-28, and 
connective analysis. In other words, illuminating our conceptual network is not best 
thought of reduction of "complex ideas" to "simple ideas" or analyzing terms into 
independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but mapping out 
interconnections between ideas or terms (cf. PI § 67). Further, as Glock (2017 b) 
notes, connective analysis needs to be mindful of inherently "contested concepts" (98) 
as well as sensitive to the interplay between empirical and conceptual (passim). 
Granting this supplemented conceptual analysis, it is not at all clear if an impure 
connective analysis aims at the sort of reductive explanation that common sense, for 
better or worse, imputes to science.  
For the logical unification, the devil will be in what, precisely, such 
unification enables. Though such a logical unification will certainly be rigorous and 
rely on sophisticated mathematical logic, "what is the point of rigour without 
relevance?" (Horwich (2013), 22e). For example, Ptolemy's system of epicycles-
within-epicycles-on-top-of-more-epicycles33 is certainly is far more mathematically 
complex and sophisticated than Copernicus's system and Ptolemy does unify the 
motions of the heavenly spheres into a single framework. However, as Copernicus 
notes, "[o]n the contrary, their [acolytes of Ptolemy's system] experience was just like 
some one taking from various places hands, feet, a head, and other pieces, very well 
depicted, it may be, but not for the representation of a single person; since these 
fragments would not belong to one another at all, a monster rather than a man would 
be put together from them. Hence in the process of demonstration or ‘method,' as it is 
called, those who employed eccentrics [i.e., epicycles] are found either to have 
omitted something essential or to have admitted something extraneous and wholly 
irrelevant" (Copernicus (2003), 10). Copernicus's point here, and a valuable lesson 
from the history of science more generally, is that byzantine complexity often 
                                                 
33 Indeed, Alfonso the X wryly noted that, commenting on the Ptolemaic system's rather obscene use of 
epicycles, "had I been present at the Creation, I would have given some useful hints for the better 
ordering of the universe." 
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betokens ad hocery, not progressive unification. Indeed, such complexity need not be 
read as revealing unity but as gerrymandering our formalism. Succinctly, progressive 
unification is not identical to monster-making. Furthermore, this point is especially 
aligned with common sense. When an account becomes too complex, intricate, 
"sophisticated," people often, and rightly, claim to smell a rat.  
(c) The third feature of science is that the scientific community converges on 
acceptable theories, methods, results, and so on. From a common sense perspective, 
convergence has two interdependent features. First, the more advanced a science is, 
the more the scientists agree with one another. Indeed, from the perspective of 
common sense, a striking feature about the physics community, say, is broad 
agreement on seemingly startling claims. Further, common sense also notes that for 
less advanced sciences like sociology, this agreement does not seem to be as 
pronounced. Second, pursuant to this, scientists working in more advanced sciences 
tend to work in the same sorts of way. They use the same machines, methods, the 
same fancy-Dan math, talk in the same weird technical jargon, and so on.  
When we turn to T-philosophy, neither of these conditions is met. Indeed, 
"[e]ventual rational convergence is an item of faith" (Horwich (2012), 43). First, 
clearly, philosophers do not agree, even on the most basic assumptions, 
methodologies, "theories," etc. This intuition of common sense can be borne out in 
two ways. One, one needs only open a philosophy journal to see how widely 
disagreement and debate spread, even concerning seemingly basic elements. Two, on 
sociological grounds, Chalmers (2015) notes that no proposed answer to a core 
philosophical question has reached universal acceptance. For example, external world 
skepticism is still considered a challenge by 18% of analytic philosophers. Kant's 
scandal, it seems, has yet to be adequately addressed. In sum, this lack of agreement is 
perhaps most clearly seen in a joke my mother, a paragon of common sense, is very 
fond of. To wit, "what do you get when you put two philosophers in a room? Three 
opinions." 
Second, a striking feature of philosophical investigation is that there simply is 
no agreement about what constitutes an apt or proper method, a set, and standardized 
jargon, etc. Perhaps this can most clearly be seen on philosophy's inability to establish 
a "canon" of paradigmatic thinkers whose methods and jargon philosophers should 
emulate. Thus, is Hegel's dialectical logic best viewed as a the dying gasp of 
Aristotelian logic mixed with an unhealthy dose of obscurantism (e.g. Russell (1967), 
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730-746) or as genius methodology so far ahead of its time that formal logic is only 
just now catching up with it (e.g., Brandom (2008), passim, Priest (1989))? Is 
phenomenology as Heidegger conducts it merely dissimulation of pseudo-intellectual 
nonsense (e.g., Carnap (1932)) or is it a powerful way of bringing out the importance 
of embodiment and situationality (e.g., Druyfus (1992), passim)? And so on. Further, 
even when one restricts attention to one particular current in philosophy- "analytic 
philosophy"- one finds exactly this pattern repeated. Is the renaissance of metaphysics 
the best bet we have to make philosophy, finally, scientific as, e.g., Williamson 
(2008), 278-292, argues or is it a horrible degeneration and retreat from the most 
important insights of early analytic philosophy as, e.g., Hacker (1996 b), 228-73, 
claims? Worst, however, when viewed in these lights, philosophy is even more 
problematic than pre-paradigmatic science. For example, the "electricians," despite 
their acrimonious theoretical disagreements, at least agreed on their target (e.g., Kuhn 
(2012), 14-18). By contrast, it is unclear what the proper target of philosophy is. 
Indeed, the bemusement common sense feels when philosophy cannot provide an 
adequate self-definition betokens this. 
(d) The final feature common sense imputes to science is that it is potentially 
radically revisionary. This can be seen in two interdependent ways. First, common 
sense knows that science often replaces, root and branch, one research program with 
another. For example, Newton replaced Aristotle, Fodor et al. replaced Skinner, 
chemistry replaced alchemy, etc. Second, common sense accepts that science can 
revise its own opinions concerning various matters. Indeed, part of why the supposed 
religion/science debate is so heated is precisely because, though it seems as though 
life is designed, most educated people accept that biology has proven it is not. 
This is, perhaps, the most debatable point that the anti-theoretical 
methodology raises against t-philosophy. Indeed, Wittgenstein, in particular, is very 
sensitive to the fact that grammatical-cum-philosophical statements and empirical 
statements can shift (Glock (1996 a) provides a nuanced account). In any case, 
granting that these sorts of conceptual revisions are possible, "why shouldn't 
philosophy simply proceed after the fashion of science? Put simply, if we are open to 
the possibility of radical change in our scientific conceptions, then why shouldn't we 
also think that philosophy can deal with its troubles in this way?" (Hutto (2005 a), 
207). Indeed, if we can replace "philosophy" with some more progressive program in 
the same way Newton's physics replaced Aristotle's, perhaps the above worries can be 
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obviated. Philosophy the day after tomorrow, after such a revolution, may outgrow it 
seemly eternal infancy and, at last, find the sure path to science.34 However, critically, 
"[w]ith respect to such [T-philosophical] matters, there is no possibility of conceptual 
revision because they cannot be fully conceptually framed. Here there is no question 
of revision. With respect to the most fundamental issues, those of meaning, mind and 
logic… change is not an option. To change our ‘minds' or our ‘logic' would not be 
merely a conceptual alteration… it would be nothing short than a complete change of 
our form of life" (ibid 214). This is partly because "our fundamental concerns cannot 
be addressed by empirical investigation… there is no justification when we hit 
bedrock that forms the very foundation of our practices" (ibid). In other words, the 
features that T-philosophy addresses are different in kind than those of science (cf. PI 
§ 109, TLP 4.111). It seems that part of this inability to radically revise comes from 
our inability to drop "the manifest image" and still rely on concepts like "persons", 
"solid objects," and so on (e.g., Sellars (2007), 369-86). For example, it is unclear 
what would be left over in, e.g., action theory, ethics, or political philosophy, if we 
revised the concept “person” in light of an eliminative neuroscience. And, more 
importantly, it becomes opaque what such a brave new world with no people in it, 
would even look like. Revising the concept “person” ramifies far more quickly and 
deeply than revising Aristotle’s theory of the heavens, say. And, in any case, it isn’t 
clear if we can drop less fundamental features of the manifest image. Indeed we still 
say “sunset.”  
 In turn, these four reminders give Wittgenstein a set of very good, and very 
common sense, reasons to repudiate "theory" in T-philosophy. Indeed, being 
reminded of the presence of the four features discussed above in science, and 
Wittgenstein pointing out their obvious lack in T-philosophy, should lead us to view 
"philosophical theory" as something of a misnomer (e.g., Horwich (2016), 13, & 
Hutto (2005 b), 10). In effect, scientific research is just too different from 
philosophical investigation to support the assumption that we can analogically 
reposition "theory" from its scientific home into a T-philosophical one (cf. PI § 116). 
Succinctly, granting that science and T-philosophy are different in kind, there is very 
little reason to expect any analogy from one to the other will be apt. However, notice 
                                                 
34 This hope is something of a leitmotif in certain metaphilosophical circles. If we can just work harder 
(e.g., Williamson (2007), 278-92), be more Frege-an (Dummett (1981), discard the metaphysics of the 
stone age (e.g., Russell (1913)), etc., we will find the sure royal road to science. 
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that this inability to construct theories in philosophy gives us, as yet, no direct 
guidance on what to do with philosophy per se. In other words, once we realize that 
we cannot have theories in philosophy, what should we do with philosophy? Is there 
anything salvageable in philosophy or should it be abandoned completely by all but 
intellectual historians? It is to these questions we now turn. 
 
3.2 Two End Games: 
 
Granting that the above two sections are correct- that Wittgenstein had very 
justifiable, and non-theoretical, reasons to object to theories in philosophy and that 
Wittgenstein held this anti-theoretical metaphilosophy throughout his career- we now 
turn to the positive ramifications. In other words, if T-philosophy cannot offer us 
theories, be scientific, etc., what can it do correctly? Here, anti-theoretical philosophy 
can legitimately impute to Wittgenstein two distinct answers. One of these, the end-
of-philosophy account, answers this in a wholly negative way. In effect, what 
Wittgenstein has put before us should lead us to conclude that T-philosophy is 
entirely irrational. Granting this, and further assuming that T-philosophy is the 
"traditionally dominant form of philosophy " (Horwich (2015), 130), the best we can 
do is "deconstruct" failed attempts at T-philosophical theory construction and then, 
eventually, just walk away. T-philosophy is a non-starter, and it is irrational for us to 
keep plugging along after Wittgenstein's intervention. I discuss this in section 3.3a 
and criticise it in 3.3b. The other, a form-of-life account, answer that what we should 
start doing from here is a form of philosophical anthropology. In this endgame, we 
happily accept that theories are out of place and the T-philosophy is moribund. 
However, the form-of-life account reimagines the role of philosophical investigations 
along wholly descriptive lines. In other words, just because philosophy cannot do 
theories, it is not eo ipso irrational or useless. There are other things it can usefully do. 
I discuss this in section 3.3c and criticise it in 3.3d.  
 
3.2.a  Horwich's End Game: The-End-of-Philosophy: 
 
Horwich ascribes to Wittgenstein a unique endgame. To bring this into view, 
it is best to ask what led us to begin to attempt to do something as obviously 
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problematic as T-philosophy as well as why T-philosophy has continued, despite 
these open to view defects. For Horwich, the critical answer to both questions is 
irrationality. Indeed, "the trouble with philosophical theories and questions is [not] 
our having unwittingly lapsed into nonsense. For he [an anti-theoretical 
metaphilosopher] can suppose, much less contentiously, that their true defect is 
irrationality… their objectionable feature is not meaninglessness. It's that the 
commitments… are ill-motivated and facilitate nothing worthwhile… we have no 
good reason to embrace those commitments" (Horwich (2010), 149). Further, this 
irrationality causes confusion and is exactly what gives life to attempts at theorization 
in T-philosophy. Indeed, all T-philosophical theorization "is prompted by confusion 
rather than ignorance. In such cases, had we been thinking properly, we would have 
been able to tell that, initial appearances to the contrary, no fact is implicitly 
indicated, no fact is at issue" (Horwich (2012), 171). Granting this, "the 
uncomfortable truth is that paradoxes [e.g., T-philosophical problems] are 
blameworthy confusions in us, not bizarre features of the world; and so, instead of 
marveling at them… we ought to be trying to understand where we have gone astray 
[i.e., what irrational commitments we have]" (ibid 47).  
Let us examine this more closely. First, I discuss how, for Horwich, 
Wittgenstein puts forward an account of the vicious dynamic at play between 
confusion, irrationality, and attempts at T-philosophical theorization. Second, I briefly 
touch on Horwich’s micro-methodology that aims to break this dynamic and to 
expose specific T-philosophical theories as irrational, confused, and so flawed root 
and branch that they should be abandoned. Finally, I consider what, if anything, is left 
of philosophy after we have excised our confusions, returned to sanity, and left 
theorization behind in philosophy. 
To begin, Horwich notes that the "fundamental source of this irrationality is 
scientism" (Horwich (2015), 137). Indeed, it is exactly this "science worship" that 
leads us to try to apply the methods of science to a field that is decidedly non-
scientific. Further, this point is exegetically well attested to in Wittgenstein. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein’s invectives against "science-worship" and our culture's rather odd need 
to "explain" everything in "scientific" terms, is well documented (e.g., NB p. 51, TLP 
6.4321, PO p. 125, PR preface, and so on). To quote a passage Horwich returns to 
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often35, "[o]ur craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with 
the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws…. Philosophy 
constantly see the method of science before them are and are irresistibly tempted to 
ask and answer the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics 
[or T-philosophy] and leads the philosopher into complete darkness" (BlBK 18). 
Further, if the work done in chapter 3.1 is compelling, Wittgenstein is quite right to 
condemn this form of scientism as irrational. Indeed, T-philosophical investigation is 
simply too different in kind from scientific research for us to hold out any hope that 
the latter can fruitfully inform the former. In sum, T-philosophy is not science, we 
know it is not science, but we insist on trying to emulate science because we really 
like science! This is irrational.  
  In turn, this irrational preconception generates the confusion Horwich 
mentioned above.36 Though Horwich is rather vague on what sort of confusion he has 
in mind, the most apt gloss is that he has in mind a sort of pragmatic confusion. By 
“pragmatic confusion” I mean we attempt to achieve a goal using a method that runs 
cross-purposes to it. For example, I may attempt to reach my goal of buying a new 
computer by walking to a hardware store. Since the hardware store does not sell 
computers, my goal and method come apart and I confuse myself and everyone else in 
the process. Notice also that pragmatic confusion is distinct from “semantic 
confusion”- i.e., not knowing what certain terms mean or various sorts of category 
mistakes.  
In terms of T-philosophy, Horwich thinks T-philosophy's purported goal is 
gaining objective theoretical knowledge of various "phenomena [that] strike us as 
puzzlingly non-naturalistic- as peculiarly hard to place within the vast network of 
objects and properties bearing spatial, temporal, causal, and explanatory relations to 
one another" (Horwich (2016), 3). Moreover, the method that T-philosophy then 
attempts to rely on to gain knowledge of the phenomena is "'scientistic': that is to 
say… methods that lie behind them are inspired by, and modeled upon, those of 
empirical sciences. The object, as in science, is deep truth… fundamental principles 
that will explain relatively superficial facts" (Horwich (2012), 24). In other words, T-
                                                 
35 e.g. Horwich (2012), 20 fn 1; (2015), 137; (2016), 19. 
36 "Confusion" is something of a motif in his metaphilosophical reflections. See Horwich (2004:, 163-
171); (2010: 149-52); (2012:  vii-xv & 1-18 [through the entire book elaborates this]; (2013); (2015). 
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philosophy attempts to employ scientific theory to explain decidedly non-naturalistic 
features of the world. Horwich notes, rightly from my perspective, that this 
misalignment of using methods designed to handle the natural world for problems that 
are different in kind than natural scientific ones, misfires (e.g., Horwich (2012), 21-
44). In turn, this misfiring generates deep pragmatic confusion. In other words, much 
as the goal of buying a computer and the method of walking to a hardware store 
(because we really like hardware stores!), will misfire, and cause confusion on the 
part of the shopper and the salesperson, so too do the attempts at building theories in 
T-philosophy. 
Finally, the pragmatic confusion that our irrational preconception produces 
ends up reinforcing T-philosophy in a perverse way. To see this clearly, it is best to 
reflect on how our irrational need to rely on the methods of science for decidedly non-
scientific problems, causes us to willfully distort both what the "methods of science" 
are as well as the target of investigation. Specifically, T-philosophy insists that an apt 
T-philosophical theory "must have a certain generality and depth" (Horwich (2012), 
21). Both "generality" and "depth" are critical, so let us take each in turn. 
For "generality," T-philosophy assumes that the various phenomena T-
philosophy examines should have some lower level simplicity and unity. For 
example, recall in 3.1 that T-philosophy insisted, despite historical evidence, 
sociological surveys, interpersonal variation, and so on, that our supposed a priori 
intuitions are unified, trans-cultural, veridical, etc. T-philosophy makes this 
problematic assumption exactly because it wants to apply a "scientific" methodology 
that shows "a plethora of complex systems, each one tending to behave somewhat 
different from the others, often turn out to be construed by different arrangements of 
relatively few parts" (Horwich (2016), 7). However, this simply parodies the methods 
of science. In effect, a scientist does not begin by stipulating that, despite 
appearances, apples falling, moons orbiting, and tides coming in, are really governed 
by the same simple laws. Rather, she arrives at this insight. As it were, simplicity in 
science is an ideal end, not a pre-assumed pre-condition for scientific research. 
Indeed, the ever witty and ever insightful Duhem makes exactly this point (Duhem 
(1982), 7-18). In contrast, T-philosophy has the "policy- allowing simplicity to 
override data" and "recalcitrant intuitions are blithely deemed incorrect" (Horwich 
(2012), 37) since it is opaque how to use the scientific methodology of arriving at 
simplicity for non-natural targets. In other words, rather than dealing with data that 
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problematize the generalizations it makes, T-philosophy ignores most of them. As it 
were, whatever does not fit the T-philosophy theory is "wrong," "irrational," 
obscene," "purposefully contrarian," or, worst of all and heaven help us, "French." 
Thus, T-philosophy insists that its theory and the generalization the theory enables are 
not wrong; rather, most of the data is wrong. The sad irony of this is, perversely, that 
the recalcitrant data that a T-philosopher is willing to accept strikes her as grits to her 
mill. Indeed, as she deals with the acceptable recalcitrant data, her T-philosophy 
theory becomes ever more "sophisticated"- e.g., baroque, technical, byzantine, 
incorporating ever more indices, characters, and so on. Moreover, this monster-
making, ad hocery, and gerrymandering strike the T-philosopher as a sign of the 
fruitfulness of her theory rather than a death knell. 
For "depth" matters are, if anything, worse. To begin, targets for T-
philosophical theorization are chosen because they "strike them [t-philosophers] as 
peculiarly pervasive, fundamental rich, and idiosyncratic." (ibid, 22). In turn, it is 
exactly these seemingly interesting, rich, idiosyncratic, etc., features that warrant a T-
philosophical theory. So it is the point of a T-philosophical theory is to explore 
exactly these features. Notice here that there is a circularity afoot- we need T-
philosophical theories for these phenomena because they are interesting and cry out 
for explanation and since these phenomena are interesting and cry out for an 
explanation, we need T-philosophical theories. Pace this, Horwich thinks the proper 
response is to deflate this seeming depth. To take his favorite, and powerful, example, 
consider truth.37 It seems striking that:  ‘<electrons are negatively charged> is true iff 
electrons are negatively charged’; ‘<Mr. Spock is Vulcan> is true iff Mr. Spock is 
Vulcan’; ‘<Sally is kind> is true iff Sally is kind.’ Indeed, if we relax the 
propositional requirement, we may even be able to say ‘”The Nothing noths” is true 
iff the Nothing noths’ and even ‘"Kaloo Kalay no work today" is true iff Kaloo Kalay 
no work today.’ This seems shocking. The truth predicate applies to our best theories, 
fiction, psychological dispositions, and maybe even Heidegger and nonsense. 
However, all these examples show us is that truth is a device for generalization, and 
the "depth" it has is wholly exhausted by the schema ‘<p> is true iff p.' Indeed, 
demanding something more, some depth to the truth predicate is not only unwarranted 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., See Horwich (1998 a) passim  
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but also patently wrong-headed.38 One reason for this is that every attempt to give 
voice to this "depth" runs into insuperable problems fairly quickly. In any case, for 
our purposes, notice the circle that clearly emerges here. ‘<p> is true iff p' cannot 
exhaust the truth predicate because we want a rich and robust T-philosophical theory 
to explain it. Since we want a rich a robust philosophical T-theory to explain the truth 
predicate, it cannot simply be exhausted by ‘<p> is true iff p.' Also, the irrational 
commitment, the insistence that there must be more to it than this, is what provokes 
T-philosophical attempts at theorization. Further, it is irrational in that we do not 
know what this "more" really consists of and why we should want it. However, again, 
this insistence on depth has the sad irony of reinforcing T-philosophy. 
Thus, the attempt to construct theories in T-philosophy, despite the apparent 
and open to view differences between T-philosophy and science, arises from an 
irrational will-to-science. In turn, the attempt to utilize (or ape) the methods of 
scientific research for decidedly non-scientific problems gives rise to confusion. 
Moreover, this confusion and the irrational commitment to scientism lead T-
philosophy to distort both the target of her investigation and parody the methods of 
science. Further, all these combine in a perverse dynamic way and lead to the 
"conjuror's trick" (PI § 308) that get T-philosophical theorization going and keeps it 
going, despite clear difficulties and problems.  
In closing, for Horwich, one key distortion that a T-philosophical theory relies 
on, and that make us forget their irrationality and keep going with them, is "a perverse 
exaggeration of linguistic analogies" (Horwich (2012), 19). In turn, these 
exaggerations are engendered by "the T-philosophers' demand for simplicity [which 
causes]… them to unreasonably overstretch the ‘analogies between different regions 
of language'" (Horwich (2016), 5). Indeed, "the mistakes of perverse 
overgeneralizations… the fundamental source of this irrationality is scientism" 
(Horwich (2015), 137). This tendency to make deeply problematic analogies can be 
seen at each stage in the above, and they reinforce each other in a deeply problematic 
way. A T-philosopher begins by making a strange analogy between T-philosophy and 
science- i.e., her scientism. She then makes a confused analogy between the role of 
scientific theory- i.e., depth and generality- and her own use of theory. Moreover, this 
                                                 
38 Horwich (1998 a) is the most sustained elaboration. However, Horwich (2010: 1-13) is a very apt 
introduction. 
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confused analogy reinforces her irrational commitments as the "queerness" (e.g., 
depth) of her target and her constant ad hoc modifications (e.g., her generalizations) 
strike he as evidence that she is on to something.  
With this in view, the question becomes how we can disrupt this vicious 
dynamic. Horwich then claims that "the aim of a reasonable philosophical 
methodology should be… to expose the irrational overgeneralizations from which 
they [confusions] emerge" (Horwich (2012), 19). In other words, the best we can do is 
"deconstruct" these flawed T-philosophical theories. However, it is imperative that 
each T-philosophical theory is "deconstructed" on its own terms so that the 
irrationality that gives rise to it can be seen clearly. Thus, Horwich proffers a micro-
methodology designed to expose the "conjuror's trick" for particular T-philosophical 
theories. Specifically, Horwich ascribes to Wittgenstein an 8-step procedure to 
expose, for individual T-philosophical attempts at theory, their inherent irrationality. 
Though the details of this procedure, and its application to various T-philosophical 
theories, need not concern us in detail39, what is critical for us is threefold. First, the 
aim of the procedure aims to make clear the irrationality of the T-philosopher's initial 
commitments and, relatedly, her tendency to rely on perverse analogies between 
distinct domains. For example, a T-philosopher might irrationally assume that "[j]ust 
as the predicate ‘is magnetic' designates a feature of the world, magnetism, whose 
nature is revealed by quantum physics…so it seems that ‘is true' attributes to a 
complex property, truth" (Horwich (1998 a), 2). Second, the procedure should expose 
the impasses that the T-philosopher ends up in. For example, it should make clear 
why there have been "various attempts to analyze truth… [that] have been made over 
the last two thousand years or so…. [And why] none of these ideas has won general 
acceptance" (Horwich (2010, 2). Finally, third, this procedure should then function as 
a "strategy of (self-)persuasion" that make us "appreciate that any such theoretical 
response is wrong headed" (Horwich (2012), 53). In effect, the procedure aims to 
convince us, based in part on the non-theoretical dis-analogies between scientific and 
philosophical investigation, in part on the charge of the irrationality against the 
commitments to generality and depth, and in part on the 8-step procedure itself, that 
the game of T-philosophy is irrational, engenders confusion, and should be 
                                                 
39 Readers interested in a fine-grained account of the 8 step procedure should see, in particular, 
Horwich (2012), 50-55. 
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abandoned. Though such a procedure is not an airtight reductio, the hope is that these 
criticisms will convince us to abandon attempts at T-philosophical theorization.  
With all this in view, we can ask what is left of philosophy after these 
voluntary irrational commitments are excised and theory set aside. To begin, Horwich 
notes that Wittgenstein assumes an "extreme pessimism about the potential of 
philosophy- perhaps tantamount to a denial that there is such a subject" (Horwich 
(2015), 134). This pessimism need not be theoretical- especially granting that 
philosophy is "notorious for its perennial controversies and lack of decisive progress- 
for its embarrassing failure, after over two thousand years, to settle any of its central 
questions" (Horwich (2012), 34). However, the denial of ‘philosophy' itself is more 
exciting and what we focus on. 
To bring this out clearly, let us begin by examining the exchange between 
Horwich (2013) and Williamson (2013) on precisely this point. Williamson claims 
that if this anti-theoretical metaphilosophy is correct, then "90% of philosophy is a 
waste of space, while the remaining 10% consists of the praiseworthy demolition of 
the 90%. Horwich does not explain why the taxpayers should be expected to fund a 
branch of the academy with this structure" (Williamson (2013), e7). In his reply, 
Horwich attempts to address this point directly. Specifically, he tries to offer "some 
plausible explanations of why someone endorsing my argument might not advocate 
the closing of Philosophy Departments" (Horwich (2013), 25e). First, Horwich notes 
that "T-philosophy is still going strong, and the Wittgensteinian critic might well 
prefer that its practitioners be rationally persuaded to abandon it rather than starved 
out" (ibid). However, this note is problematic for two reasons. One, an anti-theoretical 
philosopher will stress that "some people enjoy tiddlywinks, others golf, and others 
bungee jumping- and why not?- so some will be simply fascinated by this or that 
branch of philosophical theory…. But the objection to such theorizing I have been 
exploring… is that… there appears to be no objective reason to desire true theoretical 
belief in a priori philosophy. For what is discoverable will contribute neither to 
successful deliberation nor to significant understanding. As long as there is no illusion 
on this point… let him [the T-philosopher] carry on" (Horwich (2012), 44). Granting 
this, it seems to me Williamson is quite right to insist that enjoying tiddlywinks, or 
philosophy, and asking taxpayers to fund departments whose sole goal is letting 
people satiate this odd fancy, are very different things. Indeed, it is not implausible 
that taxpayers would insist that a department of tiddlywinks should be ‘starved out.’ 
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Two, the pragmatic confusion I ascribed to Horwich above may belie this response. 
Specifically, pragmatic confusion seems to be something that is needs to be exposed 
and corrected only once and further persistence in the activity manifests willful 
irrationalism.40 For example, once I realize that hardware stores do not sell computers, 
I do not go back to hardware stores to try to buy computers, on pain of willful 
irrationality. Granting this, if Wittgenstein’s anti-theoretical arguments are as 
powerful as they appear, it may be that the T-philosophical game has already ended. 
In this case, it is unclear what more an anti-philosopher can plausibly do for the mad 
who persist in T-philosophy. As it were, what T-philosophers are doing is glaring 
irrational and very little can help to correct them after Wittgenstein’s interventions. If 
this is so, again, Williamson is right to point out that taxpayers would be unhappy to 
fund the endeavors of these odd people, especially that their activities have been 
shown to be irrational already.  
Second, Horwich notes that "like me, she [someone who is anti-theoretical 
metaphilosophically curious] may think that the critique is correct but not be sure that 
it is. So she may well find it reasonable to wish for continued reflection on the issue" 
(Horwich (2013), 25e). This is striking, as it seems to accept that if the account 
Horwich has adumbrated proves to be correct, Williamson is right that there may just 
be no such thing as ‘philosophy' anymore. In other words, once the irrationality of T-
philosophical theory construction is seen for what it is, there may just be nothing left 
to do.  
A third move is to stress that "refined critical techniques in which some 
philosophers are peculiarly expert can be valuably applied in other fields" (ibid). In 
other words, T-philosophy may have some instrumental value as, e.g., a tool to 
explicate and clear up some other field. However, there are two critical issues with 
this instrumental gloss. One is that it is unclear why a T-philosopher is uniquely 
positioned to provide such a service as this. For example, if explication and the logic 
of justification are always post hoc reconstructions from the field, it is not terribly 
clear what work they can do for that field.41 Two, Horwich notes that "work in 
empirical semantics, in the foundations of quantum electrodynamics, in evolutionary 
                                                 
40 In contrast, semantic confusion may simply be part of language if viewed diachronically, a point we 
discuss briefly in chapter 4.0f 
41 It is precisely this debate that, in philosophy of science, Lakatos (1980) and Feyerabend (2010) had. 
The real question turns on if a rational reconstruction exposes the real rational underpinnings of a field 
or simply rationalizes it.   
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biology, and in the history of ideas" (Horwich (2012), 23) are, properly speaking, not 
T-philosophical in the first place. However, this leaves proper T-philosophy in a very 
odd place. For example, a historian who reflects on her methods and aims is, one 
suspects, not doing T-philosophy but historiography or some form of philosophy of 
history that is not in the purview of T-philosophy at all. 
A final reply to Williamson is that we may explore "other intellectual 
activities legitimately called ‘philosophy.'… In particular, there's the popular Quinean 
conception… as flagrantly a posteriori and continuous with the sciences" (Horwich 
(2013), 25). This response has two problems. One, however plausible such a Quinean 
move may be, it is clearly an anathema to Wittgenstein, earlier (TLP 4.111) and later 
(PI § 109). In turn, this means that it is not a viable option provided one is concerned 
with elaborating, exegetically interpreting, following in the footsteps of, etc., 
Wittgenstein. Two, the move to a Quinean conception of “philosophy” may seem fine 
until we recall that Horwich's anti-theoretical metaphilosopher already considered, 
and explicitly rejected, this option. Thus "[i]t does seem clearly wrong to think of 
Russell's logical atomism, Leibnitz's monadology, McTaggart's account of time, or 
Rawls' theory of justice in that way [i.e., some sort of naturalized philosophy]… 
[Further] is Quine's view correct? His web-of-belief model, in so far as it purports to 
cover commitments of every kind, is not especially plausible. It works nicely as an 
account of how scientific opinions evolve. But many of our beliefs- such as those 
about logic, right and wrong, numbers… are not constrained by observation in the 
way the model would imply… [t]here is no good reason to expect epistemology in 
general to coincide with epistemology of science" (Horwich (2012), 24).  
In sum, it does indeed seem that when the aforementioned procedure is used, 
when Wittgenstein's micro-methodology that relies on the 8-step procedure to expose 
the inherent irrationalities that drive t-philosophical theory construction is applied, 
"we will not be left with any positive theory or new understanding. The net result will 
be simple that we have cured ourselves of a particular tendency to get mixed up" 
(Horwich (2012), 6). In short, as Horwich notes, "most of us have been interested in 
philosophy only because of its promise to deliver precisely the sort of theoretical 
insight that Wittgenstein argues are illusory… if he turns out to be right, satisfaction 
enough may surely be found is what we can still get- clarity, demystification and 
truth" (Horwich (2015), 138). Thus, the endgame is that we expose irrationality and 
then walk away. Philosophy comes to an end. 
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3.2.b Irrationality and the Ends of Philosophy: 
 
 Horwich's endgame can be problematized along three interrelated lines. First, 
there is the scope of T-philosophy. Second, pursuant to this, there is the question of 
what irrationality is. Third, there is the question of the end-of-philosophy and 
Wittgenstein. Let us examine each in turn. 
First, recall Horwich tells the reader that the target of Wittgenstein's anti-
theoretical criticisms is T-philosophy. However, such a specific target runs some 
reasonably substantial risks. One, there is the worry that it implicitly assumes what it 
should instead prove- i.e., that doing philosophy is always tantamount to trying to 
build quasi-scientific theories. Indeed, per definition, this is precisely what T-
philosophy is (e.g., Horwich (2016), 130-31). However, it is an open question if this 
is the best way to characterize the majority of philosophy.42 In turn, this problematizes 
both the terms by which Horwich criticizes philosophical practice as well as the 
profoundly pessimistic endgame he ascribes to Wittgenstein. For the former, if some 
school of philosophy is not attempting "the construction and defense of important 
philosophical theories" (Horwich (2012), 21), the entire dialectic outlined in section 
3.1 and 3.2a falls flat. Succinctly, if you are not trying to build a theory that emulates 
science, the anti-theoretical metaphilosophy passes you by like a ship in the night. For 
the latter, if there are viable alternatives that are doing genuine philosophical 
investigation but repudiate the "will-to-science" that characterizes T-philosophy, the 
situation may not be nearly as bleak as Horwich’s endgame makes it out to be. 
Indeed, perhaps Williamson is right that taxpayers would be deeply unhappy to pay 
people to ape science and then pay other people to show that this aping fails. 
However, it seems to me that a taxpayer might be happier to pay for a philosophy that 
attempted to understand and facilitate cross-cultural interactions hermeneutically, that 
systematically examined possibly problematic assumptions about rationality in 
economics, that attempted to think through the implications of contemporary physics 
for our place in the universe, etc. Though Horwich might claim that the middle, and 
certainly the last, fall outside the scope of T-philosophy, this is fodder for the point. If 
                                                 
42 To be a bit fairer, sometimes Horwich does vacillate on the scope of his criticisms-  e.g. Horwich (2012), 22-23) 
& (2015),130). That being said, especially given how much he emphasizes the 8 step procedure that assumes that 
almost all philosophical positions are irrational in such a way that the procedure can expose their irrationality and 
the charge that history has not progressed, it seems that his scope is very broad. 
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T-philosophy is defined in such a narrow way, it is unsurprising that anti-theoretical 
philosophy has such radical implications. 
Two, pursuant to this, there are viable alternatives that, though not T-
philosophical, strike me as being decidedly philosophical. For example, outside of 
analytic philosophy, there are several approaches that are openly hostile to T-
philosophy and that are, nonetheless, themselves philosophy. Consider, for instance, 
that "[o]n our view, theory of knowledge [a term Husserl played with, in this early 
work, for phenomenology], properly described is no theory. It is not a science in the 
pointed sense of an explanatorily unified theoretical whole… The theory of 
knowledge has nothing to explain in this theoretical sense, it neither constructs 
deductive theories nor falls under any…. Its aim is not to explain…but to shed light 
on the Idea of knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws" (Husserl (2001 
[1901]), 98) Notice how in this quote, from 1901 AD, Husserl seems to have 
anticipated and explicitly rejected T-philosophy. The goal of phenomenology is not 
"the construction and defense of important philosophical theories" (Horwich (2012), 
21). Rather, the goal is pure phenomenological description of experience itself. And 
this tradition, despite various modifications, has continued to insist on the rejection of 
theory (Marion (1998), 4-40). Further, within analytic philosophy, there have always 
been individuals, schools, etc., that are both doing philosophy and are decidedly 
skeptical of T-philosophy. For example, so-called "ordinary language philosophy", 
logical positivism, Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, Feyerabend, and even aspects 
of the works of seemingly paradigmatic examples of T-philosophers like Putnam (e.g. 
Putnam (2005), 23-27, for a nuanced engagement with Levinas and ethics), all fall 
outside T-philosophy. Indeed, as I argue in Part II, Wittgenstein himself may best be 
read as putting forward a non-T-philosophical version of philosophy (cf. PI § 126). 
Finally, and granting the above, the question of what “theory” really means itself 
becomes pressing. Though Husserl, Strawson, and so on, are engaged in a form of 
abstract reflection, it is unclear if this reflection is relevantly analogous to “theory” in, 
e.g., physics. Indeed, Husserl, Strawson, and so on, do not seem to be trying to make 
predictions, offer explanations in the causal-mechanistic sense, reduce complex 
phenomena like our experience or our conceptual schema to lower parts, and so on. If 
this is so, it may be that the anti-philosophical criticism simply misframes these 
thinkers. As it were, there does not seem to be a reason to assume that all abstract 
reflection is even roughly synonymous with theory construction in science. 
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Three, following from one and two, Horwich's conception of T-philosophy 
runs the risk of either being anachronistic with respect to the history of philosophy or 
else having a problematic lack of specificity. This charge depends on what “theory” 
really amounts to for the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher. On the one hand, an anti-
theoretical metaphilosopher may stress the (failed) attempt to analogically redeploy 
“theory” from the natural sciences to philosophy, as discussed in section 3.1. In turn, 
this stress gives “theory” an intuitive meaning as well as making very good sense of 
why attempting to apply scientific theory construction to decidedly unscientific 
phenomena leads to pragmatic confusion. However, this makes it difficult to 
understand how we can ascribe T-philosophy to Plato, Aristotle, and so on, without 
being anachronistic as they simply did not have a robust science that they could 
emulate in terms of “theory.” Furthermore, if one grants the admittedly whiggish 
historiographical assumption that modern empirical science began with Galileo 
throwing stuff off of towers around 1638 AD, clearly the lion's share43 of 
philosophical abstract reflection cannot be considered T-philosophical as they simply 
had no conception of a “scientific theory” that they could seek to emulate. On the 
other hand, an anti-theoretical metaphilosopher may stress that a “theory” is the sort 
of abstraction reflection that “must have a certain generality and depth. They must 
organize, unify, and explain common-sense commitments- and have the potential to 
correct them. And they must be initially controversial- deriving credibility… from 
their possession of theoretical virtues such as internal coherence, compatibility with 
what is known, and explanatory power” (Horwich (2012), 21). However, such a 
characterization of “theory,” without the scientistic analogy, has three problems, or so 
I argue. One, without the scientistic analogy, certain terms in the characterization 
becomes rather underdetermined. For example, “generality,” “organize,” “explanatory 
power,” and so on, are rendered unclear. Related to this, two, certain common sense 
boundary lines begin to break down. For example, religion, epic poetry, and so on, 
each seem to organize, explain, offer depth and generality, and so on. However, prima 
facie, there seems to be a distinction between the abstract reflection that goes on in 
poetic texts (or religious parables) and the sort of theory building that physics gets up 
to. Three, even granting such a definition, there are philosophers who would still 
object to it, as we noted in two. 
                                                 
43 More than 80% if one assumes philosophy began with Thales.  
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In sum, the real danger with T-philosophy as Horwich defined it is that it is 
too narrow to take in all philosophy and too engineered to do the work Horwich needs 
it to do to sustain his rather sweeping condemnation of philosophy as well as his 
pessimistic endgame. However, I note in closing that there is, indeed, a particular 
tradition that Horwich has in his sights and that, from my perspective, Horwich does 
show to be flawed- root and branch. To wit, and as we would expect from 
Wittgenstein (e.g., TLP 6.53, PI § 116, etc.), much contemporary metaphysics is T-
philosophical in precisely the sense Horwich discusses. To bolster this further, it is 
striking that van Frassen (2004), 1-30, also singles out specifically analytic 
metaphysics as a gross parody of scientific methodology and attacks it on grounds 
that are stunningly similar, in several respects, to Horwich.44 Granting this, Horwich's 
assault on T-philosophy provides a great service to contemporary philosophy. To wit, 
trying to develop odd theories about impossible worlds, arguing about how a property 
gets instanced in an object, and so on, simply goes wrong.  
Second, there is Horwich's reliance on his charge of irrationality as the real 
failing of philosophy. This worry harmonizes well with my aforementioned concerns 
about the proper scope of T-philosophy. To begin it seems as though the anti-
theoretical end-of-philosophy account is committed to the assumption that everyone 
from Parmenides to Parfit is guilty of the same sin, irrationality. Indeed, only such a 
broad scope can justify such a pessimistic endgame. The account further claims that 
this irrationality is always engendered by scientistic preconceptions. However, 
Horwich’s metaphilosophical discussions are strangely silent on what, exactly, 
“irrationality” means. Further, it is not clear that such a condemnation is open to view 
in the same way that the dis-analogies between science and philosophy are open to 
view. Specifically, the heterogeneous and disparate sorts of philosophical positions, 
arguments, methods, goals, and so on, seem to belie the obviousness of the 
assumption that any and all philosophical positions are irrational in the same way- 
i.e., by being scientistic. Finally, and most critically, it is not clear that such a charge 
falls back on common sense in the way that the dis-analogies did. Indeed, for 
common sense, the claim that irrationality is a ramification of scientism is somewhat 
odd. This is only compounded by the promiscuity of our everyday ascriptions of 
irrationality to, e.g., theories, actions, beliefs, people, assumptions, and perhaps even 
                                                 
44 In personal correspondence, van Fraassen has also stressed to me that much of “Continental” 
philosophy should be taken seriously and is unscathed by his criticism of analytic metaphysics. 
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moods and emotions. However, let us assume that some concept of “irrationality” has 
been worked out that can support the broad scope of the charge.  
Granting this, I argue that such a concept of “irrationality” that can 
substantiate the rather sweeping claim that all philosophy is irrational rests on T-
philosophical assumptions concerning irrationality or the scientistic nature of 
philosophy. If this is so, then the charge of irrationality cannot be deployed in such a 
sweeping manner without, itself, resting on T-philosophy. In turn, ironically, this 
means that the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher who ascribes irrationality to all T-
philosophical theories bases her condemnation on a T-philosophical theory of 
rationality. To prove this, I argue that any account of irrationality robust enough to 
support the ascription of irrationality to all philosophy brings into play generality and 
depth in exactly the T-philosophical way.  
For generality, recall that a T-philosophical theory begins with the 
unwarranted assumption that disparate and heterogeneous phenomena are unified at a 
lower level. In turn, this assumption makes sense of why a T-philosophical theory is 
required. Specifically, the goal of a T-philosophical theory is to give us objective 
theoretical knowledge of this deeper level unity. Finally, this preconceived unity often 
leads a T-philosopher to dismiss or ignore (most) problematic data and deal with the 
subset she accepts in decidedly ad hoc ways.  
This pattern fits the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher’s charge of irrationality 
in a rather striking way. First, the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher begins with the 
assumption that all philosophy from Socrates to Sartre is scientistic and so irrational. 
Further, she makes this assumption exactly because it ensures that both her global and 
micro-methodology function properly as criticisms. For the global method of 
reminding us of the difference between philosophy and science, it is clear that the 
method only works provided that the abstract philosophical reflection is relevantly 
similar to theory construction. Without this, the anti-theoretical methodology and the 
philosopher’s reflections pass each other by. For the micro-methodology, things are 
even more explicit. Horwich notes that the 8-step method assumes “the idea that 
philosophical problem areas tend to share the same abstract structure” (Horwich 
(2012), 50). One, notice what underwrites this assumption of a structural similarity 
between philosophical problem areas is exactly the generalized claim that all 
philosophy is scientistic. Two, such an abstract structure allows the anti-theoretical 
metaphilosopher to hold in abeyance the particular content of specific philosophical 
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theories. Indeed, since their structures are the same, the 8-step method can work on 
each in a nearly algorithmic fashion.45 Three, notice too that this ability to abstract 
from specific content of individual philosophical theories is the only way to properly 
ground the sweep of anti-theoretical metaphilosophy’s condemnation of philosophy. 
Four, exegetically, the claim seems to conflict directly with Wittgenstein who notes 
that there is not one form or structure of philosophical problems and that each may 
require its own sort of engagement (cf. PI § 133). Regardless, the anti-theoretical 
metaphilosopher’s uses of these methods are then meant to return the non-trivial, 
objective, and, ironically, theoretical in Horwich’s sense (i.e., interesting, non-trivial, 
corrective, etc.) result that philosophy is irrational. Finally, this assumption about the 
irrationality of all philosophy leads the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher to 
gerrymander, dismiss, and so on, recalcitrant data. This can be seen in two ways. One, 
philosophers who work in theoretical semantics, the foundations of physics, and so 
on, are set aside (e.g. Horwich (2012), 23). Further, it is a safe bet that people like 
Kierkegaard or Diogenes the cynic are also best ignored. Two, the assumption that the 
anti-theoretical metaphilosopher does not need to deal in-depth with the content of 
specific philosophical theories is problematic as it easily lends itself to assuming what 
it should prove- i.e., that the content of the philosophical theory is scientistic.  
For depth, recall that T-philosophical theories rely on strangely and viciously 
self-justifying circle. In effect, we need a philosophical theory because we assume 
that the phenomena in question is uniquely interesting for philosophy and the 
phenomena is uniquely interesting for philosophy because it seems amenable to 
theories. Again, this tracks the relationship that the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher 
sets up between philosophy and scientism remarkably well. The anti-theoretical 
metaphilosopher assumes that all philosophy is scientistic so she can deploy her 
methods and prove it to be irrational. Since the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher wants 
to use her methods and prove philosophy to be irrational, she assumes that it is 
scientistic. 
Thus, prima facie, the charge of irrationality, and the assumption about 
scientism and philosophy, falters. Notice, in closing, three additional things. One, the 
irrationality charge can easily lead the anti-theoretical metaphilosopher to begin 
                                                 
45 I should note that Horwich mentions, at several points, both that his applications of the 8-step 
method are, at best, illustrative examples (e.g., Horwich (2012), 54 fn 26) and that the application may 
not be nearly as mechanical in practice. However, without a sustained example, it is rather hard to 
know how ‘non-mechanical’ a real application would be.   
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explicit theorization herself. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine an anti-theoretical 
metaphilosopher to turn to, e.g., Bayensianism, and try to work out some more 
substantial notion of rationality. Clearly, such a move is deleterious. Two, these 
arguments are mooted if one restricts one scope to analytic metaphysics or any other 
philosophical position that is explicitly trying to emulate from science in terms of 
theories. Simply, if the philosopher is explicit in her attempt to emulate science, then 
this is not hidden and the criticisms in 3.1 and 3.2a work without ado. It is only when 
we insist that a non-explicitly-T-philosopher is, really, a T-philosopher, that things 
become unclear. One can say many things about Kierkegaard or Feyerabend. 
However, convicting either of some odd scientism strains credulity. Three, tellingly, 
Wittgenstein himself avoids such sweeping claims and focuses instead on specific 
philosophical problems and exposing the unique irrationality for each. 
Third, there is the question of the aims of philosophy and Wittgenstein. To 
begin, it seems that if philosophy is taken as T-philosophy, Horwich's point stands. 
However, it seems that we have good reason to deny the assumed synonymy between 
philosophy and T-philosophy. In any case, the specific end-of-philosophy endgame, 
i.e., that we should abandon philosophy, seems to rest on an implicit argument that 
Wittgenstein would have, rightly, objected to as ceding far too much to the scientistic 
tendencies he struggled against (cf. PR preface). Specifically, and in an admittedly 
simplified manner, the underlying argument for the end-of-philosophy is the 
following: 1- the only rational and useful sort of abstract reflection is scientific theory 
construction; 2- philosophy cannot do scientific theory construction. Ergo, philosophy 
is irrational and useless. This simply cedes to scientism the claim that all abstract 
reflection is either scientific theory construction or else useless and irrational.  
 Pace this, Wittgenstein objects along several lines. One, he points out that the 
reduction of abstract reflection to scientific theory construction is simply not viable. 
Thus, consider "Man has to awaken to wonder — and so perhaps do peoples. Science 
is a way of sending him to sleep again." (CV p. 5); "[s]cientific questions may interest 
me, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions have that 
effect on me" (ibid 91); "[p]hilosophy is not one of the natural sciences" (TLP 4.111); 
"[a] hypothetical explanation will be of little help to someone, say, who is upset 
because of love.- It will not calm him" (PO p. 123); "[t]he importance of grammar is 
the importance of language" (BT § 88 p. 305); and so on. In each case, Wittgenstein 
calls our attention to a form of reflection that can be abstract but cannot be made into 
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science without faltering. Indeed, reflections on life, love, death, the meaning of 
Being, etc., are notorious exactly because they seem impervious to scientific 
theorization. Further, though there has been a fashionable attempt, since at least the 
logical positivists, to argue that this shows the questions are not worthwhile, such a 
dismissive attitude horrified Wittgenstein (e.g., LWVC p. 68-69, PO p. 37-44). Two, 
this linkage presupposes that the only sorts of problems that demand reflection are 
scientific. Pace this, "[a] philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don't know my way 
about.'" (PI § 123). We return to this at length in Part II of this dissertation. For now, 
notice that one does not learn one's way about in, e.g., a foreign city by trying to 
construct a theory defined as "a hypothesis about some non-evident reality- an attempt 
to unearth facts that are not out in the open, that cannot be discerned merely from 
looking in the right direction" (Horwich (2012), 64). Indeed, though it is best to try to 
learn one's way about by reflection- e.g., paying attention to where one has been, 
hunting actively for landmarks, etc.- it simply will not due to try to unearth hidden 
facts. Finally, three, and most critically, Wittgenstein himself notes that "I should not 
like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to 
stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (PI preface 4e). For the end-of-philosophy 
view, this point is rather hard to make sense of. If philosophy is synonymous with T-
philosophy and that is always irrational, why does Wittgenstein want to start anyone 
off doing it? Indeed, it seems that "thinking" is a form of reflection and, whatever 
Wittgenstein has in mind, clearly it does not reduce to scientific theorization.46  
 
3.2.c From Forms of Logic to Forms of Life: 
 
 Hutto proposes a rather different response to the inability to construct theories 
in philosophy than Horwich's end-of-philosophy account. To wit, Hutto proposes that 
Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical account should lead us re-conceive philosophy as a 
field whose goal is to describe the forms of life. First, I discuss Hutto's claim that "the 
office once performed by logical form [in the TLP] was assumed by forms of life [in, 
e.g., the PI]- the latter becoming his new metaphor for that which is the limit of all 
                                                 
46 If this is right, it is striking how correct Braver (2012), 119-172, to call attention to the fact that both 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein were swimming against the current and trying to defend a form of 
reflection that is not scientific and, in Heidegger’s more extreme case, is not ‘logical’.  
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possibility and sense-making" (Hutto (2005), 108). Second, I attempt to characterize 
these forms of life that limit possibility and sense-making. However, as we shall see, 
this is rather difficult as Hutto takes forms of life as properly primitive. Finally, third, 
I examine what positive uptake that a descriptive philosophy predicated on describing 
forms of life could have. I note that this positive uptake is indirect in that Hutto 
maintains a distinction between the results of such descriptions and what we can do 
with them after we have them. 
 To begin, Hutto claims that "[t]he ‘fundamental thought' of the Tractatus is 
still driving later Wittgenstein only in a new context… that signs can mislead by 
obscuring the true working of our language" (ibid, 106). Recall that, for the anti-
theoretical "tragic" reading of the TLP, part of the work of the TLP is attempting to 
re-present what we already know and presuppose in our practice of language use. 
Though this goal is vitiated, ultimately, by Wittgenstein's reliance on an anti-
theoretical theory, Hutto takes this goal of re-presentation to be critical.  Indeed,  
"what is fundamental to our practices is something that can only make itself manifest 
in and through those practices and activities" (ibid 112). Thus, what the PI attempts to 
re-present is "not just to the use of words but also the practices that surround them" 
(ibid 117). As we discuss more fully in a moment, how this re-presenting works is 
rather hard to fully explicate. Regardless, for Hutto, the goal of the PI is not to put 
forward theories but re-present the practices that ground our sense-making practices 
and account for what we take to be possible. Moreover, the complex 
interdependencies of these practices, and the uses of words that interpolate with them 
are forms of life. Thus, the PI attempts to re-present the form of life to us and, by 
doing so in a perspicuous manner, clarify various features of the workings of 
language that we elide or occlude. Notice that this is still not ‘positive’ in that this re-
presentation is best construed as reminding us of things we already rely on. In effect, 
we are already involved in our form of life and Wittgenstein simply seeks to 
foreground this.  
 With this in view, we can attempt, as best we can, to talk around the form of 
life. This is because "the idea of a form of life cannot be explicated. It can provide no 
conceivable boundary. It… is the very ground of all inquiry: the basis of all saying 
and doing" (ibid 111). In other words, the concept of a form of life, so central to 
Hutto's subsequent discussion, is properly primitive and so cannot itself be explicated 
further. However, Hutto does offer a few characteristics of the form of life. First, we 
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are told that "forms of life… govern ‘the bounds of sense' and must remain outside 
the scope of the explicable, strictly sayable or articulable. Neither logic nor grammar 
can make any pronouncements as they are transcendental to the limits of sense" 
(Hutto (2004), 138). Thus, one characteristic of the form of life is that it governs the 
bounds of meaningful discourse. Second, this ‘bounds of sense' depends on "a whole 
range of activities, mutually fixed by our nature and that of the world" (Hutto (2005), 
109). In other words, whereas the TLP had rigidly distinguished sense from nonsense 
based on the assumed representational theory of language, the PI rejects this. 
However, as we discuss more latter, how these activities manage to fix the bounds of 
sense is rather hard to articulate. Third, pursuant to this, "Wittgenstein was clearly not 
trying to use them [e.g., logical or life forms] to make philosophical pronouncements 
about ‘what there is' or ‘what there must be.' Both remain outside the scope of the 
explicable, sayable or articulable" (ibid 110). Indeed, "we cannot anticipate the limits 
of what is sensible to say by appeal to logical form or forms of life since neither are 
substantial notions- we can only explore such possibilities from within" (ibid 111- 
underlining mine). Thus, the claims Wittgenstein puts forward in the PI should not be 
read as propounding a sort of a priori bounds of sense. Rather, this must be 
established by working through examples. Relatedly, what must be taken as given is 
the forms of life we already rely on to speak, do human being things, and so on (cf. PI 
§ II xi 235). Fourth, pursuant to this, Kant and Wittgenstein "are concerned with 
issues concerning the bounds of such that it makes it look as if Wittgenstein's 
grammar could be a substitute for Kantian synthetic a priori categories. But the key 
difference… is that… logical form [or a form of life] says nothing [and so] could not 
be equated with Kantian categories if these are regarded as defining a positive limit to 
the bounds of sense" (Hutto (2004), 143- underlining mine). In other words, logical or 
life forms are not deployed by Wittgenstein as fixed and stable a priori categories that 
allow one to police the bounds of sense. Indeed, what Hutto seems to object to is the 
“synthetic” in Kant’s “synthetic a priori.” The sorts of claims Wittgenstein’s make are 
reminders of things we already rely on, not claims that “go beyond” what is already 
there. Furthermore, for Hutto, forms are oddly negative notions- indeed Hutto claims 
that they are empty and say nothing. However, fifth, these empty forms of life also 
enable a particular sort of description. Again, the basic thought here is that a form- 
logical or life- must be tacitly presupposed to begin using language, describing, etc., 
at all. And, due to this very fact, all we can hope to do is re-present aspects of it. 
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Finally, sixth, the later Wittgenstein sought to re-present the form of life by utilizing 
reminders. These reminders are neither "speculative nor hypothetical, nor does it tell 
the audience anything new about the state of the world, for without the requisite 
background knowledge already in place such an example would be pointless" (Hutto 
(2005), 123). Rather, Wittgenstein uses reminders to, for example, point out "our 
training or its background, or at least some aspects of these. This is what it means to 
re-educate philosophers- to help them find their way home" (ibid 124). Thus, a point 
about the forms of life should remind us of something we know. 
 Clearly, this project of reminding us, via re-presentation, of our forms of life 
is different in kind than theory construction as discussed in section 3.1. We already 
have access to the form of life and so data and observation fall out of the picture, such 
re-presenting does not explain anything, the idea of converging on theories, data, etc., 
is out of place, and revision is rather hard to make sense of, prima facie. 
 With this primitive form of life, we can turn to what philosophy should 
rightly be. Specifically, there is a negative and a positive ramification. The negative 
ramification is that proper philosophy reminds T-philosophy that any attempt at 
theorization of the form of life is untenable. This is due, partly, to the disanalogous 
features discussed in section 3.2. However, just as Horwich noted that T-philosophy 
emerges from irrationality, Hutto maintains that T-philosophy emerges from trying to 
talk about the properly primitive. In effect, a T-philosophical theory is, at best, a futile 
attempt to explicate features of our forms of life (cf. PO p. 44). However, since the 
form of life is necessarily primitive, such theorization transgresses the bounds of 
sense and is, ergo, nonsense. Moreover, the role of a reminder is to help the T-
philosopher realize she has violated the bounds of sense and abandon her claim.  
The positive upshot is more challenging to articulate. To reiterate, such a 
positive upshot is indirect in that it depends on how we use the results of 
philosophical investigation. To begin, Hutto writes that he wants "to resist the 
attendant thought that Wittgenstein's approach eschews anything constructive in the 
sense of positive" (Hutto (2005), 217). Indeed, "[p]hilosophy is good for more than 
freeing us from false pictures and breaking our bad habits of thoughts. Wittgenstein's 
reminders…are primarily assembled for the purposes of removing confusions about 
what troubles us to enable us to get a clear view of the matter" (ibid 218). Thus, 
Wittgenstein's reminder based "procedure, but not its aim is therapeutic…In so 
clarifying fundamental matters he is no quietist. Having united these knots, he does 
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not advocate silence on important matters" (ibid 219). In other words, Wittgenstein's 
therapy is the means he uses to his end goal, engendering clarity. And this clarity, in 
turn, may indirectly help foster change or give insight into viable conceptual 
possibilities. To see how such clarity can foster change, it is critical to note that, for 
Hutto, a given conceptual schema that we find ourselves in is "subject to diachronic 
development" (Hutto (2005), 201). Granting the thought that our conceptual schema 
evolves and changes, it may turn out that, "[f]or example, in exploring ethical 
possibilities we will need to assess the kinds of lives they will engender if adopted 
and what sorts of people we wish to become…. Asking… ‘What is justice?' is not a 
question about essences but a prelude to change" (ibid 220). In other words, by 
describing our current conceptual schema, we, ipso facto, describe the possible 
modifications to it that it can sensibly have. Further, figuring out these possible 
modifications is "guided by analogies relating to their current understanding… 
Indeed, over time, this was how new ideas on these topics began to take root" (ibid). 
Thus, by describing how our conceptual schema and form of life currently work, we 
ipso facto describe the sorts of modifications it makes sense to make. As it were, 
Socrates’s haranguing Euthyphro may lead the latter to develop a different account of 
what “pious actions” are.  
  
3.2.d Forms of Life, Silence, and The Mystical: 
 
 Hutto's positive account suffers from three problems. First, several of his 
claims are difficult to harmonize with Wittgenstein. Second, the primitive status he 
ascribes to a form of life and its interconnections with our sense-making practices and 
the bounds of sense, are difficult to make sense of. Finally, third there is Hutto's 
inability to avoid quietism, despite his best efforts. 
 The first problem is that many of Hutto’s remarks are rather difficult to 
square with Wittgenstein. One, the primitive and unsayable status Hutto ascribes to 
the forms of life is problematic. Wittgenstein, in an admittedly gnomic way, does talk 
about our forms of life (e.g., PI § 19, 23, 241; OC § 358). Indeed, to presage a bit, 
many commentators (e.g., Hacker (2001), 74-97; Glock (1996 c)), including Hutto, 
manage to say a great deal about what cannot be said. Two, the role of “grammar” is 
held in a strange sort of abeyance in Hutto’s account. Specifically, it is rather unclear 
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what Wittgenstein is after when he talks about “the grammar of our concepts,” or 
“grammatical investigations” as these, prima facie, do seem to function as fixed 
features of our language. Three, Wittgenstein insists that “[p]hilosophizing is: 
rejecting false arguments” (BT § 87 p. 302). Whatever else this quote may mean, it 
clearly goes beyond the thought that, in philosophy, all we can or should do is re-
present the forms of life.  
Second, Hutto’s account insists that the forms of life as inherently primitive 
and inexplicable notion and then seems to rely on it to ground other aspects of his 
philosophical project, specifically the bounds of sense and our sense-making 
practices. However, it is opaque both how the bounds of sense and form of life relate 
and what role a form of life plays in our sense-making practices. Let us examine this 
further. 
 To begin, for Hutto a critical role of the form of life is that it establishes a 
bounds of sense such that it can help us determine if some supposed ‘claim' is 
senseful or nonsense. However, such a claim seems prima facie odd. If the form of 
life is already given and already in play, and all we can do is re-present it, it becomes 
unclear how it can sustain a charge of “nonsense.” Further, pursuant to this, a major 
charge Hutto makes against a T-philosophical claim is that they fall on the wrong side 
of this boundary and so are confused. However, Hutto is rather salient about how a 
form of life manages to establish and maintain bounds of sense. We consider three 
plausible interpretations of how a form of life establishes and maintains the bounds of 
sense. These are a strong interpretation, a weak interpretation, a piecemeal 
interpretation. I argue that each is problematic. Let us examine each in turn.  
 A strong interpretation sees the bounds of sense as directly dependent on 
forms of life. In effect, much as my biology limits me from breathing underwater, so 
my form of life limits me from sensefully making certain ‘claims.' Furthermore, the 
strong interpretation casts the form of life as something ‘hard-wired’ into the sort of 
animal I am, the sort of brain/mind I have, etc. Indeed, what prevents me from making 
certain claims ‘sensefully’ are certain brute facts about how I am built as an organism. 
Granting this, for the strong interpretation, the bounds of sense is simply an 
explication of what my form of life can and cannot do. However, Hutto notes that "the 
idea of a form of life… can provide no conceivable boundary" (Hutto (2005 a), 111). 
Thus, a strong interpretation is a non-starter. 
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A weak interpretation of the relationship between the bounds of sense and 
forms of life argues that, properly speaking, the form of life does not issue any bounds 
of sense at all. Indeed, such a reading seems encouraged by the Hutto quote given 
above. In effect, the form of life underwrites everything so fundamentally that even 
mistakes, confusions, seeming nonsense, and so on, still presuppose it. Further 
support for the weak interpretation of the forms of life can be taken from the fact that 
sense-making practices are radically contextual and seem able to make sense even of 
seeming gibberish. However, granting this, there are two problems. One, it is unclear 
why T-philosophical theories should be condemned as confused in the first place. In 
effect, if the ‘bounds' of sense are this indeterminate and porous, and if the form of 
life is this flexible and open ended that it can potentially make sense of everything, it 
simply is not clear why we should rule T-philosophy out of bounds. Two, pursuant to 
one, it is unclear why we should talk about a ‘bounds of sense’ at all under the weak 
interpretation. 
The third interpretation, which Hutto seems to favors, is a piecemeal 
interpretation that sees the bounds of sense as dependent on our sense-making 
practices (e.g. Hutto (2005 a), 48). The most plausible account of this piecemeal 
interpretation is that forms of life underwrite our sense-making practices and then 
these practices establish the bounds of sense. More fully, we assume things about our 
form of life. In turn these assumptions underwrite our sense-making practices. 
Critically, these practices are best understood as being made up of ‘success verbs.’ If 
the practices succeed on marks or sounds, we have sense and if not, we have 
nonsense. In turn, this gives rise to the bounds of sense. However, Hutto stresses that 
sense-making practices are inherently contextual, pragmatically mediated, occasion 
sensitive, and so on (e.g., ibid 111). Ergo, let us bring our sense-making practices into 
view by considering a concrete example. 
 Imagine that we find some arabesque marks in an abandoned temple. We 
begin by assuming features of our forms of life- for instance that written language has 
a finite and invariant set of graphemes that recur in systematic patterns. From there, 
we engage in sense-making practices- e.g., we examine the arabesque marks and see 
if they have repeated graphemes arranged in a systematic pattern. If they do display 
these features, our sense-making practices may lead us to infer that the arabesque 
marks are some form of written language and we may begin trying to translate them 
in a host of ways. If they do not display these features, we may conclude that the 
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marks are not a written language but, e.g., a decorative motif for the temple. The 
result of these sense-making practices will be a bounds of sense that determines if the 
arabesque marks should be treated as a written language or a decorative patterns. 
Notice, further, that this bounds of sense emerged from how we engaged with the 
arabesque marks as well as background features of our own forms of life, e.g., that 
written English has a set of graphemes that repeat regularly in systematic patterns.  
Granting this, there are at least four critical problems with such an 
interpretation. One, sense-making is hopelessly underdetermined and so context 
dependent, occasion sensitive, and so on, that it is simply unclear if it can do any 
philosophical work. Hutto may reply that this is a virtue of his account. Indeed, our 
sense-making practices do vary, we engage with artifacts in a myriad of different 
ways, and so forth. However, if this is so, then it is simply unclear if any sort of 
abstraction or generalization is possible concerning the bounds of sense specifically. 
For example, some people claim to make sense of Finnegans Wake, some claim to 
make sense of Lacan, and some claim to make sense of quantum electrodynamics. It 
is simply unclear if, and how, any of these claims can be examined, assessed, and so 
on, in a non-person relative way. As it were, the only person who knows if sense 
making succeeds is the individual who engages in it. However, this quickly 
deteriorates into a TLP-esque solipsism (e.g. TLP 5.62) wherein I am the only 
language user, the locus of sense, and everything that falls outside of my sense-
making practices is nonsense. Furthermore, it slurs over the difference between 
“thinking I have made sense of x” and “making sense of x.” (cf. PI § 202). Indeed, 
someone may think they understand quantum electrodynamics until they have to do a 
problem-set. Thus, it is clear that my subjective impression and actually having made 
sense of something can and do come apart. 
 Two, relatedly, such a piecemeal interpretation of our forms of life and sense-
making practice may render my bounds of sense as the bounds of sense. In turn, this 
seems to imply that my failure to make sense of, e.g., quantum electrodynamics is a 
problem for physics and not for me. Needless to say, such a conclusion is rather odd.  
Three, pursuant to two, it is unclear how to conceptualize forms of life in the 
first place. As noted above, I am unable to make sense of quantum electrodynamics 
because I lack the requisite background, mathematical training, and so on. Does this 
entail that a physicist who happily chugs along with her research has a different form 
of life than I do? Indeed, individuating forms of life, determining who shares them, 
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and so on, is rather opaque. Matters are made even worse by Hutto’s insistence on the 
inexplicability of the forms of life here. Furthermore, if we cannot properly establish 
who, where, when, and so on, two people share a form of life, it is clear that we 
cannot rely on assumptions about our form of life to underwrite sense-making.  
Finally, four, exegetically, it is opaque what role the form of life plays in 
Hutto’s reading of the PI. For example, one might assume that a language-game is a 
tool later Wittgenstein relies on to re-present sense-making practices. However, Hutto 
(2005), 114, stresses that language-games serve a variety of rather different functions 
in the PI. Worse, a language-game’s dependency on rules makes them difficult to see 
as mere re-presentations of a form of life that both underwrites and cannot be 
expressed in rules. Thus, the primitive forms of life both do not do any philosophical 
work, and it is unclear what sorts of descriptions of them we should give so that they 
can do work. 
The third, and most intractable, problem with Hutto’s account is that there is a 
profound tension between his insistence that we need not be quietists and his 
insistence that the form of life is always tacit and unsayable. In effect, if the form of 
life is unsayable, it is unclear how we can say anything at all about it. However, if we 
cannot say anything about it, even in the form of a description, as descriptions too 
presuppose the forms of life, then it is unclear how we can maintain any position over 
and above a fairly radical TLP-esque quietism-i.e, whereof we cannot speak, thereof 
we must be silent. Indeed, the link between the TLP and the PI that Hutto attempts to 
establish seems, in this key, to plunge the PI into very similar sorts of paradoxes as 
the TLP. To wit, Wittgenstein posits and relies on some unexplained explanatory 
form- be it logical or life- to do the heavy philosophical lifting that accounts for our 
sense-making practices. However, when he is pressed on what, exactly, this form is, 
and how, exactly, it underwrites the sense-making practices, all he can do is try to 
whistle it. So as Ramsey had it, if you cannot say it, you cannot whistle it either. 
Conversely, if we attempt not to be quietists and assume that we can give precise 
descriptions of the forms of life so that they can elucidate our sense-making practices, 
we have effed the ineffable. So this is untenable.   
 
3.3 The Key Uptake: 
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 The anti-theoretical metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein has 
several features that, both exegetically and philosophically, make a great deal of sense 
of Wittgenstein. First, it gives an articulate nuanced, and philosophically robust, 
account of why Wittgenstein was so hostile to attempts to use scientific methods (e.g., 
theory construction) in philosophy. Second, it sticks very close to common sense and 
offers criticisms of philosophy based on worries that my mother indeed shares.  
 However, the critical problem for anti-theoretical metaphilosophy is that, in 
both endgames, it misfires in deeply problematic ways. For Horwich, the assumed 
reduction of philosophical reflection to T-philosophical theory construction seems 
untenable, is scientistic in precisely the sense Wittgenstein seeks to avoid, and cannot 
make sense of why Wittgenstein wanted to provoke thought rather than silence it. For 
Hutto, by contrast, the primitive status he ascribes to forms, logical or life, forces him 
into the problem the TLP seems faced with. To wit, Wittgenstein either must not 
speak or else he is, somehow, effing the ineffable. Thus both endgames go misfire. 
   
3.4 Summary: 
 
 This chapter examined the anti-theoretical account of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. First, it discussed how the account presupposes an invariant 
diachronic metaphilosophical goal in Wittgenstein. To wit, he always aimed to show 
that philosophy cannot utilize theory to gain objective knowledge. However, it also 
noted that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology in the TLP goes wrong by, 
paradoxically, relying on a philosophical theory to condemn philosophical theories. 
Second, it discussed Wittgenstein's mature method. Specifically, it focused on 
Wittgenstein's reminding us of obviously different features that exist between science 
and philosophy and why this should make us deeply skeptical of theory construction 
in philosophy. Third, I examined two responses to this realization that philosophy 
cannot use theory as it is simply different in kind then science. One, Horwich's end-
of-philosophy account is based on exposing irrationality and terminating philosophy. 
Two, we examined Hutto's form of life account. I further argued that both endgames 
go wrong in various ways. 
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4 The Grammatical Metaphilosophical Interpretation: 
 
  This chapter discusses the metaphilosophical ascription that the grammatical 
account proffers for Wittgenstein. In many ways, this account rejects the above 
dialectic as I have characterized it. Specifically, the therapeutic, antiphilosophical, 
and anti-theoretical accounts all ignore a critical aspect of Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy, according to the grammatical account. To wit, in addition to his 
negative goal of addressing and redressing confusion, Wittgenstein also has a positive 
metaphilosophical goal- conceptual cartography (e.g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 284). 
In other words, Wittgenstein aims to explore the interconnections that obtain within 
our inherently normative conceptual-linguistic framework. In turn, this positive 
program allows Wittgenstein to avoid the de-coupling of a philosophical problem and 
his methodology. Succinctly, and in a manner to be developed further, the 
grammatical account maintains that philosophical problems arise due to us confusing 
the normative rules and interrelation that partly constitute our linguistic-conceptual 
schema.  By describing the framework properly, the problems dissolve and we learn 
our way about the framework better (cf. PI § 123). Further, Wittgenstein neither aims 
to end philosophy- by exposing irrationality or nonsense- nor does "philosophy" 
collapse into rhetoric. Instead, philosophy becomes the exploration of our ways of 
thinking and talking. Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein's philosophical method is a form 
of connective conceptual analysis (e.g., Strawson (1992), 17-28). I note that it is this 
positive metaphilosophical goal that I focus on as it is the most distinctive feature of 
the grammatical account.  
However, bringing into view the metaphilosophy that the grammatical account 
imputes to Wittgenstein is a rather complicated task. This is because the grammatical 
account is sensitive to the complex interdependencies between Wittgenstein's avowed 
metaphilosophical ends and means, his global philosophical themes, and his 
engagement with specific issues like rule-following or private language. Ergo, though 
my focus is on Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, I often find it necessary to draw 
materials that relate to both particular issues in his actual work as well as examining 
overall themes in his thought. I also note here that I follow, e.g., Hacker & Baker 
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(2009), 271-303, and Glock (2017) in focusing on the PI, and use the TLP as a sort of 
foil or backdrop. 
  This chapter divides into two sections. In section one, I lay out the 
metaphilosophy the grammatical account imputes to Wittgenstein and how it 
interconnects with other aspects of his project. Specifically, the grammatical account 
takes Wittgenstein’s positive metaphilosophical goal as the description of the 
inherently normative interdependencies that obtain between constitutive rules that 
govern the use of terms. Pursuant to this, Wittgenstein’s philosophical methodology is 
a form of nuanced conceptual analysis that aims to clarify constitutive rules that 
determine the correct uses of expressions, the interconnections between these rules, 
and how normative practices underwrite these features. In section two, I criticize this 
account. 
 
4.0 Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy From a Grammatical Point of View:  
 
 This section adumbrates the grammatical account’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy as conceptual cartography. It does so by considering 
several interdependent aspects of this ascription. Section 4.0a examines the claim that 
philosophy is non-cognitive and a second order discipline. Section 4.0b links second 
order conception of philosophy to the project of describing the constitutive rules that 
determine the correct uses of expressions. Section 4.0c refines this by discussing how 
shared normative practices, notably correction and explanation, underwrite these 
constitutive rules. Section 4.0d further develops this account of correction and 
explanation by examining how they link to “understanding” and “the immanence of 
meaning.” Section 4.0e discusses how the grammatical account avoids an untenable 
holism that the immanence of meaning seems to carry in its wake by introducing a 
“perspicuous representation” as a particular form of description. Section 4.0f 
examines how this form of description enables a positive project of mapping out the 
interdependencies of grammar. Finally, section 4.0g summarizes the dialectic. 
 
4.0.a Philosophy as Non-cognitive and Second Order: 
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A leitmotif of the grammatical account of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is 
ascribing to him the viewpoint that "philosophy is not a cognitive discipline" (Hacker 
(2001), ix. Also see, e.g., Hacker (2009 a), 7-15; Hacker & Baker (2009), 271-76; 
Glock (1986); Glock (2017), 231-32)). However, “[t]his [non-cognitive] 
characterization must be qualified in so far as Wittgenstein's philosophy features 
grammatical descriptions. But we shall see that, first, this renders it ‘cognitive' only in 
a low-key sense" (Glock (1991), 86). I take the ‘low-key sense' to mean that 
philosophical statements that describe grammar are propositionally structured and 
truth-apt in a particular sense discussed more fully in a moment. Critically, for the 
grammatical account, philosophical statements are not cognitive because they do not 
describe the world, states-of-affairs, objects, and so on. Rather, philosophical 
statements describe the linguistic-conceptual schemas we rely on when we represent 
the world. Thus, unlike "science or common sense, philosophy does not itself describe 
objects of any kind… Instead, it is a second-order discipline" (Glock (2003), 24). 
First, I discuss why the grammatical account claims that philosophy is not cognitive. 
Then, I examine how the grammatical account links this non-cognitive gloss to the 
claim that philosophy is a second order discipline.  
   The non-cognitive nature of philosophical statements is radical and is perhaps 
the most controversial of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical insights, according to the 
grammatical account. Such a non-cognitive account maintains that philosophy is not a 
discipline that "could result in knowledge expressed by true propositions" (Glock 
(1991), 69; see also, e.g., Hacker (2009 a)). There are three basic features of 
philosophical investigation that account for its non-cognitive status. First, 
philosophy's statements, properly construed, are not "about entities" (Glock (1996 a), 
199). For earlier Wittgenstein, this is a ramification of his insistence that "all the 
propositions of logic… are tautologies" (Hacker (1986), 45) and his assumption of 
philosophy and logic are nearly synonymous  (e.g., NB p. 106). Since a claim like "it 
is raining, or it is not the case that it is raining" can hardly be said to be about the 
weather, this seems apt. For later Wittgenstein, though rejecting much of the TLP’s 
framework and adding non-tautological ‘grammatical connections,’ the insistence that 
philosophy is not about entities is "transformed rather than abandoned... there are no 
propositions expressing philosophical knowledge" (Glock (2001), 21). Specifically, 
later Wittgenstein consistently maintained that "(A) philosophy differs in principle 
from the sciences…[and that] (B) [philosophical] propositions do not depict necessary 
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states of affairs" (Glock (2017), 237). Thus, the first reason philosophical statements 
are non-cognitive is that they are not about features of the world.  
Second, pursuant to this "radical suggestion [that there are no entities or states 
of affairs that philosophy describes] excludes the idea that … philosophy has a special 
subject-matter" (Hacker (2006), 20; See also, e.g., Glock (1997 a), 287-91). This lack 
of a subject matter can be seen in several interrelated facets of philosophy. One, prima 
facie, philosophy is utterly odd in that one can have a philosophy of x where x is 
rather unrestricted- everything from atoms to agape is a topic of philosophy. Two, 
"[t]he nature of philosophy is itself a contested philosophical issue, and views about 
this issue are philosophically controversial" (Glock (2017), 249). Three, it is "striking 
that the later questions [e.g., what is a problem in chemistry] are not themselves 
problems in their respective disciplines. The question of what is a chemical problem 
is not itself a chemical problem… But the question of what a philosophical problem is 
is itself a philosophical problem" (Hacker (2006), 18). Four, "[t]here is no general, 
agreed body of philosophical knowledge" (Hacker (2009 a ), 2). In sum, whereas 
since Aristotle's Physics, we have assumed that whatever else it does, physics should 
study motion and change in the natural world, philosophy does not have a universally 
accepted subject matter, set of universally accepted questions, etc. Thus, the second 
reason philosophy is non-cognitive is that it has no set topics, methods, and so on.  
  Third, for a cognitive discipline, the problems that vex it often emerge when a 
theory encounters recalcitrant data.47 Alternatively, the problems may emerge when 
some new situation arises. In contrast, the real source of philosophical problems is "a 
disorder in our concepts. They are to be solved by ordering those concepts… 
[Philosophical questions often] manifest conceptual unclarity" (Baker & Hacker 
(2009), 274). Moreover, this is exactly because "philosophy is concerned not with 
truth, or matters of fact, but with meaning. Philosophical problems are conceptual 
confusions which arise out of the distortion or misapprehension of words with which 
we are perfectly familiar outside of philosophy" (Glock (2001), 21-22). Thus, what is 
responsible for a philosophical problem is not recalcitrant data or unexpected events. 
Instead, it is, in an interestingly Socratic sense, a lack of self-knowledge or, better put, 
self-understanding, which causes philosophical problems. Thus, a third reason why 
philosophy is non-cognitive is that its problems are different than cognitive problems.  
                                                 
47 E.g., Kuhn (1987) for a case study of the birth of quantum physics from the black-body problem. 
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  In turn, this last point, in particular, connects to the claim that philosophy is a 
second order discipline. To begin, the grammatical position argues that philosophy is 
a second order discipline. To begin, prima facie, if a philosophical problem is a 
product of a disorder of concepts, philosophy should aim remove the disorder. In turn, 
an apt method to remove a disorder is to describe our concepts in such a way that their 
inherent order is made clear. Indeed, a disorder of concepts emerges from the simple 
fact that we do not understand the interdependencies that obtain, i.e., the correct order 
of concepts, within our conceptual-linguistic framework. By describing this 
framework properly, the disorder dissolves. Thus, whereas "science describes reality, 
philosophy is not directly concerned with objects of any kind… Instead, it reflects on 
the preconditions of our knowing or experiencing the objects" (Glock (2017), 232). In 
other words, philosophical statements are not cognitive in that they do not describe 
entities and features of the world. Instead, they are second order in that they describe 
our linguistic-conceptual frameworks that we rely on to describe or represent the 
world in the first place (cf. PI § 126). Further, philosophy has no proper topic exactly 
because all first order disciplines, from astrophysics to art history, involve 
representing the world in certain ways and, thus, each can be a topic for philosophical 
investigation. Finally, philosophical statements may be truth-apt in the low-key sense 
of either accurately or inaccurately describing this framework. However, to reiterate, 
philosophical statements are not about the world, objects, and so on. 
Notice too that the Kantian overtones here are not accidental. According to the 
grammatical account, both Kant and Wittgenstein re-interpret philosophical 
statements as not being about the world but as being about the concepts that we use to 
represent it (e.g., Glock (1999)). In other words, both Kant and Wittgenstein cast 
philosophy as an investigation of the preconditions for us to gain knowledge about or 
represent the world. However, we must also realize that Wittgenstein makes four 
critical modifications of critical or second order philosophy. First, whereas Kant 
"characterized [a priori statements] as knowing the truth of a description of how 
things necessarily are in nature… [Wittgenstein saw a priori statements as] norms of 
description. The world has no scaffolding- neither original… nor constructed and 
imposed. Such (apparently synthetic a priori) propositions constitute the scaffolding 
FROM which we describe the world" (Hacker (2013), 35). In other words, a norm of 
description is arbitrary since it is neither metaphysically nor transcendentally justified.  
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Second, pursuant to this, Wittgenstein repudiates outright "transcendental 
psychology [as] at best [it] boils down to an empirical psychological theory; at worst, 
it is simply a fairy tale" (Glock (1997 a), 295). Indeed, "these preconditions [of 
representation] no longer reside in a mental machinery which constructs the 
phenomenal world… but in a system of rules for the employment of signs" (Glock 
(1997 b), 159). In other words, rather than locating the preconditions of representation 
or description in the shadowy world of the transcendental subject, Wittgenstein aims 
to examine the prerequisites involved in using our languages.  
   Third, Wittgenstein re-imagines the a priori elements philosophy investigates 
not as synthetic judgments in Kant's sense but as grammatical propositions. 
"Grammatical propositions antecede experience in an innocuous sense. They can 
neither be confirmed nor confuted by experience… To say that it is logically 
impossible for a white object to be darker than a black one is to say that given our 
semantic rules, it makes no sense to apply ‘white' and ‘darker than black' to one and 
the same object" (Glock (2017), 239). However, to reiterate, such grammatical 
propositions "are arbitrary, not in the sense that they are unimportant, capricious, 
[etc.]…but in the sense in which a unit of measurement is independent of the length 
of the objects to be measured, and is not true or false, correct or incorrect, in the way 
in which a statement of length is" (Hacker (1996), 222-23). In other words, 
Wittgenstein does not pursue a validator metaphysical description that seeks to 
vindicate our a priori rules. Instead, all we can do in philosophy is describe the 
grammar that governs our descriptions or representations of experience.  
  Finally, fourth, philosophical statements are "normative rather than 
descriptive. They function as… grammatical propositions which are typically used to 
express… ‘norms of representation [or description]'" (Glock (1997 a), 300). This is 
one of the most innovative aspects of Wittgenstein's thought and links directly with 
his thoughts on the necessity (see, e.g., Hacker (2009 b); Glock (2008), (Glock 
(2013)). For example, the claim "black is darker than white" is necessarily true. 
However, rather than jumping to either de re metaphysical necessity to account for 
this claim or trying to hash out the transcendental structure of possible experience, 
Wittgenstein insists that we ask "what is it for a proposition to be a ‘necessary 
proposition'?" (Hacker (2009 b), 3). He answers that for a proposition to be necessary 
is "to say that given our semantic rules, it makes no sense to apply ‘white' and ‘darker 
than black' to one and the same object" (Glock (2017), 239). In other words, 
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grammatical propositions describe the semantic rules that constitute our norms of 
description. In turn, the norm of description of colors disables "white is darker than 
black" not due to some essential features but instead do to the way we have structured 
our color descriptions. Moreover, these rules, in turn, are displayed in the "human 
practices of using signs" (Hacker (2009 b), 3).  
  Thus, we see that philosophical statements are non-cognitive in that they do 
not describe features of the world, have no particular first order topic, and do not arise 
from vexation but disorder. Second, pursuant to this, philosophy describes the 
concepts or terms we rely on when we offer descriptions of various features of the 
world. In other words, philosophy describes the inherently normative order of our 
linguistic-conceptual framework rather than natural features of the world. In sum, a 
philosophical statement is a "descriptions of the normative connections within the 
web of concepts that constitute our form of representation" (Hacker (2009 a), 23). The 
next section clarifies what these normative connections are.  
  
4.0.b Rules; Constitutive and Implicit: 
 
In the last section, we discussed why the grammatical account imputes to 
Wittgenstein a non-cognitive view of philosophical statements. Succinctly, a 
philosophical statement is non-cognitive because it does not describe natural features 
of the world but normative features of our linguistic-conceptual schema. In other 
words, a philosophical statement describes the normative aspects of the framework(s) 
by which we represent various features of the world. Thus, philosophical statements 
are "not statements of fact. They are descriptions of the normative connections within 
the web of concepts that constitute our form of representation" (Hacker (2009) a), 24). 
In turn, conceptual cartography begins to come into view. In effect, "[a]ll philosophy 
does is describe the topography of the grammatical landscape" (Baker & Hacker 
(2005), 268). In other words, philosophy "qua discipline, is a normative description… 
of language (Hacker (2012), 4). Granting this, what are the normative features of 
language that our philosophical statements describe? To address this, first, I discuss 
the grammatical account's reliance on constitutive rules and their interdependencies. 
Second, I refine this account further by considering several questions that naturally 
arise concerning the nature of, and status of, such constitutive rules. 
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  To begin, the grammatical account insists that what we describe with a 
philosophical statement is "the meaning of an expression [as] determined by rules of 
its correct use" (Glock (2005), 222). Without going too far afield, the grammatical 
position is committed to a particular version of the inherent normativity of language 
thesis (ibid. See also, e.g., Glock (2009), Glock (2015)). At a minimum, a normativist 
about language is committed to what Glock terms the bare normativity of meaning 
thesis, which claims that, a word w is meaningful only if there are conditions for the 
correct use of w.48 However, the grammatical position opts for a stronger version of 
the normativity- the rule-based normativity of language. This claims that an 
expression e is meaningful only if there are rules for the use of e. Further, these rules 
are constitutive in that they determine, rather than regulate, offer helpful guidance for, 
etc., the correct use of an expression e. Further, and granting that "the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language" (PI § 43), these constitutive rules partly determine the 
meaning of expression e by determining the correct use of e. In other words, much as 
the rule "knights move in an ‘L' shape" partly determines if some token-wooden-bit is 
a knight as well as the correct use of a knight, so to do rules for correct use determine 
what some expression e means as well as how to correctly use e. Thus, what we 
describe in philosophy are these constitutive rules that determine correct use and, 
ergo, meanings of expressions. 
Notice also that the rules for the use of an individual expression e interdepend 
with other rules in such a way as to form "[w]hat later Wittgenstein calls the 
‘grammar' of a language… the system of constitutive rules… which define the 
language" (Glock (2009), 265). In other words, a constitutive rule that determines 
correct use and meaning interdepends with other rules in such a way that their 
normative interconnections define a particular grammar for a portion of our linguistic-
conceptual schema. For example, the constitutive rule that determines the correct use 
of "red" also interdepend with other rules that determine the use of "light," "bright," 
"not green," "color," and so on. The totality of these interdependencies is the grammar 
of our color language. Further, these linkages within grammar are themselves 
normative and conceptual. It is part of how we have normatively structured our 
grammar of color descriptions, that accounts for why "the ball is bluish red at point p 
                                                 
48 At this level, the debate often turns on if "correct" is itself a normative notion. See Whiting (2007) 
for a pro-normativity argument and Hattiangadi (2006) for contra-normative argument.  
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at time t" is innocuous whereas "the ball is greenish red at point p at time t" is 
problematic. Again, we just refuse to accept the later sentence as it violates the 
constitutive rules’ interconnections. 
Notice, finally, that such a model sets up a very particular set of dependencies. 
In the first place, there is the semantic content of an expression- i.e., what the 
expression means. In turn, this content is partly engendered by the use of the 
expression in language. From here, the use is determined by constitutive rules that are 
established and maintained by certain normative practices- a point we examine in the 
next section. Granting this, the rules also interdepend with one another to form a 
language-game. And Wittgenstein’s goal is describing this game and, by doing so, 
accounting for the meaning of expressions by bringing into focus e’s correct use. 
  With this in view, let us further clarify the nature of and role of these 
constitutive rules by addressing two questions, in this and the next section. (a) Must 
the constitutive rules that determine meaning rest on explicit stipulation? (b) Do the 
constitutive rules have to be an occurrent feature of an agent's mind or intention?  
 (a) The grammatical account notes that the constitutive rules that determine 
meaning cannot rest on explicit stipulation. This is because "by pain of regress… 
[one] cannot explain language [via convention or stipulation]… because articulating a 
convention presupposes language" (Glock (2015), 848). Indeed, much as a social 
contract theory seems problematic as it presupposes the legal institution of a contract 
without laws, so too does the stipulative account of constitutive rules presuppose 
language in which the stipulations are made, to function at all. Instead of such a 
stipulative account, the grammatical account insists that "[g]rammatical rules do not 
somehow follow from ‘meanings,' they partly constitute them… we give them 
meaning by explaining and using them in a certain way" (Glock (2001), 14). In other 
words, it is not that we ‘have' meanings as individual persons and then collectively 
decide what tokens to use to express them. Rather, it is that the way we use, correct, 
explain, understand, and so on, our terms, that determines their meanings in the first 
place. Thus an expression has meaning, not due to explicit stipulation, but instead due 
to the social practices of correction and explanation, a key point for chapter 4.0c. 
(b) The grammatical account also insists that the constitutive rules need not be 
explicit or occurrent features of an agent's actual current state of mind or intention. 
This is somewhat like how a competent chess player knows and abides by the rules of 
chess without continually having to refer to them in her mind or a book before each 
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move. However, what is critical is that the agent is "capable of recognizing the correct 
formulations of the relevant rules, if only with a little help from their friends" (Glock 
(2017), 244). In other words, when presented with an abstract rule-formulation49 
prescinded from her normatively guided behavior, the agent will recognize and 
endorse that this is the rule she is following. For example, someone may learn how to 
play chess via trial-and-error and correction and never entertain the rule-formulation 
"knights move in an ‘L' shape." When she is told this, however, she will readily agree. 
Let us call this sort of latent rule but potentially recognizable rule, an implicit rule.   
However, as it stands, the idea of a constitutive rule is still under-specified and 
trades more on intuition, especially with respect to language. Indeed, what establishes 
and maintains these constitutive rules if they are neither innate nor explicitly 
stipulated? Further, how can such rules be implicit to an agent- i.e., how can she 
know-how to follow them without thereby knowing the correct rule-formulations of 
them? Also, how do correction and explanation factor in? It is to these questions we 
turn.  
 
4.0.c Convention, Correction, and Implicit Constitutive Rules:  
 
  In the last section, we noted that Wittgenstein aims to describe the constitutive 
rules that determine the use of expressions, according to the grammatical account. 
However, this account left open several critical questions. To answer them, first, I 
discuss the grammatical account's conception of a "convention." Second, I discuss 
how conventions are established and maintained via our shared normative corrective 
and explanatory practices. Finally, third, I note how this account can make good sense 
of an implicit constitutive rule that does not rest on an explicit stipulation. 
  To begin, a critical question for the grammatical account, especially granting 
that constitutive rules are not products of stipulation, is what establishes and 
maintains these constitutive rules. To address this, the grammatical account ascribes 
to Wittgenstein a view that “insists not just on the rule-governed nature of language, 
but also on the idea that these rules are conventions, i.e., rules that are both arbitrary 
                                                 
49 "Rule-formulation" is a concept from von Wright (1960). We discuss it more carefully in section 
4.2a. Suffice to say, a rule-formulation is one possible articulation of a rule such as "shh!" "no talking 
during the opera" "please be silent during the show" etc., for the rule that one should not speak during a 
performance.  
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and inter-subjectively shared” (Glock (2009), 174). In turn, a convention is a "shared 
arbitrary rule. If members of a community behave in a regular fashion, react to 
deviations not just with surprise but with disapproval, corrections or sanctions, and if 
these adverse reactions are generally accepted, then they share a rule" (Glock (2002), 
253). This implies that, with specific reference to language, a convention establishes a 
communal "use that constitutes meaning while individual use is responsible to it" 
(Glock (2015), 848). In other words, my individual use of an expression e in a natural 
language, e.g., English, answers to the conventions of the English speaking 
community. Furthermore, deviant uses, solecisms, etc., are met with social sanctions. 
And, indeed, when my younger self uttered "Sally and me went to the store," my 
mother's reaction was "No! Sally and I went to the store! ‘Sally and me' is ignorant!"  
Second, pursuant to this, these conventions are established and maintained by 
shared practices. To begin, it is imperative to note that such practices are inherently 
and irreducibly normative. Indeed, it is these normative practices that establish the 
internal relations between, e.g., a shared convention, a constitutive rule, and a correct 
use. Further, such internal relations are "de dicto, i.e., they depend on how we 
describe things…. To insist on internal relations does not introduce any mysterious, 
supernatural phenomena. Internal relations… are effected by our normative practice- 
the fact that we introduce, teach and explain standards of correctness, and criticize or 
justify performance by reference to them" (Glock (1996 b), 162-63). In other words, 
to properly account for what establishes and maintains a convention that engenders a 
constitutive rule, we must rely on a particular, and inherently normative, framework 
to even ‘see' what is afoot at all. This harmonizes well with Wittgenstein who insists 
that "[t]here are characteristic signs of it [e.g., being corrected or getting it right] in 
the players' behavior. Think of the behavior characteristic of someone correcting a 
slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that… even without knowing his 
language" (PI § 54). Further, notice that these normative practices are precisely what 
establish and maintain the constitutive rules that determine proper use. In other words, 
my mother's hectoring is, partly, what maintains correct English.  
Granting that we must adopt an irreducible normative framework to discuss 
the social practices that establish and maintain conventions, we can ask which 
practices establish and maintain the constitutive rules that determine correct use of 
expressions. For the grammatical account, two practices, in particular, are critical. 
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These are correction and linguistic-explanation.50 For linguistic-explanation, the 
grammatical account insists that there is an "internal connection of word-meaning and 
explanation which is antecedent to any empirical investigation. Meaning is what is 
explained in giving an explanation of meaning" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 29). Indeed, 
"[m]eaning is what is given by the explanation of meaning… [and we] have a well-
established practice of explanation" (ibid 33-34). Relatedly, a correction relies on the 
same sort of internal connection between the meaning of an expression and the 
communal practice of using it in certain ways (e.g., Glock (2005), 228-31). 
Furthermore "[t]he words with which we learn to do things are, of course, rule-
governed. Their rule-governed employment manifests itself in a regularity that 
presupposes the recognition of a uniformity (RMF 348). The normative practices of 
using words are surrounded by normative activities of correcting mistakes, explaining 
what is meant, appropriate responses to correct use [etc.]…  And it is the normative 
practices of the speech community that fix and hold firm the internal relation between 
a word and its application" (Hacker (2009 c), 5). Thus, the constitutive rules that 
determine the proper use of an expression e are underwritten by our actual and shared 
normative practices of linguistic-explanation and correction. Indeed, it is exactly these 
practices that establish and maintain the constitutive rules that determine proper use 
and, ergo, the meaning of various expressions. Intuitively, an expression e means 
what it does in English because English speakers linguistic-explain e in certain ways- 
and correct deviant uses of e in certain ways. Notice, as we discuss more fully in 
section 4.1d, this implies that language is normative all the way down. 
Granting this, we can begin to make sense of how a constitutive rule can be 
implicit. In other words, we can account for how a speaker can rely on and follow a 
constitutive rule without having occurrent access to a rule-formulation. To begin, 
consider that many competent English speakers could not "off the cuff, spell out the 
differences in use between ‘nearly' and ‘almost'… Yet no one would ever say ‘there is 
not almost enough sugar in the pudding" (Hacker (2009 c), 3). Notice, one, that an 
English speaker would correct someone who uttered "there is not almost enough sugar 
in the pudding." Notice, two, that Hacker is quite right in that hashing out the 
difference between "almost" and "nearly" is difficult and something many people 
                                                 
50 I call these explanations "linguistic-explanations" to separate them out from, e.g., scientific 
explanations (e.g., Glock (1996 c), 111-112 for further discussion). 
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cannot do. Indeed, knowledge of even the basic grammar of one's native language- 
e.g., when to use the present perfect and when to use the progressive past- is often 
sorely lacking. Finally, three, nevertheless, we do correct deviant uses because they 
"sound wrong." For example, "I was studying since October" is a sentence that would 
be correct. Thus, it seems prima facie plausible but that speakers do, in fact, rely on 
shared corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices that establish and maintain 
constitutive rules without thereby having occurrent access to the rule-formulations 
that describe the normative practices. In other words, the yeoman’s work is not done 
by the rule-formulations but by the normative practices that establish and maintain the 
constitutive rules. I may not know why a solecism is problematic, but I know when I 
am corrected for uttering it and I tacitly see a pattern of similarities that allows me to 
avoid the mistake in the future.  
Further, this reliance on practices without a grasp of occurrent rule-
formulations seems to simply be part of our form of life. We do follow norms, 
conventions, do correct each other’s English because it “sounds weird,” and so on. 
However, such a reply may seem philosophically unsatisfying. Indeed, the reader may 
insist that the goal of philosophy is to articulate these rules in some rigorous way, 
perhaps using variations on game theory to make norms explicit (e.g., Bicchieri 
(2006), 1-54), to offer some theory of meaning to account for semantic content (e.g., 
Dummett (1975)), or, at the very least, try to dig deeper and not simply accept that 
this is just part of how we do the human being thing.  This demand is exegetically 
unsound in terms of Wittgenstein, unhelpful from the perspective of the actual 
normative practices that establish and maintain the constitutive rule, and 
philosophically far more problematic than it appears. Let us examine each repost.  
Exegetically, demanding a more robust "philosophical explanation" is 
anathema to Wittgenstein's avowed descriptive methodology (e.g., PI § 109). Indeed, 
if these corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices are simply part of the 
anthropological warp and weft of our ways with languages, trying to "dig below" 
them can no longer be understood as reconstructing Wittgenstein's position. It seems 
like this is exactly where "my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘this is 
simply what I do'" (PI § 217). Further, Wittgenstein would insist that such an 
attempted explanation deeply misunderstands how deeply interconnected human 
forms of life, normative practices, and language, are. Thus, Wittgenstein tells us that 
"[g]iving orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat are as much a part of 
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our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing" (PI § 25). In other words, 
what "children learn is not how to translate their thoughts and wishes into words, but 
how to request, demand, beg… in short, they learn to be human- not homo sapiens but 
homo loquens" (Hacker (2009 c), 4). It is striking, further, that this harmonizes with 
much contemporary cultural anthropology that insists that part of what is ‘natural' for 
human beings is precisely their sensitivity to normative practices (e.g., Greetz (1973), 
33-54, for discussion). Thus, exegetically, Wittgenstein would surely maintain that 
these normative practices, and their anthropological instances, are the “ground floor.” 
  Such an insistence on philosophical explanation of implicit rules, normative 
practices, and so on, is also unhelpful from the perspective of the normative practices 
themselves. My mother's correction- e.g., "'Sally and me' is ignorant!"- both corrected 
my solecism as well as ensuring that I did not make the same mistake in the future. In 
contrast had my mother said "'Sally and me' is the subject of the sentence. Thus, the 
case should be nominative. In English, the first person pronoun's nominative form is 
‘I' and not ‘me,' which is dative or accusative," would have left my six year old self 
completely in the dark.51 The point is that the corrective and linguistic-explanatory 
practices are not so much theoretical as practical. They aim not to account for why 
"Sally and me" is problematic but, rather, to ensure that it is not uttered. Furthermore, 
it is clear that these practical practices of correction and linguistic-explanation do 
their jobs quite well. And, if it is not broke, why fix it? 
Third, the insistence that philosophy should aim to offer a theory aimed to 
account for implicit rules, normative practices, etc., misunderstands our relationship 
with language itself. To wit, it rests on the assumption that learning and teaching 
language is a theoretical endeavor and that we acquire a language in the same way we 
acquire facts about Napoleon III, say. Pace this, however, "a language like English is 
not a theory…. Unlike a theory, a language does not predict anything, nor does it fit 
or face reality, and it cannot be true or false. Rather, it is statements in a language 
which do so" (Glock (1996 b), 158). In other words, trying to understand a language 
as some odd set of hypothesis misframes the nature of language itself. Yelling "damn 
it!" after being burned does not have much to do with a theory of pain or psychology. 
However, it has a great deal to do with English.  
                                                 
51 Further, such a grammatical correction is rather tame if compared to a correction that, e.g., tries to go 
back to the generative grammar that supposedly underlies this. 
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Notice that this third point further reinforces the exegetical discussion voiced 
in the first point. Indeed, Wittgenstein is quite keen to insist that learning and teaching 
a language is nothing like, e.g., hunting for correlations between utterances and things 
(e.g., PI § 32). Further, this seemingly simple note radically alters both what teaching 
and learning a language means. For teaching, "unless the natives [or our elders] 
shared our desire to communicate with foreigners [or teach kids] as well as the 
language-games of querying and correction, the mutual instruction between explorers 
and natives would not take place" (Glock (1996 b), 166). Indeed, a point anthropology 
often makes and that Wittgenstein would readily accept, is that to teach a language is 
to initiate someone into a culture as much as anything else. For learning, as noted 
above, by being trained in our first language we acquire a form of life that is "is not 
uniformly biological" (Baker & Hacker (2014), 220). Indeed, "a form of life is 
primarily a culture or social formation" (Glock (2000), 70). In other words, by 
learning a language, we do not so much gain a transparent medium that lets us 
transmit the intentions (or whatever) that already exist in the mind (or wherever). 
Instead, we learn what it means to want, intend, dream, etc. In other words, by 
learning a language, we become enculturated humans rather than homo sapiens. 
Thus, our ability to follow implicit rules merely is part of our forms of life. 
We can all "latch onto" the relevant patterns that correction and linguistic-explanation 
aim to inculcate into us normatively, we all can learn-how to follow, and so on (e.g., 
Glock (1996 c), 112 & 124-29; Baker & Hacker (2009), 29-34). Thus, the insistence 
that we offer a philosophy theory to account for how implicit rules work, why we 
have them, and so on, are quixotic questions that Wittgenstein would avoid. Indeed, 
when ‘we look and see' (cf. PI § 66), we see that we do correct and linguistic-explain 
our words to each other without occurrent access to rule formulations.  
Thus, a constitutive rule for language is inherently conventional- i.e., shared 
by members of a language community and arbitrary. In turn, these conventions are 
established and maintained not by explicit stipulation but by our human practice of 
living together with each other in language using communities (e.g., Aristotle, Politics 
1253a1-18). However, a reader may still be unsatisfied with this account. 
Specifically, how do correction and linguistic-explanation relate to the person we are 
sanctioning? Can we account for their effects in non-semantic terms? It is to these that 
we turn.  
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4.0.d Understanding, Circles, and the Immanence of Meaning: 
 
  Recall that the last two sub-sections discussed the normative features that the 
grammatical account claims Wittgenstein aimed to describe. To wit, the features that 
a philosophical statement describes are the often-implicit constitutive rules, 
underwritten by our normative practices of correction and linguistic-explanation, 
which determine the correct use of expressions. Further, we noted that these 
normative practices engender the internal relations that obtain between, e.g., the 
meaning of an expression and a linguistic-explanation of meaning or a correction of 
the expression if used incorrectly. That being said, we have held in abeyance what 
these corrections and linguistic-explanations do to the subject being corrected. 
Pursuant to this, one may hope that an account of this can help us leave the semantic 
sphere and account for our ability to use and understand language with something 
else. Let us take each in turn. 
 To begin, to account for how linguistic-explanation and correction relate to the 
person being corrected or linguistic-explained to, the grammatical account introduces 
a new element to the semantic sphere- "understanding." However, we may worry that 
such a focus on understanding "is guilty of not separating the psychological from the 
logical" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 39). In effect, understanding may appear, prima 
facie, too intertwined with subjective or phenomenological features to do any real 
work. To obviate this worry, we must bear in mind that "[w]hether someone 
understands an expression depends on whether he can use and explain it correctly, 
and whether he can respond appropriately to its use by others" (Glock (2013), 580). In 
other words, a linguistic-explanation or correction has engendered understanding of 
the meaning of expression e iff the linguistic-explanation or correction enables an 
individual to respond appropriately when the e is used, conform her use of e to the 
constitutive rules that determine the correct use of e, provides her with at least the 
potential to justify her rule-following behavior, and gives her the ability to linguistic-
explain e to others. Thus, understanding is not a subjective or phenomenological 
moment but "is akin to an ability, not a [psychological] state from which performance 
flows. The criteria for linguistic understand are of three general kinds: correct use, 
giving a correct explanation of meaning in context, and responding appropriately to 
the use of an expression" (Hacker (2001), 24). Thus, a linguistic-explanation or 
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correction affect the agent by engendering understanding, i.e., teaching her how to use 
e properly, linguistic-explain or correct e for others, and so on.  
Notice that such an account of understanding tracks our ascription practices 
for "understanding" remarkably well. For example, imagine someone who has 
memorized a Russian-English dictionary, has perfect theoretical knowledge of 
Russian grammar, and so on. Further, imagine we give her a drug so that her 
subjective experience when hearing Russian is identical to a native Russian speaker's 
experience in every way. Nevertheless, if she cannot respond correctly to a simple 
question like "как дела?," cannot correct someone who misuses this expression, and 
cannot linguistic-explain to others when and how to use "как дела" in Russian, we 
would not ascribe to her an understanding of Russian. Thus, it is prima facie plausible 
that understanding Russian is different from knowing-that Russian grammatical rules, 
the Russian lexicon, and so on.52  
However, the reader, again, may claim that this is not philosophically 
satisfying. Notice that this account of “understanding” still presupposes normativity, 
our ability to latch onto patterns of proper use, and so on. Indeed, though we have 
expanded the semantic sphere, we have not left it by, e.g., accounting for semantics 
on the basis of something else. Here the grammatical account makes its second, and 
more radical, move. To get this move into view, we must keep in mind that "some 
rules, like the rules of cooking, can be justified as correct by reference to the goals 
pursued in the activity… [but] the rules of grammar are not like that" (Hacker (1996), 
234). This is partly a ramification of the arbitrariness of grammar discussed in 4.0a, 
the constitutive status of the rules determining expressions discussed in 4.0b, and the 
reliance on normative practices that are simply part of our forms of life discussed in 
4.0c. In effect, the rules of grammar answer to nothing, determine, rather than being 
determined by, meaning, and are underwritten by our normative practices of 
correction and linguistic-explanation.  
In turn, this claim has radical consequences. Most critically is the realization 
that "language and human practice more generally can only be understood from a 
normative perspective alien to the natural sciences… even though it [philosophical 
investigation of these features] does not deal with supernatural entities" (Glock 
(2013), 588). In other words, we can neither account for language in non-semantic 
                                                 
52 This example is admittedly similar to Searle (1980) and his famed "Chinese room." 
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terms nor reduce it to hypothetical imperatives. Indeed, the assumption that language 
is for something (e.g., communicating intentions, making assertions, etc.) is itself 
wrong. Language simply is. Thus, "Wittgenstein observed that ‘meaning' is a 
primitive concept" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 154). In turn, such an account simply 
rejects the attempt to account for semantics in something “lower” or “other than” 
semantics. Indeed, this desire for a “lower ground” tacitly assumed that there is some 
lower x- e.g., the intentionality of the mind, reference and truth, semiotics- that can 
account for the semantic aspects of language. However, this is just wrong. We can 
illuminate the semantic sphere somewhat by moving in it but cannot leave it without 
abandoning the very features we seek to examine. 
In other words, there is no lower than understanding as conformity to correct 
use and linguistic-explanation or correction as engendering correct use. Indeed, the 
grammatical account insists that "a cardinal feature of Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
is that the immanence of meaning is stressed at every turn… The meaning of a word 
is not an object of any kind… [Rather] the meaning of an expression is given by an 
explanation of a meaning. An explanation of meaning is the rule for the use of an 
expression… to grasp the meaning of a word, to understand what an expression 
means… is to be able to use the word correctly" (Hacker (1996), 236-37). Further, 
such a perspective insists that to understand language displays itself when "we have to 
react to it as subject to a distinction between correct and incorrect, meaningful and 
nonsensical" (Glock (1996 a) 222). Thus, constitutive rules determine the proper use 
of an expression. The proper use of an expression engenders its meaning. Correction 
and linguistic-explanation foster an understanding of an expression's meaning. To 
understand an expression's meaning is to conform to the constitutive rules that 
determine proper use. There is no outside of this.  
However, this raises another issue. If meaning is profoundly immanent and 
enmeshed so deeply in our normative social practices, how can he describe it without 
succumbing to an untenable holism? It is to this worry that we now turn. 
 
4.0.e Perspicuous Representation as Focused Description: 
 
In the previous section, we discussed understanding and an immanent 
perspective on meaning. However, now we seemed faced with an intractable holism. 
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Indeed, if understanding an expression requires knowing the constitutive rules that 
make up the grammar, and knowing this grammar falls back on grasping the 
anthropological warp and weft of all our normative practices, then it seems as though 
"to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" (PI § 19). To mitigate this holism, 
the grammatical account notes that Wittgenstein has a particular conception of 
description- a perspicuous representation. A perspicuous representation, in turn, is a 
way of arranging philosophical statements that is guided by four key features. In turn, 
as we shall see, these features allow Wittgenstein to avoid untenable holism. 
First, as noted in section 4.0c, we must keep in mind that "it is the normative 
practices of the speech community that fix and hold firm the internal relations 
between a word and its application, between explanation of meaning and what counts, 
in the practice of using the word, as correct use" (Hacker (2009 c), 5). Indeed, internal 
relations are reflected in "[n]ecessary propositions… themselves rules, norms of 
representation which partly determine the meanings of words. They function as or are 
linked to ‘norms of description' or of ‘representation' which lay down what counts as 
intelligible description of reality, establish internal relations between concepts" 
(Glock (2001), 17- emphasis mine). Thus, the internal grammatical relations depend 
on rules and rules fall back on the actual normative practices- chief among these 
normative practices are linguistic-explanation and correction. This may seem to 
reiterate the intractable holism. However, it is critical to note that this characterization 
already gives us some clue of where to search for the normative practices that interest 
us- i.e., those that engender meaning. To wit, we should look at the corrective and 
linguistic-explanatory practices of some community. Furthermore, this clue 
exculpates Wittgenstein from the charge that his musings on learning and teaching are 
either armchair psychology or genetic fallacies. They are heuristic devices that bring 
precisely these normative practices into view. Thus, the grammatical account can 
focus on a particular subset of our normative practices, i.e., those of linguistic-
explanation and correction. Granting this, we can focus even more specifically on 
learning and teaching contexts where these practices are clearly in play. 
Second, we must also bear in mind that "the selection of the salient rules of 
grammar is guided by conceptual problems that arise in the domain in question" 
(Baker & Hacker (2009), 332). This further focuses our inquiry. Indeed, as 
Wittgenstein says, "[a]nd this description gets its light- that is to say its purpose- from 
the philosophical problems" (PI § 109). Thus, part of what guides a perspicuous 
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representation is the conceptual muddle that someone falls into. Though "I know I am 
in pain" may have an emphatic use, this use is unimportant provided that the person 
who says it is trying to argue for an apodicticity concerning her mental states. 
  Third, it is also critical to bear in mind that a perspicuous representation is "an 
arrangement of the data we are studying in such a manner that it will enable us to 
survey it, to see analogies and connecting links" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 319). 
Indeed, "[w]hat has to be put together in the right way is a judicious selection of 
Frazer's data [say]" (Hacker (2001), 88). In other words, there are no new ‘facts' that 
we need to acquire. Instead, what we "should do [in philosophy] is present judiciously 
chosen examples as centres of variation around which to group the multifaceted use of 
the problematic concept. The examples selected as centres of variation could be said 
to be poles of description, not the ground floor of a theory" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 
319-20). Thus, giving a perspicuous representation is arranging the philosophical 
statements (i.e. statements that describe constitutive rules) in such a way that their 
interconnections become clear.  
Notice that this addresses the untenable holism. Wittgenstein's perspicuous 
representations do not aim to describe the whole hurly-burly of our normative 
practices, their interdependencies, and their interpolations with languages and forms 
of life. Instead, Wittgenstein focuses on corrective and linguistic-explanatory 
practices. Further, by relying on particular philosophical problems, Wittgenstein has 
clear criteria as to which of these corrective and linguistic-explanatory practices are 
relevant and which are not. Moreover, the goal of arranging these relevant 
philosophical statements so that their connections are clearly seen narrows even more 
which constitutive rules Wittgenstein describes.  
However, we seem confronted with another worry. Specifically, this account 
may imply that the sole criterion for the correctness of a perspicuous representation is 
its ability to clarify particular philosophical problems. In turn, a reader may think that 
this introduces a form of problem-relativity. In effect, the only criterion to know if an 
assemblage of philosophical statements is correct is that it dissolves the particular 
philosophical problem. However, this seems to mean that "grammatical reminders 
could do no more than point out new aspects of the use of words employed in 
philosophical theories, without ever challenging such philosophical usages" (Glock 
(1991), 83). In other words, all a perspicuous representation can do is present certain 
arrangements of philosophical statements that highlight certain connections. 
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However, these connections may simply be a product of "an organizational schema… 
[One] can represent [Frazer's data, say]… by means of development hypothesis… 
or… by means of a schema of religious ceremony" (Hacker (2001), 89). Thus, a 
perspicuous representation is one way of arranging grammatical data so that one set of 
possible connections emerges. There may be other arrangements that display 
alternative connections. In turn, this perspective may deteriorate into "'grammatical 
aspect seeing' for the sake of intellectual acquiescence. This… suggestion has the 
unpalatable consequence of obliterating the difference between persuasive rhetoric 
and sound dialectical argument" (Glock (1991), 83-84). Since the sole correctness 
criterion is that a perspicuous representation dissolves a problem, any unusual 
arrangement of philosophical statements that achieves this would do the trick. 
However, the grammatical account insists that this objection rests on a 
misunderstanding. To rectify it, we turn to the last criterion for a perspicuous 
representation.  
Fourth, a perspicuous representation must give "correct descriptions… [A 
perspicuous representation] offers us the correct way of viewing things, which is both 
faithful to the grammar of the problematic expression under consideration and makes 
evident the philosophical nonsense in which we were enmeshed…. His 
[Wittgenstein's] definitive solutions are not given by showing us that grammar might 
be otherwise, but rather by reminding us that it is thus-and-so and showing us the 
consequences" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 323). In other words, a perspicuous 
representation is not just a random arrangement of philosophical statements that may 
happen to dissolve a problem. It must be correct. In turn, this correctness can be seen 
in two interdependent features. 
  One, the philosophical statements that make up a perspicuous representation 
can be neither fabrications of the philosopher nor arbitrarily selected rule-
formulations of our normative practices. Instead, they must "express the rules for the 
use of words" (Glock (2009), 656). In other words, philosophical statements are not 
simply arbitrary inventions of the Wittgenstein inspired philosopher. Rather, "our 
system of thinking and speaking may be articulated through propositions but is 
ultimately constituted by a set of practices" (ibid 659). Thus, the philosophical 
statements that make up a perspicuous representation are internally linked to the 
grammar they describe and are correct or incorrect, relative to normative practices.  
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  Two, the assemblage of grammatical rules that make up a perspicuous 
representation are not arranged in an arbitrary fashion that exploits the idiosyncratic 
foibles of a conversation partner. Instead, "a perspicuous representation brings about 
the understanding that consists in seeing the connections" (Hacker (2001), 89). In 
other words, though a particular philosophical problem can help guide a perspicuous 
representation, its goal is showing us the interconnected and interdependent network 
of grammar. Indeed, a proper perspicuous representation is a form of connective 
"analysis… that is, a description of the conceptual connections and exclusions in the 
web of words… A sentence is completely analyzed, in the new sense, when its 
grammar is laid out completely clearly" (ibid, 23). In sum, "the location of a word in 
grammar is its meaning- its position in grammatical space" (Hacker (2012), 6). 
Thus, the grammatical account avoids the untenable holism that the 
imminence of meaning carries with it by proffering a very particular kind of 
description for Wittgenstein- a perspicuous representation. First, perspicuous 
representation focuses on a community's corrective and linguistic-explanatory 
practices. Second, a perspicuous representation is focused by a particular 
philosophical problem to restrict the range of philosophical statements. Third, a 
perspicuous representation is focused towards arranging the philosophical statements 
in such a way that they address and dissolve the problem. Fourth, the perspicuous 
representation must bring the conversation partner to see the real connections that 
already obtain with grammar. In turn, this allows us fully articulate Wittgenstein's 
cartography. 
 
4.0.f Metaphilosophy, Mapping Grammar, and Rationality: 
 
In the last sub-section, we discussed the nature of a perspicuous representation 
in Wittgenstein. We noted that a perspicuous representation must do the following: 
focus on particular normative practices (those that have to do with correction and 
linguistic-explanation); be focused by a particular philosophical muddle; be focused 
towards dissolving this muddle by arranging philosophical statements, so certain 
internal connections become clear; correctly display the normative interconnections 
that obtain within grammar. In turn, this conception of perspicuous representation 
allows the grammatical account to characterize Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy "both 
 165  
positively and negatively. The positive aims are subservient to the negative. 
Positively, philosophy aims to attain an overview of a conceptual field… so that the 
manifold relationships become perspicuous. Negatively, philosophy aims to 
disentangle conceptual confusions…. It is natural… that Wittgenstein should have 
invoked the further metaphor of logical or conceptual geography [to describe the 
positive aspect]" (Baker & Hacker (2009) [Philosophy], 284). So it is here that the 
grammatical account's positive metaphilosophical ascription to Wittgenstein comes 
into view. First, I spell out what this cartographic project aims to achieve. Second, I 
discuss the assumptions that such a project makes about the grammar it is mapping. 
Third, I note how the methodology that the grammatical account ascribes to 
Wittgenstein is perfectly rational and does, in fact, dissolve philosophical problems. 
To begin, it is clear that perspicuous representations presupposes that our 
linguistic-conceptual network already has a order- i.e., a set of interdependent nodes 
and connections that can be properly displayed by a perspicuous representation.  
Granting this already given order, Wittgenstein can discuss these interdependences 
apart from any particular philosophical issue. Indeed, a "‘correct logical point of view' 
is achieved… through a quasi-geographical ‘overview' [i.e., a perspicacious 
representation]… Insofar as analysis is legitimate, it… amounts to a description of 
grammar… a version of ‘connective analysis'" (Glock (2017), 244). Moreover, this 
enables a "'a new method'… Skillful philosophers are local cartographers, not meta-
physicists or meta-physical cosmologists. They have a journeyman's skill to map the 
terrain where people lose their way" (Hacker (2009 c), 2-3). Thus, granting that the 
internal connections within grammatical space are already given, we can map them 
out independently of particular philosophical problems. Indeed, the grammatical 
account maintains that mapping out these already given normative interconnections 
between various constitutive rules, is exactly what “conceptual cartography” is for 
later Wittgenstein (e.g. Hacker (2001), 66-73). As it were, Wittgenstein maps out the 
normative interrelations within grammar. 
In turn, this positive project of mapping out connections that already given 
within grammar brings into play two assumptions about the nature of grammar itself. 
First, it assumes that the relationships that exist between individual constitutive rules 
that govern the use of individual expressions relate to each other in a coherent, 
consistent, rational, and systematic way. Thus, grammar is made up of "a system of 
constitutive rules" (Glock (2004), 233). Indeed, "connective analysis… is the 
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description of the rule-governed use of expressions, and of their connections with 
other expressions by way of implication, presupposition and exclusion" (Glock 
(2017), 93). In other words, much as several schools of cultural anthropology have 
maintained that a ‘culture' is the coherent whole in which individual practices and 
traditions are situated, so too does the grammatical account assume that ‘grammar' is 
a coherent and interconnected network that is made up of the interdependencies of 
various individual constitutive rules.53  
  Second, this project of mapping assumes that grammar has a fair amount of 
internal stability and diachronic consistency. However, it is critical to note that 
Hacker's and Glock's account on this point diverges somewhat. For example, Glock 
(1996 a) is sensitive to the fact that the boundary between the empirical and 
grammatical can and does shift for all sorts of reasons- cultural developments, 
scientific discoveries, contestation, and so on. Indeed, "[t]he status of sentences does 
not just change diachronically. Even when the use of a term is relatively stable, a type 
sentence can be used either normatively [or empirically] by one and the same person 
in different contexts" (ibid 213). In contrast, Hacker often discusses grammatical 
connections, and the philosophical statements that make up a perspicuous 
representation that display such connections, in rather invariant terms. Thus, "a 
conceptual field may be partially illuminated for a generation or two, only to be cast 
into shadow again… [N]ovel scientific theories are introduced which cast long 
shadows over conceptual articulations previously clarified" (Hacker (2009 a), 27). 
Indeed, these shadows may require "old ground to be traversed afresh from a new 
angle (e.g., the need to clarify the concept of mind in response to the temptation to 
conceive of the human mind on a computational model)" (Hacker (2006), 27). 
However, shadows do not change landscapes and, by analogy, science does not 
change the grammar. That being said, it seems that this divergence is best understood 
in terms of focus and emphasis. Whereas especially later Glock has become 
increasingly interested in ‘points of contestation' and ‘impure conceptual analysis’ 
wherein we attempt to articulate the dynamic interplay between scientific 
investigation and conceptual cartography, Hacker seems to be more interested in a 
Strawsonian project of mapping out the most basic categories and their 
interdependencies. Both are of one mind in thinking that there are "cases which are 
                                                 
53 Critically, though, in a point we shall return to in section 4.2, Glock also notes that "the constitutive 
rules of natural languages do not form a precise and stable system" (Glock (2009), 162). 
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conceptually linked with notions like ‘reasoning,' ‘thinking,' ‘inferring,' et cetra, such 
as modus ponens. Of course it is conceivable that these norms of representation might 
be abandoned. But they are indispensable in the sense that the resulting behavior 
would not be what we would call ‘reasoning.'" (Glock (1996 a), 217). In other words, 
though certain philosophical statements do fluctuate and are contestable, there is some 
subset of philosophical statements whose revision is hard to fathom. It is on these 
stable grammatical connections that I focus. 
In turn, these two requirements on grammar allow the grammatical account to 
separate "Wittgenstein's personal ideology, on the one hand, and his philosophical 
methodology, on the other" (Glock (2001), 213). Wittgenstein's ideology is taken to 
be an avowed irrationalism- i.e. "his cultural hostility towards aspects of science and 
the Enlightenment… [and his] anti-intellectual metaphysical doctrine [e.g., the TLP 
and mysticism], and in particular a pessimistic anthropology" (ibid 197). However, 
the grammatical account insists that Wittgenstein's methodology is "a critical 
activity… [that] can be entirely rational… criticizing philosophical positions in this 
way is immanent, that is, does not rely on dogmatic assumptions of one's own" (ibid 
214). In turn, this depends on the thought that "[p]hilosophical theses would have to 
be indisputable because they remind us of the linguistic rules with which we are 
already familiar outside philosophical reflection…. [Grammatical reminders] show 
that metaphysical philosophers use words according to conflicting rules… 
philosophical views can be criticized because their tacit assumptions lead to 
inconsistency" (ibid 215). In other words, this sort of imminent criticism rests on the 
assumption that grammatical connections are presupposed by the philosopher’s 
seeming claims. In turn, this allows a Wittgenstein inspired philosopher to remind the 
philosopher of the connections that she both tacitly presupposes and contravenes. For 
example, a metaphysician is speaking English, say, and given that she is speaking 
English, her attempt to say something like "the chair has redness" instead of "the chair 
is red" quickly runs into a deep problem. To wit, we are unsure how to understand 
"has" or "redness" in this expression. 
From here, this is what allows Wittgenstein to use to reveal "the illegitimacy 
of the positions it [this method] attacks…. The idea is to demonstrate a certain kind of 
inconsistency in the philosophical positions or questions attacked, an inconsistency 
concerning the use of words [by forcing] a trilemma: either their new, technical uses 
of terms remain unexplained (unintelligibility), or it is revealed that they cross 
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language-games [e.g., the coherent and stable connections between constitutive rules] 
by using incompatible rules (inconsistency), or their consistent employment of new 
concepts simply pass by the original philosophical problem, which is based on our 
ordinary use [e.g., arises from a muddled understanding of the connections]" Glock 
(1991), 84).   
Notice too that this philosophical methodology does have a positive aspect as 
well. To wit, in addition to countering philosophical muddles, we are also "clarifying 
our existing conceptual framework" (Glock (2010), 89). Indeed, these two features 
move in lockstep. To dissolve a philosophical problem means to offer a perspicuous 
representation that makes clear the constitutive rules and their inherent 
interconnections. Furthermore, notice that this means Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy 
and his philosophical methodology are, in fact, internally connected to philosophical 
problems. In effect, a philosophical problem only emerges when we do not know our 
way about- i.e., do not have rule-formulations that make clear the constitutive rules 
and their interconnections. By adducing such rule-formulations, Wittgenstein 
addresses the problem by showing it rests on misunderstandings as well as clarifying 
the conceptual schema we have. In sum, “[l]anguage has the same traps ready for 
everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false paths. And thus we see one 
person after another walking down the same paths and we already know where he will 
make a turn [etc.]… Therefore, wherever false paths branch off I ought to put up signs 
to help in getting past the dangerous spots” (BT § 90 p. 312). 
 
4.0.g Summary: 
 
Thus, we have a clear view of what the metaphilosophy the grammatical 
account ascribes to Wittgenstein as well as some of the methodological consequences, 
entailed philosophical positions, etc. To sum up, for the grammatical account, 
philosophy is non-cognitive because there are no facts, objects, and so on, that 
philosophical statements aim to describe. Instead, philosophy describes the 
constitutive rules that determine the correct use for expressions. In turn, these 
constitutive rules are established and maintained by shared normative practices- 
notably correction and linguist-explanation. In turn, such correction and linguistic-
explanations engender understanding which is the ability to conform one’s use of an 
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expression to the correct use, the linguistic-explain the use to others, and to correct 
deviant uses. Granting this, Wittgenstein aims to perspicuously represent specific 
normative practices, rules, and meanings, in such a way that philosophical problems 
dissolve and we are freed from confusion caused by disorder. Finally, the positive 
metaphilosophical goal of mapping out these connections is just part of this overall 
ascription. Thus, by describing the already given order of our concepts, Wittgenstein 
both helps us learn our way about our linguistic conceptual schemas and addresses 
and redresses problems by showing them to rest on semantic confusion- i.e., that a 
philosopher both relies on and contravenes the proper order of our concepts.  
  
4.1 Normative Descriptions, Constitutive Rules, and Forms of Life: 
 
This section criticizes aspects of the grammatical account. Specifically, it 
focuses on the assumption that the grammatical account makes that rule normativity 
of meaning is the proper way to cash out the normativity of language (see 4.0b). In 
section 4.1a, I discuss the problematic relationship between constitutive rules and 
philosophical statements that are meant to reflect them. In section 4.1b, I argue that 
constitutive rules that determine the use of expressions and the semantics of 
expressions come apart. In section 4.1c, I argue for a bare normativity of meaning to 
avoid these problems. 
 
4.1.a Philosophical Statements and Constitutive Rules: 
 
This section discusses three possible ways that the grammatical account 
proffers to make sense of how a philosophical statement and the constitutive rules that 
determine the use of an expression relate- a descriptive, an expressive, and a ‘fused' 
gloss. I argue that the descriptive gloss faces what I term a ‘force problem.' I argue 
that the expressive gloss faces what I term the ‘cartographic problem.' I argue that the 
fused gloss begs the question by assuming aspects from both.  
To begin, let us set the stage. Recall, as discussed in section 4.1b, that the rule 
normativity of meaning claims that an expression e has a meaning only if there are 
(constitutive) rules that determine the use of e. Granting this, the grammatical account 
then assumed that the function of philosophical-as-grammatical statements is to 
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reflect these constitutive rules that determine the use of an expression and so engender 
its meaning. However, the grammatical account offers three distinct glosses on how 
this reflection works. (a) One gloss, the descriptive gloss, claims that philosophical 
statements are "descriptions of the normative connections within the web of concepts 
that constitute our form of representation" (Hacker (2009 a), 23). In other words, a 
philosophical statement portrays the normative connections in much the same way as 
a description of a room portrays a room being thus-and-so.  (b) The second gloss, the 
expressive gloss, claims that philosophical statements are "'normatively true' in that 
they express—rather than describe… conventions that are actually in place in a 
particular linguistic community" (Glock (2008), 74). In other words, a philosophical 
statement is a rule-formulation that functions in conversation as a correction or 
linguistic explanation. (c) A third gloss, the fused gloss, claims that "grammar… 
states rather than describes, the rules of language" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 147). As 
we shall see, the fused gloss attempts to put together features of both glosses. Let us 
examine each in turn.  
(a) Let us consider the descriptive gloss on grammatical rules. To begin, the 
descriptive gloss assumes that a philosophical statement describes a constitutive rule 
that determines correct use of an expression. With this in view, first, I examine how 
the descriptive gloss would work for games whose constitutive rules clearly do 
determine the practice. Then, I consider how the gloss relates to language. 
To begin, imagine an anthropologist from a culture that has no similar practice 
to "sport," who goes to live in the US. She finds her ‘tribe’ is interested in a practice 
called ‘basketball.' Further, she finds that this practice engenders overt tribalism, has 
religious connotations, etc. In short, the ‘basketball' practice is anthropologically 
interesting and she begins careful observation. 
Eventually, she distills from the complex and heterogeneous ‘basketball' 
practice, a set of rules she thinks aptly describes this practice. For example, she 
realizes that, after being a hit by another priest in the ritual space, a priest is allowed 
to throw the sphere at the ring.54 This is, thus, a rule. By contrast, the priest may kiss 
the sphere before he throws it, but he need not. So this is not a rule. Imagine further 
                                                 
54 Miner (1956) in a semi-satirical paper (about the habits of the "Nacerima" tribe- flip the word to get 
the joke), notes how quickly anthropologists use "religion" as a catch-all for any practice their culture 
lacks. I follow this admittedly problematic anthropological practice as I find it decontextualizes 
helpfully.   
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that our anthropologist's list of descriptive anthropological rules for basketball 
(hereby descriptive rules) is identical with the constitutive NBA rules that actually 
determine the play (hereby NBA rules). However, there are two critical differences 
between the descriptive and NBA rules. 
First, the descriptive rules cannot in principle cover the possible contingencies 
that may occur in the ritual space. For example, the anthropologist may never observe 
a particular sort of foul. When such a foul happens, she begins careful observation 
and notes the behavior of the participants. In other words, her rules can never be as 
complete as the NBA rules, and it is always possible that she will discover new rules 
in odd situations that occur on during the practice. 
Second, more critically, the described rules do not have the normative force of 
the NBA rules because the direction of fit is different. For example, if an event on the 
court occurs that contradicts one of her described rules, she revises her rule 
accordingly. The direction of fit of her rules is word-to-world. By contrast, the 
direction of fit of the NBA rules is world-to-word. The players on the court conform 
their behavior to these rules. It is precisely in this sense that the NBA rules determine 
the game of basketball. Indeed, if "an agent [or player] follows a rule in phi-ing, the 
rule must be part of her reason for phi-ing… Rule following is, therefore, a type of 
intentional… behavior" (Glock (2015), 843). However, the rules that the player 
intentionally follows are not the descriptive rules that the anthropologist distilled from 
the practice. Notice three further things follow from this. One, this direction of fit 
problem has little to do with the rules themselves as both sets of rules can be identical. 
Instead, it is the role the rules play that determines their status as constitutively 
determining the practice or describing it. Two, relatedly, the anthropologist could not 
use the descriptive rules to call ‘foul' or dispute a lousy call. There are several reasons 
for this inability. For our purposes, the key is that the ‘tribe’ the anthropologist is 
studying can rightly reject her corrections, as her rules simply do not play the 
constitutive role for the practice. Three, the descriptive rules cannot function as 
action-guiding for the player of basketball precisely because the descriptive rules 
depend on the actions of the basketball players. Thus, any descriptive rules, regardless 
of how correct or accurate they are, are decoupled from the corrective and 
explanatory practices that the constitutive rules enable. Let us call this decoupling, the 
force problem. 
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The grammatical account has several possible responses to the force problem. 
One is to insist that the internal relations that constitute a basketball game are "de 
dicto, i.e., they depend on how we describe things… The internal relation between a 
rule and its application is lost if the relata are described… in preseamntical, non-
normative terms" (Glock (1996 b), 162). In other words, the anthropologist's 
description goes wrong by trying to cash out the normative rules of basketball in 
terms of, e.g., brute physical movements. Pace this, notice that our anthropologist is 
not trying to describe her tribe in pre-semantic or non-normative terms. Indeed, she 
relies on the concept of "rules" and attempts to explicitly describe the basketball 
practice in terms of the rules that determine the play. However, again, it is precisely 
because the anthropologist's rules describe the practice that she cannot correct it, call 
foul, etc. As it were, to describe a practice is not the same as regulating it.55  
A second retort is to insist that the descriptive rules are "not statements to the 
effect that certain norms exist" (Hacker (2009 c), 16). In other words, "Wittgenstein 
insisted that grammatical propositions must be distinguished from empirical 
statements to the effect that a community follows certain linguistic rules, e.g., ‘all 
Englishmen use these signs in this way.' For they are used normatively, to explain, 
justify and criticize uses of words" (Glock (2009), 169). Thus, the above account of 
basketball has confused what von Wright calls a norm-proposition, i.e., an empirical 
statement concerning what people in a community do, with a rule-formulation that has 
the proper relationship with the constitutive rules. However, this objection runs 
together two distinct questions. Specifically, there is: the, broadly speaking, 
descriptive question concerning what sorts of descriptions allow one to discuss rules 
and their roles in human practices; the, broadly speaking, epistemic question 
concerning both access to rules and correction. The anthropologist can grant that the 
descriptive rules she employs to describe the practice have nothing to do, e.g., 
statistical regularities concerning what people actually do. Indeed, emic descriptions, 
i.e., the sort of ‘insider descriptions’ that participatory observation and fieldwork 
enable in anthropology, attempt to articulate the rules that govern practices, rather 
than mere regularities of the behavior of the subjects.56 Further, much pre-post-
modern anthropology assumes that rituals are constituted by rules, that these rules 
                                                 
55 My thanks go to Glock for this formulation.  
56 There is great debate about what ethnography is and how it should function (e.g., Clifford and 
Marcus (1986)). Suffice it to say, emic descriptions are not similar to statistics or surveys 
 173  
have a normative force that does not boil down to empirical claims concerning what 
people actually do, and that ‘seeing' these rules relies on particular sorts of 
descriptions. However, what is at issue is the question of how the anthropologist can 
access these constitutive rules and if her descriptive rules can enable correction and 
explanation. The access problem harkens back to our first point. Regardless of how 
complete descriptive rules are, new occasions may always arise. Furthermore, 
determining what rules actual constitute basketball is a tricky and inherently 
contestable business (e.g., PI  § 562 and § 5624). For example, the NBA has 
stipulated that players must stand for the national anthem. Is this a rule for NBA 
basketball? Indeed, Wittgenstein also notes that not all features of play are regulated 
by the constitutive rules that determine a game (e.g., PI § 68). Even granting that the 
access problem can be addressed, the force problem persists. She still cannot call 
‘foul' with her descriptive rules. And this is not because she is describing statistical 
correlations as opposed to rules but because she is describing full stop. The direction 
of fit is wrong for correction.  
With the force problem in view, let us turn to the relationship between the 
anthropologist's descriptive rules and the constitutive rules that make up a language 
she is studying. To begin, it is critical to note that there is a fundamental dis-analogy 
between language and basketball that may prevent the force problem and allow 
descriptive rules to function properly. To see this, notice that "all these 
characterizations [of human cultures and the varied practices that constitute each]… 
are dependent upon more fundamental feature- namely, that mankind is unique in 
nature in possessing a developed language" (Hacker (2001), 56-7). Indeed, to "learn 
to speak is to learn to act… What children [or anthropologists] learn is not how to 
translate their thoughts and wishes into words, but how to request, demand, beg, 
[etc.]… in short, they learn to be human [or members of a tribe]- not homo sapiens, 
but homo loquens" (Hacker (2009 c), 4). In other words, whereas with basketball, the 
anthropologist can merely observe the practice, with language, she must actively 
participate and learn it. Thus, the descriptive rules for a language "presupposes 
learning for its genesis… It articulates an understanding obtained as part of language 
acquisition and of enculturation, that is, of the immersion into a shared linguistic 
practice" (Glock (2017), 85). This point can be further reinforced by the grammatical 
account’s discussion of “understanding” noted in 4.0d, and the insistence that 
understanding a language requires that one can linguistic-explain, correct, and so on. 
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Thus, the only way for an anthropologist to describe a language is by learning it and it 
is precisely learning it that puts her in a position to correct, linguistic-explain, etc. As 
it were, language is a contact sport.  
Nevertheless, this dis-analogy does not mitigate the force problem for 
philosophical statements, or so I argue. To see this, it is critical to notice that 
philosophical statements, for the grammatical account, are meant to achieve very 
different goals than either classical grammar or the descriptive rules of a language that 
mothers rely on. To wit, a philosophical statement must allow for correction of 
specifically philosophical misuses. However, a philosophical statement must allow 
for such a correction in an intuitive way- i.e., in the same way that my mother 
corrected me with "'Sally and me' is ignorant!"- since philosophy "only states what 
everyone concedes to it" (PI § 599). I argue that these two features cannot be held 
together. To bring this into view, first, I examine the break between a philosophical 
statement and classical grammar. Then, I consider the relationship between a 
philosophical statement and a descriptive rule that my mother’s rely on. 
The break with classical grammar is a consequence of the goal of a 
philosophical statement. To wit, a philosophical statement is meant to correct a 
philosophical misuse. However, such a philosophical statement should not rely on 
some abstract account of language, e.g., a case system, as this leaves the philosopher 
who is abusing language room to maneuver. Indeed, the philosopher can simply insist 
that the philosophical statement rests on a theory of language that she denies. Thus, 
philosophical statements cannot be "codifications, codes of rules [that] impose a 
system upon the phenomena they represent… When [classical] grammarians began 
the task of tabulating rules of Latin grammar for foreigners who wish to learn the 
language [for example], they imposed order upon linguistic usage by complex 
systems of classification of declensions, conjugations, moods, etc. The rules they then 
formulated were not rules anyone had hitherto used or enunciated (no Roman mother 
had ever corrected her child's mistake by pointing out that avis belongs to the third 
declension)" (Baker & Hacker (2014), 53-4). In other words, not only must a 
philosophical statement correctly describe the constitutive rules that determine the 
proper use of an expression in language, it must do so in such a way that any 
competent speaker acknowledges the rules in play (cf. PI § 128) as this ensures that 
the philosophical statement is recognized at the outset as a trivial reminder. A Roman 
mother probably does not know that "Magna est domus puella" is wrong because the 
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feminine "puella" is, in this sentence, genitive and not nominative and so must decline 
as "puellae." Thus, philosophical statements "are instruments… something is a rule 
only dynamically, only in so far as it is used a certain way, viz., in normative 
activities" (Baker & Hacker (2014), 52). Thus, philosophical statements differ from 
classical grammar in that the latter offers taxonomies those organize a language in a 
way that is possibly unrecognizable, and possibly contestable, for a native speaker 
whereas philosophical statements should be more like a mother’s correction. 
In turn, this may seem to align philosophical statements with descriptive rules. 
Much as my mother's correction- e.g. "'Sally and me' is ignorant" rested on no 
theoretical apparatus, no cooked up grammatical system, and so on, so to a 
philosophical statement's correction also does not rest on any theoretical apparatus. 
However, there are three critical problems with this motherly account of grammar.  
First, the rather philosophically uninteresting corrective practices of mothers 
and Wittgenstein's philosophical-as-grammatical statements (e.g., "an ‘inner process' 
stands in need of an outward criteria" (PI § 580)) are clearly different. To mitigate 
this, one might attempt to distinguish "two categories of grammatical remarks. The 
first comprises truisms about the way words can be used [e.g. "John lost his body" 
(*)57]…[The other] are synoptic descriptions in which such truisms are drawn 
together and related to a particular philosophical problem" (Glock (1991), 79). The 
hope here is that these synoptic descriptions can ground PI § 580. There are three 
problems with such a reply though. One, it is unclear what this drawing together of 
truisms amounts to. How does one move from "John lost his body" (*) "Sally felt 
John's pain" (*), and so on, to a claim like PI § 580? Two, even granting that this 
worry can be addressed, it is as yet unclear how such a drawing together is different 
from that of a classical grammarian's codification of Latin. In both cases, the internal 
connections that the classical grammarian or the Wittgenstein inspired philosopher 
distills from their respective data reflect an organizational taxonomy that necessarily 
goes beyond the raw data itself. However, as Baker & Hacker are aware of, the 
problem is that this means that the practices of correction and linguistic-explanation 
that mothers do, on the one hand, and the taxonomy of internal relations that a 
philosophical statement rests on, on the other, move out of sync. In turn, this means 
that the force problem re-emerges as the philosophical statements no longer function 
                                                 
57 I use the standard linguistic practice of marking problematic sentences with ‘(*)’ 
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in the ebb and flow of corrective and linguistic explanatory practices correctly. 
Indeed, such a taxonomy runs the risk voiced above- to wit, a philosopher who is 
misusing language can simply deny that the taxonomy is apt. Three, even if these 
three worries can be addressed, one can construct Travis-esque cases where matters 
are problematic. For example, someone who says "Christ lost his body" is not 
committing a solecism but proclaiming herself to be a follower of the Docetian 
heresy. We cannot dismiss such cases since Wittgenstein took them seriously (e.g., 
PO p. 119-155, L&C p. 53-72). 
Second, following from this, "if philosophy is to be the guardian of the bounds 
of sense, it is a referee who can adjudicate only with the consent of the players, who 
acknowledge the particular rules according to which they use words" (Hacker (1996 
a), 240). In other words, the philosophical statements that describe the constitutive 
rules can acquire the function of correction and linguistic-explanation only when the 
conversation partners acknowledge them as such. However, without this consent, the 
force problem re-emerges. In turn, and critically, this belies the metaphilosophical 
assumption that describing grammar and dissolving philosophical problems move in 
lockstep. In effect, the ability to use a philosophical statement as a correction depends 
not on its describing a constitutive rule but on the statement's acknowledgment by the 
conversation partner. In a different key, notice too that the sync problem re-emerges. 
PI § 580 is not something my mother would recognize or accept. 
Third, following from the prior two, it is critical to note that the "status of 
sentences does not just change diachronically. Even when the use of a term is 
relatively stable, a type-sentence can be used either normatively [or empirically] by 
one and the same person in different contexts. And it may be indeterminate whether a 
token sentence expresses criterial [e.g., grammatical] or empirical relations" (Glock 
(1996 a), 213). In other words, the sole difference between descriptive rules that 
reflects the linguistic behavior of a community and a philosophical statement that has 
the proper force is the role the sentence plays in the corrective and linguistic 
explanatory practices of the community. In turn, this means that a correct description 
is not enough to determine if a statement is grammatical or empirical as the role 
matters as well. This shows that the descriptive account of philosophical statements 
based solely on description is not viable. 
  (b) A second gloss conceptualizes the relationship between a philosophical 
statement and the constitutive rules as expressive. In effect, a philosophical statement 
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does not so much describe a constitutive rule as express that rule in a rule-
formulation. Intuitively, much as the rule do not talk during the performance can be 
expressed in rule-formulations like "Shh!," "Please remain silent during the show," 
etc., that have the proper normative force, so to do philosophical statements express 
rules in such a way that they have their force. 
To bring the expressive gloss more into view, the grammatical account notes 
that philosophical statements are "expressions of a convention, and, moreover, one 
that is partly constitutive of (and does not follow from) the concepts expressed by the 
constituent terms of a proposition" (Hacker (2001), 342). Further, once a 
philosophical statement has this role of expressing a constitutive rule, "it is not an 
empirical proposition which is falsified… Its dependence on the contingent behavior 
of Anglophones is indirect" (Glock (2008 a), 33). Furthermore, "Wittgenstein's notion 
of a grammatical proposition concerns function rather than linguistic form. 
Accordingly, a grammatical proposition like (1) [i.e., All Bachelors are unmarried 
men] can both be about bachelors and function as a rule for the use of words" (Glock 
(2008 b), 71). Furthermore, “[t]he status of a sentence does not just change [from 
empirical to grammatical and vice versa] diachronically. Even when the use of a term 
is relatively stable, a type-sentence can be used either normatively [sic.] by one and 
the same person in different contexts” (Glock (1996 a), 213). Assuming that the 
missing clause is “or descriptively,” it is clear that the sole determinate of the 
expressive status of a philosophical statement is the role it plays in the conversation. 
Thus, the expressive gloss on grammar assumes that the sole criterion to determine if 
some contribution to a conversation is a philosophical statement is the role it plays- 
i.e. that it is used as a correction or linguistic-explanation. 
Also, recall, as discussed in section 4.0e and 4.0f, that the grammatical 
account imputes to Wittgenstein the project of conceptual cartography. This project 
assumes that grammar is coherent, consistent, systemic, and so on, as well as rather 
invariant diachronically. In other words, grammar is not context or occasion sensitive, 
is external to particular conversational exchanges in such a way that we can describe 
it independently of such exchanges, and the normative interdependencies that define a 
particular grammar already obtain due to the constitutive rules that make up this 
region of language. In turn, these assumptions make good sense of conceptual 
cartography- i.e. we map already obtaining connections in grammar that obtain 
irrespective of context, occasion, and so on. However, I argue the expressive gloss 
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faces what I term ‘the cartographic problem’ in that its focus on the corrective role of 
philosophical statements belies the aforementioned conception of grammar. To bring 
this into view, let us examine two objections. 
First, the expressive account insists that, depending on its role, the same type-
sentence can be used expressively to correct or empirically to record. In turn, the role 
of such type-sentence is context or occasion sensitive in that, in one conversational 
exchange, and when uttered by one particular person, a sentence may be expressive 
and, in another situation, it may be empirical. In other words, granting that the sole 
criterion to individuate out a philosophical statement is its role in a conversation and 
further granting that this role is context or occasion sensitive, it is clear that a 
philosophical statement depends on the context or occasion of its use. However, this 
raises two interdependent problems.  
One, this degree of context and occasion sensitivity makes the project of 
mapping rather difficult to fully understand. This is because the context or occasion 
sensitivity that determines if some type-sentence is descriptive or expressive and non-
contextual and non-occasion sensitive status of grammar are difficult to align. For 
example, assume that "[p]hilosophy is interested in the rules of grammar, rules for the 
use of expressions, only in so far as they shed light upon particular philosophical 
problems" (Baker & Hacker (2014). Granting this, and the occasion or context 
sensitivity of expressive sentences, it seems that the expressive philosophical 
statements in play can and do change, given the nature of the underlying mistake as 
well as their role. The heretic who says "Christ lost his body" and the cognitive 
scientist who, convinced that mind is just a program, says "John lost his body" 
betoken two different mistakes and demand two separate expressive philosophical 
statements. In turn, it is unclear if the two expressive philosophical statements that 
correct these solecisms rely on the same grammatical networks to function.  
Two, pursuant to one the occasion or context sensitive status of expressive 
philosophical statements threaten to undermine the conception of grammatical 
interdependencies as already obtaining in grammar (see chapter 4.0f). Indeed, it 
seems as though the only access we have to grammar are through expressive 
philosophical statements whose role is inherently context or occasion sensitive. In 
turn, this makes it opaque how we can then use these expressive philosophical 
statements to map anything at all. As it were, philosophical statements are simply to 
enmesh in, and dependent on, context or occasion to allow for a non-context or –
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occasion sensitive, independent of a particular conversation, and so on, account. In 
sum, the expressive gloss on philosophical statements belies the cartographic project 
since it individuates out a philosophical statement based solely on its context or 
occasion sensitive role as a correction in a conversation, rather than its supposed 
relationship with constitutive rules that it reflects.  
However, the expressive gloss has a ready-reply to these objections. In effect, 
being in a position to offer these sorts of expressive philosophical statements as 
correctives and linguistic explanations presupposes the ability to speak and 
understand the language in question. And, though perhaps the boundary is not sharp, 
we can still rely on using this understanding to map out the internal connections. 
Indeed, the "what would we say if…" question emerges as a means to articulate 
exactly this ability and so map out grammar. However, the "what would we say if…" 
question can be cashed out in two distinct ways. One of them, discussed by Cavell 
(2002), 1-44, sees the question as a form of invitation to the reader/speaker and grants 
that it is unable to establish anything without the negotiated consent and mutually 
forged reciprocity between the speaker and the philosopher. However, this abandons 
the idea of any external and pre-established normative interdependencies to map. In 
effect, “what would we say if…” does not explore pre-given normative 
interdependencies between constitutive rules that determine the use of expressions. 
Rather, it establishes these interdependencies on a case by case, and conversation 
partner to conversation partner, basis.  
The other way to cash out the "what would we say if…" question is to offer a 
philosophical articulation of what language, ability, and understanding, amount to. In 
effect, since correction and linguistic explanation, embedded in philosophical 
statements, rests on the understanding of the language in question, we should attempt 
to clarify what this understanding is, how it works, etc. From here, the grammatical 
account utilizes Aristotelian jargon complete with powers, first and second order 
potentials, vehicles and manifestations, etc., to make sense of the abilities that such 
expressive philosophical statements rely on (see, e.g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 380-
85, Glock (2014)). The hope is that, by articulating these complex relationships, we 
can come to understand how an expressive philosophical statement works fully. And, 
in turn, this will re-enable the cartographic project as it will allow us to mitigate the 
context or occasion sensitivity of expressive philosophical statements.  
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This reply, however, faces two objections. One, such a wheeled in Aristotelian 
terminology may involve Wittgenstein, and his interpreters, in first order 
metaphysical debates Wittgenstein strived to avoid. Indeed, someone can just reject 
the Aristotelian terminology that was wheeled in to clarify "ability” say. Further, this 
rejection need not betoken stubbornness or irrationality on the part of the rejecter but 
a different metaphysical theory concerning “ability.” And clearly this is problematic 
as Wittgenstein insists that “[i]f someone were to advance theses in philosophy it 
would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them” (PI § 
128). Two, it seems to flatly contradict Wittgenstein who claims that the "mistake is 
to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in" (Z § 16). The 
grammatical account would read this note, and others like them, as a repudiation of 
the ‘meaning-body' myth (e.g., Glock (1996 a), 207). And this is correct. 
Furthermore, this links back to their discussion of the imminence of meaning noted in 
4.0d. However, this also seems to problematize the Aristotelian apparatus that the 
expressive gloss relies on to make sense of meaning as well. Indeed, "Wittgenstein 
observed that ‘meaning' is a primitive concept" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 154). If 
meaning is primitive, then I am unclear how Aristotle can help us dig deeper here. 
Second, even granting that these worries are unfounded or wrong, there 
remains a grave problem for the expressive gloss. To wit, "not all rules for the use of 
a word are essential. And the distinction between what is essential and what is 
inessential, though guided by considerations of the purpose of the relevant language 
game is, at least to a degree, a matter of decision" (Hacker (1996), 199). In other 
words, it is not enough that we correct and linguistically explain various aspects of 
language. Indeed, if this were all that interested us, then we would have to allow in 
corrective practices that "seems to have nothing to do with philosophy…. As Moore 
put it, grammar is the sort of thing one teaches small children at school, e.g. ‘you 
don't say ‘three men was in the field'' (Baker & Hacker (2014), 57). Thus, we need a 
criterion to individuate the properly philosophical corrections from the less interesting 
ones. However, this goes beyond the resources of the expressive gloss that 
individuates philosophical statements from the ebb and flow of conversation based 
solely on their corrective or explanatory role. Indeed, it is unclear how parsing out 
‘boring' corrections like "English plurals get –s" from ‘philosophical' corrections like 
"'to know' implies the possibility of doubt" can be anything but arbitrary- as 
“decision” in the quote from Hacker seems to hint at. Further, Wittgenstein's reply to 
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Moore's objection, "what about [the sentence] ‘God the Father, God the Son, and God 
the Holy Ghost were in the field or was in the field'" (ibid, 58), speaks to this. In turn, 
this raises the cartographic problem as the map we make may become so rich with 
exogenous details and so arbitrarily determined by decisions that it ceases to function 
as a map. Thus, the expressive gloss is unworkable. 
(c) The fused gloss attempts to synthesize feature of the above two accounts. 
To begin, it accepts that "the use of a term is relatively stable [but], tokens of the 
same type-sentence can be used either conceptually or factually by one and the same 
person in different contexts. It may even be indeterminate whether a token sentence 
expresses conceptual or empirical relations" (Glock (2002), 90). It also accepts that 
"interaction between the conceptual and factual aspects implies that the division of 
labor between conceptual clarification of philosophy… and factual discoveries… 
require dynamic interaction rather than splendid isolation" (Glock (2017), 241). From 
here, it attempts to incorporate aspects of both the expressive and the descriptive 
glosses. In effect, it agrees with the expressive gloss that the role of correction is a 
(not the) critical criterion to identify philosophical statements. It agrees with the 
descriptive gloss that these philosophical statements can only play this role because 
they rest on a description of the constitutive rules that determine proper uses. In other 
words, a philosophical statement can only play the role of correcting when it 
describes already obtaining grammatical relationships. As it were, I can only use a 
map to help someone when the map describes the city we are both in. 
From here, the fused gloss insists that the above two accounts rest on a flawed 
attempt to bifurcate expressive and descriptive aspects of philosophical statements. 
Indeed,  "a necessary statement [which we argued in section 4.1a is deeply connected 
with a normative rule-formulation] cannot both be about, e.g., numbers and colors 
and be a rule for the use of words. A look at the rules of chess suggests otherwise, 
however" (Glock (2008 b), 72). In other words, there are, in fact, clear cases of 
artifacts, e.g., rulebooks for chess, that do function both as constitutive rules that 
determine a practice, and so are expressive in our sense, as well as enabling one to 
map out interconnections independently of errors, and so is descriptive in our sense. 
Indeed, a similar vein "[t]he so-called central paragraphs of the constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany are constitutive of the constitution… not just in the 
mereological sense, but also in the sense that they define that particular body of law" 
(ibid). Thus, "grammar… states rather than describes, the rules of language" (Baker 
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& Hacker (2009), 147). Thus, in point of fact, we do have descriptive rules that 
overcome the force problem and can function as expressive correctives. 
However, this fused gloss rests on a question-begging assumption, or so I 
argue. Let us begin with the seemingly paradigmatic case of jurisprudence. A lawyer 
must have both knowledge of the descriptive rules of the law- e.g., what statues, suits, 
judgments, etc., are in play for a particular question- and can use these descriptive 
rules to exculpate her client. However, what does the yeoman's work here is not the 
descriptive rules but the lawyer's role in the actual legal practice. And this role cannot 
just be taken for granted. For example, Wiess has written what a very apt one-volume 
discussion of Islamic law (Wiess (2006)). However, since Wiess is not a Muslim, 
neither he nor his work can play any role in Islamic legal theory and practice. In a 
similar key, a legal historian or anthropologist of law may offer perfectly cogent 
descriptive rules concerning, e.g., the evolution of civil law or the normative 
interconnections that define the legal system of a tribe. However, their works cannot 
be deployed by a lawyer in court because they cannot play the necessary role. Turning 
to chess, the same exact question begging emerges. Thus, we are told that it "is 
implausible to insist that the medieval board-game was not really chess, because the 
pawns could not move tow squares at a time in their first move" (Glock (2008 c), 
173). What is telling about this claim is that it depends on the role in a similar way. 
Indeed, a historian of board games would be remiss if she insisted that this version of 
chess is not chess. Equally clearly, though, I would demand my money back from a 
chess-teacher who tried to teach me this dated version of chess as modern chess. 
Thus, the fused gloss overcomes the force problem is by assuming that the 
philosophical statements already play the required role. So this begs the question. 
Perhaps matters are better regarding language and the grammatical 
philosopher. However, there are two critical problems here. First, critically,  
the "margin of tolerance is greater and less well defined in the case of natural 
languages than in the case of chess. There is a simple though important reason for 
this: The constitutive rules of natural languages do not form a precise and canonized 
system" (Glock (2015), 846). This seems to mean that a philosophical statement 
cannot link to the constitutive rules of language in the way that tightly connected 
descriptive legal rules and expressive lawyerly uses. Further, this lack of tightness 
quickly ramifies in a deleterious way.  
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Let us spell this out more carefully. One, recall that the same type-sentence 
might be a grammatical or empirical statement, depending on context and occasion. 
However, it seems that even the location of the same type-sentence within grammar 
can change given context and occasion. For example, as Cavell (2002), 238-266, 
points out, "I know I am in pain" may be used to put forward an ethical demand rather 
than as an epistemic claim. When "I know I am in pain" is used in this ethical sense, 
pointing out that apodictic and certain knowledge of mental states is problematic, falls 
rather flat. However, without a clear way to determine if someone's use of "I know I 
am in pain" is meant ethically or epistemically, the fused gloss simply begs the 
question. Succinctly, how do we know what the conversation partner means by this 
claim without negotiation?  Two, and even more problematic, it becomes rather 
unclear what "constitutive" means if the status of language is so flexible and the rules 
that are thought to determine it are not tightly interwoven. In effect, a constitutive 
rule, by definition, determines a game/practice. However, if the rules can change 
positions so readily be altered, be modified or abandoned, and so on, while the 
language remains the same language, it becomes unclear if the changed rules really 
were constitutive of the language in the first place. Three, related to two, by what 
criteria do we know when a language has changed? Indeed, Davidson (2005), in an 
admittedly exaggerated way, calls attention to the problem of individuating out 
languages, dialectics, slang, etc. Is Shakespearian English still English? Four, 
pursuant to three, and even worse, if language can be modified in that constitutive 
rules can be altered and the language continues to be the same language it is, 
identifying nonsense is deeply problematic. This is because a seemingly nonsensical 
claim may, in fact, rest on a modification to a constitutive rule or an addition of a new 
constitutive rule. For example, Hacker (1996 a), 235, claims that Freud’s use of 
“unconscious motive” betokens a new use rather than just nonsense. However, it is 
unclear why we should grant that that this is so. 
Second, the philosopher does not have anything like the clear role that a 
lawyer has. Indeed, a classical objection to this methodology can, I think, be re-
framed at this juncture. Often, the worry makes it appear that any modification of 
language in terms of jargon, technical use, etc., is somehow problematic. As it stands, 
such an objection is, at best, a misunderstanding of the grammatical account. 
However, the underlying worry that may motivate this objection is that the 
philosopher's role, unlike the lawyer’s, is rather unclear. As it were, by what right is 
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the philosopher the arbiter of correct use? There seem to be two ways to answer this 
question. One is Socratic. The philosopher's role is totally immanent to the 
conversation, and her ‘authority' rests simply on her careful listening and mischief 
making in terms of the conversation partner's own words and concepts. This 
harmonizes well with some aspects of the grammatical account (e.g., Glock (1991)). 
In this case, however, I see absolutely no reason why fact that "ordinary people use 
words in specific ways… [implies that] non-philosophical usage excludes certain 
ways of using words as nonsensical" (ibid 84) is relevant. Indeed, a Socratic method 
can work for an invented rule governed ideoletic that I subsequently learn just as well 
as anything else. The other is to insist that the role of the philosopher is to give "a 
synoptic overview… [And in] so doing, one will also often be describing the bounds 
of sense- characterizing combinations of words that are excluded from the language" 
(Baker & Hacker (2009), 285). Thus, the philosopher aims to "remind us of how we 
use words, show the bounds of sense were transgressed, offer us analogies and point 
out disanalogies, or juxtapose the case in hand with imaginary language games... to 
highlight features we overlooked" (ibid 286). However, the key problem with this 
model is that "if philosophy is to be the guardian of the bounds of sense, it is a referee 
who can adjudicate only with the consent of the players, who acknowledge the 
particular rules according to which they use words" (Hacker (1996), 240). In turn, 
assuming this consent begs the question.  
 
4.1.b Correct Uses and Meanings:  
 
  Thus, we see that the relationship between philosophical statements and the 
constitutive rules that govern the use of expressions is problematic. This section 
examines a somewhat related problem for the grammatical account. Specifically, it 
examines the way the grammatical account attempts to coordinate the correct use of 
various expressions and the semantics of those expressions. It argues that there is no 
way to relate correct uses and meanings together in such a way that we can read off 
from the correct use of an expression e, the meaning of an e. Pursuant to this, correct 
use and meaning can and do come apart in various ways. First, I present a reasonably 
intuitive conception of the relationship between correct use and meaning- i.e., 
"meaning=use"- and argue that it is unworkable. Second, I examine the claim that 
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"use determines meaning" and argue that it still cannot account for semantics. Third, I 
examine cases where sounds have clear constitutive rules for their use but fail to have 
meanings.  
To begin, one way to understand the relationship between correct uses and the 
meanings of various expressions is to see them as equivalent. In other words, 
"meaning is use" is best read as "meaning=use." However, this equivalency quickly 
runs into problems as use and meaning can and do come apart. For example, 
following Rundle (1991), 9, in spirit, assume that the use of the term ‘hella' has clear 
constitutive rules that determine its use. However, the use of ‘hella' can be 
fashionable, annoying, etc., though the meaning of ‘hella' is not fashionable, 
annoying, etc. Further, my use of ‘hella' can be improper, e.g., in a formal setting. 
However, it is rather unclear what it would mean to claim that the meaning of ‘hella' 
is improper. Indeed, "someone who identifies meaning and use cannot discard these 
points as minor details. For the reveal that the use of ‘use of a word' differs from the 
use of ‘meaning of a word'" (Glock (1996 d), 208). Thus, the claim that the correct 
use of an expression and the meaning of an expression are identical is problematic.  
  Thus, a reformulation of the relationship between meaning and correct use is 
required. A plausible attempt is to note that "though meaning does not determine use, 
use determines meaning, not causally, but logically… given the use of a word we can 
infer its meaning without further evidence, but not vice versa" (ibid 209). 
Furthermore, note that "[e]very difference in meaning is a difference in use; but not 
every difference in use is a difference in meaning" (Baker & Hacker (2009), 157). In 
other words, for the grammatical account, the correct use of an expression engenders 
the meaning of an expression in such a way that I can infer from the correct use, the 
meaning, but not vice versa. Granting this, a corollary is that one must be able to 
"learn from the use of a word everything there is to its meaning" (Glock (1996 d), 
209). In other words, when I know the correct use of an expression I, eo ipso, must be 
able to "read off" from this use the semantics of the expression in question.  
However, this reply is deeply problematic in three interdependent ways. First, 
it is somewhat unclear that knowing the correct use of an expression e and knowing 
the meaning of e is such that knowing the use eo ipso means I know the meaning. For 
example, consider the phrase ‘Allah Rahmet Eylesin' (hereby ARE). I learned the 
correct use of this expression well before I understood its semantics. In turn, the rule 
that governs the use of ARE is "say ARE at funerals or after-events, to as many 
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people as possible, and people will be happy and praise your language skills and when 
someone says ARE to you, look sad and say ‘sag ol.'" In point of fact, this was how 
ARE was linguistic-explained to me and how I linguistic-explained it to other non-
native Azerbaijani speakers. Further, this linguistic-explanation allows one to both 
deploy the term correctly as well as respond to it appropriately. And I can follow the 
rule for this use intentionally. Nevertheless, it strains credulity to ascribe to myself a 
knowledge of the meaning of ARE based on this knowledge of the correct us of ARE. 
However, the grammatical account has a ready reply to this. To wit, the grammatical 
account insists that we should focus on is "the use as determined by grammar… And 
that is the use as given by explanations of how the word is used" (Baker & Hacker 
(2009), 153). In other words, the rules that determined how I used ARE are not the 
salient constitutive rules nor is my account of the correct use of ARE an apt account 
of the real correct use of ARE. In other words, there is a distinction between the real 
correct use, as determined by the constitutive rules of grammar, and coterminous rules 
that contribute to use but do not engender meaning. Succinctly, knowing that the 
correct use of “Gesundhiet” in English is to utter it after someone sneezes, does not 
engender meaning because it is not the real correct use as determined by the 
constitutive rules.  
This reply, however, leads to the second problem. To begin, notice that this 
reconstruction of the argument grants that there are rules that are coterminous with an 
expression, e.g., say ARE at a funeral, say "Gesundheit" after someone sneezes, etc., 
that does not properly determine the meaning. However, it is unclear what criteria let 
someone know that they have isolated the ‘right' constitutive rules that determine the 
meaning of an expression, without already assuming the semantics themselves. In this 
register, the note by Baker & Hacker that it is the grammatical rules we should focus 
on begs the question. On the one hand, if these grammatical rules are the prior 
semantics of the expression, apparently we are given no further criteria to individuate 
them out from rules like "say ARE at a funeral.” Indeed, "say ARE at funerals" is a 
rule that determines the correct use of the expression, I can linguistic-explain it, etc. 
Moreover, given our discussion of understanding in 4.0d, it is unclear by what right 
one can dismiss these rules as not really fostering understanding. Again, I used the 
term correctly, I could linguistic-explain it to others, I could respond properly, I could 
intentionally deploy it, and so on. Equally clearly, the rule “say ARE at funerals” does 
not give me a handle on the meaning.  
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On the other hand, if we rely on the semantics to individuate out the right 
constitutive rules, the neat relationship between constitutive rules, correct use, and 
meaning is problematic. As it were, I rely on the meaning to individuate out meaning 
engendering constitutive rules. Such a move is clearly circular in a vicious sense. I 
assume the semantics of a term to isolate the real constitutive rules that determine the 
right correct use that engender the meaning that I rely on to isolate the real 
constitutive rules, and so on. Further, it seems clear that if the “use determines 
meaning” thesis is plausible, such a circle is unacceptable. Again, this leads us back to 
the above paragraph and the question of how to move from correct use to meaning. 
Finally, the grammatical account may insist that the above discussion has 
ignored the point of ARE (cf. PI § 564). In turn, it is exactly the ‘point’ that allows me 
to isolate the proper constitutive rules from coterminous rules and make sense of the 
claim that “correct use determines meaning.” This leads to the third problem. To 
begin, it is clear that this ‘point’ either itself depends on more rules or it does not. If it 
depends on more rules, the same sort of problem can be raised for these rules that tell 
me the point of the original rules. As it were, such rules for the point of the rules hang 
like signposts (cf. PI § 85). Conversely, if the point is different in kind than the rules, 
as PI § 564 seems to imply, then some non-rule based x is required to sort out 
semantics. In turn, this belies the claim that “correct use determines meaning” is a 
sufficient condition for meaningfulness. We return to this in section 4.1c. Regardless, 
it is clear that “correct use determines meaning” faces some objections. 
 Third, in a different key, having constitutive rules that govern the use of 
sounds does not necessarily engender a semantic value for those sounds. Consider, 
"tally-ho" or "abracadabra."58 These sounds seem to have very clear constitutive rules 
that govern their deployments. One cannot end a lecture on evolutionary biology with 
"abracadabra!" say. However, it is rather unclear if these terms have a meaning. 
Indeed, these "show that there are differences between the use of ‘the meaning of a 
word' and the use of ‘the use of a word'…Does this mean that it has a use but no 
meaning? That would be too swift… We might say that it has meaning but not a 
meaning… But they do show the concepts of the meaning of a word and having a 
meaning faltering while that of the use of a word still holds firm" (Baker & Hacker 
(2009), 155). Thus, clear constitutive rules that determine the use of a sound simply is 
                                                 
58 Again, Rundel (1991), 190-98, points this out. 
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not sufficient to ensure that the sound has a semantic value. Again, we see that the 
constitutive rules that determine when and how to use a sound/expression and what 
that sound/expression means, come apart. 
 
4.1.c Bare Normativity of Meaning and Non-Rationalism: 
 
  This section argues that the source of the problems discussed in section 4.1a 
and 4.1b is the rule-based normativity of meaning. First, I briefly set the stage. 
Second, I argue that replacing the rule-based normativity with a bare normativity of 
meaning circumvents or mitigates the objections raised above. However, third, I argue 
that replacing rule normativity with bare normativity requires us to abandon the claim 
that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is "rational" and opt, instead, for a 
"non-rationalism" that is far closer to his "personal ideology."  
To begin, recall that the grammatical account insists that the normativity of 
meaning be understood in a "ruly" way59- i.e., an expression e has a meaning only if 
there are rules for the use of e. Section 4.1a argued that the relationship between these 
constitutive rules for use and philosophical statements is deeply problematic. Section 
4.1b argued that the relationship between the constitutive rules that determine correct 
use and the semantics of an expression is deeply problematic. Thus, the rule-based 
normativity of meaning account is problematic. Furthermore, it is unclear if this rule-
based account is an apt reading of the PI. For example, Wittgenstein asks "is there not 
also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where 
we alter them- as we go along" (PI § 83). Instead of rule normativity of meaning, let 
us see if a bare normativity of meaning can avoid or address these worries. Recall that 
bare normativity of meaning, and an "unruly" reading of Wittgenstein, insists that an 
expression e is meaningful only if there are correctness conditions for e. 
  Granting this weaker bare normativity of meaning, both objections can be met. 
First, the complaint that knowledge of the constitutive rules that determine the correct 
use of an expression do not eo ipso give one the semantics of the expressions is 
avoided. For marginal cases like "abracadabra," the correction conditions accounts for 
why these sounds are different than the sounds my old car makes. Further, as Baker & 
Hacker noted, these correct use conditions are not sufficient to ensure that 
                                                 
59 Glock (2009), 163-65 introduces the categories of ‘ruly' and ‘unruly' interpretations of Wittgenstein 
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“abracadabra” has a meaning. For more central cases, e.g., cases where the expression 
clearly has a meaning, the bare normativity of meaning does not claim to capture or 
account for the meaning fully but merely note a necessary condition for us to treat an 
expression as meaningful in that there are normative conditions that determine its use. 
Indeed, here it seems that when Wittgenstein writes the "meaning of a phrase for us is 
determined by the use we make of it" (BLBK 65-emphasis mine), "[w]hat we call 
their meaning [e.g. of a figure in this context] is not anything which they have got in 
them… irrespective of what use we make of them" (BRBK 170-emphasis mine), or, 
most famously, "[f]or a large class of cases of the employment of the world 
‘meaning'- though not for all- this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of 
a word is its use in the language" (PI 43-underlying mine), we need to take his 
hesitancy and restrictions seriously.60 It is not that knowing the constitutive rules that 
determine the correct use of an expression can, on its own, allow one to grasp the 
meaning of that expression. Instead, it is that using ‘use' instead of ‘meaning' is an apt 
way to avoid various philosophical misunderstandings- as Hacker & Baker (2009), 
136-144, note. Furthermore, as noted in section 4.1b, the ‘point’ of various language-
games is critical for isolating the proper rules themselves and does not readily reduce 
to more rules. Thus the correct use of e, and the rules it brings in its wake, is not 
solely responsible for meaning. Indeed, if we accept meaning is properly primitive, 
then it cannot be accounted for by correct use and constitutive rules any more than by 
reference and truth, semiotics, etc. Thus, as Wittgenstein notes, "[i]n giving 
explanations, I already have to use language full-blown… this is enough to show that 
I can come up only with externalities about language" (PI § 120-emphasis mine). In 
other words, Wittgenstein’s project was never accounting for meaning on the basis of 
something else- even on the basis of constitutive rules that determine correct uses. 
The grammatical account may insist that I have misconstrued the tightness of the link 
between constitutive rules and meanings. However, section 4.1b shows that the two 
do come apart. In sum, the objection in section 4.1b fall flat as Wittgenstein was not 
trying to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the semantic content. At best, he 
                                                 
60 Against this unruly Wittgenstein, Glock (2009), 164-65, offers a set of further quotes that support a 
ruly reading. However, barring his quotation from RFM, these he refers to all occur during 
Wittgenstein's ‘transition period' (e.g., Glock (2001), 10-16). In turn, it is rather unclear how much this 
transitional material can be used to elucidate later Wittgenstein- a point also made against Baker in 
chapter 1.1f. Further, the quote from RMF is not knock-down evidence as Wittgenstein is talking about 
language-games and not language per se.  
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is offering a necessary condition- i.e. sounds have meaning only if there are normative 
standards for their deployment.  
The question of how philosophical statements and constitutive rules relate is 
addressed by noting that philosophical statements do not aim to reflect underlying 
constitutive rules that simply exist within language. Though philosophical statements 
do rely on constitutive rules, and these rules are critical for a host of reasons, some of 
which we discuss in chapter seven, it is imperative to realize that the rules themselves 
depend on normative correctness conditions. Indeed, this is one way of further 
radicalizing the grammatical account’s discussion of the shared normative practices 
that establish and maintain the constitutive rules voiced in section 4.0c and the 
imminence of meaning discussed in 4.0d. These practices are not themselves ruly but, 
rather, bring into play correctness conditions that are far more flexible, fudge-able, 
and so on. For example, the English speaking community decided, for a host of 
reasons, to let James Joyce ‘get away with’ Finnegans Wake, in my mind the best 
book ever written in English and in all minds a book that goes out of its way to flaunt 
any and all standards for the correct use of English. This cannot be accounted for by 
constitutive rules per se but the decision of a language community and this decision 
does not reduce to rules without setting off the stipulative regress mentioned in 4.1b. 
In other words, the problem with the grammatical account’s conception of the way a 
philosophical statement and constitutive rules relate is not so much the rules. Instead, 
it is the assumption that the constitutive rules, and the normative interconnections 
they have with one another, are self-supporting features of language. Pace this, an 
unrly account insists that, below these constitutive rules, are communal corrective 
practices that do not readily reduce to more rules. Granting this, the fact that an 
expressive philosophical statement can be rationally disputed need not cause us 
problems. When such a dispute breaks out, we rely on the underlying unrly normative 
practices to come to a decision concerning the problematic philosophical statement.  
 This slight shift to an unruly conception, though leaving many insights of the 
grammatical account intact, modifies other aspects of the grammatical account. 
Explicitly, we must abandon the claim that Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology 
is "rational" in that it simply describes already-given, stable, and systematically 
interconnected normative interdependencies that obtain in grammar due to self-
supporting rules. Instead, Wittgenstein's philosophical methodology is deeply 
sensitive to the fact that grammar may not form a system in this way and the rules that 
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define a particular grammar are not self-supporting- i.e. they depend on the unruly 
normative practices of communities and these often come down to decisions that the 
community makes. Let us bring this more into view. 
  To begin, as section 4.0e and 4.0f discussed, the rule-based normativity of 
meaning allows us to section off Wittgenstein's irrational ideology from his rational 
methodology. In effect, the methodology relies on mapping out the stable 
interdependent relationships between various rules and using these rules to check 
various solecisms whereas his ideology is taken as some form of anti-rationalism. 
However, notice that the rational/irrational binary excludes a third possibility- a non-
rational account. By a non-rational account, I mean that there are certain brute facts 
that are not properly considered as being either rational or irrational. The fact that 
objects fall towards the Earth at about 9.81 m/s2 does not strike me as being either 
rational or irrational. It is merely the case. Similarly, the fact that people cry when 
they are sad does not strike me as either a rational or an irrational response to sadness. 
It is simply what we do (cf. PI § 217). In turn, this non-rationalism notes that the 
anthropological features that account for the internal connections within grammar are 
not so much based on interdependencies of rules as on "patterns of behavior, which in 
turn presuppose a framework of shared cognitive capacities, needs, emotions, and 
attitudes" (Glock (2000), 82). Indeed, this presupposed framework is "not exclusively 
or even primarily cognitive in nature but comprise conative and affective aspects of 
our lives. Thus, we could not identify assent and dissent unless the native shared 
certain fundamental preferences with us, such as the acceptance of food or drink, or 
the refusal of unpleasant things" (Glock (1996 b), 168). In other words, what holds 
the interconnections of grammar together are not rational rules that form a coherent 
and interdepend network of grammar but non-rational brute facts about the sorts of 
beings we are and the sort of world we inhabit. In other words, it is our unruly 
normative practices that support and maintain the rules. Furthermore, someone who is 
unmoved by correction, who does not seek to avoid unpleasant things, etc., is just not 
someone for whom linguistic-explanation, correction, and so on., can work on. 
 In turn, this means that the interconnections in grammar are underwritten by 
patterns "which recurs, with different variations, in the tapestry of life" (PI II I § 2). 
These patterns are no more rational than the speed at which rocks fall. They simply 
are. Further, this begins to account for Wittgenstein’s seemingly idiosyncratic style, 
his odd examples, and so on. Wittgenstein’s methodology attempts to bring these non-
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rational features to light by allowing the themes he deals with to emerge in a manner 
that, from a rational point of view, is rather desultory and shambolic. Indeed, the basic 
point is that clear logical presentation is a post hoc rational reconstruction of how 
thinking, conversation, reasoning, etc., actually work in human life, a point we return 
to to some extent in chapter six. And Wittgenstein “writes poorly” is to display these 
human features clearly.  
 
4.2 The Key Uptake: 
 
The grammatical account is a nuanced metaphilosophical interpretation of 
Wittgenstein. Indeed, it has several features that, both exegetically and 
philosophically, make a great deal of sense of Wittgenstein. First, the insistence that 
philosophy's distinction from science is best construed along a first and second order 
discipline divide is apt. Indeed, this distinction avoids the upsetting consequence that 
"philosophy” is some inherent mistake or irrationality. Second, and more critically, 
the insight that we must adopt an immanent perspective on meaning and that such a 
perspective is necessarily normative is precisely right. Third, consequently, a straight 
naturalistic reduction of language to some x is slightly problematic. However, this is 
not because there are abstract meanings that hang out in Platonic heaven. Instead, it is 
that these features are inherently normative. Finally, fourth, pursuant to this, and most 
important, is the insistence that all of this depends on our forms of life- the sorts of 
creatures we are and the things we do. As the grammatical account insisted in section 
4.0c, we simply are the sorts of creatures that respond to normative pressure.  
However, the critical problem for the grammatical account is that its focus on 
a rule-based normativity of meaning, and the related assumptions that these rules are 
self-supporting features within language that normatively interconnect with one 
another in a coherent and consistent way and that we can describe these normative 
connections without any reference to philosophical problems, particular 
investigations, or patterns in our non-rational form of life, is deeply problematic. As 
argued above, such a rule-based conception cannot account for how philosophical 
statements and constitutive rules relate. Further, it is unclear how the rules that 
determine the correct use of an expression and the meaning of an expression relate.  
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4.3 Summary: 
 
This chapter has attempted to lay out the grammatical interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as well as how this metaphilosophical interpretation 
goes wrong. In section 1a, we note that, according to the grammatical account, a 
philosophical statement is non-cognitive, in that it does not describe features of the 
world, and second order in that it describes the inherently normative features involved 
in representation or description. In section 1b, we linked these normative features to 
constitutive rules. In section 1c, we discussed how these constitutive rules depend on 
normative practices- notably linguistic-explanation and meaning. In section 1d, we 
added “understanding” and noted that, once understanding is added, the semantic 
circle cannot be escaped from. In section 1e, we discussed how to avoid intractable 
holism by depending on perspicuous representation. In section 1f, we noted that this 
enables conceptual cartography. 
However, in section two, I argued that the philosophical statements and the 
constitutive rules they reflect couldn’t align. I also argued that the constative rules, the 
correct uses they determined, and the semantics of expressions, couldn’t align. Finally 
I claimed that a bare normativity of meaning is a more apt account.  
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Part II 
 
 
“Without philosophy thought are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make 
them clear and to give them sharp boundaries” TLP 4.112- emphasis mine. 
 
 
 
 
“I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if 
possible to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own” PI preface 4- emphasis mine. 
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5 Chapter Five: Clear Thinking: The Philosophy of Philosophy 
in the Tractatus: 
  
This chapter offers an engagement with the metaphilosophical points 
Wittgenstein proffers in especially TLP 4.111-4.116.61 By doing so, it aims to achieve 
two goals. First, it gives a consistent, coherent, and apt account of these points. 
Second, it shows that aspects of this metaphilosophy are quite different than either the 
four metaphilosophical readings of Wittgenstein discussed in Part I, or contemporary 
metaphilosophy more generally.62 I should note here that, though I engage with the 
secondary literature at various points- e.g., a "resolute"63 account in section 1 and a 
more "classical," 64 one in section 2- my goal is not adjudicating the debates between 
the classicists and the new Wittgensteinians. Ergo, I use the literature somewhat 
sparingly and with an aim more to elucidate Wittgenstein than offering a battle-cry.  
This chapter divides into four sections. First, I engage with the first few 
mentions of "philosophy" in the TLP. I develops a "straightforward reading," partly 
inspired by Russell's (in)famous introduction to the TLP (cf. especially TLP 
(Introduction), x, xiii & xix), that promises to make good sense of the Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophy. However, this reading is then shown to be unworkable. From here, I 
begin to develop an "alignment reading." As I discuss more fully later, “the alignment 
reading” interprets the philosophical activity (cf. TLP 4.112) as a procedure that 
ensures that abstract logical forms like P(a) or aRb and specific, particular semantic 
content like <John is nice> or <Sally loves John> align properly. To articulate the 
alignment reading properly, second, I examine several nuances that the 
straightforward reading ignored or elided. With these in view, third, I turn to 
Wittgenstein's most sustained metaphilosophical discussion- TLP 4.111-4.116. I 
present an interpretation of them that relies on the distinctions drawn in section two. 
Finally, I discuss the implications of metaphilosophy so understood as well as setting 
                                                 
61 Wittgenstein would object to the use of "metaphilosophy." I use it as a, perhaps problematic, 
shorthand for Wittgenstein's discussions of philosophy and philosophical methodology. Circumspect 
readers beware  
62 E.g. (Williamson (2007), ix-x), (Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood (2013), 1-12) 
63 The locus classicus is (Diamond (1995), 179-204) and (Conant 1989). See also, e.g., (Goldfarb 
(1997)), (Rickets (1996)), (Read and Hutchinson (2006)), (Kuusela (2011)), (Floyd (2007)). 
64 e.g., (Anscombe (1971)), (Hacker (1986), 1-145), (Glock (1996), various points), (Fogelin (1976), 1-
104), (Pears (1988)). 
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the stage for other chapters in Part II. Specifically, I discuss how the alignment 
reading’s interpretation of the philosophical activity relates the activity to clarity in 
such a way that doing philosophy is just clarifying thoughts.  
 
5.0 A Straightforward Reading and Straightforward Problems: 
 
This section attempts to develop a straightforward reading of the early 
metaphilosophical remarks of the TLP- i.e., the preface, TLP 3.324, 3.3421, 4.003 and 
4.0031. The goal of the straightforward reading is to present an initial and intuitive 
reading of these points that promises to make good sense of them, their 
interrelationships, and their ordering in the work. I begin with such a reading for both 
interpretive and exegetical reasons. Concerning interpretation, over the past thirty 
years or so, so much of the TLP has become contested and disputed that it is 
challenging to know how to begin to read and interpret the book.65 Proffering a 
straightforward reading, I hope, avoids several of these debates by attempting to read 
the TLP with fresh eyes, as though one has only just encountered the book. 
Concerning exegesis, a constant temptation, especially when engaging with the TLP- 
a book that is both so pregnant with insight and so terse and laconic in presentation- is 
that one begins with a theory and then cherry-picks gnomic remarks that support it. 
By attempting to just read the book, as far as one can, I hope to mitigate this 
unfortunate tendency.  
  First, I present the straightforward reading. I note how it both makes good 
sense of the aforementioned philosophical remarks as well as how well it aligns with 
Russell explicitly and Frege somewhat implicitly. However, I argue that such a 
reading cannot be sustained as Wittgenstein flatly contradicts it. Finally, I examine a 
resolute response and discuss some ramifications. 66  
To begin, the preface to the TLP claims that "the aim of the book is to draw a 
limit to thought, or rather- not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in 
order to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit 
                                                 
65 Indeed, it may not be wrong to ask if one can even read the book in the first place, a point we touch 
on later in this section. 
66 We discussed a "resolute reading" in chapter 1.2a,b, and 1.2i, j. I should note here that though 
resoluteness and therapy often move in lockstep, they need not. Prima facie one can read the TLP 
resolutely but deny that the overall metaphilosophical aim is excising philosophy.  
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thinkable (i.e., we should have to think what cannot be thought)" (TLP preface, 3). 
This sentence seems to encourage us to assume a sharp distinction between thoughts 
and the expressions of them. Indeed, it is natural to move from this to the assumption 
that the real focus of the TLP is not on thought per se, but the medium in which 
thought is expressed, i.e., natural languages. Moreover, this assumption seems 
confirmed by the claim that "only… in language that the limit can be drawn, and what 
lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense" (TLP preface, 4). Thus, the 
straightforward reading begins with the working assumption that thought as such is in 
order and that it is the medium in which thought is expressed that is problematic. 
  Granting this, the straightforward reading turns to the first mentions of 
"philosophy" in the TLP. These mentions seem both to confirm this straightforward 
view as well as to refine and to deepen it. The straightforward reading begins by 
noting that the first reference to philosophy within the TLP's text, occurs in section 3 
of the work. This section elaborates the claim that "a logical picture of facts is a 
thought" (TLP 3). Wittgenstein has already told us that a logical picture is the most 
abstract possible isomorphism possible between a possible fact and a picture or 
representation of it. Indeed, a picture or a representation constitutively depends on 
this logical isomorphism in such a way that for x to be a representation of y 
necessarily implies that x and y share a logical form (e.g., TLP 2.181-2.2). He also 
tells us that "[t]hought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should 
have to think illogically" (TLP 3.03). To interpret this, the straightforward reading 
assumes that, if a thought is a picture, then "to think" is "to depict." In turn, this 
means  "to think illogically" is "to depict illogically." However, "[w]hat a picture… 
must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it…. is logical form" 
(TLP 2.181). In other words, per definition, "x depicts y" implies that x and y share a 
logical form. This means that "to depict illogically" is a contradiction in terms as for 
any relation to count as a depicting relation, there must be a logical isomorphism in 
play. This further strengthens the straightforward reading as it implies that not only 
can we not have illogical thoughts, we cannot think illogically. 
From here, the straightforward reading notes that per definition, a thought 
cannot be illogical. Further, per definition, a thought is a logical picture. Three, per 
definition, a logical picture represents a possible fact by sharing a logical form with it 
(e.g., TLP 2.16 & 2.161). And finally, per a seemingly innocuous assumption the 
straightforward reading makes, to have a thought that p is ipso facto to have grasped 
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the content <p> of the thought. As it were, thoughts are transparent. Granting these 
definitions and the seemingly innocuous assumption, there is no room for confusion, 
philosophical errors, etc., to enter into the relationship between a thought and the 
possible state of affairs it represents. Succinctly, to have a thought that p is to know 
the content <p> of the thought. In turn, the content <p> is a logical picture, and this 
picture shares the same logical form as a possible state-of-affairs p. There is no room 
for confusion, nonsense, etc. 
Next, the straightforward reading seems further confirmed when Wittgenstein 
turns to metaphilosophy proper. Indeed,  "[i]n everyday language it very frequently 
happens that the same word has different modes of signification- and so belongs to 
different symbols" (TLP 3.323-emphasis mine) and "[i]n this way the most 
fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them)" 
(TLP 3.234). In other words, philosophical confusions, nonsense, and so on, only 
emerge when one attempts to convey a thought in a natural language. Indeed, the 
straightforward reading goes on to claim that "philosophy is a ‘critique of language'" 
(TLP 4.3001) indicates precisely this. In other words, philosophical nonsense, 
muddles, etc., emerge only due to the defective nature of the medium in which we 
express thought.  
In turn, the straightforward reading ascribes to Wittgenstein a clear 
metaphilosophical goal, a robust methodology to achieve this goal, a clear and 
articulate sense of how elucidation fits into this, and a deep harmony with Russell and 
Frege. To begin, clearly if natural language is what generates nonsense, confusion, 
etc., then the goal of philosophical work should be to replace it with an artificially 
constructed ideal language. Indeed, Russell's Introduction seems to confirm that this 
is Wittgenstein's goal. Thus, Russell notes the TLP lays down "the condition which 
would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language… Mr. Wittgenstein is 
concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language… the whole function 
of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfills this function in proportion as it 
approaches to the ideal language" (TLP Introduction ix-x). For example, the "is" of 
English might best be broken up into the "is" of identity, and the "is" of predication 
(e.g., TLP 3.323). The methodology Wittgenstein relies on is that of logical analysis. 
This methodology promises to present the real logical form a thought has 
independently of the "surface grammar" that natural language presents it in. Indeed, 
the methodological goal is to strip thought of its ill-fitting clothing and present it 
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naked, in all its sharpness (e.g., TLP 4.002). On the straightforward view, an 
elucidation is logical analysis carried through (cf. TLP 4.111). A thought, in virtue of 
being a thought, already has a distinct logical form. It is natural language that distorts 
it, and philosophy aims to strip this away and offer an ideal language that displays 
clearly the real logical form.  In effect, we elucidate a proposition by relying on 
logical analysis that re-presents the thought shorn from misleading natural language. 
And the harmony with Russell (e.g., (1996), 42-65) and Frege (e.g., (1997), 48-52) is 
fairly obvious. For all three, natural language is just too ambiguous, accidental, 
downright irrational, etc., to convey thoughts clearly. 
Alas, however, the straightforward reading is quickly vitiated by an equally 
straightforward set of problems. First, Wittgenstein is keen to insist that "all the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order" 
(TLP 5.5563). This quote has substantial implications for how to interpret the TLP. 
Regardless, it directly contradicts any interpretation of the TLP that seeks to locate 
the source of philosophical confusion and nonsense in ordinary or everyday language. 
Indeed, whatever Wittgenstein's concerns are, a straightforward account that locates 
the problems of philosophy solely and squarely within natural language is not viable. 
Second, and more damningly, Wittgenstein explicitly claims that "[p]hilosophy aims 
at the logical clarification of thought" (TLP 4.112- emphasis mine). Under the 
straightforward reading, this point is nearly unintelligible. A thought is already a 
logical picture, a thought already shares a logical form with a possible fact, and the 
content of a thought, by the seemingly innocuous assumption, is already entirely 
transparent to the thinker. There is, quite literally, nothing to clarify. 
In turn, there are at least two reactions to the failure of the straightforward 
reading. One of them is to be resolute. In effect, the problems that emerge for the 
straightforward reading are a consequence of its taking Wittgenstein's points as 
propositions. And this is already to misunderstand the text. Though the resolute 
reading has become a myriad set of overlapping unique interpretations- e.g., concept-
script and sans-concept-script67, Jacobins and Girondins68, etc., I focus the discussion 
by taking Diamond and Conant at their word. To wit, "[t]here are two interrelated 
general features that suffice to make a reading ‘resolute'… The first is that it does not 
take those propositions of the Tractatus about Wittgenstein said, at §6.54, that they 
                                                 
67 E.g. (Kuusela (2011), 127-32) 
68 E.g. (Read and Deans (2011), 149) 
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are to be recognized as ‘nonsensical' to convey ineffable insight. The second feature is 
a rejection of the idea that what such a recognition requires… the application of a 
theory of meaning that has been advanced in the body of the work… It is a corollary 
of the second of these features that a resolute reading is committed to rejecting the 
idea that the Tractatus holds that there are two logically distinct kinds of nonsense: 
the garden-variety kind… and a logically more sophisticated kind" ((2004), 47-48).  
Granting this, the tension that the straightforward reading stumbled upon is merely a 
result of not being resolute. Wittgenstein's points do not offer us a theory of 
philosophy, say. These points are just nonsense, and nonsense cannot "contradict 
itself."  
To bring this further into view, let me remind the reader of the work done in 
chapter 1.1a. In effect, and provided that one is still interested in doing philosophy, 
the TLP divides into two kinds of points- frame-propositions and faux-propositions. 
The former are instructions on how to work through the book- methodological notes 
Wittgenstein offers the reader. The latter are merely attractive nonsense that we are 
meant to work through and expose as nonsense. As it were, we use the method the 
frame-propositions offers to expose the faux status of faux-propositions. Perhaps most 
critically, the resolute reading also insists on the fact that nonsense is monistic- i.e. all 
nonsense is the same from a logical point of view and all nonsense is caused by a 
failure to assign meaning to terms. In other words, we may feel like "the world is all 
that is the case" (TLP 1) is distinct from "piggly wiggle tiggle" (Diamond (2000), 
151). However, this is psychology, not logic. Let us examine this response at the 
metaphilosophical level. 
To begin, it seems to me that such a resolute view runs into problems when 
applied to the (seeming?) metaphilosophical propositions of the TLP. To see this, 
consider how the metaphilosophical tension arose. In the preface, Wittgenstein said 
that "the aim of this book is to draw a limit… not to the thought, but to the expression 
of thoughts…It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn" (TLP 
preface 3-4- emphasis mine) paired with, e.g., philosophy "must set limits to what can 
be thought: and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought" (TLP 4.114). There seems to 
be a tension here. Specifically, Wittgenstein seems to change targets. The preface 
insists that we cannot limit thought as this implies we would have to think illogically.  
Indeed, this is what motivated the straightforward reading. By contrast, TLP 4.114 
indicates that philosophy works at the level of thought and does, in fact, limit it. 
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Further, notice that prima facie pinpointing this tension does not depend on any 
"theory" at work in the faux-propositions of the TLP- no "picture theory" is needed, 
no saying/showing distinction, etc. Rather, the prevarication between thought and 
language seem to be something "pre-theoretical." Notice, further, that such a tension 
cannot just be ignored or explained away. Again, for the straightforward reading, it is 
nearly definitional that thought cannot have any un-clarity, confusion, etc. However, 
Wittgenstein seems emphatic that thought can be unclear. In turn, this raises a host of 
issues concerning how logic, thought, language, and states of affairs relate, what sort 
of work elucidation does, and so on. 
However, let us assume that there is underlying nonsense is driving this. 
Indeed, a resolute reader may insist that my conception of "thought", "language", or 
"philosophy" is philosophically loaded in such a way that it is faux-propositional. 
Granting this, a resolute reading of the metaphilosophical points of the TLP can, it 
seems, make one of three moves. It can take: the preface to be faux-propositions that 
we are meant to expose using the TLP method of elucidation and leave TLP 4.112 as 
a frame-proposition; TLP 4.112 as faux and the preface as the frame; she can go the 
whole way and take both as faux. Let us examine each in turn.  
The most plausible way for a resolute reader to go is to argue that the preface 
is made up of faux-propositions. Indeed, the business about drawing a limit, the 
distinction between thought and expression, the insistence on the truth of the TLP, 
etc., are all just nonsense we are meant to see through. There is nothing we cannot 
think/say, and so the idea of a limit is silly (e.g., Diamond (1995), 179-204).69 
However, this faces two interrelated objections. One, there are other points of the 
preface a resolute reader wants to maintain are frame-propositions. Indeed, the claims 
that TLP is "not a textbook" (TLP preface 1) and that "[t]he book deals with the 
problems of philosophy and shows… the reason why these problems are posed is that 
the logic of our language is misunderstood" (ibid). However, it becomes unclear by 
what right we can argue that some points in the preface are frame and others faux. 
Indeed, since there's no numbering system here, it seems like the only responsible 
exegetical way to deal with the preface is to take it as a unit. Two, if Wittgenstein 
begins his book with faux-propositions, without telling us what he is up to, then the 
                                                 
69 Better said, it needs to be treated with a great deal of care- (e.g., Conant and Diamond (2004)) 
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reader is slightly unsure how to proceed. Indeed, if the preface is not a frame then 
what is? 
A second response is to claim that TLP 4.114 is nonsense. However, this is 
problematic as the claim seems to follow from the claim that "[p]hilosophy aims at 
the logical clarification of thought. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an 
activity" (TLP 4.112-emphasis mine). Indeed, TLP 4.112 introduces the 
metaphilosophical tension noted above in a more implicit way. Regardless, perhaps 
TLP 4.114 and the first sentence of TLP 4.112 are nonsense. However, without the 
first sentence of TLP 4.112, the sort of activity philosophy does is left critically 
undefined. Perhaps Lacan punning on his own name should count as philosophy? 
Furthermore, the metaphilosophical points from TLP 4.111-116 seem required for 
making sense of the sort of methodology Wittgenstein is engaged in and is trying to 
teach us. Succinctly, if Wittgenstein's comments on his own methodology are 
nonsense, then it is slightly opaque how we can learn it. 
The third is to interpret both as faux-propositions. In turn, this involves the 
resolute reader in a "self-mate" (e.g., Geach (1965), 460). Wittgenstein literally says 
nothing- not about philosophy, methodology, etc. In effect, the entire content of the 
book is just nonsense, and there are no frames. In turn, such a “enragés-ist” reading is 
clearly antiphilosophical in that Wittgenstein’s sole concern is best cast as convincing 
us to abandon philosophy- by hook or crook. Such a reading, in turn, falls prey to the 
objections I voiced in chapter 2.1a and b.  
The second possible reaction is to admit that the straightforward reading 
failed. However, this is not due to being taken in by faux-propositions but due to the 
straightforward reading's ignoring nuances of the TLP. Ergo, let us bring those into 
view. 
 
5.1 Distinctions, Differences, and Definitions; Oh My!: 
 
Thus, we see that the straightforward reading is untenable for straightforward 
exegetical reasons. This section offers an alternative reading, the "alignment reading." 
Succinctly, the alignment reading argues that the causes of philosophical problems 
and confusion are neither due to logical form nor (defective) natural languages. 
Rather, confusion and philosophical problems arise from a misalignment between 
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logical form and semantic content. Pursuant to this, the goal of philosophy is ensuring 
that the alignment between them is correct. We develop this in far greater detail as we 
work through the chapter. 
To begin, alignment reading is far more intricate than the straightforward 
reading in that it takes seriously the myriad distinctions the TLP introduces. First, I 
outline some critical points that the alignment reading insists we keep in mind. 
Second, I describe a three-stage account of the nature of "thought" that helps make 
sense of the TLP. As we shall see, this three-stage account is key to making sense of 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. However, I stress here that this account is heuristic 
rather than philosophical.70 In other words, the aim of the account is not proffering a 
rational reconstruction of the TLP per se but, rather, presenting certain salient aspects 
of the TLP in such a way that the metaphilosophical points can be brought into view. 
Further, the heuristic stages I present offers a "bottom-up" approach. In effect, we 
begin from the simple name-‘object' denotation, move to a “formal level” of thought, 
and then project this formal thought onto the world and, by doing so, impute semantic 
content to the thought. To reiterate, I use this three-stage heuristic because it helps 
brings aspects of the metaphilosophical points fully into view, as we shall see in the 
section 3.2.  
  To begin, the alignment reading calls into question one of the premises of the 
straightforward reading. Explicitly, the straightforward reading assumed that the 
thought that p and the content of the thought <p> are transparent and unmediated. 
Indeed, it was this that allowed the straightforward reading to maintain that, at the 
level of thought, error, confusion, etc., are impossible. Succinctly, to have a thought is 
to have a representation and I ‘automatically’ know what the thought represents. 
Heterodox as it sounds, the alignment reading maintains that this is deeply 
problematic. Specifically, the alignment reading follows Glock in assuming that 
"[t]houghts are not entities beyond language, and language is not merely a medium 
for transmitting a pre-linguistic process of thinking" (1996 c), 358). In other words, 
the alignment reading rejects any sharp division between thoughts and natural 
language. Indeed, consider Wittgenstein's claim that "thinking is a kind of language" 
(NB p. 82). Further, "I don't know what the constituents of a thought are, but I know 
that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language" (NB 
                                                 
70 In this, I follow (Kuusela (2008), 55-65) and (Kuusela (2011)).  
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p. 130- underlying mine) and "'[d]oes a Gedanke consists in works?' No! But of 
psychical constitutes that have the same sort of relation to reality as words" (NB p. 
131-emphasis mine). Indeed, in many ways, it seems that Wittgenstein has anticipated 
a dilemma and accepted one horn.71 To wit, assume that language requires convention 
to function. Also, assume that thought is inherently representational and non-
conventional. Granting these, a "language of thought" is either not a language as it 
does not rely on conventions or it does not have thoughts defined as non-conventional 
representational content. Wittgenstein rejects the latter and insists that some aspect of 
thought requires convention too.  
Pursuant to this, the alignment reading also follows Glock in assuming that 
Wittgenstein "uses ‘thought' (Genanke) in two different roles" (1996 c), 357). 
However, these uses are not a latent equivocation between the logical and the 
psychological (cf. ibid and ibid 247-50). Instead, Wittgenstein has analytically 
separated out two aspects of thought for heuristic purposes. More specifically, 
Wittgenstein isolates a formal aspect of thought and a content aspect of thought. To 
bring this fully into view, let us turn to the three-stage bottom-up heuristic account to 
clarify how "thought" works in the TLP. 
The first stage is the simple name-‘object' denotation relationship. At this 
level, "[a] name means an object. The object is its meaning" (TLP 3.203) and "[i]n a 
proposition a name is the representative of an object" (TLP 3.22). However, it is 
critical to ask what, exactly, the simple names capture of the ‘objects.' To answer this, 
it is critical to note that "[i]f I know [by acquaintance] an object I also know all its 
possible occurrences in states of affairs" (TLP 2.0123) and "[t]he possibility of its 
occurring in a state of affairs is the form of an object" (TLP 2.0141). Further, "[a] 
picture can depict any reality whose form it has" (TLP 2.171- emphasis mine). Taken 
together, these mean that what the denotation relationship, and knowledge-by-
acquaintance of ‘objects,' grasps for the simple names are formal combinatorial 
possibilities of the ‘objects.' Thus, though it is critical to also keep in mind that 
‘objects' do have form and content (e.g., TLP 2.021 & 2.025)72, the content part is left 
out of the simple names and what remains are combinatorial possibilities. Notice two 
further things. First, these combinatorial possibilities should not depend on the 
                                                 
71 This argument is spelled out in much greater detail, and with far more force, in Glock (2009) and 
Glock (2010). This brief treatment does not do justice to the matter. 
72 This caveat will be critical in a moment. 
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content of the ‘objects' the simple names denote. Indeed, "[i]n logical syntax the 
meaning of a sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical 
syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign" (TLP 3.33). Second, at this level, 
thought as such is entirely out of place. This is for several reasons. One is that we 
refer to, and do not describe, ‘objects' (e.g., TLP 3.221). In sum, and most critically, a 
simple name that denotes an ‘object’ reflects only the formal combinatorial 
possibilities of the ‘object’ and not its content.   
At the second stage, the combinatorial possibilities of the simple names 
combine with each other in such a way that "the elements of a picture are related to 
one another in a determinate way… Let us call this connexion of its elements the 
structure of the picture" (TLP 2.15- emphasis mine). In turn, the form an object has is 
the possible structures it can enter into. Indeed, "[f]orm is the possibility of structure" 
(TLP 2.032). Thus, the simple names have formal combinatorial possibilities, and, at 
the second stage, the simple name concatenates with other simple names in such a 
way that they manifest to particular structures or interdependencies. However, 
following Anscombe, there are "two distinct features belonging to a picture… first, 
the relation between the elements of the picture; and second, the correlations of the 
elements in the picture; and as we have seen, the first feature must belong to a picture 
before the second one can; only if significant relations hold among the elements of the 
picture can they be correlated with objects outside so as to stand for them" ((1971), 
68). The focus of the second stage is on the purely intra-pictorial elements that obtain 
within the picture. The alignment reading stresses that these intra-pictorial elements 
are governed solely by combinatorial possibilities of the formal aspects of simple 
names and are, ergo, also contentless. In other words, a logical picture presents a 
particular structure, an arrangement of some simple names in such a way that they 
display definite dependencies with one another and are "governed" solely by logical 
syntax. Indeed, "[l]ogical pictures can depict the world" (TLP 2.19- emphasis mine). 
However, such logical pictures are, as yet, contentless and not about anything. I note 
here that I follow Wittgenstein in calling these intra-pictorial dependencies a logically 
determinate structure. Also, I call this logically determinate total structure of intra-
pictorial elements the "formal aspect" of thought. In sum, for the second stage, simple 
names that reflect the formal combinatorial possibilities of ‘objects’, concatenate with 
one another in such a way that determinate logical structures manifests itself. 
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Let us examine the formal aspect of thought further. First, the seemingly 
innocuous assumption about the transparence of thought is correct for the formal 
aspect of thought. In other words, to have a thought that p is to, eo ipso, know the 
determinate logical structure the thought has. Indeed, "[i]n a certain sense, we cannot 
make mistakes in logic" (TLP 5.473). However, second, I cannot go wrong here 
because the formal aspect of thought cannot properly be said to be about anything at 
all. Logical syntax, and the determinate logical structure that the intra-pictorial 
elements manifest, have no semantic content at all. Thus "logic must take care of 
itself. A possible sign must also be capable of signifying. Everything that is possible 
at all is also legitimate. Let us remember… why ‘Socrates is Plato' is nonsense. That 
is, because we have not made an arbitrary specification, not because a sign is, shall 
we say, illegitimate in itself!" (NB p. 2. Also, see TLP 5.473). In other words, the 
reason ‘Socrates is identical' is not nonsense at the formal level is because, simply, 
these ‘words' are mere dummies73 that have no semantic content whatever. Indeed, at 
this stage, McGuiness (2002), 82-94, and Ishiguro (1969) are quite right to insist that 
"[i]t is inconceivable that anything which can function as a name at all should lack a 
bearer, jut because the bearer is given with its semantic role" (McGuiness (2002), 89). 
However, third, pace McGuiness and Ishiguro, logical syntax, and a sign language or 
concept script that displays it cannot be the end of the story. Indeed, for both readers, 
there are two critical problems. One, Wittgenstein insists that it is only in a certain 
sense that we cannot make mistakes in logic. It is rather unclear what this caveat is 
meant to accomplish on this "linguistic view.”74 If an ‘object' is simply a sort of 
dummy abstraction from the formal aspects of a proposition, we cannot make 
mistakes in any sense. Indeed, Ishiguro's example of such a name/object- "Let a be the 
centre of a circle…" makes this point very well. We simply cannot be wrong with 
"Let a be the centre of a circle," "let phi be a first-order predicate," and so on. Two, 
more damningly, if we abandon "the realm of reference," (McGuinness  (2002), 94), 
then it becomes unclear what sort of elucidatory work the TLP can achieve for us. 
Simply put, if formal logic can only operate in a frictionless formal void, how can it 
help clarify the propositions of natural language? Indeed, Wittgenstein insists that 
"[i]f the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend 
on whether a proposition was true" (TLP 2.0211) and that "[i]n that case we could not 
                                                 
73 Ishiguro (1969), 45, makes this point as well 
74 Glock (2005), coined this term as far as I am aware 
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sketch any picture of the world (true or false)" (TLP 2.022). In other words, if we 
remain at the formal level, we abandon the representational role of language; logical 
syntax, dummies names, and so on, are not about anything at all. In turn, it becomes 
opaque how a proposition can represent anything apart from its logical form at all. 
Moreover this lacuna undermines the linguistic reading as Wittgenstein is both keen 
to address how propositions and states-of-affairs relate (e.g., TLP 2.1511) as well as 
keen to insist that truth and falsity are critical features of propositions that are of 
critical importance for him (e.g. TLP 2.223). Most critically, these points make it 
clear that, though the formal aspect of thought is essential, it cannot replace natural 
language. Simply put, the formal aspect of thought is not about anything and so does 
not have any semantic content off its own bat. Indeed, the sole source of meaning is 
our arbitrary specification, a point we address presently.75  
  At the third stage, we rely on the "method of projection… to think of the sense 
of a proposition" (TLP 3.12). Let us continue to follow Anscombe and note that 
"objects outside [the logical picture are linked to intra-pictorial elements] so as to 
stand for them. The correlating is not something that the picture itself does; it is 
something we do" ((1979), 68). Indeed, "[t]he connection between sentence and 
possible state of affairs is conventional rather than iconic… [It is] due to our 
stipulating [the relationship]" (Glock (2006), 357-emphasis mine). In other words, for 
a logically determinate structure to be about something, i.e., to have semantic content, 
we must stipulate that intra-pictorial features stand for various features of (possible) 
states-of-affairs. Thus, what ‘fills' a determinate logical structure with semantics is the 
fact that I project the former onto the later by meaning assignment. Let us call the 
stipulated semantic values for the intra-pictorial elements, semantic content. Let us 
call this level of thought "the content aspect" of thought. Notice, critically, that the 
method of projection, and the semantic content it engenders, requires that the 
(possible) state-of-affairs be a particular and specific combination of ‘objects’- i.e., a 
fact (TLP 2 & 2.01). This is because a proposition can only be true or false of such 
particular and specific combinations. Roughly76, consider the determinate logical 
structure, P(a). This structure has a mathematical multiplicity (TLP 4.04) that allows 
                                                 
75 Regardless, separating out the syntax of the concept script from proper semantics strikes me as a 
critical innovation of Wittgenstein. Goldfarb (1979) notes how logic in the twenties was infected by an 
inability to distinguish syntax from semantics adequately.   
76 We discuss this more fully in the next section. Suffice it to say, since the TLP does not give us any 
example of what a simple name is, almost all concrete examples are problematic. Circumspect readers 
should keep this in mind.  
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it to be projected onto states-of-affairs like Dan’s being fat, Mars’s being red, 
London’s being lovely, etc. However, clearly the truth or falsity of the proposition 
<Dan is fat> has nothing whatever to do with London’s being lovely. <Dan is fat> is 
about, i.e., true or false of the possible fact of Dan’s being fat precisely because I 
assign the semantic value “Dan” to “a” and “__ is fat” to “P(_).”77 In sum, at the 
content level of thought, I correlate a formal aspect of thought with a (possible) state-
of-affair by a projection that assigns semantic values to ‘parts’ of the determinate 
logical structure.  
Granting this, it is critical to notice that this projection relies on extra-logical 
features to function. As it were, nothing in a determinate logical structure tells me 
what semantic values to assign to it. Indeed, Wittgenstein notes that "[t]he tacit 
conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are 
enormously complicated" (TLP 4.002) and, further, that "[w]hat signs fail to express, 
their application shows. What signs slur over, their application says clearly" (TLP 
3.262). These points are critical in the next section.  
  Thus, the alignment reading proffers a three-stage bottom-up heuristic account 
designed to bring into view how "thought" works in the TLP. At ground floor are 
simple names-‘objects.' These are preconditions for thought but not properly thoughts. 
At this stage, a simple name denotes an ‘object’ and, in virtue of this dentation, 
reflects the formal combinatorial possibilities of the ‘object’ (though not the content 
of the ‘object). At the second stage the formal combinatorial possibilities that the 
simple names reflect concatenate with one another in such a way that they manifest 
determinate logical structures. This is the formal aspect of thought. We cannot go 
wrong here. However, there's no content at all. At the third stage, we project these 
formal features onto a state of affairs via assigning the ‘parts’ of the structure to 
‘parts’ of specific and particular states-of-affairs. When this is done, the proposition is 
true or false of the fact I have projected the determinate logical structure onto. With 
this in view, let us turn to the metaphilosophy of the TLP. 
 
5.2 Learning How to Think Clearly: 
  
                                                 
77 Another possible reading, drawn from Sellars (2007), 103-125 is ‘Jumblese’ where ‘_is fat’ is, as it 
were, built into the concept-script’s representation of ‘Dan.’ Though interesting, I bracket this. 
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With the alignment reading's more nuanced view of the TLP, we can turn to 
how it interprets Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy. Specifically, we examine TLP 4.111-
4.116. The alignment reading, as we shall see, makes good sense of the exegetical 
placement and progression of these remarks, enables an interpreter to distill some 
impressive philosophical arguments from the gnomic remarks, and betokens a 
profoundly innovative metaphilosophy. I note here that, in this section, I move "top-
down"- e.g., from already given semantic content to the formal aspect of thought. 
To begin, the major metaphilosophical discussion in the TLP occurs in section 
4, the elaboration of "[a] thought is a proposition with sense" (TLP 4). The alignment 
reading begins by stressing that the "with sense" clause is not pleonastic. Wittgenstein 
is indicating that we are dealing with both the formal and content aspect of thought. 
Thus, the alignment reading notes that, for Wittgenstein, philosophy only begins 
when semantic content is taken as a given. Further, this accounts for why 
Wittgenstein says so frustratingly little about "projection" in the TLP. Projection must 
be taken as already given- a sort of transcendental requirement for language that must 
be assumed and cannot be talked about (cf. p. NB 51-55).78 Indeed, Wittgenstein is 
best read as claiming that we necessarily assume this precondition and cannot talk 
about it.  
  Next, the alignment reading notes that the metaphilosophical discussion is a 
further elaboration of the claim that "[p]ropositions represent the existence and non-
existence of states of affairs" (TLP 4.1) and that "the totality of true propositions is 
the whole of natural science" (TLP 4.11). Point 4.1 is somewhat of a reiteration of 
bipolarity- i.e., that all propositions are capable of being true or capable of being 
false- already broached in TLP 4.023. It is TLP 4.11 that is more critical for the 
alignment reading. Notice that this point stresses that truth (and falsity) fall under the 
purview of science. In other words, once a thought-with-projected-content is clear, the 
truth or falsity of the picture that thought encodes is established by science. Thus the 
alignment reading assumes that philosophy only begins when semantics is taken as 
given for either a thought or a natural language sentence and that philosophy may be 
distinct from science in that the latter aims at truth. 
This assumption that science is distinct from philosophy is quickly confirmed 
by the TLP. Thus, "[p]hilosophy is not one of the natural sciences (The word 
                                                 
78 As, e.g., Glock (1999), 427-37) notes, this places Wittgenstein within the critical tradition of Kant 
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‘philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural 
sciences, not beside them)" (TLP 4.111). This quote emerges fairly clearly from the 
above. Indeed, if science is concerned with establishing if some possible picture 
actually describes an obtaining fact in the world, philosophy's concerns are sui 
generis. Notice, first, that this means that the idea of a "scientific philosophy" implies 
a category mistake (cf. Russell, e.g., (1914)). Second, pursuant to this, it is best to 
read Wittgenstein's own points as not offering a paradoxical theory of language. 
Indeed, Kuusela is quite right in insisting that Wittgenstein's "logical insights don't 
find their expression… in theoretical true/false assertions. Rather, they are 
embodied… into the notation… whereby it is important that to be in possession of a 
notation- i.e., certain linguistic or logical tools- is not yet to make a statement… about 
anything" ((2011), 134). In other words, the points are heuristic devices meant to 
teach us philosophy. Third, the parenthetical comment in TLP 4.111 is interesting for 
two reasons. One, the spatial metaphor in play further stresses a radical break between 
science and philosophy. Two, the alignment reading emphasizes that this quote should 
be paired with the claim that Wittgenstein "found, on all essential points, the final 
solution of the problems [of philosophy]… [And] the value of this work consists is 
that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved" (TLP preface: 4- 
emphasis mine). The alignment reading stresses that this seems to mean that 
Wittgenstein places philosophy below science in that the problems of philosophy are 
not factual matters that can be solved. Instead, they betoken confusions and nonsense. 
As it were, philosophy cleans up messes. Further, Wittgenstein is quite derisive here 
and often suggests that many of these messes are themselves products of philosophy 
poorly done. 
This derisive attitude, in turn, explains the few examples of philosophical 
confusion Wittgenstein mentions. He stresses confusion concerning the ‘is' of identity 
and predication (TLP 3.323) and treating adjectives as nouns (TLP 4.003). It is 
critical to notice that both problems are neither the result of some problem with the 
determinate logical structure per se- indeed, there can be no problems with the formal 
aspect of thought- nor, more critically, with natural language semantics per se. As it 
were, no woman-on-the-street understands the sentence "Sally is nice" as some 
bizarre identity statement between Sally and some abstract x. Rather, this sort of 
confusion emerges as a direct result of trying to do philosophy badly. E.g., consider 
Wittgenstein's acerbic review of Coffey's work on logic.  Wittgenstein flags Coffey's 
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confusion of  "the copula ‘is' with the word ‘is' expressing identity. (the word ‘is' has 
obviously different meanings in the propositions- ‘twice two is four' and ‘Socrates is 
mortal')" (PO 3- emphasis mine). Thus, Wittgenstein finds this confusion about ‘is' to 
be both familiar in philosophy and absurd for anyone outside it. Indeed, Wittgenstein 
closes by noting that the "worst of such books as this is that they prejudice sensible 
people against the study of Logic" (ibid- emphasis mine). The point here is that the 
work of philosophy is not establishing truth or falsity but cleaning up messes. 
However, this leaves unclear both how these confusions arise as well as how 
philosophy dissolves them.  
In turn, both find an answer in TLP 4.112. I note that this point is the heart of 
the alignment reading's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Ergo, I divide the examination 
of this quote into several paragraphs. To begin, "[p]hilosophy aims at the logical 
clarification of thoughts" (TLP 4.112). Recall, as noted in section 4.0, this quote 
problematizes the straightforward reading. The work of philosophy clarifies thoughts 
as much as natural language. To make sense of this, the alignment reading relies on its 
distinction between the formal and content aspects of thought proffered in section 4.1. 
The former, again, is perfectly in order and clear to the thinker as it has no content, is 
not about anything, and so cannot be true (or false) of anything. However, where 
things go wrong is when someone confuses the correlated determinate logical 
structure that is projected onto the possible state of affairs. Specifically, she may 
attempt to correlate a determinate logical structure, though not the one the proposition 
really has, with the features of the (possible) state-of-affairs that do not share the same 
logical multiplicity (e.g., TLP 4.04-4.041). For example79, the problem with the 
sentence/thought that "the present king of France is kindly" is not a formal aspect of 
thought per se- e.g., F(a)- nor with the semantics of the sentence in natural language- 
as though we did not really know what the sentence means. Rather, the problems 
emerge when I take the proposition to have the formal aspect F(a) and then try to 
correlate F(a) to "the present king of France is kindly" by assigning to "a" "the present 
king of France" and "F" "is kindly." In turn, this mismatches generates "deep" 
confusions. We may say, with Meinong and Guns N' Roses, "welcome to the jungle!", 
we may try to deny that the sentence really makes sense, we may argue that there are 
truth-gappy sentences, etc. In any case, the critical cause of philosophical confusion is 
                                                 
79 See (Russell (1968), 39-56). 
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when we misalign or, better said, misconstrue the semantics of a thought and the 
determinate logical structure of a thought. So philosophy's job is clarifying this. 
Notice, before moving on that the alignment reading insists that such a misalignment 
is just a more "sophisticated version" of trying to pair to "Sally is nice" and the 
logically determinate structure a=b. However, this leaves open how philosophy 
promises to clarify such misalignment and so eliminate it.   
To address this, Wittgenstein insists that "[p]hilosophy is not a body of 
doctrine but an activity" (TLP 4.112). This sentence has two interdependent roles 
here. First, it further clarifies how philosophy is distinct from the sciences. Philosophy 
is not in the business of establishing true results that could make up a body of 
doctrine. Second, philosophy is an activity we engage in. For the alignment reading, it 
is critical to recall that projection and meaning assignments are also things we do. 
Indeed, "[a] propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought" (TLP 3.5- 
emphasis mine) and, further, that "[t]he correct method in philosophy would really be 
the following… whenever someone wanted to say something metaphysical, to 
demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions" (TLP 6.53). In turn, these quotes suggest that philosophy is an activity 
we engage in that assures us that our signs have been given meaning (i.e., projected 
properly). Thus, philosophy aligns the formal and content aspects of thought. 
However, it is still unclear how exactly philosophy achieves this. 
Wittgenstein's next sentence answers precisely this point. Thus, "[a] 
philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations" (TLP 4.112). To understand 
this, the alignment reading notes that Wittgenstein has already introduced the concept 
of "elucidation." Thus, "[t]he meaning of primitive signs can only be explained by 
means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. 
So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known" 
(TLP 3.263). Further, "I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an 
expression (or a symbol)…An expression is the mark of a form and a content" (TLP. 
3.31). First, notice that keeping with the alignment reading, these quotes suggest that 
philosophy can only begin when the semantic content of a thought is taken as given. 
We can only elucidate a proposition when we have grasped the semantic content of 
the proposition. Second, pursuant to this, these two quotes give a very particular role 
to elucidation. The best way to see this is in terms of the lexical priority of the content 
aspect of thought over the formal aspect of thought. We begin from symbols that 
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already have projective relationships with the world. We then abstract from this 
semantic content signs. However, we must not be misled. A sign is not to be taken as 
a token- e.g., sound waves or scribbles. This is because, simply, tokens do not have 
logical-combinatorial possibilities. Rather, a sign is an abstraction from the form and 
content of a symbol to the form alone and the combinatorial possibilities therein. 
Indeed, tellingly, Wittgenstein calls simple names that denote objects, signs and not 
symbols (e.g., TLP 3.201). Granting this, third, a philosophical elucidation is moving 
from the already-given semantics of a natural language sentence or a thought to the 
determinate logical structure it has. We prescind or sublimate out of, the logical 
structure out of the presupposed semantics. To return to our example, we begin with 
the semantics "the present king of France is kindly" already has. From this, we begin 
elucidating. First, we notice that the definite description "the present king of France" 
is not the same as a referring noun like "Sally." Granting this, we then move to the 
determinate logical structure ∃x(P(x)∧∀y(P(y)→y=x)∧Q(x)). Moreover, this 
structure, which the semantics of the natural language really must have for the 
projection to work, moots all the above worries. There are no subsisting beasts, no 
gappy truth-values, and no real reason we do not understand the sentence. These only 
arise when we try to pair "the present king of France is kindly" with F(a) since the 
logical multiplicity of F(a) is wrong. Critically, we see this all this in one go. 
The next sentence reinforces all of the above and adds some new features. 
Thus "[p]hilosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions,' but rather in the 
clarification of propositions" (TLP 4.111). First, again, it reminds us that 
philosophical activity is not science. Second, it reiterates that formal aspects of 
thoughts are not about anything at all. Indeed, ∃x(P(x)∧∀y(P(y)→y=x)∧Q(x)), 
F(a), etc., are, as it were, dead. They are bereft of all semantic content. Thus, 
‘philosophical proposition' is a misnomer, as Wittgenstein notes via quotation. Third, 
what the process of moving from the already given semantics of the symbols up to the 
signs and their combinatorial possibilities and multiplicities does is clarify the 
proposition. "The cheese is soft" or "Jen is loving" require determinate logical 
structures for the projection to have worked. So we simply distill that structure from 
the sentences. 
  The last sentence claims "[w]ithout philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy 
and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries" (TLP 
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4.112). First, critically, Wittgenstein does not think that philosophy is merely a cause 
of confusion. To understand this, the alignment reading stresses that Wittgenstein’s 
"as it were" caveat is best read as him indicating that it is not that the thoughts or 
natural language sentences, either their formal or content aspect, which are cloudy or 
indistinct in themselves. Rather, it is we who confuse ourselves about it, we who see 
them through a mirror darkly. Further, this tendency to confuse ourselves about 
thoughts and sentences is not always a product of philosophy done badly. Indeed, 
race, class, sex, gender, nationality, etc., can lend themselves to the same sort of 
confusion that "nothing," "for all," or "the griffin" do.80 Further, by making the 
determinate logical structure clear, we thereby clarify what sort the inferential and 
deductive role of sentences can really have. As it were, to confuse "the American 
man" with a referring name leads one to draw all sorts of bizarre, and possibly 
problematic, inferences and deductions. Only philosophy as elucidation can help 
rectify this (cf. TLP 4.0031). Second, the activity of philosophy does not produce 
results in that philosophy does not create new thoughts. Rather, philosophy is the 
activity that clarifies thoughts. Finally, third, the elucidatory activity is simply part of 
clear thinking itself. Indeed, had Polyphemus the Cyclops studied under Russell, 
Odysseus clever trick with "nobody" would not have worked as Polyphemus would 
simply see that "nobody" is not a proper name, despite appearances. Also, he would 
not have lost his eye either. Thus, though my presentation has made it appear as 
though there are discreet stages within this process, this is an artifact of the 
presentation. Ideally, when we are thinking clearly, we simply see that "the 
American" is not like "Sally," that "nobody" is not like a proper name, and so on. 
However, by insisting that we take the semantic content as already given, and 
assuming that this content carries with its coloring, non-logical associative 
connections, etc., then don't we run the risk of psychologism in logic? Wittgenstein 
answer is that "[p]sychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other 
natural science… Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of 
thought-processes, which philosophers used to consider so essential to the philosophy 
of logic? Only in most cases they got entangled in unessential psychological 
investigations, and with my method too there is an analogous risk" (TLP 4.1121- 
                                                 
80 Following Janik and Toulmin (1996), 67-91 & 120-201, it seems to me that, in this key, Wittgenstein 
is interested in a form of cultural-political criticism. Misconstruing these concepts is often deleterious 
and lead to odd essentialist claims about groups, strange inferences about class, and so on. 
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emphasis mine). Notice that Wittgenstein accepts the above concern. If philosophy 
necessarily assumes the semantics of the propositions it elucidates, and these 
propositions possess "essential and accidental features" (TLP 3.334), then we are 
always in danger of confusing the accidental for the essential. However, since a 
proposition or thought "cannot… depict its pictorial form" (TLP 2.172), such a risk 
cannot be avoided. As it were, we cannot "step outside of language" to ensure that the 
projection and the determinate logical structure align. We must do so from within. 
  From here, we are told that "Darwin's theory has no more to do with 
philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science" (TLP 4.1122). The 
alignment reading sees this rather odd note as naturally following from the above. 
Specifically, if clarification of thoughts depends on assumed semantics and this 
assumed semantics does bring psychological features- that we should try to guard 
against- in their wake, perhaps biology can help us as undoubtedly our psychology 
depends on us having brains. The terseness of this reply shows Wittgenstein thinks 
this is a mad category mistake. If psychology has no role in logic, then biology is 
beyond the pale. 
  The last four points close out the section by reflecting on the overall 
metaphilosophy. We are told that "[p]hilosophy sets the limits to the much disputed 
sphere of the natural sciences" (TLP 4.113). The alignment reading views this quote 
as emphasizing that confusing philosophy and science is a profound mistake. 
Specifically, the attempt to expand these sciences into the realm of logic, and ergo 
ignoring the limits of the sphere of natural sciences, deteriorates into a gingersnap 
view of numbers (i.e., Frege (1980), vii). Further, and worse, it mistakes intrinsic and 
extrinsic kinds of inquiries. We want to do good science provided that we are 
interested in establishing which logical pictures actually obtain. However, one can 
imagine people who are not so interested and, for them, science would be a waste of 
time.81 By contrast, thinking is not something we can opt out of. Granting this, and 
that philosophy has no aim other than the logical clarification of thoughts, doing 
philosophy may not be something we can avoid. Indeed, as we discuss further in 
section 3, the philosophical activity and clear thought are internally related. 
Next, we are told that "[i]t must set limits to what can be thought; and, in 
doing so, what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by 
                                                 
81 For example, Pyrrhonism and the goal of "suspending judgment" is probably not something that 
science can help achieve.  
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working outwards through what can be thought" (TLP 4.114). Again, the alignment 
reading makes sense of this in terms of the formal and content aspects of thought. In 
effect, we begin from what can be thought- i.e., propositions in their projective 
relationship with possible facts- we distill formal aspects of these- i.e., the 
determinate logical structure that the simple names manifest in concatenation with 
other names- we run through all the permutations of these formal aspects using the 
recursive definition Wittgenstein offers (TLP 6.01), and, voilà, the limit of the formal 
aspect of thought is set from within.82   
  From here, we are also told that "[i]t will signify what cannot be said, by 
presenting clearly what can be said" (TLP 4.115). The alignment reading takes this as 
further evidence of the deep interdependences between thought and language. In 
effect, this point follows from the previous one since by showing the structure of 
thought, we have also shown the structure of language.   
  The final point recapitulates the argument. Thus "[w]hat can be thought at all 
can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly" (TLP 
4.116). First, language and thought are deeply intertwined. Second, thought-in-
projection needs both a meaning assignment and a determinate logical structure. 
Third, these two aspects are always already in place for philosophy to begin and can 
only be separated for heuristic purposes. Fourth, the role of philosophy is just 
distilling the correct formal aspect of thought from already-known semantics. 
  Thus, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy in the TLP relies on a heuristic 
conception of thought that has both a formal aspect and a content aspect. However, 
such distinctions are heuristic and meant to teach us to think. The sentence "the 
unicorn is majestic" necessarily has a particular determinate logical structure to have 
the semantics it does. However, there are two related temptations. One of them is that 
we misinterpret the depth grammar. The other is that we think that the "depth 
grammar" just hangs out happily in Frege-space and has nothing whatever to do with 
actual propositions. So Wittgenstein tries to undermine both while trying to teach us 
to think using logical tools. Moreover, this "goal" of teaching us to think is merely 
learning self-care (e.g., CV p. 6). We are already thinking, we already know the 
semantics of sentences, etc. Wittgenstein only helps us do what we must do to be 
human, better. 
                                                 
82 I follow (Horwich 2012), 84-88), and his interpretation of the "N-operator" to a large extent. 
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5.3 The TLP's Metaphilosophy: Simple Clear Thinking: 
 
  With this in view, I close by both proffering a gloss on the metaphilosophy 
discussed above that further focuses on the process of clarification as well as setting 
the stage for the following chapters. To begin, a metaphilosophical approach that 
emphasizes process in earlier Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy must make sense of the 
relationship the process has with clear thinking. Specifically, I argue that, for earlier 
Wittgenstein, the process of philosophy results in clear thought and, more 
importantly, that without the philosophical process, one cannot have clear thought. 
First, let us discuss the ‘internal relation’ between clear thoughts and the 
philosophical activity more carefully. Second, let us discuss an objection to this view. 
Third, let us set the stage for the next chapters by noting the preconceptions that 
earlier Wittgenstein’s account of the philosophical activity rests on. 
 First, the most critical quote for the my metaphilosophical interpretation of the 
TLP is the claim that “[w]ithout philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and 
indistinct: its task is to make them clear and give them sharp boundaries” (TLP 
4.1121). Notice that this quote clearly relates clear thought and philosophy together in 
a manner that is internal. Indeed, if one grants that a plausible paraphrase of this is “if 
there is no philosophy, then thoughts are unclear,” by contrapositive, we have “if 
thoughts are clear, then there is philosophy.” Thus, philosophizing (when it succeeds) 
simply produces clear thoughts and without philosophizing, clear thoughts are not 
produced. In turn, this has profound ramifications. First, I examine how ascribing a 
clarifying metaphilosophy to earlier Wittgenstein helps make good sense of several 
parts of the TLP as well as Wittgenstein’s biography. Then, I argue that the 
implication of this gloss, i.e., that if someone does not do philosophy, they do not 
think clearly, is defensible and compelling.   
For earlier Wittgenstein, the claim that philosophy and clear thought are 
related in such a way that the success of philosophizing is the clarity of thought makes 
sense of several exegetical puzzles. One, Wittgenstein’s dismissive attitude to the 
supposed ‘problems’ of philosophy can be explained in a rather straightforward way 
(cf. TLP preface 4). Such ‘problems’ only emerge when one is not thinking clearly, 
which is to say, when one is not engaged in the activity of philosophy or else one is 
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failing to do the activity properly. In other words, it is only when philosophizing fails 
to succeed that one is left with the sort of muddles that plague ‘robust’ philosophy. 
Indeed, this point makes sense of Wittgenstein’s Janus-faced use of “philosophy” in 
the TLP. To philosophize is, as it were, an accomplishment verb. When it fails to 
work properly, philosophy engenders confusion in much the same way that a failed 
explanation engenders confusion. From there, and as discussed in chapter three, 
philosophy may make matters worse by attempting to be ‘robust’ or ‘T-
philosophical.’ In contrast, when philosophizing succeeds, we grasp the “depth” 
determinate logical structure that a sentence already must have to have the semantic 
content it does. Two, pursuant to this, the silence at the end of the book (TLP 7) is 
neither the nihilistic destruction of philosophy nor a sort of mystical moment. It is 
simply the realization that when philosophizing has succeeded in clarifying a thought, 
one has a clear thought: when one has a clear thought, the task of philosophizing is 
over. Indeed, the now clear thought passes over into science and we pass over into 
silence. Three, the ‘only correct method’ is strikingly Socratic. Specifically, let us 
focus on how we “demonstrate to him [someone whose thinking is not yet clear] that 
he had failed to meaning to certain signs in his proposition” (TLP 6.54). One way to 
make sense of this method is to bring in a radicalized version of the Fregean context 
principle, make stipulations concerning the nature of nonsense, and so on. However, a 
far more intuitive way to interpret the correct method is that it is a method that simply 
asks a conversation partner to spell out her claims- i.e., clarify her term. In turn, this 
may force her into an aporia wherein she realizes that her thoughts are not clear or 
else it can help her better grasp her own thoughts by helping here sublimate the 
determinate logical structure and the meaning assignments the semantics of her 
expressions depend on. In any case, such a method “would not be satisfying to the 
other person” (ibid) and may result in drinking hemlock, it clarifies the other person’s 
thoughts by either helping her grasp the place of her term in determinate logical 
structure her thought already has or else showing her that something has gone wrong.  
Four, related to this, both methods rely on ignorance to function properly. Earlier 
Wittgenstein claims no insight into, e.g., the nature of nonsense. Instead, he and 
Socrates simply ask that someone spell something out to them- i.e., that they clarify a 
term by exhibiting the ‘part’ of the determinate logical structure and the semantic 
value they have assigned to it. Thus, philosophy has nothing whatever to do with 
knowledge per se (TLP 4.111).  
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In addition to this, ascribing a metaphilosophy that focuses on the 
philosophical process to earlier Wittgenstein makes sense of biographical oddities in 
his life. Monk points out that “[E]verything in his life [Wittgenstein’s] was 
subordinated to the twin search- the single search, as I would claim- for philosophical 
clarity and ethical Anstaendigkiet (decency)” (Monk (2001), 12. See also Glock 
(2001), 213). Indeed, Wittgenstein’s fanatical obsession with “clarity” is so well 
attested to that they do not require much comment. Critically, the method earlier 
Wittgenstein used to engender clarity is philosophy as an activity. And, conversely, 
his commitment to clarity requires his commitment to the philosophical activity.  
However, be this as it may, the reader may insist that the paraphrase of TLP 
4.1121 and the contrapositive, are indefeasible. Indeed, such a view implies that if 
someone is not doing philosophy (i.e., engaged in the clarifying activity), then they do 
not have clear thoughts. Though extremely bold, I argue that the contention can be 
supported on historical, psychological, and philosophical grounds.  
Historically, let us begin with Wittgenstein and then move to our own time. To 
begin, as Janik & Toulmin (1973), note, it is imperative to keep in mind that, in 
Wittgenstein’s time, certain un-clarities in thought/language- e.g., those concerning 
“Race,” “the Nation,” etc.- as well as the first systematic use of mass propaganda83 on 
the part of governments, allowed for the construction of dreamscapes of words 
unattached from any concrete reality and yet powerful enough to motivate millions to 
die and kill in the conflagration of two world wars. Suffice it to say, the assumption 
that without some sort of clarifying activity, ghostly pseudo-names like “the Nation,” 
and ghastly ersatz-essentialism concerning “the X Race,” lead people to the very gates 
of hell, must have appeared as a simple and undeniable fact, not only to Wittgenstein 
but most intellectuals of that time.84 Turning to our time, it seems to me, at any rate, 
that exactly these traps (and the horrifying consequences of falling for them), still 
exist today. Indeed, such systematic un-clarities are depressingly common, as a glance 
at a paper or the nightly news show. Indeed, it is striking how readily people rely on 
terms/concepts without any clear idea of what the mean, what follows from them, 
what can support them, and so on. Without being clear on these matters, we run 
substantial risks. Notice that this historical note seems to repudiate the assumption 
                                                 
83 Welch (2014) discusses this at length.  
84 Indeed, this hypothesis seems well confirmed. Modernism in art, literature, analytic philosophy (e.g., 
Matar (2015)), etc., shows a fanatical quest to invent modes of expression that prevented the 
emergence of these sorts of psudo-abstractions.  
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that ‘the Folk’ are clear and that only philosophers muddy the waters. In point of fact, 
‘the Folk’ are not clear and we do not ‘fall from grace’ when we begin studying 
philosophy, a point we turn to more fully in the next two paragraphs. In any case, this 
explains Wittgenstein’s fanatical obsession with philosophizing and clear thought. 
Getting clear is not merely ‘academic’ as words are the first weapon we reach for in 
war and the best salve to bring about peace.  
Pursuant to this, psychologically, it has been fairly well established that ‘the 
Folk,’ without some sort of training in a clarifying activity, are terrible at even basic 
inferences, deductions, and so on. To take one well-researched example, consider 
Wason selection tasks and their endless iterations and variations (e.g., Wason (1966), 
for the original paper).85 A standard version is as follows. Imagine you are presented 
with four cards marked with E, K, 4 and 7. You are told that the letter cards have 
numbers on the opposite side and that the number cards have letters on the opposite 
side. You are then asked to select all and only the cards that can show if the following 
rule is true or false: if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on 
the other. Clearly, this is a material conditional and so, by modus ponens, we should 
select E and, by modus tollens, we should select the 7. Shockingly, a recent meta-
analysis of 300 studies claims that, on average, 5% of participants get it right (e.g., 
Ragni, Kola & Johnson-Laird (2017), 981). Without philosophizing, it seems, 95% of 
us do not think clearly.  
Finally, the claim that, without philosophy, people do not think clearly can be 
supported on purely philosophical grounds, as the argument I reconstruct from parts 
of the TLP shows. To bring this into view, recall that, for the TLP, the cause of un-
clarity is our tendency to misalign the determinate logical structure a thought/sentence 
has and its semantic content. Indeed, it is our tendency to confuse ourselves about 
thoughts that gives rise to the problems.86 Thus, much as objects are “cloudy and 
indistinct” not due to features of the objects, but our perspective on them, so too 
thoughts are “cloudy and indistinct” not due to some problem with them, but how we 
construe them. In turn, our tendency to misconstrue our thoughts arises from the fact 
that a human being “possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing 
every sense without having any idea how each word has a meaning or what its 
                                                 
85 As with all social sciences, there is an ongoing debate concerning the methodology of the study, the 
meaning of the results, the phrasing of the question, and so on.  
86 I thank Ms. Nicole Rathgeb for this formulation.  
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meaning is- just as people speak without knowing how individual sounds are 
produced” (TLP 4.002-empahsis mine). In other words, practically speaking, people 
know-how to use, understand, and so on, language (e.g., TLP 3.326). However, 
people go wrong in that they do not have a proper theoretical grasp on the determinate 
logical structure, and its inferential relationships with other thoughts, that the 
thought’s semantics presupposes to function. Notice that this makes sense in that 
understanding a claim like “if a card has a vowel, then it has an even number on the 
back” is different than seeing that P->Q (TFTT) is the same as ¬Q-> ¬P (TFTT). 
Further, if one grants that there is a break between knowing-how to do something and 
being able to articulate it or give a theoretical account (e.g., Ryle (1946)), then there is 
sound philosophical reason to maintain that we there is a constant tendency confuse 
ourselves on these basic points as we have no properly grasped the determinate 
logical structures and their interrelationships. In turn, philosophizing (when it 
succeeds) “gives thought sharp boundaries” by making sure that we just see the 
determinate logical structure and the inferential relations it has with other clear 
thoughts.  
Thus, a metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein’s TLP that focuses 
on the process of philosophy seeks to establish an internal connection between the 
philosophical activity and clear thoughts. Specifically, that philosophizing (when it 
succeeds) engenders clear thoughts and that only philosophizing can do this. Though a 
bold claim, I have argued that it both helps make sense of the TLP and Wittgenstein’s 
biography as well as being defensible on independent grounds. However, there is still 
a lurking problem. To see this clearly, consider that in “the course of our 
conversations Russell would often exclaim: ‘Logic’s hell!’- and tis perfectly expresses 
the feeling we had” (CV p. 30e). Granting this, it may be that the price of the 
philosophizing is simply too high. Indeed, given the above paragraph’s claim that we 
already know-how to use and understand language, coupled with the claim that, for 
earlier Wittgenstein, we must take semantic content as already given, it may be that 
such an endeavor is not worthwhile. Climbing a mounting is certainly ‘internally 
related’ to being on the peak but maybe the peak isn’t worth getting to. To address 
this worry, let us examine “thought” first and then turn to “clarity.” 
 For the "thought" portion, the key is that we have no ‘opt out’ ability here. We 
may decide we are no longer interested in building structurally sound bridges. In that 
case, engineering is useless. However, when we turn to thinking, the relationship is 
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different in kind. To stop thinking requires a thought that one stops thinking or else 
death, which is to say, ceasing to be human at all. This point can be buttressed further 
by recalling the tight interdependency between thought and language noted in the last 
section. Indeed, if one grants that thought and language are deeply interwoven, we 
can say that one cannot opt out exactly because one cannot choose to not understand a 
language one already knows.87 We hear English, not sounds, see words on blinking 
neon store signs, not flashing colors, and trying to get to the sounds or colors requires 
a great deal of work. Furthermore, clearly the TLP’s method of taking semantics as 
already given presupposes that one already understands the semantics in question. 
Indeed, to engage with the TLP at all presupposes that one is reading, understanding, 
and thinking in the first place! Finally, in a slightly different key and to presage a bit, 
the PI and its discussion of "thinking" (PI § 466- § 470), hint at precisely this. We do 
not think because it pays. It is merely part of the sorts of beings we are. Thus, 
especially when given a linguistic twist, thinking is simply not the sort of thing we 
can stop doing, anymore than we can stop understanding someone’s English because 
what-is-said is unpleasant, say. As it were, we are stuck with it. 
With this in view, we turn to the “clarity” part. Though we know-how to think 
and understand already, I have argued that, for various reasons, we always risk 
confusing ourselves concerning the thoughts/sentences. From here, if we further that 
that clarity is preferable to confusion as to have a confused thought is not to 
understand the thought properly, then it follows that “clarity” for thinking is just an 
internal good. Thus, even if logic or philosophy is hell, we are stuck with them.  
In closing, it is critical to notice that the internal relationship between the 
philosophical activity and clear thinking depends on a particular conception of both 
the semantics of natural language expressions as well as a particular sort of 
philosophy of logic.88 To wit, an expression has the semantic content it does because 
it is constitutively related to a possible fact via a determinate logical structure. Indeed, 
as common wisdom has it, thought/language and the world relate solely by a logical 
isomorphism. In turn, philosophizing is the process of sublimating out of this 
                                                 
87 Kenny (1989) calls this sort of relationship a “one way power.” 
88 I use "philosophy of logic" as a catch-all for any inquiry that attempts to understand the relationship 
between, e.g., sentences and propositions, "John" and logical objects, etc. This is a relatively standard 
way of thinking about the philosophy of logic; it seems to me. For a general account, see Wolfram 
(1989), 2-6. For application to this Wittgenstein see, e.g., Maddy (2014), Greve (2017), Kuusela 
(2014).     
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semantics a theoretical grasp of the determinate logical structure in play. As we shall 
see, for a host of interconnected reasons, later Wittgenstein came to view the 
preconceptions at work in both the TLP’s philosophy of logic and its account of the 
semantic content of expressions as indefensible. In turn, this realization forced him to 
reimagine the nature of the philosophical activity and the ways clear thinking works. 
It is to this we turn. 
 
5.4 Conclusion: 
 
 This chapter has presented an alignment reading of the TLP. Specifically, it 
relied on a three-stage conception of thought to make sense of what the philosophical 
activity is, how it relates to clarification, and how it engenders clear thought. 
Succinctly, it argued that all confusion emerges as a result of a misalignment between 
a determinate logical structure and semantic content. It also linked together clarity and 
the philosophical process together in such a way that doing philosophy results in clear 
thoughts. It further contended that without philosophy, one does not have clear 
thoughts. 
 Alas, however, this account misfires, or so later Wittgenstein argues. 
Specifically the underlying assumption that all forms of confusion, muddles, etc., 
arise from one, and only one, sort of mistake, is something that the later Wittgenstein 
rejects problematic (see Kuusela (2008), 65-73 for a similar account). Indeed, there is 
not one problem, but a host of them, each demanding rather different methods. The 
next two chapters spell out how Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy of logic and 
description repudiate the TLP and reject several of its preconceptions. This sets the 
stage for chapter 8.  
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6 Chapter 6: Desublimated Logic and Pragmatic 
Representation:  
 
 In the last chapter, we put forward a reading of the TLP that argued that a 
determinate logical structure is partly constitutive of an expression’s semantic 
content. In other words, the meaning of a proposition is its determinate logical 
structure combined with its content (i.e., the projective relationship between the 
structure and the world). This chapter examines later Wittgenstein's reimagining of 
the nature of logic and its relationship to language and semantics. It focuses on PI § 
89- § 108. I argue that, for later Wittgenstein, a critical shift is how representation 
works. In effect, and in a rough way for now, for later Wittgenstein, logic is not a 
constitutive feature of meaning but, instead, a way of representing sentences as 
propositions for specific purposes. I stress here that by “logic” I mean formal calculi 
or ‘concept-scripts’ of the sort that, e.g., Russell and Whitehead (1967), 216-223, or 
Frege (1967), 1-82, utilize. Especially given that ‘middle’ Wittgenstein often uses 
“logic” as a synonym for “grammar,” circumspect readers should keep this in mind. 
First, I set the stage and discuss the TLP's philosophy of logic as well as why PI § 89- 
§ 108 arise where they do in the PI and why the TLP’s philosophy of logic seems so 
irresistible (e.g., PI § 103). Next, I examine later Wittgenstein's response to the TLP’s 
conception of logic in terms of a diagnostic investigation that aims to make a tension 
between the crystalline purity of logic and the cloudiness of natural language 
intolerable (e.g. PI § 107). Finally, I examine later Wittgenstein's corrective response 
to the TLP. I argue that later Wittgenstein does not dispute the TLP's understanding of 
logic per se, nor does he attempt "bargaining any of its [logic's] the rigor out of it" (PI 
§ 108). However, he radically alters how logic and language relate to one another. 
Specifically, I argue that later Wittgenstein shifts from a constitutive account of logic 
to a representational one that sees logic as one way of representing language. In turn, 
this paves the way for our discussion of "description" in the next chapter and our 
engagement with "semantics" in chapter eight. 
 
6.0 The Formal Aspects of Thoughts and Ghosts of the Third Realm: 
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  This section examines later Wittgenstein's discussion of the TLP and its 
insistence that the semantics of natural language expressions depend on a determinate 
logical structure. To begin, I set the stage by reminding the reader of the TLP's 
philosophy of logic. Second, I examine why the PI's philosophy of logic emerges 
where it does in the text. Specifically, I argue that later Wittgenstein's fundamental 
question- i.e. "[i]n what way is logic something sublime?" (PI § 89)- emerges as a 
direct consequence of several interdependent attacks Wittgenstein launched on the 
preconceptions that ground the TLP's philosophy of logic. Finally, I discuss how this 
preconception of how logic and language relate seems to force an irresistible picture 
on us. Specifically, that it makes it seem as though "the ideal must be in reality; for 
we think we already see it there" (PI § 101), just below the “surface grammar.” 
To set the stage, recall that earlier Wittgenstein insisted that the semantic 
content of any and all expressions necessarily have a determinate logical structure. 
This, in turn, is grounded in Wittgenstein's assumption that: the sole function of 
language is asserting propositions (e.g., TLP 4.5); the content of an asserted 
proposition is a picture (e.g., TLP 4.06); this picture relates to a possible facts by both 
sharing the same logical form (e.g., TLP 2.2); such picturing is constitutive of the 
semantics of natural language in that the content of expressions just are these pictures 
(e.g., TLP  4. See Foglin (1987), 20-25, for an apt summary). Thus, succinctly, 
language and the world stand in a 2-place representing relationship that depends on 
logic. In other words, and as conventional wisdom has it, the TLP assumes that a 
logical isomorphism necessarily obtains between a proposition and a possible fact.89 
As it were, a proposition has the semantic content it does because it "pictures" a 
possible fact and this picture is partly constituted by the determinate logical structure 
the picture shares with the possible fact (e.g., TLP 2.2). 
In turn, this made elucidation a process of prescinding from, or subliming out 
of, the solid and assumed semantics of natural language, the determinate logical 
structure that the semantics already has. It also gave the TLP an intuitive and 
compelling answer to the question of how logic and language relate. To wit, "younger 
Wittgenstein argued that such formal languages articulated the covert underlying 
structure of ordinary thought and language" (Williamson (forthcoming), 6). Finally, it 
                                                 
89 This claim must be handled with care. As chapter five argued, the determinate logical structure 
between a proposition and a possible fact is best thought of as a "scaffolding" ( e.g., 4.023) as it has no 
semantics off its own bat. 
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made philosophy exactly what the TLP claimed it should be- an activity whose aim is 
clarifying a thought/sentence/representation by ensuring that the determinate logical 
structure the representation presupposes, and our understanding of this structure, 
align. The key uptake is that  "[w]he we say, mean, that such-and-such is the case, 
then, with what we mean [i.e., a determinate logical form], we do not stop anywhere 
short of the fact, but mean: such-and-such—-is -– thus-and-so" (PI § 95).  
With this in view, we can turn to the placement of later Wittgenstein's 
reflections on the philosophy of logic. These emerge, as PI § 89 implies, as a response 
to Wittgenstein's sustained attack on several of the preconceptions that the TLP relies 
on to justify its philosophy of logic. Though these attacks are complicated, 
multifaceted, often hard to isolate or rationally reconstruct, etc. exegetically, I focus 
on three reasonably independent strains in this assault. These are:  (a) the PI's 
repudiation of the simple name-‘object' relationship; (b) the PI's assault on the 
supposed exactness and determinacy of the logical structure; (c) an apology for the 
‘haziness'90 of natural language and criticism of clarity. Let us take each in turn.  
(a) First, a critical preconception of the TLP's philosophy of logic is that a 
proposition can be analyzed down to simple names-‘objects' relationships. It is this 
that ensures both that a "proposition has one and only one complete analysis" (TLP 
3.25) and that "a proposition has a sense that is independent of the facts" (TLP 4.061 
See Maddy (2014), 37-48, for an apt account the implications). In effect, analysis or 
elucidation will ‘bottom out' in these simple name-‘object' denotations, and this 
ensures both that there is only one determinate logical structure and that we 
understand it without knowing if it is true or false (see NB p. 60-63 for Wittgenstein's 
discussion of this). Later Wittgenstein offers three intertwined criticism of this 
account. One, later Wittgenstein problematizes the denotation relationship by noting 
that there's no good way to philosophically account for how this name-‘object' 
relationship is supposed to work. A major target is ostensive definition (e.g., PI § 35). 
Succinctly, even pointing requires a context and, it seems, the only way to make sense 
of context is within language. However, the basic point of the later Wittgenstein's 
attack is that simply assuming such a denotation relationship is in place (e.g. TLP 
3.221) strains credulity as we have no clear individuation criteria to determine if a 
                                                 
90 I use ‘haziness' as a catch-all term that applies to vagueness, ambiguity, polysemy, homonymy as 
well as various pragmatic infelicities.   
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simple name "links with" an ‘object' and begs far too many questions (e.g., PI § 46- 
roughly § 52). Two, Wittgenstein problematizes the idea of ‘objects' or ‘metaphysical 
atoms' by insisting that the distinction between simple and complex is inherently 
contextual and cannot be made sense of in absolute terms (e.g., PI § 60). For example, 
there are some contexts where a broom is one object and others where it is composed 
of a brush and a stick. Three, Wittgenstein problematizes the simple name 
relationship by arguing that there is no way to ensure that they get the logical 
multiplicity right. For example, Wittgenstein forcefully argues in the game PI § 48. 
And his comments on it (e.g. § PI 53), that it is unclear if "R" refers to a red as such 
or a red-square. Moreover, this quickly causes problems both for individuation and 
for the relationship between "R" and the squares they describe. For example, is a red 
square really two red triangles? In turn, these three attacks cast profound doubt on the 
assumption that analysis will terminate in a set of simple concatenated names that 
denote ‘objects' or ‘metaphysical atoms' that constitute a possible fact. In turn, the end 
point of analysis, and the assumption that we reach a determinate logical structure is 
vitiated. 
(b) Second, and naturally following from (a) three, even granting that we 
isolate out the determinate logical structure in the elucidatory manner the TLP 
proposes, Wittgenstein problematizes the assumption that such a structure is 
"determinate" or "exact." He does this in three interrelated ways. One, he argues that, 
much like ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ are inherently contextual, so too are exactness and 
determinacy (e.g., PI § 96). In other words, a logical picture is determinate or exact 
only provided a contextual standard that accounts for what "determinate" or "exact" 
means (e.g., PI § 69). Two, Wittgenstein presages a bit here and hints at the rule-
following objection and the problems that emerge by trying to insist that certain rules 
or logical structures simply explain themselves to us (e.g., PI § 85). Three, 
Wittgenstein insists that we understand many features of the use of natural language 
in spite of their "inexactness" or "indeterminacy." For example, "the ground is quite 
covered with plants" (PI § 70) is a sentence whose semantic content is clear, even 
when the speaker has not defined what "plant" is or what she is willing to count as a 
plant. In turn, this casts doubt on the assumption that the determinate logical structure 
is "exact," immune from any sort of misinterpretation and required to make sense of 
our actual practices and ways with words. 
 228  
(c) Third, and perhaps most interesting, Wittgenstein insists that the TLP's 
conception of clarity is, in point of fact, a profoundly problematic philosophical 
dogma. Indeed, the TLP's assumptions about semantic content and the elucidatory 
method earlier Wittgenstein employs assume that there is only one type of 
philosophical mistake and only one set method of excising it (Kuusela (2008), 54-73, 
makes a similar point). Later Wittgenstein, by contrast, is skeptical of such a 
preconceived linkage. To bring this into view, it is best to examine later 
Wittgenstein's apology for the haziness of natural language, carried out on two 
interdependent lines. One, as, e.g., Cavell (1979), 168-190, Mulhall (2001), 52-70, 
and Travis (2006), 10-40, forcefully point out, Wittgenstein focuses our attention on 
the flexibility of language and our ability to project it to cover novel cases or new 
contexts (e.g., PI § 42). To take an example that I hope convinces the reader that this 
sort of projection is as much a part of physics as ‘everyday' language consider the 
term/concept "entropy." From a philosophical point of view, the term/concept is a 
tragi-comic farce.91 It has no clear extension, we are not in agreement about its sense 
(i.e., what its intension is), and, even defining the term clearly is incredibly tricky and 
inherently contested. However, critically, it is exactly this lack of a precise definition 
that allowed "entropy" to move, by halting analogies, utterly bizarre associative links, 
and von Neumann-y rhetorical flourishes (i.e., "You should call it entropy [i.e., the 
uncertainty function that Shannon discovered], for two reasons. In the first place, your 
uncertainty function has been used in statistical mechanics under that name, so it 
already has a name. In the second place, and more important, nobody knows what 
entropy really is, so in a debate, you will always have the advantage" (von Neumann- 
Quoted by Shannon (1971)-emphasis mine), from Carnot's concerns with steam 
engines through state equations about gases, into statistical ones, and to find a good 
home in information theory and a rather odd one in sociology. The point is that 
insisting on a certain inflexible form of logical clarity wherein all terms are 
regimented, all extensions clear, etc., seems to simply kill off essential aspects of the 
"logic of discovery" like analogies (e.g., Maxwell (2005), 157; see also Hesse (1963), 
101-129), metaphors (e.g. Loettgers (2013)), abduction (e.g. Peirce (1998), 226-43), 
and so on. It is exactly because, strictly speaking, we have not defined, explicated, 
                                                 
91 Indeed, the classic study of early thermodynamics in named ‘a Tragicomic History of 
Thermodynamics' (Truessel (1980)). For the difficulties with the term philosophically, see, e.g., Jaynes 
(1983), 77-86; Haglund, Jeppsson, and Stromdahl (2010).   
 229  
presified, or whatever other operation one wishes to use to ‘clarify' science's 
theoretical terms, "entropy" that it can "move" into seemingly unrelated areas and 
structure research in shockingly productive ways. Haziness is, thus, not always a 
problem for scientific research, but often may be a precondition for it. Two, even if 
"entropy" and related terms can be given an explication that avoids these worries and 
captures the "real meaning" of the term, there are features of natural language that 
simply do not function like this. For example, presifying "stand roughly here" ends up 
losing the role that the command plays in language (e.g., PI § 88). In turn, these two 
features should make us wary of the overly hasty assumption that clarification is 
always logical analysis or elucidation and always terminates in a perfectly sharp and 
sublimely determinate logical structure. Indeed, clarifying what one means by the 
order, "stand roughly there," is completely different than the sort of clarification that 
the TLP insists is properly philosophy. 
These attacks strike me as persuasive assaults on several tacit, and not so tacit, 
preconceptions at work in the TLP. However, this forces a problem on us. To wit, 
what is the relationship between logic and language? Can we maintain that logic is 
rigid, a priori, etc., and avoid the problematic aspects of the TLP's philosophy of 
logic? Above all, "[w]ith these considerations we find ourselves facing the problem: 
In what way is logic something sublime?" (PI § 89). Indeed, in spite of these attacks, 
the conception of logic as something sublime- something with diamond-like purity 
(e.g. PI § 107), perfect hardness (e.g. PI § 437) and, above all, as the "essence of 
language, of propositions, of thought" (PI § 92)- seems forced on us. This is for three 
interdependent reasons. One, and in spite of the above, we may still insist that a 
constitutive precondition for a semantic content is exactly its logical isomorphism 
between a proposition and a possible fact. In other words, x represents y only in virtue 
of the fact that x and y share a determinate logical structure. Indeed, without this, we 
run the risk of not having any account of how P(a), <Dan is fat>, and Dan’s being fat 
relate. Two, any attempt to modify the TLP's ‘picture of logic' may bargain  "its 
[logic's] rigour out of it" (PI § 108), something that is simply unacceptable. As it 
were, anything that counts as "logic" necessarily has exactly the essential 
interconnections between true and false, "&" and "v," and so on, that the TLP insisted 
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on.92 Without these connections, whatever we are talking about, simply cannot count 
as logic. Three, rejecting the TLP’s philosophy of logic seems to resurrect a ghost that 
earlier Wittgenstein sought to silence- the very idea of thinking "illogically." 
 
6.1 A Diagnostic Examination of the TLP's Philosophy of Logic: 
 
Thus, we seem faced with a deep tension. On the one hand, later Wittgenstein 
has offered us a battery of arguments that seem to undermine the preconceptions that 
the TLP's philosophy of logic rests on. On the other hand, it seems as though we are, 
nevertheless, committed to the TLP's account as abandoning it raises a host of worse 
issues. To adequately address this, Wittgenstein engages in a diagnostic investigation 
that seeks not to mitigate this tension, but to worsen it. In effect, Wittgenstein aims to 
make "[t]he conflict [between logical requirements and language as we find it] 
becomes intolerable" (PI  §107). By doing so, as we shall see, he achieves two things. 
First, he helps us realize that a drastic reimagining is required as we cannot simply 
‘live' with this tension or blithely claim that, ‘really' logic is in language, it is just so 
‘deep' that excavating it takes a terrible amount of work (e.g., PI § 102). Second, he 
begins to bring the actual "workings of our language" (PI § 109) into view by 
emphasizing aspects of language that the TLP account elided, ignored, or even 
condemned as outright nonsense. 
To begin, on the one hand, Wittgenstein notes that "logic seemed to have a 
peculiar depth- a universal significance. Logic lay… at the foundation of all the 
sciences.- For logical investigation explores the essence of all things" (PI § 89). As 
Shulte and Hacker note (PI endnote p. 249), the use of "essence" is critical here. 
Wittgenstein has used the word three times before this (PI § 1, PI § 46, PI  § 65), and 
has a fairly standard definition in mind, it seems. To wit, by "essence" Wittgenstein 
means a set of independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that is 
constitutively required for something to be count as something else. And, indeed, this 
is exactly what the TLP's conception of the determinate logical structure and the 
projected relation seemed to give us. An utterance has a meaning because it is a 
                                                 
92 Of course, this is somewhat megalomaniacal on Wittgenstein's part. However, I do think that later 
Wittgenstein would simply reject modifications of logic like ‘fuzzy logic,' paraconsistent logic, etc., as 
just not being logic. 
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representation of a possible fact and it is a representation of a possible fact because 
the fact and representation share a determinate logical structure and we have assigned 
semantic value to the ‘parts’ of the structure. In turn, it is exactly this hunting for the 
essence that makes the TLP's philosophy of logic seem so irresistible. Thus, "[w]e 
think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there" (PI § 101). 
Indeed, the "strict and clear rules for the logical construction of a proposition [i.e., the 
determinate logical structure prescinded from the semantics] appears to us as 
something in the background… I already see them… for I do understand the sign, I 
mean something by it" (PI § 102- emphasis mine). In sum, granting the 
preconceptions of the TLP, the essence of language is the logical picture and what 
wears the constitutive pants is the logical isomorphism between words and world. 
Meaning/representation is constituted by logic! 
  However, on the other hand, this leads us to conclude that "there must be 
perfect order even in the vaguest sentences" (PI § 98). Such an unjustified insistence 
is problematic for several reasons. First are the criticisms of the TLP that noted above. 
For example "stand roughly here" does not seem capable of functioning properly if its 
logically determinate structure is sublimed out of it in a manner the TLP would 
accept. Second, Wittgenstein has taken great pains in the preceding sections of the PI 
to point out how heterogenic and multifaceted our conceptual-linguistic practices 
actually are. In turn, this should lead us to be very pessimistic that such a unified 
account of all language can be culled from the depth (Horwich (2015) makes this 
point with great force). Third, Wittgenstein notes that our quixotic quest for a 
determinate logical structure in even the vaguest sentences leads us to "become 
dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called ‘sentence,' words,' ‘signs.' The sentence 
and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut. 
And now we rack our brains over the nature of the real sign" (PI § 105). Indeed, from 
this commitment to sharpness in vagueness, "it seems we have to describe extreme 
subtleties, which again we are quite unable to describe… We feel as if we had to 
repair a torn spider's web with our fingers" (PI § 106).  
In turn, this terminates in the odd situation where the "more closely we 
examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our 
requirement [that semantics presupposes a determinate logical form]" (PI § 107). In 
other words, our preconceived demand that the essence of semantic content be its 
isomorphic logical relation with a possible fact, and the simple fact that I know what 
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someone yelling "damn it!" means after she burns herself, even though it is unclear 
what ‘possible fact' this relates to, cannot be reconciled with one another.93 Indeed, 
attempting such a reconciliation, for later Wittgenstein, quickly leads into utter ad 
hocery where we posit ever finer-grained distinctions, characters, contents, indices, 
worlds, etc., to make a vague sentence conform to a preconception. In turn, such ad 
hocry becomes harder and harder to maintain as it leads us to insist that this baroque 
mathematics and byzantine complexity of ever-more ‘sophisticated' logic, is properly 
ascribed to a three-year-old who is ‘tacitly' grasping it when she understands or utters 
that "there are many more apples in this basket!"94 And, indeed, at this point, the 
tension between our pre-established condition that semantics requires determinate 
logical structure, and our realization that ascribing set theory, model theory, modal 
logic, etc., to three year olds is wildly off the mark to account for our ordinary ways 
with words, threatens to either leave logic spinning in a frictionless and idealized void 
or else leave us with no account whatever of the semantics of a natural language.95 
Notice, in closing, that I have explicitly, and Wittgenstein somewhat implicitly at this 
juncture, changed gears. The focus on language has shifted from a sole concern with 
semantic content to ascription practices and various other ‘pragmatic' features. 
 Thus, we see that, over the course of PI §89- §108, Wittgenstein seeks to make 
the tension between the preconceived requirements the TLP’s philosophy of logic 
places on language, and the way we use, ascribe, etc., language, unbearable. Indeed, 
he helps us realize that we are torn between the Scylla of imputing extremely 
advanced math to extremely young children to account for the semantic content of 
their sentences and the Charybdis of leaving our ways with language mysterious and 
letting logic spin in a void.  
                                                 
93 The oft-told story of Sraffa and his gesture fits in here (e.g., Monk (1991), 260-61) 
94 I hasten to add here, a point I make with more care in a moment, that the problem is not modeling, 
e.g., a graded adjective like "many" in such a rigorous way (Romero (2015) gives one such eloquent 
formalization). Instead, the problem is what we are trying to do with it. If we are trying to build a 
computer program, this might be the only viable option. However, if we are trying to account for 
child's ability to use and understand such a sentence, positing pre-doxastic computational processes 
that take mathematicians and logicians years to master is rather odd.   
95 The reader may demur and insist that such ‘depth grammar’ is not “wildly off the mark.” Linguistics, 
like physics, has a right to posit theatrical terms, mind/brain modules, and so on. However, critically, 
such a scientific program does not capture the normal ways we get by with language, how we ascribe 
understanding to people, and so on. As it were, we do not make a three year old do modal logic to 
prove she understands a claim like “if you had eaten your veggies, you would be allowed to have 
cookies” (cf. Horwich (1998 b), 87, for a similar point).  
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6.2 The Corrective: The Pragmatics of Representation: 
 
  In turn, this naturally raises, again, later Wittgenstein's question. To wit, how 
do logic and language relate? How is logic something sublime? This section argues 
that Wittgenstein reimagines not logic, and its hardness, but representation. In effect, I 
argue that, for later Wittgenstein, logic is one way of representing specific features of 
language. This attributes to Wittgenstein a conception of representation that is far 
more fluid and less rigid than the isomorphic account the TLP presupposes. To begin, 
I set the stage and lay down some conditions that any account of later Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of logic must meet. From there, I examine how he reimagines 
representation. Finally, I close with two examples.  
Before beginning, I lay down one exegetical assumption and two adequacy 
conditions that I believe any apt account of the PI's philosophy of logic must respect. 
First, I exegetically assume, following Greve (2017) and Kuusela (2014), and against 
Maddy (2014), 51-61 and 81-100, as I understand her, that Wittgenstein's 
understanding of logic itself remains genuinely consistent, stable, and unified 
throughout Wittgenstein's work. Second, I assume that any adequate account of later 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic cannot ascribe to logic as formal calculi a 
constitutive role that accounts for semantics. Indeed, "[i]n giving explanations, I 
already have to use language full blown… this is enough to show that I can come up 
only with externalities about language" (PI § 120- emphasis mine). Finally, third, this 
new philosophy of logic cannot bargain out any of the rigor, rigidity, a priority, etc. 
out of logic. Indeed, though attractive in several respects, Maddy's account badly 
misfires by attempting to ascribe to later Wittgenstein a conception of the empirically 
contingent status of logic (e.g., Maddy (2014), 79).96  
With these assumptions and requirements in view, let us turn to Wittgenstein's 
gnomic remarks on how to expunge the tension. To begin, Wittgenstein insists that 
the only way the "preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning 
out whole inquiry around" (PI § 108). This quote is difficult to understand fully and 
                                                 
96 Maddy is aware of this. She argues that it is a product idiosyncratic biographical move that has no 
philosophical justification (e.g., Maddy (2014), 101-125). Regardless, for Maddy, a fundamental 
assumption seems to be that if a claim is revisable or fallible, then it is empirical. Pace this, as Glock 
(1996 b) argues, the fact that we can and do revise our conceptual schemas in no way entails that they 
are made up solely of empirical propositions. Indeed, such an assumption conflates empirical revision 
with conceptual revision, a move that later Kuhn, among others, warns us against (e.g., Kuhn (1990)) 
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the secondary literature is strikingly heterogenic and varied on how best to read it 
(e.g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 266-270, Mulhall (2001), 87-93, Glock (1996 b), 202, 
etc., all give their own gloss). For our purposes, part of what the quote calls attention 
to is the preconception of how representation itself works in the TLP. Indeed, notice 
that Wittgenstein claims that a critical confusion in the TLP is that it "predicates of 
the thing what lies in the mode of representation" (PI § 104). Thus, the TLP's 
conception of logic "is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see 
whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off" (PI § 103). Furthermore, 
such an interpretation of what "turning our whole inquiry around" means harmonizes 
the quote with the work done earlier in this chapter. Wittgenstein's central target has 
been the preconception that a representation of x and a represented x share a 
determinate logical structure. Indeed, it is only when we re-imagine how 
representation works that we can maintain both logic's rigor, a priority, etc., and not 
predicate on language the crystalline purity that logic has. Thus, let us examine how 
later Wittgenstein shifts what and how representation is and works.  
To begin, it is critical that Wittgenstein insists that we need to take into 
account a "means of representation" (PI § 50) and keep in mind that "[w]hat we call 
‘descriptions' are instruments for particular uses" (PI § 291- presages in PI § 24). We 
return to this in chapter seven, as it is critical for Wittgenstein's novel methods. 
Granting this, a plausible view is that a representation is not always a logical 
isomorphism between a proposition and a possible fact. Instead, it is a pragmatic 
relationship that both requires a particular purpose, a specific though sometimes 
implicit audience, and a set means to function. Thus, a more apt account of 
representation for the PI is ‘S represents x as y to A for some purpose p'97 where S is a 
person or group, x is some feature of the world, y a model of it, and A is a possibly 
implicit audience. Notice, first, that this pragmatic account of representation makes 
good sense of Wittgenstein's increasing interest of the "x as y" clause seen most 
clearly in PI II xi. Second, it gives considerable flexibility as to what "representation" 
means and, in turn, helps us make sense of, e.g., the language-game methodology 
Wittgenstein relies on.98 For example, clearly, PI § 2 is meant to represent or describe 
the Augustinian picture of language proffered in PI § 1. However, equally clearly, 
how PI § 2 represents Augustine’s picture is hard to make sense of, especially 
                                                 
97 This formulation is taken, with slight modification, from Giere (2004), 743 
98 Kuusela (2014), makes a similar point. We return to this in chapter 7.2. 
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granting the TLP’s preconceptions. In point of fact, Augustine’s picture and PI § 2 do 
not seem to share the right ‘mathematical multiplicity’ (TLP 4.04). There is no 
determinate logical structure that Augustine’s picture and PI § 2 shares. Augustine’s 
picture proffers a child ostensibly learning her first language whereas PI § 2 stipulates 
a builder and an assistant who ‘just know’ “brick,” “slab,” and the proper responses. 
Augustine’s picture seems best thought of as an ‘indicative language game’ wherein a 
child learns to correlate words and things by listening to assertions and the like 
whereas PI § 2 is ‘imperative’ in that the builder yells “Slab!” and the assistant 
fetches it. We return to this in chapter seven. For now, notice that the relationships 
between PI § 2 and Augustine’s picture is unworkable in terms of the TLP’s 
preconceptions concerning “representation.” Third, pursuant to this, "later 
Wittgenstein's carefully described language games [are] partial models of language" 
(Williamson (forthcoming), 7; See also Kuusela (2014)). Notice, as the above makes 
clear, these models represent in a manner that is quite different than the TLP’s 
account.  
  Let us spell out this pragmatic account of representation further. To begin, let 
us take our cue from Williamson- specifically his overall linkage between scientific 
models and philosophical models. To begin, both later Wittgenstein and the natural 
and social sciences are confronted with a similar striking problem- the problem of 
complexity. For Wittgenstein, he reminds us that when we represent language 
"[w]e're talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about 
some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity" (PI § 108-box). Indeed, much of the PI is 
meant to show how complex, multifaceted and heterogenic this phenomenon of 
language is. I can be interested in prosodic features of language, syntactic rules, the 
intertwinement of language-culture-identity-nationalism, etc. However, such 
complexity threatens to overwhelm any attempt to proffer any representation of the 
phenomenon of language, be it in philosophic, linguistic, literary theoretic, etc., terms. 
As it were, such a representation either becomes vacuous (e.g., PI § 107) or arbitrary 
(e.g. "language is always deferred desire!"). Similarly, consider a red brick thrown out 
my office window on a particularly windy day. Notice that the brick is not a uniform 
mass distribution, the wind is continuously affecting air resistance in somewhat 
erratic ways, the earth has a bulge at the equator, and so it too is not a uniform mass 
distribution, the orbit of the moon exerts a slight pull in the brick, etc. Indeed, if we 
grant the plausible view that all material things are causally related to all other 
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material things, the fall of the red brick needs a total understanding of everything else 
afoot in the universe. In turn, such complexities threaten to preclude representing the 
brick in terms of classical physics as there's too much going on.  
To solve this problem of complexity, scientists utilize a pragmatic theory of 
representation that rests, at base, on models.99 To begin, by "model" I do not mean a 
mathematical "structure which satisfies the axioms of a theory" (van Fraassen (1980), 
43). Rather, I include a far wider range of what scientists actually call models. Balls 
and sticks are models of molecules in chemistry, differential equations are models 
inherently discreet population growth in evolution, etc. Indeed, a surprising feature of 
scientific practice is how promiscuous the use of the term "model" is and how 
heterogenic their relationships with what they represent is. As it were, a ball-and-stick 
model does not represent a molecule in the same way that a differential equation 
model represents a population. Examples of modeling and the different ways they 
represent can be expanded nearly indefinitely.100 Granting this, a physicist deals with 
the complexity of our brick by representing the brick and the earth as if they are point 
particles of mass, as if the only salient causal relationship in play is the earth's 
gravitational pull on the brick, as if there's no air, etc. In turn, this model of two points 
of mass interacting only with each other allows us to apply classical physics to the 
situation without ado. Thus a scientist represents the brick-system as an idealized two 
point particles of mass model for the purposes of, e.g., calculating when the brick hits 
the ground. Notice three further things. One, there are multiple possible and unrelated 
models that represent the same thing(s) differently. Indeed, even for our humble brick, 
I might be interested in, e.g., optics and the red color of the brick, rather than its fall. 
In that case, I will represent the brick in a very different way. Two, pursuant to this, as 
Williamson (Forthcoming), 10, is forced to admit, and as Toon (2012), 34-61 
celebrates, modeling often has more to do with a sort of tacit know-how than an 
algorithmic ‘plug and chug’ theory. Knowing what simplifying idealizations to 
introduce is not something we can compress into a set of clearly defined rules. Three, 
how idealized representations, and models, relate to the world, is an outstanding and 
highly contested issue. Fortunately, given Wittgenstein's strictures on explanation, it 
need not concern us. How we make models and how they relate to the world is not an 
                                                 
99 Giere, e.g., (1999) (2004) and (2009) is a champion of just such a view, and I rely heavily on him.   
100 The Philips pipes-and-colored water model represents the economy in a different way than a 
computer simulation model represents a possible alternative universe in cosmology, in a different way 
than a rational agent model represents the Mutually Assured Destruction in political science, etc.  
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issue, that we do so is what matters (e.g., PI § 139 box-b).101And if we ‘look and see' 
we realize that we use dishware to represent geography, myths to represent morality, 
etc.  
Let us tarry a bit longer and make three additional notes to this model based 
pragmatic representation. First, this method does not bargain out any of the rigor of 
classical mechanics. Indeed, once I enter the ‘model-world,’ the mathematical 
architecture of Newton's theory unfolds in a precise, well-defined, perfectly 
systematic, etc., way. Second, this model cannot be taken as literally depicting the 
system. Indeed, in much of scientific practice, taking a model as a literal depiction, 
literally falsifies it.102 The brick is not a point particle of mass, and it does us very 
little good to rack our brains over if "point particle" is even coherent- e.g., how does 
something with no dimensions have mass?! Pursuant to this, the truth or falsities of 
models tend not to interest us.103 Instead, what is critical is that they be useful for 
some purposes or other. Indeed, and pace Maddy (2014), e.g., 123-25, a model could 
be considered ‘a priori' in that they are not ‘descriptions of the phenomena’ but, 
rather, possible ways to represent the phenomena so that certain patterns become 
salient. As it were, how we model something is a priori and up to us. Third, and pace 
Williamson (forthcoming), 1-3, this model-making does not strike me as a useful 
heuristic to get by when ‘real science' is swamped by intractable complexity. Rather, 
model-making strikes me as a scientific elaboration and refinement of representation 
itself. The world is simply too complex to deal with ‘directly' and to get by, we all 
make idealizing assumptions, construct mental models, etc. 
Granting this, and returning with these fruits to the PI, later Wittgenstein's 
reimagining of the philosophy of logic becomes at once eloquently simple and 
profoundly innovative. To begin, the problem with the TLP is not its conception of 
logic per se. Instead, as Wittgenstein stressed, the problem is that we predicated on 
the real phenomenon of language our way of representing it. In turn, this leads us to 
"misunderstand the role played by the ideal in our language" (PI § 100). In effect, 
"[w]e take the possibility of comparison, which impresses us, as the perception of a 
highly general state of affairs" (PI § 104). In other words, we confuse the 
                                                 
101 This is, suffice it to say, a slight dodge on my part. And in point of fact, I do think Wittgenstein has 
more to say. However, we cannot discuss this further.  
102 The locus classicus of this point is Cartwright (1983), esp 54-73. She, among others, has continued 
to develop her account in, e.g., Cartwright (1999), esp 23-34  
103 This point is, rightly due to preconceptions about what science should be, emphasized ad nauseum 
in the literature. See, e.g., Morison (1999), Frigg (2012), Cartwright (1983), Wiesberg (2013), etc 
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phenomenon of language, with all its intractable complexity, with a model of 
language as propositions. In effect, we take a representation of x to, somehow, have 
sublimed out the essence of x. Indeed, the logical isomorphism between language and 
the world seems to force this on us. By contrast, now later Wittgenstein is keen to 
emphasize that "it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon [e.g., language] in a 
variety of ways" (PI § 108-box). Indeed, especially granting that "language can be 
regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new 
houses" (PI § 18) and that there is no core feature of language that makes it into 
language (e.g., PI § 23), we should realize that we can represent language in multiple, 
orthogonal ways, each of which ignores some features and each brings some features 
into view. In other words, logic is a model of language, a means by which we 
represent language as a set of deductive and inferential relationships, not the 
constitutive feature of language. Further, and more critically, this pragmatic account 
of representation- i.e., that we represent sentences as propositions for logical 
purposes- is endorsed by Wittgenstein in several places in the Nachlass. For example, 
“[w]e are interested in language as a procedure according to explicit rules, because 
philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by 
clarification of the rules… We consider language from one point of view only” (PG § 
32 p. 68- emphasis mine). Furthermore, and even more explicitly, "[n]ow however it 
[logic] plays a different role. What used to be a prejudice concerning reality [i.e., that 
it must have a determinate logical structure] has turned into one form of 
representation. Where has its crystal clearness ended up? It has turned into a form of 
representation, nothing else" (Notebook 157a as quoted in Schulte (2006), 46-7,- 
underlying mine).  
The critical point is that, for later Wittgenstein, logic is one way of 
representing language. Certainly, if one represents a sentence as a proposition with 
determinate logical structure, then one relies a sharpness of sense, clearly defined 
bipolar truth values for classical logical models, etc., in the same way that if one 
represents the brick's fall in a classical mechanical model, one relies on point particles 
of mass and two objects in the universe. Further, in both cases, none of the rigor or 
crystalline purity is lost. However, bricks aren't point particles and sentences aren't 
propositions. Confusion on this simple point led, e.g., Cartesian physicists to rack 
their brains about how weight can ‘fall out' of Descartes representation of matter as 
extension (Duhem (1982), 39-54, gives a lovely account) and, e.g., Wittgenstein to 
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rack his brain over how "damn it!" has a determinate logical form. Logic is a means 
of representation, and it is often an apt one. However, confusing the model and the 
assumptions it makes- the sharpness of sense, well-defined truth conditions, etc.- with 
the thing modeled, is the height of folly. In sum, succinctly, whereas the TLP insists 
that logic is constitutive for semantic content, the PI insists that we can represent 
sentence as propositions for certain purposes. In closing, let us examine two examples 
to further this interpretation. 
First, consider the famous sentence "I have a pain." This is a sentence in the 
indicative mood, and it is often uttered as an assertion. And it clearly enters into 
normal deductive and inferential relationships, when one represents it logically. For 
example, we can move from it to "There exists someone who has a pain." However, 
as Wittgenstein powerfully argues, taking this logical representation as literally 
depicting what's afoot, leads one to an untenable philosophical position wherein we 
seem both forced to posit an odd inner object, pain, and then have no real account of 
how such an object and the word "pain" relate to each other (e.g. PI roughly  § 244-§ 
265). Indeed, our ability to represent "I have a pain" in a logical model impresses us, 
and we are quickly led into hopelessly dark places with inner worlds and mind's eyes. 
Notice, critically, that the problem is not the logical representation but the attempt to 
take it literally, e.g., as giving us some constitutive account of how "I have a pain" 
and the pain in my head, relate. Again, the best analogy here is with a physicist who, 
because her model demands point particles of mass, starts shaming bricks in an 
attempt to find them. Indeed, how mysterious that bricks have point particles of mass 
in them and how magical that we have pain in us! And the cure is, as Wittgenstein 
said, to avoid a one-sided diet (PI § 593). Less prosaically, the key is reminding 
ourselves that "I have a pain" can function as, e.g., an ethical demand (Cavell (2005), 
238-66), an avowal, etc. Again, we can represent "I have a pain" logically, and there 
may be a good reason to. However, "I have a pain" is not simply a proposition.  
Second, consider Wittgenstein's note that "[u]nderstanding a sentence in 
language is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one might think" 
(PI § 527). One, Wittgenstein is empirically quite right- the prosody of spoken 
languages directly affects if I understand some utterance as a question, a sarcastic 
quip, etc.104 Two, apparently, the prosodic features of natural languages have no role 
                                                 
104 E.g., Crystal (1976), for a classic anthology on English tonal and prosodic features.    
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in logic per se. Indeed, if any part of language is tokening rather than what-is-said, 
surely it is how I utter a sentence. Three, and most critically, the way I understand and 
respond to a sentence shifts depending on how I hear the "music" of it (ibid). For 
example, consider a flirtatious exchange between Jen and Sally. We can assume that 
they are uttering indicative mood sentences and often making assertions. However, 
missing the tone of the conversations leads to some deep misunderstandings. For 
example, Jen may have an interest in violating the maxims of relation and manner by 
casually mentioning that she lacks a lover and Sally might want to dispute an 
established presupposition (in common parlance, tease Jen). We can happily grant that 
the point of this exchange is that Jen and Sally are looking to score. But this is 
somewhat different than what, e.g., Lewis (1979), has in mind. Of course, much of 
these features are ‘pragmatic factors' but, as Travis (2006), 1-9, argues, the 
pragmatic/semantic divide, especially in the manner we attempt to draw it today, is 
totally foreign to Wittgenstein. In any case, understanding Sally and Jen's exchange 
relies on more than following the inferential and deductive interrelationships of their 
claims. Again, such a view might be useful for some purposes. However, an alien 
who could only grasp what-is-said will miss the point of the exchange (cf. PI § 564). 
Thus, the PI does not alter Wittgenstein's conception of logic. Logic is still 
independent of experience, perfectly clear and rigorous, still governed by the same 
basic operations, etc. However, what he insists on is that logic is not genuinely 
constitutive of the phenomenon of language. It is, instead, one way to represent it. As 
it were, sentences do not simply express propositions. Rather, logicians represent 
sentences as propositions for the purposes of, e.g., clarifying inferential relationships. 
In turn, the determinate logical structure that the TLP insists on is now recast as 
something like the physicist's point particle of mass. In both cases, it is a prerequisite 
to begin doing either logic or physics. However, much as it would be absurd for the 
physicist to move from her indispensible assumption about point particles of mass to 
the claim that a brick really is just a point particle of mass, so too is it absurd for the 
logician to move from her indispensible assumption that a sentence has a determinate 
logical structure to the claim that a sentence really is just a determinate logical 
structure. I should note that the reader may find my analogy between Wittgenstein 
and science prima facie absurd. Wittgenstein, we are told, hated science or some 
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vaguely defined thing called scientism. I discuss this at length in chapter eight. For 
now, I merely note that what matters is the purpose of the tool we are using. In 
science, models function as, e.g., means to render certain causal patterns salient 
within a phenomenon that is too complex to study otherwise (e.g., Woodward (2003), 
315-349). In contrast, for later Wittgenstein, models function as a means to bring 
about understand after a breakdown, a point we discuss in chapter 8 at length. 
Regardless, the basic point is that the same tool can be used for very different jobs. 
 In closing, notice that this pragmatic account of representation is far more 
catholic than the TLP’s picture. At an abstract level, this provides later Wittgenstein a 
considerable degree of latitude concerning how one can study language. Some people 
want to get the deductive and inferential relationships that propositions have right, 
others want to talk about how language and culture relate, still more want to discuss 
the weird stuff that goes on in jokes or Freudian slips. All of this is fine, and may 
provide insight. However, one must have a clear purpose in mind, ensure that the 
model is apt, relative to that purpose, and, above all, avoid confusing the model and 
the thing modeled. It does little good to fight wars over claims like “all language boils 
down to differed desire” or “all language boils down to propositions.” At an 
exegetical level, as we take up in chapter 7, and as Kuusela (2014) hints at, this begins 
to explain the medley of representations, or descriptions, that make up the PI. 
Reflections on logic and the role of truth (e.g., PI § 136), fictional language games 
concerning tribes (e.g., PI § 6), discussions of early childhood training (e.g., PI § 5), 
and so on, all have a proper place as representations, or descriptions, that bring into 
focus aspects of the incredibly complicated phenomenon of language. Finally, at the 
level of Wittgenstein scholarship, such a pragmatic account allows us to harmonizing 
seemingly antithetical positions. Specifically, one can maintain that normative rules 
are indispensible for Wittgenstein and, I would claim, representations of language 
generally, just as point particles are indispensible for physics. However, one can also 
remain agnostic about if these rules are ‘really’ parts of language.105   
6.3  Summary: 
 
                                                 
105 Kuusela (2008), 120-148, makes a similar point. However, he does not take the indispensability 
seriously enough and often makes it seem as though we can get by fine without rules and the models 
that give them life. As I hope the above makes clear, such a view strikes me as not tenable. Language is 
simply too complex to just ‘talk about it’ without models.  
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 This chapter has argued for a pragmatic account of representation to make 
sense of later Wittgenstein's way of reimagining the role of logic and its relationship 
with language. In effect, the TLP took the relationship between language and logic to 
be constitutive and the fundamental nature of representation to be a logical 
isomorphism between a proposition and a possible fact. Pace this, later Wittgenstein 
insists that logic is one way to represent language. In the form of a slogan, sentences 
do not expression propositions. Rather, we represent sentences as propositions for 
specific purposes. Granting this pragmatic account of representation, the hardness of 
logic is understood in the correct manner as a feature of the model and not the thing-
modeled. However, this opens the question of what semantic content is for later 
Wittgenstein. To address this, however, we need to examine the nature of 
"description" in later Wittgenstein's methodology. It is to this we turn. 
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7 Chapter Seven: Description Alone! The Method of the PI: 
 
The last chapter discussed the PI's rejection of the philosophy of logic of the 
TLP. Specifically, it argued that whereas the TLP endorses an isomorphic theory of 
representation where a proposition represents a possible fact only in virtue of a shared 
determinate logical structure, the PI has a far more pragmatic and open conception of 
representation. In turn, this links up nicely to Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology 
in the PI. To bring this descriptive methodology into view, I proffer an account that 
addresses both what Wittgenstein aims to describe, his target, as well as how he does 
so.106 Specifically, following Gert (1997), I argue that Wittgenstein aims to describe 
the frameworks in which we give descriptions and, following Kuusela (2008), 74-95 
and 142-148, to some extent, that he does this by relying on "models" and "objects of 
comparison" (PI § 130). 
First, I set the stage. I examine two popular accounts of the descriptive 
methodology in the PI and argue that both are problematic in certain respects. Second, 
I examine Wittgenstein's must sustained reflections on what his descriptive 
methodology is in the PI part one- i.e., PI § 291. I then abstract from this both a target 
of description for Wittgenstein (i.e., what Wittgenstein aims to describe) as well as 
the method by which he can describe it. Finally, third, I briefly examine PI § 109. I 
argue that, far from an unjustifiable quietism, Wittgenstein's emphasis on description 
is merely putting first things first. This sets the stage for chapter 8. 
 
7.0 Setting the Stage: 
 
  It is quite clear that for later Wittgenstein, description and philosophical 
investigation are intimately connected. Indeed, consider that "[a]ll explanation must 
disappear [in philosophical investigation] and description alone must take its place" 
(PI § 109), "[p]hilosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of 
language, so it can in the end only describe it" (PI  §124), and so on. However, 
"description" and its methodological role in philosophical investigations have a rather 
odd place in the secondary literature. Specifically, it often is either discussed solely in 
                                                 
106 This way of framing matters is taken, to some extent, from Martin (2016), 80.  
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terms of contrasts with, e.g., explanation (e.g. PI § 109), the project of constructing an 
ideal language (e.g., PI § 133), the TLP (e.g., PI § 49), etc., as in the rule-based 
account107, or else attempts are made to assimilate it into some different 
methodological category as in an aspect account.108 I argue that both glosses have 
some problems. First, I examine the rule-based view. Then I argue that its tendency to 
view description solely in terms of its contrast with other features, leads it to ignore or 
under-examine features of the descriptive methodology simpliciter. Second, I examine 
the aspect view. I argue that its attempt to assimilate the descriptive methodology into 
its own understanding of “perspicuous representation” misfires primarily for 
philosophical reasons. This sets the stage for section 7.1.  
For the rule-based view, discussions of description tend to focus on 
contrasting it with some science, earlier Wittgenstein’s musings, and so on. For 
example, the chapter on “Description” in Baker & Hacker (2009), 65-80, focuses on 
contrasting the TLP’s account of sentences with the PI’s. Turning to the Baker & 
Hacker’s comments on “description” in metaphilosophical remark PI § 109, this focus 
on contrast continues. Here, Baker & Hacker (2005), 245-248, discuss “description” 
mainly in contrast with theory and explanation- i.e., “[t]he task of philosophy is not to 
explain anything… Philosophy should only describe” (ibid 246). In turn, this focus on 
contrast naturally leads the rule-based account to characterize of  “description” in 
fairly negative terms- i.e., a description is not explanation, not theory, not 
metaphysics, not the sole function of language, and so on. However, this focus on 
contrast naturally leads the rule-based account to hold the in abeyance what 
Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology simpliciter might be. And indeed, Glock's 
very systematic and helpful Wittgenstein Dictionary (Glock (1996 c)), does not 
mention “description” as an independent entry. Moreover, a glance at the index of 
Baker and Hacker’s, and then Hacker’s, seminal commentary (e.g., Baker & Hacker 
(2009), (2014)), shows that the term to appear on its own about 18 times in total on its 
own- roughly 0.133%109 
                                                 
107 This account is deeply connected to the overall grammatical account discussed at length in chapter 
4. 
108 The "aspect account" has its origins in Baker (2006), 22-52, and stresses the importance of seeing 
aspects- a point we discuss further in a moment. 
109 This figure takes the mentions of "descriptions" in the index that do not occur in footnotes, 18, and 
divides it by the total number of pages, about 1349.  
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Thus, the Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology simpliciter is seldom 
directly discussed by the rule-based account. However, there are a few remarks that 
the rule-based account proffers concerning both Wittgenstein’s target for description 
as well as his method of description. For target, the rule-based account claims that 
“what it [philosophy] should describe is the use of words, the grammar of language… 
we are examining our rule-governed used of words” (Baker & Hacker (2005), 246). 
For method, as discussed in chapter 4.0e, the rule-based account imputes to 
Wittgenstein a method of conceptual cartography. Given that we have discussed the 
method at length, I focus my criticisms on the target the rule-based account imputes to 
Wittgenstein.  
Specifically, the target of description that the rule-based account imputes to 
Wittgenstein has three major problems. First, such a target sets up a fairly natural 
exegetical expectation. To wit, if Wittgenstein aims to describe the rule governed uses 
of our words, we should find him describing how constitutive rules, normative 
patterns of linguistic behavior, and so on. However, the PI, on the whole, dashes this 
expectation. Indeed, as Williams (2015), 9-12, notes, Wittgenstein rarely gives 
descriptions of the uses of our words, or the underlying constitutive rules, in a manner 
akin to Austin, say. In turn, this makes it rather difficult to make sense of the claim 
that Wittgenstein’s descriptions aim at rule-governed uses of words. What he seems to 
describe are either language-games or else he seems to target strikingly non-linguistic 
things like faces or moods.  
Second, following from the last point, when we examine the sections of the PI 
wherein Wittgenstein explicitly notes the targets of description he would like the 
reader to reflect on, they have very little to do with rules, uses, or even language 
directly. Thus, consider:  
 
"[r]emember how many different kinds of things are called "descriptions": 
description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates, description of a 
facial expression, description of a sensation of touch, of a mood" (PI § 24). 
 
"I see a picture: it represents an old man walking up a steep path and leaning 
on a stick.—How? Might it not have looked the same if he had been sliding 
downhill in that position? Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture so" 
(PI § 139) 
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"[c]ouldn't someone describe an unfamiliar shape that appeared before him 
just as accurately as I, to whom it is familiar? … his description will run quite 
differently [than mine]" (PI II xi § 142).  
 
"If someone searches in a certain figure (call it figure 1) for another figure 
(call it Figure 2) and then finds it, he sees figure 1 in a new way… he [can] 
give a new kind of description of it [figure 1]" (PI II xi § 153).  
 
"Then is the copy of a figure an incomplete description of my visual 
experience? No.- After all, whether, and what, more detailed specifications are 
necessary depends on the circumstances." (PI II xi § 156).  
 
"What does it mean to say that I ‘see the sphere floating in the air' in a picture? 
Is it enough that for me this description is the most suggestive, natural one? 
No; for it [e.g., the description] might be so for various reasons." (PI II xi § 
169). 
 
Though these quotes all play different roles in the contexts of the sections that they 
are drawn from, the critical point is that Wittgenstein’s targets clearly have little to do 
with uses or rules. Indeed, in "none of these passages is Wittgenstein advocating 
either that philosophers describe the uses of particular terms, or that we engage in 
describing the things to which those terms refer" (Gert (1997), 226). However, a 
reader may object that, in especially the metaphilosophical parts of the PI, 
Wittgenstein describes language. To this, I make two replies. One, granting this very 
reasonable point (especially given, e.g., PI § 120), it is still imperative to get clear on 
what Wittgenstein general descriptive methodology is before we can understand how 
he “describes language.” Two, somewhat pursuant to one, the metaphilosophical 
mentions of “description” in the PI do not target constitutive rules or uses directly- a 
critical point for 7.1. 
 Third, Wittgenstein notes that “[w]hat we call "descriptions" are instruments 
for particular uses” (PI § 291). We discuss this quote at great length in the next 
section. For now it is best paired with “description gets its light- that is to say its 
purpose- from the philosophical problems” (PI § 109) and with “I [Wittgenstein] 
describe a room to someone, and then get him to paint an impressionistic picture from 
this description…Now he paints the chair which I described as green, dark red; where 
I said ‘yellow’, he paints blue.- That is the impression which he got of the room. And 
now I say: ‘Quite right! That's what it looks like.’" (PI § 368). Notice that these 
quotes contextualize the accuracy of the description as well as making them purpose-
relative. However, this purpose-relativity is difficult to harmonize with the claim that 
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Wittgenstein targets the constitutive rules that determine correct use. This is because, 
simply, constitutive rules do not seem purpose-relative. The rules of chess are the 
rules of chess, regardless of why, with whom, etc., I play chess.  In turn, these 
objections render the target the rule-based account imputes to Wittgenstein rather 
problematic.  
In contrast to the rule-based view, the other account of Wittgenstein’s 
descriptive methodology that we consider is the aspect view. This view is often paired 
with a pure therapeutic reading of the PI as discussed in chapter 1.2e, 1.2f, 1.2i and 
1.2j. To begin, the aspect view insists, pace the rule-based view, that we cannot 
describe language in terms of the uses of words and the underlying constitutive rules. 
This is because language is not "some discrete item, or ‘entity' to which we might 
appeal in our adjudications" (Hutchinson (2007), 701). Indeed, according to the aspect 
view, the rule-based view "implies (i) what John McDowell (1998b, 207) has termed 
the (fantasised) ability to ‘view language from sideways on' and (ii) linguistic 
conservativism" (Hutchinson and Read (2008), 156). However, this seems to leave the 
aspect view with a profound problem. If we cannot describe language, as language is 
not the sort of ‘thing' that can be described, how are we to read PI § 109 and related 
quotes? Indeed, if we cannot target language for description, it becomes unclear what 
Wittgenstein aims to describe in the first place. 
To address this concern, the aspect view assimilates Wittgenstein’s descriptive 
methodology into "perspicuous representation" as well as offering a very distinctive 
interpretation of "perspicuous representation." To begin, a "perspicuous 
representation" is understood as "anything which has the function of introducing 
‘perspicuity' into some aspect of the use of some of ‘our words' (i.e. anything which 
manifestly helps somebody to know his way about by dissolving some philosophical 
problem which bothers him)" (Baker (2006), 31). Indeed, "[w]hat a perspicuous 
presentation can, in fact, achieve, according to Baker, is to exhibit a further hitherto 
‘neglect aspect of the use of an expression'" (Martin (2016), 83). Granting this, what 
Wittgenstein "describes" are "less ‘factual descriptions' of grammar than pictures and 
analogies" (Morris (2006), 2). Thus "[t]he application of this concept [i.e., 
perspicuous representation] to what he called ‘descriptions of grammar' bears on what 
he understood by the remark that he advanced no theses, gave no explanations and 
avoided dogmatism in philosophy. If ‘perspicuous representations' are connected with 
exhibiting aspects of ‘the use of our words,' then they do not conform to many of the 
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features of fact-stating discourse. On the contrary, they more closely resemble 
descriptions of possibilities" (Baker (2006), 45). In other words, for the aspect view, 
what Wittgenstein aims to describe are not features of language or constitutive rules, 
but possibilities. Further, these possibilities are not determined by the constitutive 
rules and the ‘bounds of sense’, but rather, are “nothing more and nothing less than 
different possible ways of looking at things” (ibid).  
In turn, the aspect view ascribes to Wittgenstein a person-relative 
methodology that helps make further sense of what sorts of possibilities Wittgenstein 
aims to describe. To wit, the possibilities Wittgenstein describes function as devices 
that are "facilitating our interlocutor's aspect shift" (Hutchinson (2007), 702). In other 
words, Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology is one wherein he describes 
possibilities whose sole function is to break the spell of a grammatical illusion, which 
a conversation partner both is under and has come to acknowledge, and thereby 
relieve her mental cramp (e.g., Baker (2006), passim, Hutchinson and Read (2007)). 
Notice that this implies that any description that does this is in good order. Indeed, 
strictly speaking, the description need not target any feature real feature of language 
at all.  
In my view, such a viewpoint suffers from several deep problems. To begin, 
as we noted in chapter 1.2f, 1.2h, 1.2k, such person-relativity may be untenable. 
Bracketing this worry, there are three additional ones.  
First, such an account of Wittgenstein descriptive methodology ignores the 
grammar of "description of x." Specifically, a description of x as being y is true only 
if x is y. A description of a room as being red is true only if the room is red. Further, 
this grammar of "description of x as being y" is not, pace a rather odd set of 
arguments (e.g., Read and Hutchson (2007), 145-48), affected by the fact that I can 
describe a target in a myriad of different ways (Hutto (2008), 635-37, offers a similar 
criticism). For example, certainly, the London Tube map describes London in a very 
different way than a sightseeing map or a historical map. However, a London Tube 
map that describes Elephant and Castle station as being next to Russell's square is 
false as Elephant and Castle is not next to Russell's Square. Further, certain 
descriptions come out false regardless of the way I describe the x in question. Any 
map that describes London as having the Sea of Serenity in the city center is false. 
However, if a "description" is simply a sort of presentation of possible ways of 
looking at things, this grammatical relationship becomes far harder to understand as it 
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is no longer clear if a description of x as being y need have anything to do with the 
fact that x is y (or not). 
One response to this is to attempt to follow Baker and claim that 
Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology describes possibilities and not in a fact 
stating discourse. Emphasis can be placed here on ‘describing possibilities' or on ‘not 
a fact stating discourse.' Let us take each in turn. If we emphasize that description 
describe possibilities, we require some further account to make sense of this. What 
does it mean to describe a possibility? To take an example, to describe the possibility 
where Danton defeated Robespierre and wrested control of the Revolution from the 
Committee of Public Safety is, intuitively, to describe a possible world where 
"Danton" rigidly designates some fellow, "Robespierre" rigidly designates some other 
fellow, etc. And it is a short step from this to full-blown essentialist metaphysics a la 
Kripke that Wittgenstein would surely abhor. However, without an alternative 
conception of how to think about ‘described possibilities,' it is opaque what 
‘describing possibilities’ amounts to. Alternatively, we may emphasize ‘not a fact 
stating discourse.' This simply abandons the relationship that claims that a description 
of x as being y is true only if x is y. However, it then becomes unclear how a 
description of x and the supposedly described x relate. In other words, it is no longer 
clear how or why a purported description of x is "of x" or "about x" in the first 
place.110  
Second, pursuant to this, it becomes unclear what sorts of expressions count as 
descriptions of x. Specifically, if we jettison the assumption that a description of x as 
being y is true only if x is y, and insist on person-relativity, then it seems as though 
any contribution to a conversation that someone is willing to accept as being a 
description of x as being y is eo ipso a description of x as being y. To see this clearly, 
consider two cases. One, someone says that “the description of London in my 
guidebook says that the Sea of Serenity is lovely this season.” Given that we have 
abandoned the thought that a description of London as having the Sea of Serenity is 
true only if London has the Sea of Serenity, it is no longer clear if I can condemn this 
guidebook as being in error. Indeed, it seems as though if one accepts this 
guidebook’s description of London as having the Sea of Serenity, then everything is 
                                                 
110 The devil here is working out what phrases like "of x" "about x" etc. clause really amount to. Yablo 
(2014) gives an idea of how many little demons live in this big devil. 
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fine. This is a rather counterintuitive result. Two, worse, consider someone who offers 
a description of London as "quickly five-ing pudding pops," and a conversation 
partner who accepts that this is a description. Again, this seems to mean that things 
are in good order. In both cases, the aspect view must accept that, provided someone 
is silly enough, or mad enough, to accept a purported description x, then this is a 
description (e.g., Baker (2006), 41, Hutchinson and Read (2007), 152-58). In turn, 
this seems to mean ‘anything goes!’ in principle for the aspect view as any 
‘possibility’ I can proffer, and convince someone to accept as a description, can be a 
description of x.  
 A possible retort is that I have ignored fictional or metaphorical/poetic 
descriptions. Indeed, for the case of London and the Sea of Serenity, one may claim 
that this is a description of a fictional London. The problem with such a reply is that, 
again, it either leads us to metaphysics (cf. van  Inwagen (1983)) that Wittgenstein 
would find deeply problematic or else some more robust discussion of how the 
fiction-London and the real-London relate. For the second case, the description of 
London as quickly five-ing pudding pops, someone might claim that this is a 
metaphoric or poetic description akin to Romeo’s description of Juliet as the sun. 
Indeed, Juliet is not a hot ball of gas at the center of our solar system! However, such 
a retort is far too flippant with metaphors and poetic discourse. For metaphors, as 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003), 3-13, point out, there is an internal coherence that 
governs most metaphorical expressions and these do not solely depend on someone 
accepting that x is a metaphor. For poetry, Cavell (2006), 73-96, notes, that poetic 
descriptions rely on the ability of the reader or listener to ‘catch on.' We understand 
what Romeo means by his description of Juliet as the sun because we can elaborate on 
it- e.g., Juliet is the sun, she is the light of my world, she is what my entire life orbits 
around, etc. Again, it is opaque how to elaborate the "description" "quickly five-ing 
pudding pops."  
Third, the attempt to assimilate Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology into 
‘aspect seeing’ may, in fact, contradict Wittgenstein at a brute exegetical level. 
Consider that "aspect-seeing is ‘voluntary'… in that it makes sense to ask somebody 
to look at things differently, to say that a person has complied with the request, [etc.]" 
(Baker (2006), 46). In turn, and granting that "description" is just a sub-type of 
perspicuous representation and aspect seeing, we should expect this to hold for any 
and all descriptions. However, Baker ignores that Wittgenstein writes both that this 
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volunteerism does not make sense for claims like "'Now see this leaf green!'" (PI II xi 
§ 255) and that, pursuant to this "[t]wo uses of the word ‘see'. The one: ‘What do you 
see there?' – ‘I see this' (and then a description…)" (PI II xi §111- underlying mine). 
In turn, this, this should make us deeply skeptical of any attempt to assimilate the 
descriptive methodology into ‘aspect seeing’ and presenting possibilities. Indeed, over 
the course of PI II xi, Wittgenstein tends to use "description" much more for what-is-
seen than likenesses, connections, bringing out aspects, etc.  
 Thus, we see that two popular accounts in the literature have trouble making 
sense of Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology simpliciter. Though the contrasts 
that the rule-based view offers between description and, e.g., theory, are surely 
correct, this leads them to neglect description, and the descriptive methodology, in the 
PI. By contrast, the aspect view attempts to assimilate Wittgenstein’s descriptive 
methodology into its own rather unique conception of “representation.” I have argued 
that this attempt misfires for a host of philosophical and exegetical reasons. In either 
case, it is clear that a discussion of description alone is in order. It is to this we turn.  
7.1 Described Descriptions: 
 
In the last section, we noted that a descriptive methodology is clearly critical 
for Wittgenstein in general and his metaphilosophical views in particular. We also 
noted that two popular interpretations of this descriptive methodology face some 
challenges. Ergo, a new account is required. In this section, I argue that what 
Wittgenstein targets for his descriptions are the frameworks in which a description is 
given. This harmonizes with the grammatical account’s claim that philosophy is 
properly second order. What Wittgenstein aims to describes is how we describe, i.e., 
the parameters we rely on when we proffer descriptions (see chapter 4.0a). Second, 
the method Wittgenstein utilizes to bring to the fore the terms that a description relies 
on is his stunningly innovative use of models. This harmonizes well with Kuusela as 
discussed in chapter 1.2g as well as aspects of Horwich as discussed in chapter 3.3a.  
To begin, first, I set the stage by examining PI § 291 in some depth. I do this 
because PI § 291 is the most sustained discussion of "description" in part one of the 
investigation and so is critical for any attempted interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
descriptive methodology. From this close reading, second, I distill both what 
Wittgenstein targets with his descriptions as well as how he describes his target. 
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Third, I examine Wittgenstein’s method of description in some detail. I argue that it is 
indirect and relies on a stunningly innovative use of “models” or “objects of 
comparison” (PI § 130). Fourth, I briefly discuss two possible misunderstandings of 
the method of indirect description. Finally, fifth, I summarize.  
Let us begin by examining PI § 291 in full: 
 
"What we call "descriptions" are instruments for particular uses. Think of a 
machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with measurements, which an 
engineer has before him. Thinking of a description as a word-picture of the 
facts has something misleading about it: one tends to think only of such 
pictures as hang on our walls, which seem simply to depict how a thing looks, 
what it is like (these pictures are, as it were, idle)" 
 
Notice, first, that Wittgenstein introduces description with italics and double-
quotation marks. This is somewhat striking as Wittgenstein often uses either italics or 
quotations but rarely both together, especially in the case of singular words. For the 
italics, Baker, commenting on italics in Wittgenstein in general, flags this sentence 
precisely as an instance where Wittgenstein "indicates the focus of a remark" (Baker 
(2006), 227). He further notes that a related use of italics is to stress "a point that is 
apt to be neglected, or even expected to give rise to objections" (ibid).  This seems 
apt. Intuitively, we take a description not to be a tool for a particular purpose, but 
something like depiction. By "depiction" I mean a sort of iconic relationship between 
the picture and the thing-pictured. In other words, a depiction is like a "word-
picture… one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls, which seem 
simply to depict how a thing looks" (PI § 291). Notice also that Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on the purpose-relative status of descriptions further belies the word-picture 
conception. Intuitively, a depiction, or word-picture, is a depiction; regardless of the 
purposes I have in mind or put it to. 
Notice, further, that this idea of depiction and a "word-picture" clearly echoes 
the TLP and the "picture theory of propositions." Indeed, as discussed in chapter 5, 
for the TLP a proposition describes a possible fact in virtue of each sharing a 
determinate logical structure. Pace this, later Wittgenstein is here keen to emphasize 
that such a conception has "something misleading about it" (PI § 291). Indeed, the 
claim that pictures are "idle" supports the claim made in chapter 6 that later 
Wittgenstein endorses a pragmatic account of representation. Indeed, such an account 
is committed to the idea that x does not simply represent y due to some iconic 
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relation, a determinate logical structure, and so on. Rather, it requires that S represents 
x as y to A purpose p. As it were, no representation is ‘automatic.’ 
The function of the quotes around description is equally fascinating. First, they 
are double quotation marks. For various reasons, the use of double quotes in the PI 
seems to be different than single quotes. To wit, single quotes tend to be used in the 
same way as italics (cf. Backer (2006), 234) and so double quotes probably play a 
different role. Further, and regardless of how much weight we should give the 
typographical conventions of the PI, it is clear that double quotes do play a fairly 
standard and distinct role in written English. To wit, they are often used to 
characterize that some term is being used in a specific sense- e.g., “By ‘adult,’ this car 
rental agency means someone over 25 years old.” And, indeed, this fits PI § 291 
perfectly as Wittgenstein seeks to characterize “description” in the sense of 
instruments. In sum, it seems likely that, in PI § 291, Wittgenstein is characterizing 
“description” in a specific way, hence the double-quotes, and is inviting the reader to 
reflect on this characterization, hence the italics. Let us take up this invitation.  
To reflect on Wittgenstein specific use of description, it is best to turn to the 
examples he offers us- those of a machine drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with 
measurements. First, it is striking that all three examples are taken from engineering. 
This furthers the point from chapter 6.3 that later Wittgenstein seems happy to take 
over certain tools from sciences- models, machine drawings, and so on- and deploy 
them for very different ends. Second, within this scientific, specifically engineering, 
context, each of the examples is, indeed, a tool for a particular purpose. For example, 
an engineer who wants to know the size of the front door of a house will use an 
elevated drawing with measurements. Alternatively, if the engineer wants to know the 
interior layout of the house, she will use a cross-section. Third, related to this, it is 
clear that these descriptions can be orthogonal to one another. A description of a 
house in terms of a cross-section cuts away precisely the features that a description of 
a house as an elevation with measurements focuses on. However, fourth, each 
description of the house as being thus and so is true only if the house is thus and so. In 
other words, the engineer’s use of such drawings is still firmly routed in the grammar 
of description- i.e., a description of x as being y is true only if x is y. Thus, a cross-
section that describes two rooms upstairs is true only when the house has two rooms 
upstairs. Fifth, trying to give a ‘total description' of the house is a rather odd prospect. 
Indeed, a description that tries to blend together both a cross-section and an elevated 
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drawing may lose the very perspicuity of the features each made clear individually. In 
turn, sixth, this implies that, for Wittgenstein, descriptions are not ‘additive' (e.g., 
Baker (2006), 43). By ‘additive’ Baker means that one can always blend or harmonize 
various orthogonal descriptions into some more complete description. Pace this, such 
a blended drawing may loose the very perspicuity Baker insists on. Finally, and most 
critically, seventh, the selection of which sort of drawing an engineer will use is 
different matter than assessing the accuracy of the drawing that the engineer proffers. 
Indeed, it is exactly here that purpose-relativity is appropriately considered (Kuusela 
(2008), 79-81, makes a similar point). An engineer chooses to use a cross-section 
because she wants to figure out where an interior wall should go whereas she uses an 
elevated drawing to figure out if the front door is too narrow. In both cases, she 
selects the sort of diagram she will draw based on her overall project at that time.  
Abstracting from this, we can isolate both a target of description as well as a 
method for description in the PI. Let us take each in turn. For the target, let us follow 
Gert and assume that what Wittgenstein claims is that "philosophers should describe 
the description that people give of the things they talk about" (Gert (1997), 226). For 
PI  §291, this seems apposite. Wittgenstein calls our attention not constitutive rules 
per se, or to ‘possibilities,’ but, rather, to various actual descriptions we can give of a 
house. Further, this is echoed by the passages concerning “description” given in 
chapter 7.0. In each case, Wittgenstein does not describe constitutive rules, uses, or 
possibilities, but, rather, the frameworks by which we describe moods, faces, rooms, 
and so on. Ergo, Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology targets the frameworks by 
which we proffer various (first order) descriptions. Let us discuss what a “framework 
for description” means more carefully.  
To begin, a framework for description is the terms or parameters by which I 
describe a phenomenon. Again, the engineering example is very helpful. A cross 
section and an elevated drawing both utilize different parameters by which to describe 
a house. Second, framework for description I select is arbitrary from a metaphysical 
or logical point of view. In other words, the house does not ‘tell’ the engineer how to 
describe it. Indeed, though there may be more ‘natural’ descriptions of phenomenon, 
these are not simply ‘built into’ the phenomenon in question. For example, Spengler 
describes mathematics not in terms of progressive discovery, novel constructions, 
truth, necessity, and so on, but “as a historical phenomenon and historical creation” 
(Hacker (2009 a), 5). Third, the purpose-relative aspects that Wittgenstein stresses 
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concern exactly this selection of a framework. The terms or parameters I select to 
describe the house depend on the purposes I have for proffering first order 
descriptions. Further, critically, my choice of a framework can be “apt,” i.e., the 
framework I select and the purpose I have in mind for proffering descriptions align, or 
“inapt,” i.e., they do not. For example, an interior designer who selects an elevated 
drawing has made an inapt choice as such a drawing does not present her with the 
salient features she needs to figure out if a couch is too big for a room, say. Fourth, 
and in line with the grammatical account (see chapter 4.0a), the framework for 
description is normative in two senses. One, given a certain framework, an attempted 
description in that framework’s terms can be “correct,” i.e., the proffered description 
and framework match, or “incorrect,” i.e., they do not. For example, someone who 
claims to describe a house in terms of color and then gives us the area of various 
rooms has offered an incorrect description in that spatial measurements and color are 
orthogonal. Two, a framework for description is not ‘empirical’ in that I do not 
discover it, it does not simply ‘arise’ from the phenomenon, and so on. However, a 
framework is also not logical in the TLP’s sense as the color exclusion problem, and 
Wittgenstein’s focus on it, shows (e.g., PO 29-35, LWVC 64-66). Rather a framework 
for description is normative in that the interconnections between the terms that make 
it up are constitutively interdependent. For example, the terms that make up a color 
framework for description, e.g., “red,” “light,” “green-ish,” “colored,” are related in 
such a way that I can move from “the object is light red,” to “the object is red,” “the 
object is not greenish” and so on. Again, I can be “correct” if I my first order 
description conforms to these normative connections within the framework and 
“incorrect” if not. Finally, fifth, a framework for description and certain practices 
interpolate with one another in systematic ways. For example, someone who sets out 
to describe a room’s color may take a color chat but will certainly not take a meter 
stick. Indeed, the parameters that I select directly determine how I measure the 
phenomenon in question and this selection is not trivial.  
Granting that Wittgenstein targets these frameworks for description, let us turn 
to the method he utilizes to describe them. To begin, especially granting that the 
above account followed the grammatical account in viewing a framework for 
description as made up of inherently normative terms/concepts and their 
interrelations, one might expect that Wittgenstein describes the frameworks directly- 
i.e., by citing rules, examining uses, and so on. However, such a direct methodology 
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faces at least four objections. First, as argued in chapter 7.0, it does not seem 
confirmed by the PI’s use of “description.” Second, it runs to risk of setting off a 
regress. To see this, assume that all descriptions require frameworks for description. 
Intuitively, the command “describe your room!” can only be done when I, or the 
orderer, selects some terms/parameters by which to describe the room- e.g., space, 
furniture, color. Granting this, a description of a framework for description either 
itself rests on a framework or it does not. If it does, then it seems as though I must 
also describe this framework for the description of a framework for description of a 
described x, and so on. If it does not, then we are faced with the same problem we 
saw with the bare command “describe your room!” I can describe a framework for 
description by, e.g., examining its historical or genealogical evolution, considering its 
function, musing on its structure, and so on. A repost here is that what blocks such a 
regress is the normative status of the rules that constitute the frameworks. However, 
as argued in section 4.1a, such an account is problematic in that to describe a rule is to 
change the direction of fit and the rule looses its normative force. If this is so, then the 
rule just hangs, like a signpost, and does not block the regress (PI § 85). Third, PI § 
291 is adamant that descriptions are purpose-relative. Further, PI § 109 is best read as 
insisting on the same point. If this is so, it becomes unclear how this can be 
harmonized with the project of directly describing constitutive rules as these are not 
purpose-relative. Finally, fourth, Wittgenstein insists that, when describing language, 
he “can come up only with externalities about language” (PI §120). This quote, and PI 
§ 120 generally, support the claim that Wittgenstein does not attempt to describe 
language directly. 
Granting that Wittgenstein does not, and perhaps cannot, describe a 
framework for description directly, let us examine how one might describe them 
indirectly. Specifically, let us examine how an indirect description may relate to 
“models” or “objects of comparison” (PI § 130 & § 131). I note here that, though I 
disagree with several aspects of his account, I am following Kuusela (2008), 74-95, in 
this change to an indirect focus. I also remind the reader that, in chapter 6.3, we 
followed Williamson, Kuusela, and several others, in seeing, e.g., language-games as 
models. Granting all this, let us expound what an “indirect descriptive method” is. 
To begin, one feature of a model is that it rests on certain stipulative features. 
For Wittgenstein, and language-games in particular, these stipulative features are 
stipulated rules that define the game. In turn, and critically, the stipulated rules 
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Wittgenstein puts forward can match the constitutive rules that determine a 
framework. For example, Wittgenstein notes that Augustine “gives us a particular 
picture of the essence of human language” (PI § 1). Under this reading, a ‘picture’ is a 
framework for description- i.e., the parameters by which Augustine describes 
language in terms of name/thing correlations. Granting this, and bracketing the 
complexities at work in PI § 1, Wittgenstein then instructs us to “imagine a language 
for which the description given by Augustine is right” (PI § 2) followed by some 
stipulated rules concerning two individuals and various stones. The point of this 
imagined language-game is that it exhibits the parameters that Augustine’s framework 
relies on to describe language as a model. As it were, Wittgenstein foregrounds the 
normative interdependencies that determine a framework for description by re-
presenting them in the form of simplified games whose stipulative rules match the 
constitutive rules. Moreover, this way of describing a framework is indirect in that, 
rather than citing the rules or examining the uses of words, Wittgenstein offers us 
language-games that are designed to reflect the framework.  
Notice that such indirect procedure moots the above criticism of direct 
descriptions. First, Wittgenstein rarely cites rules, notes uses, etc., in the PI exactly 
because his descriptions are indirect. Indeed, if the indirect account is apposite, we 
expect to find, and do find, Wittgenstein offering all sorts models with stipulated rules 
that are meant to reflect the parameters of various frameworks by which we might 
describe faces, language, and so on. Second, the regress worry is avoided; 
Wittgenstein has no need to constantly step back onto yet higher levels of descriptions 
of descriptions. Rather, once the framework is exhibited in a model, we can describe 
the model in the same way we do anything else. Third, this proffering of models 
enables exactly the sort of purpose-relativity that Wittgenstein insists “description” as 
a methodological category has. To see this clearly, notice that Wittgenstein asks 
"[w]hat is the relation between name and thing named?- Well, what is it? Look at 
language-game (2) or some other one" (PI § 37- underlying mine). This quote implies 
that one can offer any number of models that indirectly describe Augustine’s 
framework for description. And, indeed, Wittgenstein offers at least two distinct 
models that indirectly describe Augustine’s framework: the primitive-language-game 
model(s) (e.g., PI § 2, PI § 7) and an ostensive-definition-game (not ostensive 
teaching of words!) model(s) (e.g., PI § 28, § 48). Further, selecting which to utilize 
has to do with the purpose of dissolving philosophical problems as well as the 
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preconceptions and assumptions that are at work in the audience. For Augustine, as 
Wittgenstein understands him, the primitive-language-game models are apt in that 
Augustine is likely to grant the underlying assumptions of the model- i.e., that 
language is inherently social, that learning/training is key, and that our language 
community is what correlates names and things. Indeed, by building these 
assumptions into the primitive-language-games, Wittgenstein is then able to explore 
them, a point we return to in a moment. By contrast, for the author of the TLP, such a 
primitive-language-game model is inapt as this author would reject these 
assumptions- i.e., the author of the TLP is the only language user (TLP 5.62), he has 
little time for training (TLP 5.632), and the name/thing relation is properly primitive 
(TLP 3.221 and 3.23). Thus a different model is required to indirectly describe the 
same framework in such a way that it can help dissolve these problems. In sum, 
describing a framework for description indirectly allows one to construct distinct sorts 
of models, for different purposes or audiences, to exhibit the same framework in 
different ways. Finally fourth, PI § 120 seems to endorse such an indirect method as 
such models are ‘externalities’ about language.  
Granting this, let us examine indirect description, and its methodological 
implications, more carefully. Specifically, I focus on three features of indirect 
description. These are: (a) first, such a method allows us to explore frameworks for 
description from within; (b) second, such a method helps to check our philosophical 
bad habit of making over-generalizations and overextensions (cf. BlBK 17); (c) third, 
and most critically, they make sense of how analogies might work, a point critical for 
chapter 8. Let us examine each in turn. 
(a) First, the use of models allows Wittgenstein to both explore the nature of, 
and limits to, various frameworks of description internally. To begin, it is imperative 
to keep in mind that, Augustine “does describe a system of communication; only not 
just everything that we call language is this system" (PI § 3). Indeed, Wittgenstein 
further emphasizes that "the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to 
its bearer" (PI § 43) after his seeming assault on this very idea of name/thing 
correlation. Abstracting a bit from the case of Augustine, we are also told that “[t]he 
picture [i.e., a particular framework for description] is there; and I do not dispute its 
correctness. But what is the application” (PI § 424). In other words, Wittgenstein 
does not repudiate frameworks for description per se. Instead, he focuses our attention 
on both phenomenon for which they are innocuous as well as places where their 
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application becomes inapt or incorrect. Indeed, the enrichment of the primitive-
language-game model that occurs from PI § 2 to, say, PI § 18, fulfills both functions. 
Positively, Wittgenstein’s elaborations of the primitive-language-game model help us 
realize that Augustine’s framework does a fine job with proper names, labels we 
attach to items, and so on. Further, this elaboration clarifies how the parameterization 
Augustine’s framework relies on affects the proffered first order descriptions. 
Negatively, this process of enrichment of the primitive-language-game brings into 
focus where the framework is inapt and may be incorrect. For example, it becomes 
clear that such Augustine’s framework for description will struggle with questions 
(e.g. PI § 6). Thus, by stipulating and elaborating models that indirectly describe 
frameworks, Wittgenstein can explore the nature of, and limits to, the frameworks 
indirectly by enriching the model(s) from within.  
(b) Second, in turn, indirect description also helps us to check our 
philosophical bad habit of overgeneralizing or over-extending our frameworks. To 
begin, if we return to the engineering example of PI § 291, it is quite clear that 
different diagrams are useful for different purposes. Furthermore, the question of 
which diagram is ‘best’ or captures the house’s ‘essence’ are simply misguided in that 
each diagram can bring certain features of the house into view and occlude others. 
Finally, for the engineer, this is all very clear in that her diagrams are quite clear 
about what they can do aptly and inaptly. However, when we turn to describing in 
philosophy, Wittgenstein notes that we often want to claim that some particular 
framework for description gives us “the essence of human language” (PI § 1). By 
constructing and exploring models that exhibit these frameworks, Wittgenstein helps 
us realize that any given framework for description will be apt for some purposes and 
inapt for others. In turn, these indirect descriptions should remind us that insisting on 
some ‘essential’ framework is rather odd. Notice too that this harmonizes with our 
discussion in chapter 7 concerning how Wittgenstein reimagines the relationship 
between logic and language. The framework of logic that describes sentences in terms 
of propositions (i.e., determinate logical structures), their inferential relations, and so 
on, is one among other ways to describe language. It is apt for figuring out what 
follows from what and inapt if we want to know if Jen’s attempt to seduce Sally is 
going well or not. 
(c) Finally, and most critically, this use of indirect description can help make 
sense of analogies in the PI. To see this, consider that “objects of comparison… 
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though similarities and dissimilates… throw light on features of our language” (PI § 
130). First, these similarities and dissimilarities work can work in all sorts of ways. 
For example, I might compare the primitive-language-game model to the ostensive-
definition model. In turn, this comparison suggests analogies, based on the two 
games’ similarities, concerning, e.g., how names and things relate, as well as dis-
analogies, based on dissimilarities, concerning, e.g., how assuming that the imperative 
mood is basic and how taking the indicative mood as basic alters all sorts of 
preconceptions, assumptions, and so on, in telling ways. Alternatively, I may compare 
the primitive-language-game to particular regions of language. In turn, again, such a 
comparison helps me analogically understand the role of proper nouns in language as 
akin to labels stuck on objects in the game. Further, the dissimilates between the 
primitive-language-game and another region of language, e.g., adverbs or numerals, 
helps me realize that there are fundamental dis-analogies between names and these 
uses of language (a point, e.g., Horwich (2012), 1-18, makes with force). We return to 
the role of analogies at length in chapter 8. For now, it is imperative to notice that, if 
this picture is correct, Wittgenstein does not normally make (dis-)analogies 
concerning the individual uses of words but rather between frameworks.  
Thus, we have examined what “indirect descriptions” are as well as the 
methodological uptake of them. Before closing, I want to briefly address two possible 
mistakes. First, one might take rules, the stipulated rules that define the models or the 
constitutive rules that determine a framework for description, to be mere heuristic 
devices. Indeed, Kuusela (2008), 132-140, views rules in this manner. However, such 
a view suffers from two problems. One, the relationship between a model and a 
framework is not arbitrary in the manner such an account suggests. Indeed, the danger 
with such a view is that it makes it seem like the relationship between a model and the 
constitutive rules it reflects are mere inventions of Wittgenstein. In turn, this raises 
many problems, some of which we discussed in chapter 1.1h. Two, the heuristic view 
of rules struggles to make sense of incorrectness as we discussed it above. Recall that 
“incorrect” means that the framework for description and a proffered description 
conflict with each other in that the later does not rely on, or correctly use, the 
framework. In turn, this leads to the somewhat awkward situation wherein someone 
who claims to describe a room in terms of color and then says it is five meters squared 
cannot be corrected. In both cases, the critical point is that the rules, stipulated or 
constitutive, are not features that we can simply  "drop" (e.g., Kuusela (2008), 249). 
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Second, one may nevertheless insist that a direct description is a far better way 
to go. Indeed, such a protestor may claim that, though Wittgenstein does not seem to 
give direct descriptions in the PI, this has to do with his eccentric style rather than 
some deep philosophical issue. For example, Hacker (2009 a), 23, seems to have such 
a view. However, such a view suffers from two philosophical problems, in particular, 
voiced above. One, it is rather unclear how direct description and purpose-relativity 
can be harmonized as the likely target of direct description, constitutive rules, belies 
purpose-relativity. Two, PI § 120 seems exegetically against it.  
Thus, we have an interesting account of what Wittgenstein’s descriptive 
methodology in the PI amounts to. Specifically, I have argued that Wittgenstein’s 
target for description in the PI is frameworks for description- i.e., the terms or 
parameters we rely on when we proffer description. This harmonizes with the 
grammatical accounts claim that philosophy is properly second order. I have also 
argued that Wittgenstein’s method for description is innovative and unique. 
Specifically, I have argued that Wittgenstein proffers us indirect descriptions that 
exhibit the normative features of frameworks for descriptions in models that we can 
then use as objects of comparison. In closing, it is critical to keep in mind that this 
account of indirect description has three distinct accuracy conditions. First, there is 
grammatical relationship between a description of x and the x described. Specifically, 
a description of x as being y is true only if x is y. Second, there are correctness 
conditions. These have to do with either a conflict between a framework for 
description and the proffered first order description or with a misuse of the terms that 
make up the framework for description when proffering the first order description. 
Finally, and most critically, there are aptness conditions. These are purpose-relative 
and depend in part on analogies and similarities, a critical point for chapter 8. 
 
7.2 PI § 109 and Describing in Philosophical Investigation:  
 
With indirect description in view, we can begin to make sense of the opening 
part of the metaphilosophical aspects of Wittgenstein. In this section, I seek to offer a 
reading of the first part of PI § 109. I argue that Wittgenstein's insistence that 
philosophy "merely" describes, far from trivializing philosophy or forcing it into an 
untenable quietism, betokens a fundamental metaphilosophical insight on 
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Wittgenstein's part. To wit, that "description" is lexically prior to, and critical for, 
both "explanation" and "interpretation." First, I examine explanation and why it 
necessarily rests on description. Second, I make similar case for interpretation. 
Finally, third, I briefly examine some lessons that we should take from these 
discussions. This paves the way for a proper philosophical investigation and the last 
chapter of this dissertation.  
To begin, the opening of PI 109 claims:  
 
"It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones… And we 
may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical 
in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone 
must take its place. And this description gets it light- that is to say its purpose- 
from the philosophical problems." 
 
Notice, as the italics indicate, Wittgenstein is stressing a contrast between 
"explanation" and "descriptions." Indeed, this contrastive characterization, and others 
like it, is what led the rule-based account to discuss “description” the way it did. 
Regardless, it is clear that Wittgenstein is keen to emphasis, with the TLP (TLP 
4.111), that philosophy is different in kind than science and, pursuant to this, that 
descriptions are different in kind than explanations. However, this still leaves 
“explanation” somewhat under-defined. 
 Granting this, a more robust account of “explanation” is required. In most of 
the secondary literature on this passage, a general consensus has emerged. Such a 
consensus claims that Wittgenstein’s concept of “explanation” is best thought of as a 
sort of deductive-nomological account of scientific explanation (for the locus 
classicus see Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). Hereafter ‘the DN account’). At the 
most basic level, the DN account claims that to explain a phenomenon is to offer a set 
of explanantia propositions that include nomic regularities and initial conditions. In 
turn, these explanantia should allow one to logically deduce the explanandum- a 
proposition that describes the event, state, etc., one aims to explain. Thus, an 
explanation is a logical relationship such that the explanandum is shown to be a 
deductive consequence of the explanantia. As it were, I explain a phenomenon by 
showing that it is a logically follows from ‘natural law’ and ‘initial conditions.’ 
Though it is unclear to me if imputing the DN account to Wittgenstein is apropos, 
especially given later Wittgenstein’s admittedly inchoate though deeply interesting 
reflections on the important role of causality in science and life (e.g., PO p. 371-426; 
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PI § 89), let us accept the conventional wisdom. In other words, I assume that by the 
term “explanation” in PI § 109 is best interpreted in terms of the DN account.  
 In turn, it is critical to notice that the explanandum I aim to explain is not and 
cannot be a phenomenon in the world. Rather, it is a propositional description of the 
phenomenon. Thus, "[by] explanandum, we understand the sentence describing the 
phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon itself)" (Hempel and Oppenheim 
(1948), 137- emphasis mine). Without this seemingly innocuous note, the DN 
account’s reliance on deduction becomes rather hard to make sense of as worldly stuff 
does not readily lend itself to logical deductions. However, this raises the question of 
how we are to describe the phenomenon in such a way that we get a explanandum 
proposition. Further, this question is pressing in terms of both normal scientific 
research and in light of our discussions in the above sections. It is pressing in normal 
scientific research as selecting the parameters I rely on to describe phenomena is often 
devilishly hard. 
 Granting this question, I argue that describing the phenomenon so that it is 
expressed in an explanandum neither readily reduce to more DN style explanations 
nor can be simply taken as a given. It does not reduce to more DN style explanations 
because, as discussed in the last section, descriptions are arbitrary from both an 
empirical and a logical perspective (also see, e.g., PI § 497). Granting this, it is 
difficult to know how one could derive a description. The explanandum cannot simply 
be taken at face value because, again as discussed in the last section, “description” is, 
in reality, quite complex and we can not simply assume are in order. Further, from a 
scientific perspective, selecting the proper parameters by which to describe a 
phenomenon does not readily reduce to algorithms, is not something that the 
phenomenon ‘tells’ me, and so on. Thus, the DN account presupposes that we have an 
explanandum (a description of a phenomenon) and can neither derive this description 
nor should it be taken for granted.   
 Thus, the DN account of explanation depends on having a description 
of the phenomenon it targets and cannot account for this description by proffering 
more DN style explanations. Critically, it follows that description is critical for DN 
style explanation and it cannot itself be explained in the DN style. In turn, this means 
that Wittgenstein’s insistence that philosophy “merely” describes is him putting first 
things first. Pursuant to this, our discussion in the previous sections can easily suggest 
various ways to explore how one might describe the phenomenon one wants to 
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explain. Specifically, one should ensure that the description one relies on is true in 
that if a description of x being y is false as x is not y, clearly explanation miscarries- 
e.g., trying to explain why a sample is x* C STP when it is y* C STP clearly goes 
wrong. One should also ensure that the descriptions are correct in that one does not 
misuse the parameters that make up a framework to draw absurd conclusions- e.g., 
that the sample has a boiling point of 120* C STP and that x is boiling at 90* C STP- 
or rely on a framework for description and then proffer first order descriptions that 
run against it- e.g., to claim to describe a sample’s temperature by discussing how it 
affects one’s mood. Finally, and most critically, the description must be apt. This 
point, in particular, is critical as selecting the framework for description is deeply 
important for how the DN style explanation unfolds. In all cases, it is quite clear that 
Wittgenstein is right to insist that description is different in kind than, and lexically 
prior to, DN style explanation. In turn, this sets the stage for philosophical 
investigations as DN style explanation, and science generally, just cannot help us 
here. Regardless, it is also interesting to note that this seemingly trivial note about 
description being first is critical for philosophy of explanation today. Thus, if 
Wittgenstein is correct, it is neither “no explanation without understanding” (cf. e.g., 
de Regt abd Dieks (2005) nor is it “no understanding without explanation” (cf. e.g., 
Strevens (2013)). Rather, it is that we can have neither with description!  
 Turning to interpretation, matters are strikingly similar. To begin, by 
“interpretation” I mean a sort of inquiry that engenders "Verstehen." Thus, a 
hermeneutical approach to a text, the ethnographic methods anthropologists rely on, 
and so on, all count as “interpretation” and are meant to engender some sort of 
appreciation for the meaning of a practice, a text, and so on. Further, let us accept the 
idea that this sort of inquiry is distinct from, cannot reduce to, and so on, DN style 
explanation (e.g., Taylor (1971)). Granting this, one might expect that our discussion 
of description and explanation have little to do with how description and 
interpretation relate.  
 However, I argue that this is not so. To begin, as with the DN style 
explanation, it is clear that interpretation as practiced by historians, anthropologists, 
and so on, relies on describing foreign practices, different times, and so on. 
Furthermore, these descriptions are almost always done in terms of language. 
Granting this, I argue that the descriptions that an interpreter relies on to put forward 
her interpretation cannot, themselves, be reduced to interpretations. This is for two 
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main reasons. One, the grammar of “interpretation” is best construed as interpretation 
of x presupposes an x that is independent of the interpretation. Bracketing some 
niceties, this raises the question of the status of the x. It is clear that if the x is itself 
another interpretation, then a regress comes into view as each interpretation 
grammatical demands some other ‘thing’ that it interprets. Pursuant to this, the most 
likely regress stopper is that x is a description of the practice, period, etc., in question. 
And, indeed, this seems correct as an anthropologist can only interpret the meaning of 
a practice once she’s described it, say. Further, to accuse an anthropologist of 
misinterpreting a practice often merely shows allegiance to a different interpretive 
approach whereas to accuse her of misdescribing a practice depends on the critic also 
observing the tribe. Two the attempt to assimilate “description” into “interpretation” 
engenders a sort of ‘postmodern’ semantic skepticism wherein the token marks on a 
page can be read/interpreted in any way one pleases. Indeed, “there is no outside-text” 
(Derrida (1976), 220).111 In both cases, interpretation, as with DN style explanation, 
presupposes description and cannot account for it in ‘internal’ terms.  
 Further, again, our discussion of indirect descriptions above can offer some 
helpful guidance of how description works. Specifically, for a description to engender 
interpretation, the description must be true of the text, practice, etc., described as 
clearly if an interpretation of tribe imputes to them a practice they lack, the 
interpretation is false. Second, it must be correct in that selecting a framework for 
description that assumes a ‘tribes’ behavior is rational and than proffering 
descriptions that make their practices appear mad is incorrect (cf. PO p. 125). Finally, 
a description must be apt for a particular interpretive purpose. If I select a proto-
scientific framework for description- i.e., one that emphasizing causes, hypotheses, 
and so on- and then apply it to magic, things may become problematic (Winch (1964) 
makes a similar point). 
Thus, we see that both the DN style explanation and interpretation as 
Verstehen presuppose description to get off the ground. If this is so and both 
interpretation and DN explanation assume and cannot account for “description,” then 
                                                 
111 Deploying this quote in this fashion is admittedly quite unfair of me. Specifically, what Derrida has 
in mind with this quote, as the passage makes clear, are patterns of inferential and deductive 
relationships that only make sense within linguistic/logical systems. His claim, at its most basic, is that 
‘support’ ‘follow from’ etc. are only senseful within language/logic and that, pursuant to this, the idea 
that ‘facts say that…,’ ‘the evidence (on its own as a magical worldly object) supports…,’ etc., are 
absurdities. His criticism of ‘logocentrism’ is, further, best read in this light. Regardless, both Derrida’s 
apologists and his critics tend to read the quote in the manner I use it above.  
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a focus on description, far from being some unfair and crippling stricture on 
philosophy, is giving philosophy pride of place. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s note that 
“[t]he name ’philosophy’ might also be given to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions” (PI § 126) is best read in this light. What “philosophy 
puts… before us” (ibid) are, among other things, the available frameworks for 
description we have and that can proffer various first order descriptions.  
In closing, notice that if this account of “description” as being lexically prior 
to both DN style explanation and interpretation, then Wittgenstein has not forced 
philosophy into a sort uncomfortable quietism. Nor, even more importantly, has he set 
out the destroy philosophy by showing it to be nonsense, irrational, etc. Rather, he has 
helped us come to realize what philosophy can fruitfully do. Philosophy can describe. 
And given that description is bedrock for explanation and interpretation, such a task is 
of paramount importance. Furthermore, given that neither explanation nor 
interpretation can reduce description to themselves, a radically new sort of inquiry, a 
philosophical investigation that is different in kind than physics, anthropology, and so 
on, is demanded. It is to this we turn, at last.  
7.3 Conclusion:  
 
This chapter has discussed Wittgenstein's characterization of "description" 
within his philosophical investigations. First, we noted that two attempts to 
characterize “description” in Wittgenstein go wrong for various reasons. We then 
examined Wittgenstein’s indirect method of describing our frameworks for 
description. Finally, we closed by noting that this characterization, far from 
diminishing philosophy, may give it a critical role. In turn, this sets the stage for the 
last chapter.  
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8 Chapter 8: Later Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy: Finding 
Homes for Words: 
 
In chapter six, we argued that Wittgenstein's reimagining of the relationship 
between language and logic is best understood as Wittgenstein endorsing a far more 
pragmatic account of representation. In effect, for later Wittgenstein, a sentence does 
not simply have a determinate logical structure that is constituted by a logical 
isomorphism with a possible fact. Instead, a logician represents a sentence as having 
such a structure for particular purposes. In chapter seven, refined this pragmatic 
account by examining how it affects later Wittgenstein’s descriptive methodology. In 
effect, the TLP assumed that description is a form of depiction that, again, 
constitutively depends on a determinate logical structure. In contrast, later 
Wittgenstein is keen to emphasize the heterogeneity and purpose-relativity of things 
we count as “descriptions.” Pursuant to this, later Wittgenstein also focused on 
exhibiting in models various frameworks for description under which we offer 
descriptions as well as their structures, limitations, and interconnections. 
With these points clearly in view, we now turn to later Wittgenstein's 
metaphilosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy. Specifically, I argue that, 
for later Wittgenstein, as for earlier Wittgenstein, the verb, “to philosophize,” should 
be given pride of place and that this verb is an accomplishment verb whose ‘internal’ 
result is clarity (now understood as ‘perspicuity’). In other words, for later 
Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a research program, a mental illness, bad rhetoric, an 
irrational attempt to do science badly, or a high-powered version of connective 
analysis. Instead, philosophy is a set of methods designed to help us understand each 
other and ourselves. Succinctly, I argue that philosophy is conceptually connected to 
understanding in such a way philosophizing (when it succeeds) engenders 
perspicacious understanding- i.e., an understanding that enables us to see connections 
in a sense we develop further over the course of this chapter. 
First, I set the stage. I return to the TLP and discuss how earlier Wittgenstein’s 
preconceptions lead him to view semantic content as a picture of a possible fact. 
Second, I discuss how later Wittgenstein problematizes this account as well as how 
this leads him to reconsider the relationship between meaning and understanding (see 
also .g., Baker & Hacker (2009), 357-86).  Third, I examine Wittgenstein’s new 
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conception of “understanding.” I argue that, for Wittgenstein, it is inherently 
polysemic (PI § 531) and briefly discuss various aspects of it. I focus, in particular, on 
“understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’” (PI § 122) and link it to (dis-
)analogies and (dis-)similarities as discussed in chapter 7.1. With all this in view, 
fourth, I proffer an account of what “philosophical investigations” is for later 
Wittgenstein as well as how it functions. Finally, fifth, I offer a close reading of PI § 
133. Specifically, I argue that the peace Wittgenstein seeks for philosophy is not the 
peace of the dead but a peace from a certain set of scientistic demands. In turn, if my 
arguments are plausible, then for later Wittgenstein, understanding perspicuously is 
simply the end-result of philosophical investigation (when it succeeds) and such 
investigations are critical to ensuring that we can make sense of each other and 
ourselves.  
 
8.0 Semantic Content, Picturing Facts, and the Pneuma of Understanding:  
  
This section proffers an account of how the TLP conceptualizes the semantic 
content of various sentences. First, I proffer a nuts-and-bolts discussion of the basic 
account of semantic content at work in the TLP. Second, I argue that this account of 
the semantic content of sentences engenders a "pneumatic conception of thinking" (PI 
§ 109)- i.e., a very particular conception of how meaning and understanding relates. 
Finally, third, I examine how this picture account of semantic content and pneumatic 
thinking affects earlier Wittgenstein's overall conception of language.  
To begin, it is quite clear that, for earlier Wittgenstein, the semantic content of 
a sentence is best thought of as a picture of a possible fact. Indeed, "[a] proposition 
[or sentence as “Satz” can mean either] is a picture of reality: for if I understand a 
proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition 
without having its sense explained to me" (TLP 4.021). Furthermore, “[w]e picture 
facts to ourselves” (TLP 2.1), such a picture is “a model of reality” (TLP 2.12) and 
such a picture “can depict any reality whose form it has” (TLP 2.17). In turn, we can 
see that the meaning of a sentence is the picture of a possible fact that the sentence 
displays (TLP 2.127). More formally, the meaning of a sentence is constitutively 
dependent on its sharing a determinate logical structure with a possible fact and a 
correlation between elements of the sentence and elements of the possible fact (see 
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chapter 5.1 and 5.2 for the full account). Notice that this account of the semantic 
content of a sentence as a picture, naturally leads one to a certain preconception about 
how meaning and understanding relate. To wit, to understand what a sentence means 
is to ‘see’ or ‘grasp’ the picture that the sentence displays (e.g., TLP 2.172). Thus, “if 
I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents” (TLP 4.021). 
However, it is critical to keep in mind that the represented situation, the picture, need 
not depict a fact that actually obtains (TLP 2.22). This is because the structure of the 
picture and the structure of the possible fact arise from concatenated ‘objects’ or 
simple names and, though the ‘objects’ and simple names must always already exist 
and connect (TLP 2.022), their configurations with each other can and do change in 
all sorts of ways (cf. e.g., Glock (2006), for a similar account).  
In turn, I argue that this preconception concerning semantic content and 
understanding is, at least in part, what later Wittgenstein calls the "pneumatic 
conception of thinking" (PI § 109). To begin, Schulte (2006), after a very careful set 
of exegetical arguments, notes that the most plausible interpretation of “pneumatic 
conception of thinking” is “ a conception according to which thought obeys the 
directions enshrined in the crystalline structure of the scaffolding of rules inherent in 
our language. And the directions implicit in the structure can be obeyed by thought 
because it itself participates in the same substance as the logical structure of thought” 
(54). Notice, first, that Schulte’s interpretation makes good sense of the placement of 
PI § 109 in the PI. Later Wittgenstein has just finished “turning our whole inquiry 
around” (PI § 108) by radically reformulating the way logic and language relate (see 
chapter 6.2). Granting this, we should expect to find, and we do find, one of 
Wittgenstein’s key concerns in PI § 109- § 133 to be excising the remaining ghosts of 
the TLP and trying to focus our view not on preconceptions about how language must 
be, but on how it actually is (e.g., PI § 116). 
Second, and further following Schulte, let us link his interpretation to 
“’[l]angague (or thinking) is something unique’- this proves to be a superstations (not 
a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness 
retreats to these illusions, to the problems” (PI § 110). To begin, it is imperative to 
realize, especially given that Wittgenstein tends to use the word “superstition” for 
accounts that go wrong by mistaking their way of describing something as the way to 
describe it (cf., e.g., PO p. 129, CV p. 57), that later Wittgenstein thinks aspects of the 
TLP’s account of semantics get something right. We return to this in chapter 8.2. 
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Two, notice that Wittgenstein explicitly links “thinking” and “language” together in a 
manner that further supports Schulte’s reading. Whatever pneuma Wittgenstein aims 
to expel, it seems to haunt (public) language as much as thought. Finally, three, the 
retreat Wittgenstein speaks of, it seems to me, is best thought of a withdrawal into 
“the mind… [as] conceived as a queer medium, and the mechanism of the mind, 
which we do not quite understand, can effect remarkable things, by means of 
thinking” (Baker & Hacker (2005), 247). In other words, the super-concreteness of 
the TLP’s logical isomorphism, the earlier Wittgenstein’s denial that thinking is some 
sort psychic event (e.g., NB p. 80e, TLP 5.631), and so on, all collapse in a last ditch 
effort to place the thinker at the center of the picture, as the person who, by her own 
magical actions, coordinates the isomorphism. Suffice it to say, this picture comes 
under heavy fire throughout the PI.  
 In turn, third, we can fully articulate what the “pneumatic conception of 
thinking” is for later Wittgenstein as well as how “understanding” worked for earlier 
Wittgenstein. To see it, recall that, for later Wittgenstein, the superstition concerning 
the uniqueness of thought is that "[t]hought, language, now appear to us as the unique 
correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, 
world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each" (PI § 95). 
Critically, this is exactly how the TLP links together meaning and understanding. 
Language, meaning, thought, and the world, all stand together in a grand and pre-
established harmonic determinate logical structure. And one can understand a 
sentence’s semantic content precisely because the psychic elements in my head (or 
wherever) “participant in” the same logical structure that allows a sentence to display 
its logical picture, and ‘objects’ to concatenate thus-and-so. Logic is constitutive of 
thought, language, meaning, and the world, in equal measure. All are, from a logical 
point of view, governed by the same structures and to “understand” is simply to have 
one structure align with the others. It is exactly for this reason that “we understand the 
sense of a propositional sign without its having been explained to us” (TLP 4.02). 
Hence, the pneumatic conception of thinking claims, among other things, that to 
understand is to see the picture, which is to say the semantic content, a sentence 
displays. To ‘see’ means that the structure in my head (or wherever) and the structure 
in the sentence and the structure in the world align and a projection occurs.  
In closing, notice that this picture account of semantic content, and the 
pneumatic conception of thinking, effects how earlier Wittgenstein understands 
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language as a whole. To begin, Wittgenstein claims that "[t]he totality of propositions 
is language" (TLP 4.001). This claim has several implications. First, it takes for 
granted that the sole function of language is representing possible facts (e.g., TLP 
4.5). Pursuant to this, uses of language that seem to do different work must either be 
assimilated to this picturing use or else discarded as nonsense. For example, "[w]hen 
the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. The 
riddle does not exist" (TLP 6.5) seems to presage some work in philosophy of 
language that aims to show that a meaningful question depends on the range of 
possible answers that address them properly. Second, the use of "totality" is 
important. Granting Wittgenstein's metaphysical atomism and his insistence on the 
radical independence of facts from one another (e.g., TLP 2.0122, TLP 6.37), totality 
is best understood as an indifferent collection. In other words, the elementary 
sentences that make up a given natural language have no non-logical relationships 
with one another (e.g., TLP 4.001. Hacker (1986), 108-113, notes that this explains 
why the color-exclusion problem was so devastating for the TLP). Third, pursuant to 
this, a complex sentence can always be shown to reduce to elementary sentences put 
together with truth-functional operators (Horwich (2012), 84-88, outlines this). 
Fourth, the semantic content of an elementary sentence can be understood without any 
knowledge of the other sentences that make up the language. Indeed, the possible 
fact-semantic content relationship is such that a more comprehensive knowledge of 
language is irrelevant Finally, fifth, this leaves the nature of semantic content in a 
somewhat precarious position. Perhaps this can most clearly be seen in the TLP's 
instability concerning what symbols and signs are (e.g., Glock (1996 c), 345-47, notes 
the amount of intricate work earlier Wittgenstein tried to get this distinction to do). 
Indeed, the relationship between a token (marks or sound-waves), a sign (the 
abstraction logical-combinatorial possibilities), a symbol (form and content (e.g., TLP 
3.31)), a type, and semantics are somewhat difficult to account for in the TLP fully.112  
In sum, semantic content of an elementary sentence is the ‘picture’ that the 
sentence presents me with. I can understand this picture, and so know what the 
elementary sentence means, without any knowledge of other sentences in the 
language, the states-of-affairs that really obtain, and so on. Further, this account 
                                                 
112 The reader may object that tokens and types play no role whatever in the TLP. This is undoubtedly 
true but, it seems to me, is grits to my mill as Wittgenstein appears to use, e.g., a sign to be both a 
token (e.g., TLP 3.32) and a sort of logical abstraction (e.g., TLP 3.362).   
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implies that "understanding" is best thought of as "grasping" or "being shown" an 
already-given picture.113 And it is this partly account for what a pneumatic conception 
of thinking is. As it were, the ‘breath’ that allows for the creation of possible facts 
also allows for the creation the picture a sentence displays, and the creation of thought 
and understanding in my head. Indeed, “to understand” is just an alignment of all 
these.  
  
8.1 Reified Pictures and Pneumatic Problems: 
 
With this account in view, part of what PI § 109- § 132 aims to do is expel this 
"pneumatic conception of thinking" (PI § 109). First, I rationally reconstruct three 
attacks from the later Wittgenstein that show that the pneumatic conception of 
thinking, and the picture account of semantic content and understanding it rests on, 
are deeply problematic. Second, I examine how later Wittgenstein begins to 
drastically alter his concept of “understanding,” and, as we shall see, what “meaning” 
is as well. As we shall see, he begins to refocus on language as a "spatial and 
temporal phenomenon" (PI § 108) and tries to clarify how we use and ascribe 
“understanding” rather than rely on preconceptions of how it must be. 
To begin, recall that the pneumatic conception is a view wherein 
understanding a sentence is seeing the possible fact it pictures. Granting this, later 
Wittgenstein launches three interrelated attacks on this conception. These are: (a) an 
attack on how such a picture and a sentence in a natural language can be align; (b) a 
discussion of how we access such a picture in the first place; (c) an insistence that we 
turn back to the real “workings of our language” (PI § 109) rather than an effervescent 
cloud of determinate logical structure. Let us take each in turn.  
(a) First, Wittgenstein notes that this superstition of pneumatic thinking 
suggests that "it's not the word that counts, but its meaning, thinking of the meaning 
as a thing of the same kind as the word, even though different from the word. Here the 
word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow one can buy with it" (PI § 120). 
Notice that this quote harks back to the odd position of semantics in the TLP. Indeed, 
                                                 
113 Clearly "grasp" is Frege's metaphor (Frege (1979 [around 1879]), 2-8). I follow him, rather than 
Wittgenstein, because I want to avoid heated debates about what "showing" is in the TLP. Regardless, 
in both case, the point is that the semantic content of an utterance is something that is independent of 
both us and language and that our relationship to it is akin to our relationship to rocks.    
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earlier Wittgenstein seemed to want a sign to be both the same as a token (e.g., marks) 
and different from a token (e.g., a logical abstraction with combinatorial possibilities). 
From here, it seems that the quote implicitly brings into play three intertwined 
criticisms of such an account. One, later Wittgenstein is keen to emphasize that the 
relationship between the word and the meaning is terribly unclear on the TLP's 
account. Indeed, such an account seems to imply that "the meaning were an aura the 
word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use" (PI § 117; also see PI § 
549). In turn, it becomes hard to know either how words manage to carry this aura 
with them or how we manage to glean it from mere token physical marks or sounds. 
This is made worse by later Wittgenstein's assault on the supposed denotation 
relationship between a name and an ‘object,' discussed in chapter 6.0. Two, pursuant 
to this, there is a lurking category mistake here. Indeed, the claim that a word is both 
the same and different from, its meaning, speaks to this. Further, trying to get the 
token-marks-or-sounds and the meaning together seems to be an outstanding problem. 
Three, pursuant to this, there is a real temptation to try to posit some sort of third x to 
mediate dead signs and live meanings (cf. PI § 432). Indeed, philosophers have 
posited many such x's- e.g., mind or intention; an abstract realm that we access; 
particular theories of reference; behavioral conditioning; and so on. Much of the 
firepower of the PI is directed at showing that each of these x's has intractable 
problems and cannot do the work we require- i.e. cannot align token marks and 
ghostly meanings. Thus, the first criticism of the pneumatic way of aligning 
understanding and meaning is that it leads one to impute shadowy meanings to 
concrete tokens. 
(b) Second, Wittgenstein notes that such a reified account of semantics most 
naturally lends itself to the thought in "Tractatus Logico-Pilosophicus (4.5): ‘The 
general form of a proposition is: this is how things are.'--… One thinks that one is 
tracing nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through 
which we look at it" (PI § 115). This harmonizes with the work done in chapter 6.1. 
However, it also brings into play other parts of the PI- specifically PI § 22- § 24 and 
Wittgenstein’s attack on the TLP's preconception that assertoric force ‘wears the 
pants.' To begin, Wittgenstein claims that "Frege's opinion that every assertion 
contains an assumption, which is the thing that is asserted [i.e., a what-is-said 
sentence-radical- PI § 22 box], really rests on the possibility, found in our language, 
of writing every assertoric sentence in the form ‘It is asserted that such-and-such is 
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the case.’" (PI § 22). However, Wittgenstein argues there is a deep dilemma here 
concerning what this sentence-radical really amounts to. On the one hand, one might 
assume that a sentence-radical is bereft of any force operator. Such an assumption, in 
turn, gives us a very simple way to explain what is common to, e.g., ‘the window is 
closed’ and ‘is the window closed?’ To wit, they both share the sentence-radical that-
the-window-is-closed. However, such an assumption clearly implies that "the 
assertion consists of two acts, entertaining and asserting (assigning truth-values or 
something of the kind)" (ibid). In turn, this raises three problems. One, it is unclear 
what we entertain before we assert as the parenthetical comment implies. Indeed, if 
the sentence-radical only becomes truth-apt when it has been asserted, and one 
assumes that truth-conditions and semantic content are deeply intertwined, then it 
becomes opaque what it is we entertain before we assert. Moreover, Wittgenstein's 
discussion of the boxer picture (PI § 22-box) furthers this point. The picture of the 
boxer can show us: how a particular man stood; how boxers generally stand; how one 
should stand; etc. Two, as Wittgenstein's comments on music emphasize, it may 
betoken a category mistake where the tone of my voice makes a logical difference. 
Three, the sentence-radical that-p clause is “not a sentence in our language- it is not 
yet a move in the language game” (PI § 22). Again, this raises the question of what the 
sentence-radical is and how we can do anything with it independently of various 
forces. 
On the other hand, one might insist that the assertoric force is, somehow, 
inherent in the sentence-radical and that other forces derive from or modify it. As 
noted above, this seems to be the way the TLP attempted to go. To this Wittgenstein 
retorts that "it is possible to substitute the usual form of a question the form of a 
statement or description: ‘I want to know whether' or ‘I am in doubt whether…'-but 
this does not bring the different language games any closer together" (PI § 24). 
Specifically, what such a paraphrase loses is exactly the force that a question has. To 
say "I am wondering when John will come" is just as easily understood as a report on 
my psychology as an inquiry about John's arrival. And Wittgenstein is now quick to 
emphasize that simply assuming that one knows the force begs the question. Further, 
pursuant to this, he also insists that paraphrases cut both ways. Thus "[w]e might very 
well also write every assertion in the form of a question followed by an affirmative 
expression" (PI § 22). Thus, we might paraphrase the sentence "John is coming at 6" 
with "Is John coming at 6? Yes!" Thus, another critical problem of the pneumatic 
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conception of thinking is that that the picture the sentence supposedly already has is 
rather hard to bring into view, let alone understand-by-grasping it. 
The third criticism of the pneumatic conception of thinking is gleaned from 
Wittgenstein claim that "[p]hilosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by [durch] means of our language" (PI § 109-emphasis mine. 
Anscombe’s translation). It is critical to ask what the role of language is here and how 
to understand "by." One reading would see the bewitchment of our understanding as 
caused by language. In other words, it would translate "durch" as something like 
"owing to" or "at the hands of." In turn, this would render the PI deeply harmonious 
with Frege (1997), 50, who claims that "it is the task of philosophy to break the power 
of words over the human mind, by uncovering the illusions that through the use of 
language often almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations of concepts, by 
freeing thought from the taint of ordinary linguistic means of expression" (emphasis 
mine). However, though I think this quotation from the PI is meant to call to mind this 
passage in Frege, it is clear that such a reading is not viable. Indeed, such a reading is 
precisely a pneumatic conception of thinking that insists that the semantics content of 
a sentence, the picture, is at once different from the ordinary linguistic media we use 
to express them and, somehow, embedded in them at a ‘deeper’ level. Further, this 
sort of account leads to a profound prevarication, seen in the TLP, concerning the 
nature of semantic content. On the one hand, the TLP seems to want natural language 
to be essential for semantics (e.g., TLP 5.5563). On the other, it seems to want natural 
language to be the source of confusion about the real semantic content of natural 
language expressions (e.g., TLP 3.323 & 3.324).  
The alternative emphasizes that "durch" is best translated as "by means of" or 
"by the use of." Indeed, Hacker and Schulte's slight modification of Anscombe’s 
original translation- i.e. "[p]hilosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
understanding by the resources of our language"- emphasizes this. In turn, this means 
that expelling the pneumatic conception of thought is best accomplished by careful 
examination of actual language and its uses. In effect, we combat confusion not by 
‘escaping language' but by scrutinizing how language actually works. In turn, this 
harmonizes both with the above criticism as well as the work done in chapter 6. 
Wittgenstein insists that to understand semantic content, we examine the actual use of 
language rather than our preconceptions about how language must be. 
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Metaphorically, we expel the pneumatic conception of thought by examining the solid 
and open-to-view "working of our language" (PI § 109). 
In turn, this insistence on the workings of our language changes later 
Wittgenstein's conception of meaning. As conventional wisdom has it, Wittgenstein 
ceases to think of meaning as a logical picture that we grasp by a sort of pre-
established harmony and begins to relate meaning to use (e.g., PI § 43 for the most 
famous account). In other words, the semantic content of a sentence is not due to 
some picturing relationship between it and a possible fact, but due to the role that the 
expression plays in a language game. What "breathes meaning" into dead signs is 
their use (e.g., PI § 432). In turn, to understand a sentence is to grasp, not its picture, 
but its concrete use. Indeed, as Schulte rightly emphasizes, "[u]nderstanding is not a 
pneumatic process [in the PI and related]: it is not dependent on partaking in the 
substance of a logical structure" (Shulte (2006), 47). In other words, to understanding 
is to learn the correct use of a sentence. Thus, in the form of a truism, to know what 
an expression means is to understand it and to understand an expression is to know 
what it means. Notice further, that such an account explicitly rejects the TLP's 
insistence that a language is simply a sum of indifferent propositions that have no 
non-logical relationships with one another. Rather, a language becomes an 
interconnected network of roles that various words have in virtue of their uses and 
these uses interpolate with each other both at a practical level and conceptually. In 
other words, far from being able to grasp a proposition in splendid isolation from 
everything else in the language and life, later Wittgenstein insists that "[t]o 
understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language 
means to have mastered a technique" (PI  §199).  
In sum, later Wittgenstein attacks the picture account of semantic content and 
the pneumatic account of thinking the TLP along three lines. First, he notes that it 
becomes unclear how token marks or sounds and ghostly meanings relate. Second, he 
notes that the preconception that assertoric force is somehow basic is deeply 
problematic. Third, he notes that, much as the TLP's account of the philosophy of 
logic, the TLP's account of semantics insists that language, semantic content, and 
understanding, must be one way rather than another, in a manner that is wholly 
unjustified. In turn, later Wittgenstein insists that adequately accounting for the 
meanings of various expressions relies on understanding the roles that various 
expressions play in life and language. Understanding is, thus, critical. However, we 
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have left it under defined. It is to this we now turn. I should note here, in keeping with 
the spirit of Wittgenstein, I attempt to examine “understanding” not, in the first 
instance, philosophically, but practically. In other words, I try to bring into view the 
medley of interconnected ways we use, deploy, and ascribe “understanding” as we go 
along in our lives.  
 
8.2 Understanding(s): 
 
In the last section, we discussed how later Wittgenstein repudiates the TLP's 
conception of semantic content as a picture that we simply grasp. We further noted 
that later Wittgenstein begins to reimagine the nature of semantics by insisting that 
meaning and understanding are conceptually connected in a fundamentally different 
way. However, we left "understanding" rather undefined. This section examines 
"understanding" and various interrelationships at work in it.  
In this section, first, I argue that, for later Wittgenstein, "understanding" is an 
inherently polysemic term/concept that cannot be reduced to a single concept.114 By 
“polysemic term/concept” I mean that the term/concept brings into play distinct, 
though fundamentally related, senses that interdepend with each other in various 
ways. Granting this, second, I heuristically distinguish115 between three different 
senses of “understanding.” These are: (1) understanding as grasping combinations; (2) 
understanding as a technique; (3) understanding as seeing connection. I elaborate each 
sense of understanding in turn as we go. I note here that, I focus, in particular, in 
distinguishing (2) from (3) and examining (3) in its own right. I focus on (3) because 
later Wittgenstein it is "of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way 
we represent things, how we look at matters" (PI § 122). Thus, clarifying 
understanding as seeing connections is critical for making sense of Wittgenstein's 
conception of the role of philosophy and the nature of philosophical investigation.  
To begin, "understanding" in the later Wittgenstein is used in a fairly diverse 
set of ways. Indeed, Wittgenstein notes that "[w]e may speak of understanding a 
sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but 
                                                 
114 A reader might wonder if the term is, therefore, a family rebalance concept. Though an interesting 
question, I do not explore it here. 
115 It is critical to keep in mind that such a distinction is heuristic. In point of fact, I do think that, to 
varying degrees, each ‘sub-type’ of understanding is required in varying degrees to make sense of our 
ascription practices. Circumspect readers must keep this in mind. 
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also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other" (PI § 531). He further 
notes that "[t]hen has ‘understanding' two different meanings here? – I would rather 
say that these two kinds of use of ‘understanding' make up my concept of 
understanding. For I want to apply ‘understanding' to all this" (PI § 532). Thus, 
Wittgenstein fairly clearly endorses a polysemic account of "understanding" that sees 
the concept as having several interrelated senses. Further, it seems that these quotes 
have deep resonance with PI II xi and Wittgenstein's somewhat inchoate exploration 
of ‘meaning blindness,' ‘second sense,' etc., as Mulhall (2001), 163-182, rightly notes. 
  Granting this gloss on "understanding" as a polysemic concept, let us, as much 
as possible, separate out various strands that make it up to help further comprehend it. 
Recall that there are three that interest us.  
(1) The first sense of understanding is understanding as grasping 
combinations. Though a reductive account of understanding based solely on the 
grasping the semantics content of individual terms, their various contributions to the 
meaning of an expression, and various combinations, is off the table, it does play a 
critical role when properly reformulated in terms of a minimalist account of 
compositionality.116 For example, Wittgenstein emphasizes that "the combination 
‘milk me sugar'… [is not] an order to stare at me and gape, even if that was precisely 
the effect I wanted to produce" (PI § 498). In other words, part of understanding an 
expression relies on understanding the meanings of the individual words as well as 
their combination and the various semantic contributions they make to the whole 
expression. "Milk me sugar" does not mean STARE AT ME AND GASP, even if that 
is what I want the person to do. Further, as noted in section 8.0 and hinted at in 
section 8.1, this accounts for why the TLP’s conception of understanding as grasping 
is a superstition, not a mistake. Clearly the fact that understanding relies, at least 
partly, on knowing what words mean and how they connect up properly, is a fairly 
open to view feature of our lives with language. The superstition is inflation.  
(2) The second sense of understanding is understanding as a technique (e.g., PI 
§ 150). In this key, and as discussed in chapter 4.0 at length, to understand an 
expression is to know the correct use of an expression as determined by a set of 
interdependent constitutive rules that make up the language-game or ‘grammar' of 
some part of language or other and determine the meaning of the expression. Further, 
                                                 
116 Horwich (1998 b), 143-83, offers a powerful articulation of this approach. 
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understanding as a technique should also enable one to correct deviant behavior, 
intentionally follow the rule in question, cite the rule as a justification for an action, 
linguistically-explain the expression by inculcating someone into the game, and so on. 
Indeed, in this case, to understand is akin to an ability (ibid). Thus, much like 
understanding calculus is being able to integrate expressions, so too understanding 
language is being able to speak and respond to it properly. Further, as Hacker and 
Glock, often and rightly point out, this means that language is far more than an 
indifferent collection of individual propositions. Indeed, Wittgenstein's note that 
"[w]hen philosophers use a word… and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in 
which it is at home?" (PI § 116), in part brings precisely this fact into play. The 
meaning of a word is its role in a language-game, and that game is determined by a 
set of interdependent constitutive rules that make it up. Reminding us that a word is 
not being used according to these rules is a powerful corrective to some philosophical 
misconceptions in that it attempts to remind us that meaning, far from being a sort of 
shadow words carry with them, is a ramification of words having set and normative 
uses. A horse-shaped-token without a game of chess can be anything or nothing, it is 
only within the context of a game of chess that it can function as a knight (cf., PI § 6). 
In sum, the meaning of an expression is determined by constitutive rules that 
determine its correct use. We understand as a technique the meaning of an expression 
by being able to use, respond to, etc., an expression following these rules. 
However, it is critical to realize, I argue, that understanding as a technique is 
not the end of the story. This is because understanding as a technique relies on 
particular frameworks for description and determining if some framework for 
description is apt is a different task than ascribing understanding as a technique, 
learning the abilities it relies on, and so on. To bring this into view, consider that the 
criteria for ascribing understanding as a technique are: the ability to conform one's use 
of an expression to a shared correct use; the ability, based on the shared correct use, to 
correct solecisms; and the ability to linguistically-explain the meaning of an 
expression to someone that relies on shared correct use. Further, it is often also 
assumed that the shared correct use is established and maintained by the normative 
practices of a community, a point made in chapter 4.0c. Finally, also assume that the 
internal connections that obtain between, e.g., meaning and understanding as a 
technique, shared correct use and normative practices, and so on, are "de dicto, i.e., 
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they depend on how we describe things…. To insist on internal relations does not 
introduce any mysterious, supernatural phenomena. Internal relations… are effected 
by our normative practice- the fact that we introduce, teach and explain standards of 
correctness, and criticize or justify performance by reference to them" (Glock (1996 
b), 162-63). Hence, ascribing understanding as a technique rests on shared correct 
uses that are established and maintained by normative practices and discerning these 
practices and shared uses is a description-sensitive matter.117 In other words, 
understanding as a technique requires that the first order descriptions that are 
proffered rely on very particular frameworks for description that can bring these 
normative practices into view. 
Granting this, it is clear we need some principled way to determine if a 
framework for description is apt, as defined in chapter 7.1. Further, a framework 
being apt is neither simply the phenomenon ‘just tells’ me nor is it a trivial matter. Let 
us, ergo, focus, precisely, on the aptness of a framework. Recall from chapter 7.2, that 
a framework for description is apt or inapt relative to a purpose, background context, 
audience, and so on. In turn, it is critical to notice that several features that determine 
the aptness of a framework for description are not readily incorporated into 
understanding as a technique. First, as noted at several points before, whereas 
understanding as a technique is not purpose-relative, clearly aptness is. Second, 
granting that a type-expression can shift between reflecting a constitutive rule for the 
meaning of a term and being a coterminous ‘symptom' of the use (e.g. Glock (1996 a), 
209-217), an apt framework should give us a way to "distinguish between the 
essential and inessential rules in a game to" (PI § 564). Further, an apt framework 
does so by emphasizing "not only rules but also a point" (ibid). In this key, 
Wittgenstein himself insists on a distinction between rules and point. Third, pursuant 
to this and noting Wittgenstein's use of the indefinite article, "a point," various 
frameworks for description ascribe to games different points. Fourth, relatedly, as 
both von Wright (1971), 132-35, and Winch (1958), 40-65, note, for descriptions 
concerning agentive behavior, the same practice, event, utterance, etc., can be 
described under orthogonal frameworks for description that discern different sorts of 
conceptual interconnections, emphasis different normative features, and so on, given 
                                                 
117 This harmonizes with Anscombe (2000), e.g., 84-89, and (1979). Ford (2011) offers a careful 
reading along similar lines. 
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ascription of different points. In other words, changing our conception of a point of a 
practice alters the sorts normative features we focus on. Finally, fifth, as Mulhall 
notes "his behavior, [i.e., a Crusoe we stumble on in isolation who is marking his hut 
with arabesque patterns] might… be mapped onto an endless list of different kinds of 
activity- perhaps the floor pattern is a short-hand record, and the wall markings a 
more elaborate transcription, of his hunting successes and failures, or perhaps the of a 
sonnet sequence composed on his previous trip across the island; or perhaps the floor 
pattern summarizes the rules for a game whose move he enacts on the wall; or 
perhaps it is a religious ritual" (Mulhall (2001), 133). Granting this, describing Crusoe 
as recording days, as writing poems, as doodling to amuse himself, as following an 
mathematical rule, and so on, all impute to him different normative practices, distinct 
constitutive rules, and different ways of correction, arabesque-explanation, 
conforming our arabesque marks to his Crusoe-ian standards, and so on. In sum, how 
I initially describe a practice (e.g., what framework for description I select based, in 
part, on what I take the point of the practice to be) partly constitutes what normative 
practices, rules, and so on, I ascribe to it. Further, selecting between frameworks is 
not the same as understanding as a technique for the simple reason that the latter 
presupposes a framework to function. Let us bring this more clearly into view by 
considering two further examples that show how aptness, the point of a practice, and 
selecting a framework for descriptions are different projects that constitutive rules, 
correction and linguistic-understanding, and understanding as a technique.  
Example 1: Consider one thread in Wittgenstein's somewhat inchoate remarks 
on Frazer (PO p. 119-155) and his focus on the inaptness of Frazer’s framework. To 
begin, Frazer's framework for description is one that describes his groups in terms of 
rules, is sensitive to the normative practices that underwrite the rules, and so forth. 
Indeed, Frazer’s framework does not deploy "presemantical, non-normative terms" 
(Glock (1996 b), 162; Frazer (1990), e.g., v). However, the specific framework for 
description Frazer relies on is one that describes his groups in terms of an analogy 
with science. Thus, "their [the groups Frazer examines] errors were not willful 
extravagances or the ravings of insanity, but simply hypotheses, justifiable as such at 
the time when they were propounded" (Frazer (1990), 264). In turn, this framework 
for description in terms of science leads Frazer into some very dark waters. For 
example, assume that the practice of uttering a particular incantation, say, rests on a 
hypothesis concerning the causal relationship between the weather and human action. 
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Assume further that the group is misled into thinking that the hypothesis is well 
verified, "because, for example, an incantation that is supposed to bring rain certainly 
seems efficacious sooner or later. But, then it is surely remarkable that people don't 
realize earlier that sooner or later it's going to rain anyhow" (PO p. 121). In turn, these 
sorts of ‘remarkable’ oversights lead Frazer, despite his avowed aims, to describe 
many practices of his groups as "a sort of childish make-believe" (Frazer (1990), 69; 
also see, e.g., 14, 75). In turn, it then becomes opaque how such ‘child-like savages’ 
in their fantasy worlds can manage to survive long enough to procreate and perpetuate 
their culture. Thus, by misconstruing the point of magic, Frazer misdescribes his 
tribes practices, imputes to them the wrong constitutive rules, and ends up 
flabbergasted at how people survive. Frazer’s framework is inapt and, though his 
descriptions may be true and correct, they occlude the behavior’s meaning.  
Example 2: Consider that "[i]t is… imaginable that two people belonging to a 
tribe unacquainted with games should sit at a chess board and go through the moves 
of a game of chess; and even with all the mental accompaniments. And if we were to 
see it, we'd say that they were playing chess" (PI § 200). To begin, the italics stress a 
distinction between how we, with our custom of board games (e.g., PI § 199), and 
how the ‘tribe’s people’ describe what is afoot here. For us, describing the behavior as 
“a game of chess” is fairly obvious and leads us to impute very specific constitutive 
rules, chess-corrections, chess-explanations, and so on, to the tribe. However, by 
stipulation, this tribe does not have our custom of board games generally or chess 
specifically. Thus, by stipulation, however they describe this activity, it cannot be as 
“a game of chess.” In turn, this shift radically alters what sort of corrections, ‘chess’-
understandings, and so on, we can offer and they can make sense of. For example, to 
attempt to correct a player by saying “a queen cannot jump over a rook” cannot work, 
as the player does not have the background required for to make sense of such an 
utterance. Again, by stipulation, they lack board games in general and chess 
specifically. Notice, critically, that this means that even if their token actions are 
identical to a game of chess, this does not necessarily mean that the framework of 
chess rules is apt to describe them. Again, and even more clearly, how I take the point 
of this behavior affects what framework for description I rely on, what rules I impute, 
and so on. Critically, none of this is something the token behavior ‘tells me’ and it 
does not reality reduce to rules as the rules of chess presuppose the description “a 
game of chess.”  
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Thus, the above argument, and the two examples, should make us wary of any 
attempt assume that the rules I impute to a practice, the behavior or utterances, and 
the framework I rely on, are necessarily related with one another, are ‘natural,’ or that 
we can reduce selecting a framework for description to constitutive rules and 
understanding a technique. As it were, understanding as a technique presupposes a 
framework for description. And selecting a framework for description depends on a 
host of factors including the purposes I have, what I take the point of the practice to 
be, background, context and so on. In other words, selecting a framework depends on 
seeing connections in between an incredibly complex set of factors. It is to this we 
turn. 
(3) The third sense of understanding, understanding as seeing connections, 
emerges naturally from our above discussion. Given that understanding as a technique 
depends on particular frameworks for description, and given that selecting these 
frameworks is a different matter that correction, linguistic-explanation, and so on, the 
question is what guides us in selecting a framework. And later Wittgenstein’s answer 
is by proposing that we examine both the foreign practice, odd expression, and so on, 
as well as "appeal to a tendency in ourselves" (PO p. 127) and "the surroundings of a 
way of acting" (PO p. 147). Less prosaically, it seems that what Wittgenstein is 
emphasizing that understanding as seeing connections is finding or inventing 
analogical connections between certain practices, expressions, and so on, that we are 
familiar with and then relying on these to redescribe a practice, expression, etc., that 
strikes us as problematic (cf. PI § 122). In other words, we find an analogy between a 
region of language we already understand as a technique and the problematic 
utterances, practices and so on, in terms of their respective points, the surroundings of 
them, and so on. From there, we exhibit the rules that govern the region of language 
we know in, e.g., a language-game. Finally, we use the language-game as an object of 
comparison that helps us redescribe the problematic expression, practice, and so on 
(e.g., PI § 130 and § 132). In other words, we come to understand a foreign practice, 
strange utterance, and so on, by comparing and contrasting it with a model that 
exhibits something we already understand. Notice, critically, that this relates 
understanding as a technique and understanding as seeing connections together in a 
particular formation. Understanding as a technique is intra-language-game and 
engendered by training, correction, and so on. Understanding as seeing connections is 
inter-language-games that "finding or inventing intermediate links" (PI § 122) that 
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analogically connect language games one already know to ones that are, at present, 
opaque. Let us examine understanding as seeing connections more carefully.  
To begin, it is critical to realize that understanding as seeing connections rests 
on a form of " projection." (e.g. Cavell (1979) e.g., 168-190 , Mulhall (2001) e.g., 81-
93, Baz (2008), Travis (2006) e.g.,10-40).118 For our purposes, and in a very truncated 
and deliberately schematic way, a projection has four steps. (a) An observer stumbles 
across a behavior, expression, etc., she finds confusing in that she cannot understand 
the role that it is playing (e.g., PI § 123). (b) She begins moving through a complex 
network of similarities and differences that this behavior or expression may share 
with other behaviors or expressions whose shared correct uses are clear and whose 
point she is familiar with. In other words, she tries to find some region of language 
she already understands as a technique and that strikes her as relevantly similar to the 
problematic expression, practice, and so on (e.g., PI § 66, §122). (c) Granting that she 
finds such a region, she then stipulates rules for a language-game, say, that exhibit the 
constitutive rules by which she describes her ability to conform her use to shared 
correct use, correct, etc. (e.g. PI § 82- § 83). (d) She uses this language-game as an 
object of comparison to redescribe the confusing expression, foreign practices, and so 
forth, in terms of the unproblematic region of language (e.g., PI § 130). In doing so, 
ideally, the expression is rendered transparent as its rules of this ‘foreign practice,’ the 
meaning of the ‘odd utterance,’ and so on, are made clear, and so the confusion 
dissolves. Thus, a "perspicuous representation" is engendered by using an object of 
comparison to redescribe a problematic expression, odd behavior, and so on, in such a 
way that its role because clear and that it is thereby clarifying the problematic 
expression. Granting this, some other features of understanding as seeing connections 
follow. 
First, exegetically, it is quite telling that this the relationship between intra-
language-language-game understanding as a technique and inter-language-game 
understanding as seeing connections aligns with Wittgenstein’s claim that there are 
"uses of the word ‘see.' The one: ‘what do you see there?'- ‘I see this'… The other: ‘I 
see a likeness in these two faces'" (PI II xi § 111). For understanding as a technique or 
the first use of sight, we are focused on a single language-game or object. By contrast, 
                                                 
118 As with all philosophy, there's further debate about what lessons we should learn from this that 
place, e.g., Cavell and, e.g., Travis, on opposite sides.  
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understanding as seeing connections and the second use of sight focuses on noticing 
likenesses or similarities between faces or games.  
Second, pursuant to this, it is entirely imaginable that someone is ‘blind' to the 
likenesses understanding as seeing connections relies on or the second use of seeing 
relies on (e.g., PI II xi § 257- § 272; Mulhall (2001), 153-182 elaborates). In other 
words, seeing the inter-facial relationship is different from recognizing a face, 
knowing how to reproduce it in a drawing, and so on. By analogy, “[w]hat a narrow 
spiritual life on Frazer’s part! As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive 
of a life different from that of the England of his time!” (PO p. 125). In other words, 
Frazer’s key failing is that he is unable to find apt connections between non-scientific 
practices ‘enlightened’ British people have, such as kissing a beloved’s picture (PO p. 
123), and his tribe’s practices.  
Third, understanding as seeing connections is not subjective. This is for at 
least two reasons. One, a critical mark of understanding as seeing connections is "'fine 
shades of behavior'- when my understanding of a theme is expressed by my whistling 
it with the correct expression, this is an example of such fine shades" (PI II xi § 210). 
For example, someone who understands as seeing connections between [i carry your 
heart with me(i carry it in] and sonnets will read the poem differently, respond to it 
differently, and so on, than someone who cannot overcome the solecisms, errors, 
violations of English syntax, orthography, and so on, that the poem produces. 
Moreover, this is not unique to poetry. For example, realizing that a verbal expression 
is a sarcastic quip, a genuine question, a joke, and so on, rely on noticing that the 
tokening of the expression has connections with other expressions in terms of tone, 
facial expression, and so on. Two, a critical aspect of understanding as seeing 
connections is that it can be intersubjectively seen. Someone who claims to see a boat 
in the duck-rabbit, or see a mathematical equation in [i carry your heart with me(i 
carry it in], and who cannot elaborate further, has not really seen the connections she 
claims to. Furthermore, granting this, it is also clear that the projections that 
understanding as seeing connection utilizes are not mere will-of-the-wisps or fancies 
of a philosopher but require us noticing fine shades of behavior as well as 
intersubjective verifiability. For instance, a projection of chess into shouts-and-stomps 
rather difficult to make full sense of (e.g., PI § 200).  
 Fourth, extending language, redescribing practices, and so on, is somewhat 
different from being conditioned to conform one's use to the shared correct public use. 
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Indeed, a striking thing about projection is that it does not easily reduce to the sort of 
training, or conditioning as I would translate ‘Arbrichten,’ that techniques and 
corrections do. Indeed, recognizing salient patterns of similarities and differences 
between various language-games, practices, and so on, requires a degree of creativity 
and ingenuity, a point we return to in the next section. Regardless, it is also clear that, 
unlike training and correction, understanding as seeing connections and projections 
quickly reaches a point where our reasons give out (PI § 1), and we will say both "this 
is simply what I do" (PI § 217) and ask, exacerbated, "don't you see it?!" (cf. PI § 72). 
Thus, as Baker & Hacker (2009), 212, note, and as Cavell (2005),192-212, fully 
exploits, the best we can do when elaborating a projection is introduce irreducible 
metaphors or "mythological statements"- e.g., "family resemblance", "seeing-
connections", etc.- and use these in a way that we hope the person will catch on. 
Indeed, this partly accounts for how we are able to expand, re-apply, and so on, old 
concepts to new contexts, objects, and so on.  
Fifth, understanding as seeing connections has no ‘hard and fast' guarantees. 
Perhaps this can be most clearly seen in our practices of helping someone come to 
understand as seeing connections. To bring this into view, in my reading, 
Wittgenstein instructs us to ask "[h]ow does one lead someone to understand a poem 
or a theme? The answer to this tells us how one explains the sense here" (PI § 533). 
Fortunately, Wittgenstein also offers us an answer. "I had an experience with the 18th 
century poet Klopstock. I found that the way to read him was to stress his metre 
abnormally. Klopstock put *-* (etc.) in front of his poems. When I read his poems in 
this new way, I said: ‘Ah-ha, now I know why he did this.' What happened here? I 
had read this kind of stuff and had been moderately bored, but when I read it in this 
particular way, intensely, I smiled and said: ‘this is grand'… the important thing was 
that I read the poems entirely differently, more intensely, and said to others: ‘Look! 
This is how they should be read.'" (L&C p. 4-5).  Rhees's notes go on to claim that 
Wittgenstein said "[i]f we speak of the right way to read a piece of poetry- approval 
enters, but plays a fairly small role in the situation" (ibid 5).  
Notice, one, that certainly reading a poem in a new way is somewhat different 
from grasping the semantic content of the stanzas of the poem (if poetry is best 
construed in these terms) or knowing the rules that determine the uses of the terms in 
the poem. Indeed, the poem is the same poem read in the old way or the new way. 
Two, understanding the poem required seeing a connection between the poem, 
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Klopstock's marks, and an irregular meter. Indeed, Wittgenstein stresses that what 
matters here is the rhythm of the poem. Three, pursuant to this, "[w]hy this pattern of 
variation in intensity and tempo? One would like to say ‘Because I know what it 
means.' But what does it mean? I'd not be able to say. As an ‘explanation,' I could 
compare it with something which has the same rhythm… How does one justify such 
comparisons? There are very different kinds of justifications here" (PI § 527). Four, 
as PI § 527 stresses, linguistic-explanation and training give out in these contexts. 
Further, what justifies reading the poem in this way cannot be an appeal to rules or 
shared correct uses. Rather, it has to do with helping someone to come to see what 
makes a poem grand, say. Five, helping one see the connections between language-
games, poems, and so on, relies on offering tips (cf. PI II xi § 355), offering 
characteristic marks and trying to draw attention to the ‘ring' of the expression (PI § 
454), giving examples of similar poems, language-games, etc., and trusting the 
student will catch on (e.g. PI § 72), and so on. Indeed, a patient teacher may help 
someone realize why the type-sentence "he sang his didn't he danced his did" in 
[anyone in a pretty how town] betokens a beautifully optimistic and hopeful view on 
living. For instance, a teacher may stress the finality and completion of the English 
simple past tense "did" and its link to joyous actions, she may focus on the typically 
human view of life as an ever-increasing amount of closed doors, missed 
opportunities, and regretful moments, she may show her student the film Zorba the 
Greek as an example of someone who danced his did, and so on. Though these 
teaching heuristics all make sense, none of them may achieve the goal of helping 
someone find cummings grand. Finally, six, in all cases, dissecting this type-sentence 
with standard English syntax, noting solecisms and attempting to correct them, and, 
indeed, even wading into depth grammar linguistics (e.g., Cureton (1980) gives an 
admirable attempt to use Chomsky tools to make sense of the type-sentence), grossly 
misfire. To understand the type-sentence requires seeing connections and bringing 
someone into this is a touch-and-go affair.  
Finally, sixth, understanding as seeing connections rests, at base, on a factual 
assumption concerning the sorts of animals we are and the sorts of ways we live. 
Indeed, pace Cioffi (1990), part of why Wittgenstein instructs us to appeal to similar 
tendencies in ourselves is the thought that we share certain biological, emotional, and 
human realities (e.g., Glock (2001)). By making this, admittedly unjustified, 
assumption, Wittgenstein can attempt to redescribe aberrant behavior, odd utterances, 
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‘irrational practices,' and so forth, in a manner that can clarify them for us. In turn, 
this connects to the next section. 
Thus, this section has examined "understanding" in later Wittgenstein. It 
argued that "understanding" is a polysemic concept that, for our purposes, can be 
examined in terms of three distinct senses. The first sense, understanding as 
combination, has to do with seeing how the meanings of individual terms, and their 
configuration, contribute to the meaning of a whole sentence. The second, 
understanding as a technique, focused on being trained in the correct shared uses of 
terms, learning the constitutive rules, correction, and so on. The third, understanding 
as seeing connections, focused on finding, inventing, etc., analogies between 
language-games (or whatever) in such a way that one can redescribe a problematic 
games in terms of a game one already understands. With this in view, we turn, finally, 
to later Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy proper.  
 
8.3 Understanding and the Role of Philosophy: 
 
With this linkage between meaning and understanding laid out, I turn to later 
Wittgenstein's discussion of the role of philosophy. Specifically, I focus how 
philosophical investigations and understanding as seeing connections relate. To begin, 
first, I note the aspects of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy that remain invariant from 
the TLP to the PI. Second, I sketch an account of how philosophy, understanding as 
seeing connections relate, and perspicuity relate. Specifically, I argue that 
Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations rely on projection- specifically a negative 
and a positive role for analogies. In turn, the negative role of analogies is to disabuse 
us of overhasty generalizations, over-scientistic assumptions, and so on. The positive 
role for analogies is to help us see the connections between problematic expressions, 
unclear regions of language, and so on, and regions, expressions, etc., we know 
already, so that we can redescribe the former utilizing the later. In both cases, further, 
it is clear that philosophical investigation’s inherent result (when it succeeds) is 
engendering understanding as seeing connections, as PI § 122, BT § 89 p. 307e, PO p. 
133, and so on, claim. 
To begin, it is critical to keep in mind that later Wittgenstein agrees with 
earlier Wittgenstein in two key respects. First, he maintains that philosophical 
 289  
investigations into the nature of meaning, and bringing about understanding, are 
different in kind that scientific investigations into the nature of electrons. Succinctly, 
and slightly simplistically, this is because philosophical investigations (re)describes 
what is already open to view (PI § 126) whereas science research discovers and 
explores new realms. Thus, "[i]t was correct that our considerations must not be 
scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to 
think this or that'- whatever that may mean- could be of no interest to us… problems 
are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have 
been long familiar with " (PI  §109). I also note here that the break between scientific 
research and philosophical investigation is something that Wittgenstein maintained 
throughout his career (NB p. 106; TLP 4.111; LWVC p. 130; BLBK p. 5; BT § 86; 
etc.). " (PI  §109- emphasis mine).  
Second, Wittgenstein continues to link together philosophical investigation 
and clarity. Indeed, in the TLP Wittgenstein claims that "[p]hilosophy is the logical 
clarification of thought" (TLP 4.111) and in the PI Wittgenstein states that "the clarity 
that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity" (PI § 133). We discuss what this 
"clarity" is in section 8.4. However, it is critical to realize that Wittgenstein continues 
to maintain that the philosophical activity (when it succeeds) still engenders clarity. 
With this in view, let us examine the role of philosophical investigation and its 
relationship with understanding as seeing connections. Recall, as noted in chapter 8.2, 
that understanding as seeing connections relies on projections. These projections are a 
means of clarifying problematic expressions, confusing (from our perspective) 
practices, and so on, by comparing and contrasting them with object of comparison 
that exhibits the rules that describe the ability to use an unproblematic expression in a 
relevantly similar region of language. In other words, we find an analogy between a 
problematic expression, an unclear practice, and so on, and a language-game that 
reflects a region of language that we understand as a technique. We then use the 
language-game to see the connections between the problematic expression, unclear 
practice, and so on, and something we already understand as a technique. 
Granting this, a reasonable exegetical expectation is that Wittgenstein's focus 
should be on the role that analogies play in these projections. And, indeed, 
Wittgenstein notes that "[m]isunderstandings concerning the use of words [can be] 
brought about… by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different 
regions of our language" (PI § 90). Further "language-games stand there as objects of 
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comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on 
features of our language" (PI § 130). Indeed, granting that Wittgenstein is concerned 
not so much with disputing descriptions per se, but the ‘pictures' they engender (e.g., 
PI § 1, § 423), it is striking that Wittgenstein notes that "there is something else that 
I'm prepared to call a ‘solution,' to which I'm prepared to apply such-and-such picture, 
such-and-such an analogy" (PI § 140). Thus, a key focus in the PI is on analogies and 
how they guide us in describing phenomena. 
In the Nachlass and other writings, the focus on the role of analogies is, if 
anything, more explicit. Thus, "[w]e may say that we are led into puzzlement by an 
analogy which irresistibly drags us on- And this also happens when the meaning of 
the word ‘now' appears in a mysterious light" (BRBK 108). Further, "[w]hen words in 
our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to 
interpret [or describe] them analogous; i.e., we try to make the analogy hold 
throughout" (BLKB 7-emphasis mine). Moreover, the entirety of BT § 91 focuses on 
the importance of analogies. To take but one quote, "[p]hilosophers often fare like 
little children who first scribble random lines on a piece of paper… and then ask an 
adult ‘what is that?'- here's how this happens: the adult draws something for the 
child… [and says] ‘that's a man,' ‘that's a house,'… and the child draws lines too and 
asks: ‘now what's that'" (BT § 91 p. 315e). Finally, if our interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's comments on Frazer is correct (see chapter 8.2), clearly the origin of 
seeing connections, and perspicuity, emerge from Wittgenstein trying to make sense 
of how and where certain analogies led Frazer astray. Thus, Wittgenstein is keen to 
both stress the importance the role of analogies in philosophical investigations.  
Granting this focus on analogies, I argue that there are two complementary 
roles Wittgenstein assigns to analogies in philosophical investigations. To wit, there is 
a negative role wherein Wittgenstein discerns, foregrounds, and "deconstructs" a 
latent analogy that may compel us to misdiscribe an expression, practice, and so on. 
However, there is also a positive role for analogies by which Wittgenstein attempts to 
find homes for our words (e.g., PI § 116). Metaphorically, the teacher tells the child 
both that her scribbles is not a house and tries to figure out some way to interpret the 
scribbles so that they are, in fact, a drawing of something or other. Let us examine 
each role in turn.  
The negative role of analogies in philosophical investigations has been 
adroitly elaborated by Horwich (e.g., Horwich (2012), 19-73; Horwich (20156)). In 
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this negative key, Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations attempt to discern, 
foreground, and deconstruct, the latent, and problematic, analogies that guide us in to 
select a framework for description that is inapt. In other words, I may, based on 
superficial surface grammatical features of expression1 and expression2 try to make 
an analogy between them. Specifically, I may attempt to utilize the framework for 
description I rely on to make sense of expression1 and reapply to expression2. And 
this reapplication may well lead me into darkness. In turn, Wittgenstein’s 
interventions attempt to foreground the initial analogy between expression1 and 
expression2 in such a way that I realize that trying to describe expression2 in the 
terms I use for expression1 is both optional and a tad bit mad.  
For example, consider the word “this.” We may begin by noting that “this” is 
surface grammatical similar to proper names as in “this is good” and “John is good.” 
Indeed, in both cases, “[i]t is quite true that in giving an ostensive definition… we 
often point to the object named and utter the name. And likewise… we utter the word 
‘this' while pointing to a thing" (PI § 38). Granting this, we may try to describe “this” 
as a sort of proper name. In turn, this attempt to describe “this” as a proper name 
brings into play a framework for description predicated on a particular denoting 
relationship between a proper name and its bearer. Such a framework naturally leads 
us to try to figure out what ‘this’ could denote and “[w]here our language suggests a 
body and there is none: there we should like to say, is a spirit” (PI § 36). In other 
words, given that “this,” described as a proper name, must have a bearer of some kind, 
we are quickly led into an entire mythology about ‘immediate experience’ as the 
denoted ‘thing,’ (PI § 38), a particular sort of apodictic certainty and knowledge (e.g., 
OC § 8 & § 21), the idea of privacy of sensation (e.g., PI § 253), and so on. Indeed, 
the deleteriousness of this simple misdescription of “this,” and the speed at which it 
ramifies in philosophy, is well attested to in, e.g., Russell (1968), 178-203, who 
unfolds what appear to all the world as airtight musts concerning “this” as a proper 
name.  
From here, Wittgenstein seeks to disabuse us of this tendency by bringing the 
latent analogy to the fore and criticizing it. For example, if "this" is a name like 
"John," how can it be that "this" can also name a cat, a color property, etc.? More 
importantly, how do I know what “this” really denotes if it varies so wildly and can 
select colors, shapes, and so on, out of ‘immediate experience’ (e.g., PI § 33)? 
Further, what does "this" name in an expression like "this is it" or “this is here” (PI § 
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117)? Notice, critically, that all the questions flow from trying to follow the 
name/”this” analogy and they put increasing pressure on the supposed link between 
them. Furthermore, in addition to this ‘internal’ elaboration, Wittgenstein will also 
call our attention to “[t]he decisive movement in the conjuring trick” (PI § 308) and 
point out exactly where surface grammar led us to posit souls (see, e.g., Horwich 
(2012), 19-73, for a detailed elaboration). In all cases, the role of these negative 
analogies in Wittgenstein is to show that framework we have selected to describe 
some expression, practice, and so on, in its terms, is untenable. “And now the analogy 
[that originally guided us] which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to 
pieces” (PI §308).  
However, it is critical to realize that this is not the end of the story. Indeed, as 
PI § 308 makes clear, the key problem with a one-sided negative role for analogies is 
that it leaves us in a state of deep perplexity. As it were, the practice, expression, and 
so on, remain opaque to us. To rectify this, later Wittgenstein has also has positive 
role for analogies that complement the negative role, or so I argue.  
To bring this positive role into view, let us begin with a passage from the BT. 
Consider:  
 
"[s]omeone has heard that a ship's anchor is hauled up by a steam engine. He  
thinks only of the one that powers the ship…. and cannot explain to himself  
what he has heard…. Now we tell him: No, it is not that steam engine; besides  
it, there are a number of others…. I believe his confusion has two parts: what 
the explainer tells him as fact the questioner could easily conceived of as a 
possibility by himself, and he could have put his question in a definite form 
instead of a simple admission of confusion… however, reflection couldn’t 
instruct him about the facts. Or: no ordering of his concepts could free him 
from the uneasiness that comes from not having known the truth. 
The other uneasiness and confusion is characterized by the words 
‘something's wrong here’, and the solution is characterized by (the words): 
‘Oh you don't mean that steam engine’" (BT §89 p. 306- underlying mine). 
 
Notice that the first part of confusion Wittgenstein mentions is exactly what 
Wittgenstein’s negative role for analogies achieves. In effect, we simply point out that 
"this" is not a name or that what raises the anchor is not the ship's engine. However, 
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this does not help with the second part of the confusion, the uneasiness or perplexity 
of still being unclear about what use  “this” has or what raises the engine. To resolve 
this second confusion, we need to provide the person with a different analogy that 
helps him redescribe the problematic expression, practice, and so on, in such a way 
that it is clarified and no longer causes perplexity. In sum, it is not enough to 
deconstruct flawed analogies; we must also replace them with more apt ones. In other 
words, we must "find the path from error to truth" (PO p. 119). And this positive role 
of analogies, this path from error to truth, is "leading back from their metaphysical to 
their everyday use" (PI § 116). In other words, we attempt to find analogies that can 
make sense of seemingly problematic expressions, (for us) confusing practices, and so 
on. Let us examine this more closely with four textual examples. Then, let us abstract 
from these the positive role Wittgenstein assigns to analogies and how this role 
enables us to make sense of how philosophical investigation engenders clarity. 
Example 1: Let us begin with “this.” Assume that we have convinced someone 
that "this" and cannot play the role of a name in a sentence like "this is here." Assume 
further that she is still perplexed in that "this is here" seems to be in order in a way 
that "bu di be" is not. From here, what Wittgenstein instructs us to do is ask "in what 
special circumstances this sentence [‘this is here'] is actually used. There it does make 
sense" (PI § 117). In other words, Wittgenstein instructs us to try to imagine uses for 
"this is here" that are not problematic. For example, one might imagine a person who 
has been hunting for a lost item all day and exclaims, after finding it, "ah! This is 
here!" In turn, and keeping in mind that a projection need not be "correct" or "true," I 
may further stress that this role is similar to expressions like "I found this!" or "I 
remember this now!". So this gives "this is here" a fairly clear role and a reasonably 
clear meaning. The point of this procedure is trying to find a home for expressions, 
rather than merely dismissing them outright as misguided or flawed. Less poetically, 
we attempt to ascertain the role that the expression is (supposed to) play by describing 
a possible use for it in a different language-game with alternative stipulated rules that 
exhibit the description of an ability to use a related expression in a similar area of 
language. 
Example 2: Consider Wittgenstein's reflection on the builder game in PI § 15 
and PI § 42. In PI § 15, Wittgenstein stipulates that Assistant-B is trained or 
conditioned to fetch a specific tool, t, when Builder-A shows B "t." However, in PI § 
42 Wittgenstein asks what happens if A shows "X" to B, even though B has not been 
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trained to link "X" to a specific tool and even though, in point of fact, "X" does not 
link to a tool in the rules given in PI § 15. In turn, one might expect that “X” is, 
almost per definition, nonsense in PI § 15 and § 42 as there are no stipulated rules for 
“X” that determine its correct use. However, Wittgenstein stresses that "even such 
signs [i.e., "X"] could be admitted into the language game, and B might have to 
answer them with a shake of the head. (One can imagine this as a kind of amusement 
for them)" (PI § 42). Notice that finding a home for "X," and the positive role of 
analogy does not depend on the stipulated rules Wittgenstein laid down in PI § 15, as 
the "might" stresses. Rather, it depends on B seeing the connections between "X," the 
situation, A's behavior, and so on. For example, B may be tempted to describe A's use 
of "X" as determined by the same constitutive rules that govern A's use of "t." In turn, 
she may then try to hunt for the missing X-tool. However, imagine she talks herself 
out of this. She then tries to imagine the role that "X" could play. To begin she knows 
that A knows that there is no X to which "X" refers, she knows that A knows she has 
not been trained for this situation, she notes that A has a big smile on his face, she 
knows that both A and herself share enough of a form of life that they both enjoy fun 
and jokes. And she concludes that the role of "X" is that it is a joke. She then replies 
playfully by shaking her head. This does, in fact, give "X" a home in PI § 42. 
However, it does not rest on the stipulated rules for PI § 15. Moreover, B's 
redescription of "X," and PI § 15, is innovative and not readily assimilated into the 
rules for PI § 15. Again, we see that B uses an analogy between the use of "X" in A's 
hands and the use of jokes and playful behavior (e.g., PI § 83), and then redescribes 
"X" as a joke and responds by playing along. 
Example 3: Consider many of the rather strange examples, objections, 
discussions, and so on, which Wittgenstein takes deadly seriously throughout the PI. 
To take a personal favorite, Wittgenstein has a voice note that "'But in a fairy tale a 
pot too can see and hear!' (Certainly; but it can also talk). ‘But a fairy tale only 
invents what is not the case; it does not talk nonsense does it?'- It's not as simple as 
that…. Even a nonsense poem is not nonsense in the same way as the babble of a 
baby" (PI § 282- underlying mine). Notice, one that Wittgenstein does not simply 
dismiss such a seemingly silly objection. Rather, he reminds us that part of why we 
ascribe vision or hearing to rocks or pots in fairy tales is that they talk as well. Two, 
Wittgenstein also stresses that nonsense is not simply an ‘all or nothing' matter. 
Indeed, a nonsense poem is different from babbling. Three, Wittgenstein goes on to 
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try to imagine an occasion wherein ascriptions of sight, vision, pain and so on, make 
sense for inanimate objects. Thus "[w]e do indeed say of an inanimate thing that it is 
in pain: when playing with dolls for example. But this use of the concept of pain is a 
secondary one" (ibid). Though PI § 282 is deeply fascinating for many reasons, I call 
the reader's attention to a simple fact. If only the negative role of analogies featured in 
Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations, then his response to the fairy-tale 
objection is rather difficult to grasp. Indeed, he does not simply note, as we might 
expect him to, that describing the real world in fairy-tale terms is borderline mad. 
Rather, he seeks to both problematize the analogies that lead the objector here (i.e., 
"but it can also talk") as well as finding a home for the objector's worry (i.e., "we do 
indeed…") by redescribing the objection by an analogy with our play with dolls. To 
this example, one can add: painted pots and the question of hidden boiling water (PI § 
279); lions who speak languages and who we yet do not understanding (PI II xi § 
327); perplexed aliens who see people sliding down hills (PI § 139- box (b)); people 
who speak in tongues, without lexical or syntactic standards (PI § 529); the nearly 
endless way(s) to contextualize and redescribe language-games (e.g. Cavell (1996); 
Mulhall (2001), 52-58, and so on); etc. The primary point is that were Wittgenstein's 
sole aim to display and deconstruct flawed analogies that lead us to misdescribe our 
words, these further procedures just make no sense. In each case in the PI, 
Wittgenstein attempts to find homes for our words. 
Example 4: Most powerfully of all, consider Wittgenstein's way of contending 
with Heidegger's (in)famous "the nothing noths." For this sentence, Wittgenstein 
instructs us to ask "[w]hat did the author have in mind with this proposition? And 
where did he get this proposition from?" (VoW p. 69). From there, Wittgenstein 
invents a home for this expression in terms of a poetic story about a vast ocean of 
nothing that is constantly moving (i.e., it is noth-ing) and being as a sort of island 
(ibid 70). This is, from one point of view, absolutely shocking. Wittgenstein does not 
simply dismiss Heidegger's seemingly bizarre claim. Indeed, in spite of the fact that 
this sentence- unlike "this is here!", joking builders, and talking pots in fairy-tales - 
seems to have no home in language, Wittgenstein attempts to give it one. Notice, 
further, that if Wittgenstein's primary concern is displaying flawed analogies, this 
trying to give a home to "the nothing noths," i.e., his poetic story, is hard to account 
for fully. Indeed, if all Wittgenstein aims to do is point out flawed analogies, surely 
Carnap (1959) is a far easier, and more transparent, way to go. Clearly, Heidegger is 
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trying to make a negative existential quantifier do very naughty things by an utterly 
odd analogy. However, even in this extreme case, Wittgenstein is as interested in 
figuring out a home for the expression as discussing where the expression may go 
wrong. Thus, Wittgenstein seems willing not only to draw language-games out of real 
descriptions of the uses of expressions but invent them wholly for the purposes of 
redescribing a problematic expression.  
  Abstracting from these textual examples, we can characterize the role of 
positive analogies in their own light. To begin, it is quite clear that the  positive role 
of analogies in philosophy for Wittgenstein is making sense of problematic 
expressions by trying to redescribe them in a manner that their role is clear, they are 
determined by constitutive rules, etc., and everything runs smoothly. In other words, 
the goal is finding, constructing, inventing, and so on, analogies between a 
problematic region of language, expressions, and so on, and ones where the uses of 
expressions that are relevantly similar are already known to us. This positive role is 
necessary because it is not enough to point out to the fly that it is stuck in a bottle: we 
also need to lead it out (cf. PI § 309). Further, if we find such an analogy, we 
redescribe the problematic expression in terms of the clear one. This clarifies the 
problematic expression by giving it a use in a language-game that we already have the 
ability to understand as a technique. In sum, the positive role of analogies for 
Wittgenstein is utilizing them to bring into view alternative framework for 
description, or pictures, that we already know or have access to (PI § 126), and then 
trying to describe the opaque language game in terms of this old and familiar 
framework. Poetically, he brings words home from their idle holidays into language-
games where they do an honest day's work.  
It is important to notice two further features of the positive function of 
philosophical investigation. First, I stress, and as BT, § 89 p 306 implies, that this 
positive aspect of philosophical investigations takes a great deal of work, innovation, 
and creativity. Indeed, this accounts for the odd use Wittgenstein makes of 
"discovery" (e.g., BT § 89 p. 307; PI § 119; PI § 133). Though we have not made a 
new discovery in the same way we might discover a new compound in chemistry, we 
have made a discovery in that we have invented, found, etc., a new projection that can 
help us redescribe a problematic language-game, expression, etc., in a new way. 
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However, we must also keep in mind that such a ‘bloody hard'119 procedure only 
begins when an expression is problematic. For expressions that are unproblematic, for 
language-games, we already understand as a technique, and so on, such a procedure is 
unnecessary. Indeed, "description gets its light- that is to say, its purpose, from the 
philosophical problems" (PI § 109). Further, "[w]hen we do philosophy, we are like 
savages… who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation 
on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this" (PI § 194). Thus, we only 
should utilize this procedure when we find an expression confusing or problematic. 
Second, we may fail to redescribe the expression in such a way that we can 
understand it. For example, in PI § 42, if A holds up "X" in complete earnestness and 
becomes enraged when B fails to fetch the non-existent tool X, B may very well be 
dumbstruck. In this case, B is unable to understand what "X" means exactly because 
she cannot find an analogy to help her understand a use of "X." In turn, B can rightly 
condemn A's use of "X" as senseless because there is no description she can think of 
that would allow her to ascribe to "X" a role. Thus, we may discover that some 
expression is senseless. However, notice how difficult this discovery of nonsense is. 
Indeed, the "results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense 
and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of 
language" (PI § 119). Under this reading, "running up against the limits of language" 
simply means trying, and ultimately failing (thus "results"), to find the home for a 
problematic expression, which is to say, to make coherent sense of the tokens, 
seeming practices, and so on. Further, pursuant to this, such a realization should lead 
us to "exclude it [e.g., "X"] from the sphere of language, and thereby bounds the 
domain of language… [However, third] when one draws a boundary, it may be for 
various kinds of reasons… So if I draw a boundary-line, that is not yet to say what I 
am drawing it for" (PI § 499). Thus, when we find we cannot see an analogy between 
the role some problematic (pseudo-)expression, faux-game, and so on, and an 
expression, game, and so on, whose role we already know, we should indeed rule it 
out of bounds. However, even this ruling is provisional.  
In sum, for Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation and understanding as 
seeing connections are deeply interconnected. Specifically, Wittgenstein's 
                                                 
119 The phrase is taken from Conant (2002). It links up to Wittgenstein's fear of being unjust or 
overhasty (e.g., PI 131; Kuusela (2008),275-86, elaborates). I cannot discuss it further here. 
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philosophical investigations utilize analogies- in both a negative and a positive role. 
The negative role of analogies, for Wittgenstein, is that he discerns foregrounds and 
deconstructs bad analogies that lead us to describe language-games, expressions, and 
so on, in an inapt framework. This, however, is not enough. As it were, the words are 
still on holiday, the flies are still in their bottles, and the child is upset because her 
pretty-picture has to mean something. In turn, the positive role for analogies is that 
Wittgenstein seeks to construct, discover, invent, etc., analogies between a 
problematic expression, region of language, etc., whose use is unclear and a region of 
language, expression, and so on, and one we already know. If we can discover such an 
analogy, we can then construct a language-game as an object of comparison and 
redescribe the problematic language game in its terms. Ideally, this clarifies the 
problematic expression by describing its use in terms of constitutive rules that we 
understand as a technique. If we cannot discover such an analogy, we may rule out the 
expression out as senseless. However, this boundary line is provisional. In any case, 
such a procedure shows that philosophical investigations (when they succeeds) 
engender perspicuity as we can understand the expression clearly now. As it were, the 
problematic expression on holiday is given a job and has an honest use we can 
understand as a technique, the fly is freed, not by smashing the bottle, but by tracing 
out escape paths, and the child is made happy as she is told that her picture is 
something called “abstract expressionism.” We lead words back (PI § 116). 
   
8.4 Philosophy, Clarity, and Peace- a Close Reading of PI § 133: 
 
  In the last sections, we discussed how philosophical investigations, 
understanding as seeing connections, projection and analogies, and coming to terms 
with the meaning of philosophically problematic expressions related. However, we 
left open both the nature of the "clarity" this process engenders as well as the sort of 
"peace" it gives us. In other words, we left the end game of the projective procedure. 
It is to this we turn.  
To bring this into view, I focus on PI § 133. This is for two reasons. One, it is 
one of only two explicit mentions of "clarity" in the PI. Two, it is the point in the 
investigations where Wittgenstein most explicitly discusses the ends he ascribes to 
philosophy. First, I examine an exegetical problem that some otherwise antithetical 
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interpreters have noted. To wit, "clarity" as Wittgenstein deploys it in PI § 133 and, 
indeed, through most of his career, is strikingly odd if read as some sort of external 
aim of philosophy, rather than an internal result. Second, I examine PI § 133 at some 
length to dissolve this conundrum. Specifically, I argue that "clarity" is not an 
external goal of philosophy, but the inherent end result of the activity of philosophy 
(when it succeeds). I also argue that the activity of philosophy begins whenever there 
is a breakdown in understanding. I also point out that such breakdowns of 
understanding are not always a consequence of robust philosophy. Instead, they arise 
as a consequence of us being finite rational intellects. Thus, much as I argued in 
chapter 5.3 that the TLP does not view philosophy as a sort of ‘fall from grace,’ but 
an important procedure to rectify certain inherent tendencies, given the sorts of beings 
we are, so I argue for the PI.  
To begin, Wittgenstein's conception of clarity is strikingly odd, especially if 
read as am external goal towards with philosophical inquiry should strive. This is 
because, if clarity is a goal, it is left critically underdetermined. To see this, consider 
that "Carnap pursued clarity for the sake of scientific theory building… By contrast, 
Wittgenstein regarded conceptual clarity as an end in itself" (Glock (2001 a), 213). 
Notice, first, that the contrast between Wittgenstein and Carnap is very apt and telling 
here. Whereas Carnap has a very clear idea of the sort of clarity he is after- e.g., 
explicating "temperature" so that it can be properly used in science (e.g., Carnap 
(1950), 8-15)- it is rather unclear what "clarity" is supposed to be for Wittgenstein. 
Second, pursuant to this, Glock's essay implicitly links this clarity to Wittgenstein's 
alleged irrationalism and mysticism. Indeed, it seems that the "clarity" Glock imputes 
to Wittgenstein seems akin to mystical clarity. Specifically, in both cases, the clarity 
is so clear that we simply ‘see though’ the problems of philosophy. Tellingly, Read 
(1995), 365, takes up exactly this thread and notes that, if this is so, "should we not 
be… willing to entertain the thought that the conceptions of ‘complete clarity,' of the 
complete disappearance of philosophical problems, even of ‘[giving] philosophy 
peace,' may themselves be… thoroughly- problematic?" However, Read admits also 
admits that, under this interpretation, it then becomes rather unclear how we should 
read the PI or why Wittgenstein wrote it. In either case, "clarity" is a somewhat 
unclear concept in later Wittgenstein. 
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To rectify this, and by doing so bring into view later Wittgenstein's most 
stunning metaphilosophical innovations, let us examine PI  § 133. Note that I divide it 
into five parts to enable clear exegesis: 
 
"[1]  We don't want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of 
our words in unheard-of ways. 
[2]  For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. 
[3]  The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off 
philosophizing when I want to.- The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it 
is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.- [4] 
Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of 
examples can be broken off.—[5] Problems are solved (difficulties 
eliminated), not a single problem." (underlying mine) 
 
To begin, it is clear that [1] brings into play three interdependent features. 
First, as Baker & Hacker (2014), 41-67, and Glock (2015) emphasize, Wittgenstein is 
reminding the reader of his attack on the idea of rules as often-deployed in linguistics 
or certain parts of philosophy of language. In particular, Wittgenstein can be read as 
arguing against three such accounts. One, Wittgenstein clearly has in mind ideal 
language philosophy and the thought that we can replace natural language with some 
regimented formal calculi. He shares this target with earlier Wittgenstein and I refer 
the reader to chapter 5.0 and 5.1. Two, he is also targeting the TLP’s preconception 
that a determinate logical structure is ‘buried’ in the depth grammar and that we 
simply need to sublimate it out. We discussed this in chapter 6.1 and so I refer the 
reader there. Three, Wittgenstein can fruitfully be read as objecting to certain 
contemporary approaches that try to cash out “rules” as, e.g., pre-doxastic 
computational processes that a speaker tacitly carries out when she grasps the 
semantic content of an expression (hereby "tacit rules"). If Wittgenstein is read in this 
light, it is imperative to realize that Wittgenstein does not need to claim that such tacit 
rules do not exist. Perhaps they do, and perhaps such rules are helpful for certain 
purposes. However, Wittgenstein would surely insist that such rules couldn’t play a 
role in philosophy. There are many reasons for this. Chief among them is that, per 
definition, such rules cannot allow for the perspicuity that Wittgenstein insists is 
inherent result of philosophy. Indeed, if a philosophical "problem has the form: ‘I 
don't know my way about.'" (PI § 123), being told that there are tacit rules cannot 
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help- any more than telling someone lost in a city that there is a complicated, and 
secret, mathematical formula that determines the locations of various streets. 
Second, Wittgenstein's claim that he does not want to "complete" the system 
of rules links to Wittgenstein's claim that: 
  
"[i]f you want to say that they [i.e., language-games (2) and (8)] are 
incomplete, ask yourself whether our own language is complete- whether it 
was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notations of infinitesimal 
calculus were incorporated in to it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs (And 
how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) 
Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various 
periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight 
and regular streets and uniform houses" (PI § 18).  
 
Notice that this quote emphasizes that the very idea of a complete language is prima 
facie problematic. Indeed, as PI § 23 says explicitly, language is a constantly 
changing and a diachronic phenomenon that alters as human practices, scientific 
discoveries, technological innovations, etc., occur. Further, pursuant to this, the idea 
of "refine" is rather hard to make sense of- a point Horwich (2015) argues forcefully. 
This is because refinement requires that one has a set goal and, given this goal, can 
modify or improve the means to realize it. In contrast, the maze of the ‘old city' of 
language, the interconnections and complexities it displays, are non-rational in the 
sense that our linguistic-conceptual practices did not evolve for a singular goal, but a 
myriad of functions- ordering, praying, telling stories and jokes, etc. Granting this, it 
is unclear what sort of refinement we can impose on all aspects of our messy and a-
rational linguistic-conceptual practices. Yelling "damn it!" after burning oneself is 
undoubtedly using language, but I am hard pressed to know how to refine this. 
Third, Wittgenstein's note about "the system of rules" clearly stresses that 
rules are of critical importance. As stressed in both chapter 7.1 and chapter 8.2, 
understanding as a technique rests on constitutive rules, their conceptual 
interdependencies, and the normative practices that underwrite them, to function. 
Indeed, Wittgenstein is stressing, again, that such constitutive rules do, pace Kuusela 
(2008), 132-140, and with Baker & Hacker, Hacker, and Glock, play a critical role in 
philosophy.  
[2] claims that "[f]or the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete 
clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely 
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disappear." This sentence is critical for several reasons. Chief among them is the 
relationship it proffers between philosophical problems and clarity. To bring this into 
view, recall that for Wittgenstein, a "philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don't 
know my way about'" (PI § 123). However, as it stands, PI § 123 cannot serve as the 
sole criterion determining if a problem is philosophical. Indeed, there are many ways 
of failing to know our way about that, prima facie, are not philosophical. Intuitively, 
not knowing one's way about in a foreign city is not a philosophical problem and 
rectifying this is not best addressed by philosophical investigation. To supplement 
this, two additional criteria should be added that determine what counts as a 
philosophy problem. One, the sense of not knowing our way about that interests 
Wittgenstein betokens a breakdown in understanding (Shear (2013) notes this a well). 
In other words, I do not know my way about when I fail to understand a 
philosophically problematic expression, an unclear region of language, and so on. 
Indeed, chapter 8.2 and 8.3 relied on this criterion implicitly when discussing where 
and how philosophical investigations begin. Two, this breakdown makes us "uneasy 
owing to its [i.e., a different cultural practice's] peculiar meaninglessness, irrespective 
of any interpretation (Which shows the kind of basis such uneasiness can have)" (PO 
p. 151). In other words, a philosophical problem is not knowing our way about due to 
a breakdown of understanding wherein we cannot ascribe a meaning to some practice, 
expression, etc. and we feel uneasy because of this inability. 
Second, pursuant to this, this conception of a philosophical problem 
reimagines the scope of philosophical investigations. To begin, Himly is right to note 
that "Wittgenstein's… ‘tormenting questions'… do not at all seem to be exclusively 
comprised of what might be called traditional, grand, metaphysical questions" (Hilmy 
(1991), 99). In other words, Wittgenstein's conception of a philosophical problem as a 
particular breakdown of understanding, and a list of canonical philosophical questions 
are rather distinct from one another. Indeed, part of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
genius is noticing philosophical problems that do not, at first glance, relate to 
"orthodox" questions. However, further, it is also important to note that breakdowns 
of understanding may not be a consequence of philosophy done badly or philosophers' 
metaphysical-izing. For example: 
 
"One human being can be a complete enigma to another. One learns this when 
one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is 
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more, even though one has mastered a country's language. One does not 
understand the people (and not because of not knowing what they are saying 
to themselves.) We can't find our feet with them" (PI II xi § 326). 
 
In this case, being lost has to do with a breakdown of understanding where we just 
cannot find the meaning of another culture and its ways of doing things. Such a 
breakdown does not rest on any flawed attempt at philosophical theory construction, 
metaphysical distortions of language, etc. Indeed, such breakdowns may not even 
count as “philosophical” if viewed through the lens of canonical questions and set 
schools that make up departments of philosophy. However, clearly, such breakdowns 
meet the criteria listed above for a philosophical problem and so, for Wittgenstein, 
should count as such. To buttress this further, as Sandis (2015), notes, these sorts of 
‘life’ breakdowns, were, for Wittgenstein, relatively commonplace and of grave 
concern to him.120 Alternatively, one can support this novel conception of 
philosophical problems by noticing that later Wittgenstein’s “fundamental concept” of 
perspicuous representation emerged not from his musings on the misuses of 
metaphysics, but his engagement with Frazer’s struggles to make sense of other 
people’s words and deeds (e.g. PI § 122; Hacker (200), 75, traces the origin of the 
concept back to Wittgenstein’s engagement with Frazer). Thus, a philosophical 
problem, i.e., not knowing one's way about because we fail to understand some 
expression, practice, etc., is not always or necessarily a consequence of an attempt to 
put forward a (flawed) metaphysical theory. 
Third, counting such ‘life' breakdowns of understanding as philosophical 
problems is, far from being an idiosyncratic or problematic move, deeply insightful 
on Wittgenstein's part. There are several reasons for this. Chief among them is that 
such breakdowns are strangely independent of empirical investigation and facts. 
Perhaps this is most clearly seen in Wittgenstein somewhat inchoate attack on many 
of the supposed explanations in the social sciences of his day (e.g. PO, e.g., p. 127; 
L&C e.g., p. 42-43; CV e.g., p. 54). At base, what seems to bother Wittgenstein most 
about these explanations is that they easily foster a form of dogmatism and injustice 
(cf. PI § 131) as well as engendering more heat then light. For example, Frazer simply 
assumes that he, and British society, stand at the absolute apex of cultural ‘evolution’ 
                                                 
120 Sandis attempts to make a distinction between the "official" version of understanding in the PI and 
the "unofficial" version in the PI II and OC. I find this distinction profoundly unhelpful and, instead, 
follow Mulhall (2001), in seeing these as interdependent aspects.  
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and so dismisses, or, worse, casts in the worst possible ‘British’ light, practices he 
finds problematic, expressions he finds silly, and so on. Indeed, his descriptions make 
his subjects look like madmen or day-dreaming children. Further, such ‘explanations’ 
led Frazer to posit a shallow synchronicity between Greek myths and African 
practices that, for Wittgenstein and modern anthropology (e.g. Leach (1958)) muddy 
the waters rather than helping foster any deep grasp of what is afoot. In all cases, the 
critical point that Wittgenstein seems to have realized is that providing Frazer more 
‘facts,’ amassing more ‘evidence,’ and so on, will not help. Frazer’s problem is not 
the ‘facts’ but the framework by which he describes them. As it were, Frazer has 
selected the wrong parameters and breaking this spell cannot be a matter of simply 
giving him more things to mis-measure. In other words, when a breakdown in 
understanding occurs, how we take or interpret the facts, what sort of evidence counts 
as support for a conclusion, and so on, are exactly what is at issue. And dissolving this 
breakdown is different than replacing ignorance with knowledge (cf. TLP 6.4321; 
WiC p. 450, BT § 89 p. 309). Indeed, what is needed here is a philosophical 
investigation that can help us reimagine the role of the practice, the problematic 
expression, and so on, in such a way that, rather than madmen or fools, we have 
people we can understand. From there, if one wishes, one can begin a debate.  
Fourth, pursuant to the second and third points, Wittgenstein's extreme 
pluralism furthers this novel conception of philosophical problems. To begin, Hilmy 
(1991) points out that the plural, "philosophical problems," is best read as indicating 
that there are different sorts of philosophical problems. Intuitively, this is because 
there are different ways that we can fail to know our way about and different ways to 
rectify it. Indeed, this is simply a consequence of our discussion in section 8.3 
concerning the positive role of analogies. Thus, Wittgenstein contends that "[t]here is 
not a single philosophical method, thought there are indeed methods, different 
therapies, as it were" (PI § 133- box). Furthermore, this helps explains how 
Wittgenstein's seeming idiosyncratic style and philosophical method relate. Trying to 
understand a problematic utterance, an opaque person, and so on, is far more akin to a 
shambolic and desultory conversation than it is to proofs and refutations. Indeed, the 
medley of voices in the PI and the polyphonic structure of the text are best read as 
reminding us that how we come to understand each other, how we come to see the 
connections, is often an inherently responsive form of engagement (cf. Cavell (1979), 
passim). Though there are sustained methods- e.g., listening carefully, trying to find 
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language-games that redescribe odd utterances, trying to follow someone's seeming 
nonsense as far as one possibly can, and so on- these do not readily reduce to a series 
of clear steps and algorithmic procedures.  
Fifth, following from this, the disappearance of a philosophical problem and 
the link to complete clarity is what occurs when we rectify the breakdown. Indeed, a 
philosophical problem is solvable “without reminder, in contrast to all others” (BT § 
89 p. 310) exactly because when we restore understanding, we know our way about 
again and there is no problem anymore. In other words, “what calms us is that we see 
a system that (systematically) excludes those structures that have always made us 
uneasy, those we were unable to do anything with” (BT § 89 p. 307). Thus, when 
understanding is restored and we can see how a problematic expression, an opaque 
practice, and so on, is systematically connected with what’s afoot, we understand it, 
and then we can go on. Critically, to reiterate, this sort of clarification is connected 
with understanding as seeing connections. For example, Wittgenstein notes that 
"[o]nce such a phenomenon [i.e., a radically different cultural practice] is brought into 
connection with an instinct which I myself possess, this is precisely the explanation 
wished for; that is, the explanation which resolves the difficulty" (PO p. 139).Thus, it 
is critical to realize that "clarity" is not an external goal of philosophical 
investigations but an inherent result of it. Again, philosophical investigation (when it 
succeeds) engenders clarity as I now have redescribed the practice, utterance, etc., so 
that it is no longer opaque.  
Sixth the idea that clarity is a result of philosophical investigations naturally 
links up with "[t]he results of philosophy is the discovery of some piece of plain 
nonsense" (PI § 119). Part of what philosophical investigations achieves, and part of 
how it rectifies breakdowns in understanding, is by discovering pieces of nonsense 
that prevent us from coming to understand the role of an expression, practice, etc. 
Notice, further, such discoveries are a two ways street. Sometimes we discover that 
our conversation partner's expressions or behaviors simply do not make sense. 
However, sometimes we discover that our descriptions of the role of these behaviors 
or expressions do not make sense. The problem with the private linguist is that she 
and we, at the end of the day, cannot make sense of what she means (PI § 258- § 272). 
We cannot find a role for her "S," and so we bar it. However, the problem with Frazer 
is that he is so convinced of the rectitude, superiority, and ‘enlightened status' of "a 
present day English parson with the same stupidity and dullness" (PO p. 125) that he 
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systematically misdescribes the behavior of others and their words and then is 
shocked that they do not make sense- i.e., that they are not the same as English 
parsons. It is exactly Frazer, not his groups, who is the source of confusion and 
nonsense (e.g., PO p. 131). Further, in both cases, this hunting for nonsense- be it odd 
behaviors, problematic utterances, and so on, of a conversation partner or be it due to 
preconceptions, biases, and other priors on our part- is the soberest way to understand 
Wittgenstein's strange notes on "resistance" (e.g., CV p. 33) "working on oneself" 
(e.g., BT § 87), etc.121 A breakdown in understanding is a two-way street, and part of 
the point of a philosophical investigation is undermining our prejudiced descriptions 
as much as the other person's (seeming) nonsense.  
In sum, to reiterate, it is critical to keep in mind that philosophical problems 
are not necessarily a consequence of a bad philosophical theory, a metaphysician 
misusing her words, etc. Instead, a philosophical problem emerges whenever there is 
a breakdown in understanding and these can arise for a myriad of circumstances. 
Notice three further things. One, this alters the mandate of philosophical investigation 
in a strikingly Socratic way. In effect, the goal of philosophy is helping people come 
to terms with the things they say and do. Once this is done, once the problematic 
expression is understood, the opacity vanishes and we restore understanding. Two, as 
Hacker (2009 a) and Glock (2017) rightly note, this conception of philosophy does 
not produce cognitive results in a manner akin to science. Understanding a poem, 
ascribing meaning to a practice, seeing someone's humanity, etc., are indeed laudable 
and very important goals. However, they do not have much, if anything, to do with a 
sort of systematic theory construction and a hunt for objective knowledge. Indeed, if 
the role of philosophy is just clarification, then it is barren in precisely Socrates's 
sense. Three, this sort of clarification is the unique task of philosophy. For example, 
consider some leitmotifs from the PI: seeing that someone in pain (e.g., PI § 281); 
realizing that another's face is human (e.g., PI § 583). Helping someone clarify things 
and guiding her to hear the pain in another's sounds or the humanity in another's face, 
cannot be brought about by more facts. Indeed, “’I believe that he is suffering.’- Do I 
also believe that he isn’t an automaton?” (PI II iv § 19). It is not my belief, or the 
facts, or whatever, that matters here but my “attitude towards him is an attitude 
towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul” (PI II iv § 22).  If one does 
                                                 
121 Baker (2006), 205-222, offers a compendium of such remarks 
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not hear the screams of a child as a sign of pain and an instance on shared 
humanity122, if one does not realize a face is human and betokens a soul123, then facts 
will not do the job. Only philosophical investigation can help clarify things.  
[3] notes that "[t]he real discovery is the one that enables me to break off 
philosophizing when I want to.- The one that gives philosophy peace so that it is no 
longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question." To begin, it is critical to 
notice a shift from the plural, "philosophical problems," to the singular, "the real 
discovery." In other words, Wittgenstein's concern here, and the peace he seeks for 
philosophy is distinct from the sort of clarity that inherently results from 
philosophical investigations (when they succeed). Indeed, whereas the complete 
clarity that emerges from overcoming breakdowns in understanding and is internal to 
the philosophizing, Wittgenstein here insists that an element of choice is involved 
concerning if and when one should being and end philosophizing. However, this 
distinction cannot be a difference in kind between "first-order philosophical 
investigations" and "metaphilosophy" (e.g., PI § 121). To make sense of this, it is 
necessary to proffer an account of "the real discovery" which is district from 
clarification and which "gives philosophy peace." 
To bring this into view, it is necessary to reflect on Wittgenstein's anti-
scientistic stance (perhaps most evident in PR preface). However, "scientism" is a 
rather unclear term and a definition like "the worship of science" does little to help. 
For Wittgenstein, it seems like a key problem with "scientism" is that it insists that all 
authentic problems be amenable to scientific investigation (e.g., TLP 6.4321). Indeed, 
if one follows, e.g., Kuhn (2012), 36-42, we can say that scientism is the assumption 
that all problems are puzzles that can be solved by skilled technocratic experts in a 
particular subject.124 Notice that Wittgenstein's conception of a philosophical problem 
is anathema to this conception. Coming to understand someone is not akin to solving 
a puzzle if, for no other reason, the latter has a set solution and the former does not. 
In turn, Wittgenstein's claim that what the real discovery is, is "[t]he one that 
gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring 
                                                 
122 See Dass (1996)'s elaboration of Wittgenstein and this theme in her anthropological description of 
the violent separation of India and Pakistan to see how diaphanous, thin, and tragically difficult hearing 
sounds as cries can be.  
123 "Simply put, we see them [other human beings], not as physical systems, but as human beings" 
(Krikpe (1982), 123)- a very neglected passage.  
124 It is interesting to note that this conception of problems-as-puzzle may not be viable even within 
science, a point that Popper (1970), 51-58, makes forcefully. 
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itself in question" makes perfect sense. What torments philosophy is not philosophy 
(pace, e.g., Cavell (2005), 192-212). Instead, what torments philosophy is our own, 
admittedly contingent and admittedly cultural, insistence that there are only puzzles 
and technical solutions to them. In turn, this means that the sorts of breakdowns of 
understanding that are the hallmark of philosophical problems, and the philosophical 
investigations that aim to dissolve them, just cannot occur. And, since philosophy’s 
problems are no longer taken as licit, serious, important, and so on, philosophy begins 
a desperate and herculean task of trying to prove its work and ground itself (Baker & 
Hacker (2009), 281-84, make a similar point). And Wittgenstein’s goal, what he seeks 
to give us control of, what he wants to be able to stop, is exactly “the turbulent 
conjectures and explanations" (BT § 92 p. 316) that this quixotic quest engenders. 
Given the above, it is more fruitful to see this quest for grounds as an external 
imposition forced onto philosophy by a culture obsessed by scientism and unwilling 
to accept that not all problems are puzzles. Indeed, if philosophy is internally 
connected with wonder- be it manifested in a breakdown of understanding or 
amazement at the world (e.g., Plato Theaetetus 155c-d; Aristotle Metaphysics 182b125; 
CV p. 5e; PO p. 41), then the demand for a self-grounding sort of philosophy is rather 
misplaced (TLP 6.522). What disrupts philosophical investigations, and the 
understanding and clarity it engenders, is the demand that it accounts for itself in 
scientistic terms. Far from seeking to end philosophy, Wittgenstein seeks to give it 
peace by rejecting this cultural ideal.  
  [4] notes that "[i]nstead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the 
series of examples can be broken off." Notice that this harmonizes very well with the 
BT point mentioned above. Rather than assuming that breakdowns in understanding 
and philosophical problems are puzzles, and rather than beginning the game of wild 
and endless just-so speculation about how to solve them, a method is demonstrated. 
This method is using philosophical investigations, specifically projections and seeing 
connections, to dissolve confusion by exposing nonsensical aspects of the interaction- 
be these preconceptions, utterances, etc. as well as helping redescribe the problematic 
expression in a way that it is clear. The series of examples can be broken off simply 
because philosophy is not an attempt to construct a "theory of understanding." 
                                                 
125 This understanding of Plato and Aristotle’s conception of “wonder” and the fact that it is a laudable 
state that cannot reduce to speculation is admittedly deeply influenced by Heidegger (1962) and 
admittedly very contentious.  
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Instead, it is an attempt to work through various moments where a breakdown in 
understanding occurs and how it can be rectified. In this key, philosophy is much 
more practical than theoretical, again in line with a mad brick-layer who took to 
haranguing Athenian gentlemen some 2,300 years or so ago. 
Finally, [5], "[p]roblems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single 
problem" further emphasizes this fact. There is no one type-problem "breakdown in 
understanding" and no set way to address it. Instead, Wittgenstein insists that we 
work in a piecemeal fashion to resolve various breakdowns of understanding when 
they occur. Thus, just as one can fail to know one's way about for a myriad of reasons, 
and just as one can solve this with a medley of methods, so too in philosophy.  
In sum, for Wittgenstein, philosophical investigation is merely a set of 
systematic methods that engender an understanding of opaque persons, problematic 
expressions, and so on, in such a way that the inherent result is clarity- i.e., we know 
what she means, is doing, and so on. Further, pursuant to this, philosophical 
investigation emerges when there is a breakdown in understanding; philosophical 
investigations ends when it has laid, open to view, the various nonsenses that caused 
it and found homes for the problems, which is to say rendered them rationally 
coherent. It is not cognitive in that the understanding as seeing connections does not 
result in knowledge, but restores understanding by (re)describing the role of a 
problematic expression so that it becomes clear. Thus, in sum, “[w]hen I say: Here we 
are at the limits of language, that always sounds as if resignation were necessary at 
this point, whereas on the contrary, complete satisfaction comes about since no 
question remains” (BT § 89 p. 310). This is so because clarity and restoring 
understanding are internally related. 
 
8.5 Summary: 
 
Thus, I have argued that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the PI 
maintains, with the TLP, that philosophy is an activity or process. I have further 
argued that, as it were, the verb “to philosophize” is an accomplishment verb whose 
inherent end result is perspicuity of understanding- i.e., seeing the connections. Thus, 
in both cases, what is critical is that philosophy is not something external to thought 
or understanding, but an activity that aims to help us learn to do both better.  
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  To summarize, we began by discussing the TLP and its conception of 
semantic content as pictures and a pneumatic conception of thinking. From there, we 
examined later Wittgenstein's assault on this conception and his attempt to realign 
meaning with understanding. Next, we argued that "understanding" is inherently 
polysemic and examined three senses. Specifically, we focused on understanding as 
seeing connections and the projections that engendered it. Next, we examined these 
projections in terms of a positive and a negative role for analogies and how this is 
what “philosophical investigation” amounts to for later Wittgenstein. Finally, we 
closed by discussing the sort of peace Wittgenstein seeks and how this aligns with 
clarity and philosophical investigations.  
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9 Conclusion: The Ends of Philosophy and To “Begin” Again 
(and Again): 
 
This dissertation has argued that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is unique, 
innovative, and compelling. Specifically, I have argued that, for Wittgenstein, 
philosophy is best construed as an activity or a process. Pursuant to this, I have also 
argued that this process is a sort of accomplishment one wherein the inherent end 
result, when the process succeeds, is clarity. To make this case, I broke the 
dissertation into two parts. In Part I, I considered four popular characterizations of 
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as having external metaphilosophical aims at set 
methods to achieve them. I argued that each is unworkable. In turn, this should make 
us skeptical of reading Wittgenstein's comments on philosophy in terms of set goals 
and fixed methods. In Part II I examined both the TLP and the PI. I argued that, for 
both, a critical and consistent insight of Wittgenstein's is that the philosophical 
activity or philosophical investigations are a conceptual correlates of clear thinking or 
perspicuous understanding. In other words, I put forward a reading wherein the 
philosophical activity engenders clarity as an internal result.  
In turn, this finally allows us to make sense of Wittgenstein's strangest 
remarks that we mentioned in the introduction as well (chapter 0.0). To wit, 
Wittgenstein claimed that "I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to 
philosophy when I said: really one should write philosophy only as one writes a 
poem" (CV p. 28). From the process perspective, this claim makes good sense. 
Specifically, and granting that Wittgenstein assumes that poetry, like philosophy, 
emerges when language, thought, and so forth, do, learning to do philosophy is akin 
to learning to write poetry. In both cases, they do not so much have external end goals 
but inherent results when the process succeeds. Moreover, in both cases, they seem to 
merely be part of the things we do with our words and our lives. Further, ideally, both 
remind us of things. Poetry reminds us of how tragic, and beautiful, life can be. 
Philosophy reminds us of how difficult, and essential, clear thinking or perspicuous 
understanding, can be. Finally, in both cases, asking what justifies them, why they 
exist, and so on, simply misunderstands what they are and our relationship with them. 
As long as people are struck by beauty, there will be poetry. And as long as 
understanding falters, either due to amazement at the insane thing called the world 
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and our life in it or due to the fact that people say and do bizarre things, there will be 
philosophy.  
  However, three outstanding and interrelated questions should be addressed. If 
Wittgenstein is correct and philosophy is a process, then what implications does this 
have? Specifically, what implications does a process view of philosophy have for 
Wittgenstein scholarship? What implications does such a view have for philosophy 
more generally? And what implications does it have for the broader intellectual 
world? Let us take each in turn. 
  For Wittgenstein scholarship, one may object that I have ended the game. In 
effect, if Wittgenstein's sole aim is teaching us how to think clearly or understand 
perspicuously, and once we learn this lesson we can kick him away, what good is 
studying Wittgenstein? This, it seems to me, profoundly underestimates both the 
difficulty of teaching and the travails of learning. For the difficulty of teaching, 
Wittgenstein, much like Socrates and Kierkegaard, realized that training someone in 
the art of thought or understanding is sui generis. Learning to think critically is a 
different sort of thing than being trained in our times tables or being taught to do 
physics. As Wittgenstein himself notes, "[c]an one learn this knowledge?... Can 
someone else be another man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives 
the right tip—This is what ‘learning' and ‘teaching' are like here" (PI II xi § 355). And 
understanding many of Wittgenstein's tips are, from my perspective, still very much 
open and critical questions for adequately learning how to conduct philosophical 
investigations or learning to think clearly. Thus, consider a random assortment of 
examples: what is secondary meaning and how does it relate to aspects and 
understanding? What is the proper role and function of nonsense? What is the x that is 
not an interpretation and that underwrites our rule-following practice? These are 
neither trivial questions for Wittgenstein scholarship nor can they remain unanswered 
if we hope to learn the activity or investigations Wittgenstein seeks to teach properly.  
For learning, it seems that Wittgenstein, with Kierkegaard and Socrates, would 
find nothing more gratifying than us, eventually, throwing him away and thinking 
clearly or understanding perspicuously on our own. Indeed, for all three, the best 
result of a study of them is that one goes out and thinks more carefully. One considers 
if prosecuting one's father is a pious act (e.g., Plato Euthyphro 2a-4b); one dwells on 
the question of if technological progress and the mastery of nature necessarily implies 
moral progress and a more human (not humane) life (e.g., Kierkegaard (2009), 301-
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326); one reflects on how much of our ways with language are building cities of 
words that may idle in the sky. Indeed, it seems that such a desire that a learner ends 
her tutelage and begins again- is critical to becoming human. 
For philosophy generally, one may object that I am, in fact, proposing that we 
shut philosophy departments down. Indeed, what possible roles can philosophy as a 
discipline play? Further, how can we justify it to the taxpayers? Let us take each in 
turn. The role that philosophy as an academic discipline should play does change 
when one adopts a process view of philosophy. Specifically, what philosophy, as a 
discipline, should do is invent new tools, methods, and so on, which can further help 
us learn to think clearly or to understand better. Indeed, at the most basic level, 
learning what follows from what, learning what evidence supports what, and so on, 
are laudable and critical features of learning to think clearly and understand. 
Furthermore, to the real credit of analytic philosophy, it has insisted on maintaining a 
point that many have abandoned or elided. To wit, it is merely part of the logical idea 
of assertions that the asserter can be wrong, regardless of how it makes her feel. This 
seemingly trivial note is critical to accurately understanding how to respect others, 
acknowledge them, come to understand them, and so on. Indeed, we treat dogs and 
children differently than adults precisely because we assume the former cannot be 
held responsible for their words or deeds. Abandoning such a minimum standard for 
responsibility, far from lionizing "otherness," infantilizes the individuals and groups 
one claims to respect. Again, being taught how to take responsibility for one's claims, 
and how to hold other's accountable for their claims, is a critical part of clear thinking 
and understanding and something that the discipline of philosophy inculcates very 
well. Thus, the discipline of philosophy should, and does, build tools that assist us in 
understanding and thinking clearly as well as teaching us how to converse reasonably-
i.e., how to take responsibility for our assertions and hold others responsible for 
theirs, and so on.  
However, there are parts of philosophy that, on a process view, are best 
abandoned. As mentioned in chapter 3.3b, one would have to be a form of 
metaphysics whose explicit aim is theory construction akin to science. Another would 
have to be a particularly reprehensible way of misreading certain interesting ‘French’ 
thinkers and using them defend a banal version of ‘anything goes!’ relativism. A third 
is perhaps more difficult spell out. Philosophy would need to modify its self-image. It 
is not, and cannot be, a super-science that cuts to the core the world. However, it 
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seems to be that process philosophy, and the clarity it promises us, are noble ends in 
themselves.  
For the later, justifying our existence to taxpayers, matters are quite 
straightforward. What philosophy seeks to teach and learn is how to understand and 
think. Given that so much of our world is utterly opaque, that so many cultural clashes 
do not just go away when we scream "tolerance!" that so many questions currently 
forced on us by the social moment we are in do not easily reduce to policy puzzles, 
etc., justifying philosophy is a rather easy prospect. You want to understand why 
people violently reject their host societies, turn on them, and seek to kill innocent 
people? You want to understand why large parts of the western world feel so 
disenfranchised and alienated that they would just as soon burn it all to the ground as 
anything else? You want to think through what ramifications the fact that we are 
biological creatures that evolved has for human rights? You want to know what 
justifies a claim, by what criteria news is not fake, why we value truth, how we know 
that a statistics is a reliable way to assess some features of the world, what it means to 
say that “facts prove that…,” how we know what our words mean, why they mean 
that, in virtue of what they do so? And yes, even wanting to know why some claims 
are necessary- e.g., why we are so struck by Orwell's invective against totalitarianism 
by pointing out that "2+2=4" is not negotiable or subject to Big Brother’s demands; 
Why we are so moved by Dostoyevsky's protest that “2+2=4” is a way of denying 
human freedom and agency?126 Then fund philosophy! 
The cultural ramifications of the process view of philosophy have already 
been hinted at above. If learning to think clearly and finding a better way to 
understand people, expressions, and so on, are necessary correlates of being political 
animals, speaking, and so on, then learning philosophy is inherently important. The 
world is a very confusing place and we often make matters worse by confusing 
ourselves. Learning a set of methods that can engender clarity and teach one to be 
critical is certainly culturally important. Indeed, if the mad bricklayer’s program was 
so helpful for even a homogeneous culture, it is critical for us.  
 
                                                 
126 There is an entire book to be written on the use of mathematical necessity in political-cum-literary 
discourse.  
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